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Policy makers generall% see community- he, ilth k('Blil) &ý . mcam, of 
improving ac,: c,,, t() expensive medicad care, particul-fly imong zhe ptýt i. and pre-, enting 
II ndebtedness , ccondary to medical exper. dIvJes. Hovever. there Is a I)au,: I,, %' Of 
empirical e% ldcnce on the impact ol'CBHI. and ho%ý t, impac, is in- I iucncA b,. a 
schenic's dcsi, 2n. mana-cment and contcxt. 
This vc,, circh examined the cconornic and soci, ill ImPact ofr. ýo (Jifll , lienics In (. 'uJ, 11, '',, 
India, and cxplored potentiul detcniiinants ol impact. A casc study approach %%a. s 
employed. Data %ýcrc collected using a vanct. v ofi-rictliodologies: a cro. ss-, ýccional 
household survey, rc% ic%\ ofinsurance schenic utillation &ia, t'ocus group disct.!,, ions, 
and in-depth interxic%% s. 
The CBlil schemes had acllic% cd minor Both pro\ ided 11 1 ilancial I)i-()tc,: tik)ii to 
tll(),,, c who actualk used the schemes and one oi'the schemes ý%as , uccc,,,, t'ul in iiiclL., 'ing 
the poor. These successes, ho\,.. -ý2% ei-. were o\, en%-helmed by ý ý: r. v low ratcý, of utili, iýion. 
Demand for membership in the schernes wis detemilned in p, irt h,, their stron--, Iii,. k.,, with 
larger pirent () nis, it ions (a dairy co-operati% c and a worker',, union) and ý)ý other 
scr% icc,, that Nvere packa--, cd \\ ith the health insuraii,:, -. Factors responsible t(, i- low rate, ý 
ot'licalth insurancc utilisation included a lack ot', iwareness among me,, ri, )crs k)t*t,, lc 
schernes and their benefits. and perceived problems with the co, t. quali, %- and or 
accessibility (, fbencfitý-ý provided. 
The findings support a cautious approach among those wishing, to foster CBHI in 
developing countries. Schemes should not be expected to contribute rapidi-, to bn)ad 
health system goals. Consistent with past research on CBHl. this study finds that scherne 
design and management are of utmost importance in determining whether or not the Z! 
scheme will have the desired impact. Specific areas are identified where government 
might intervene to optimise the impact of a CBHI scheme. 
"1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................. - Table of contents ............................................................................................................... 4 List of tables ...................................................................................................................... 7 List of figures .................................................................................................................... 9 Currency equivalents ....................................................................................................... 10 Abbreviations .................................................................................................................. 10 Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................... II 
Section 1: Background .................................................................................................. 13 
Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................... 14 
Background 
..................................................................................................................... 14 
Purpose and contents of thesis ........................................................................................ 
21 
Chapter 2: Health care financing and resource allocation in India ......................... 25 Summary 
......................................................................................................................... 25 Introduction 
..................................................................................................................... -76 
Evolution of India Is current system of health care financing ......................................... 
29 
Sources, agents and mechanisms of financing ................................................................ 
33 
Resource allocation ......................................................................................................... 
39 
Resource mobilisation, efficiency, equity and financial protection ................................ 
46 
How might CBHI address problems of financing and resource allocation'? ................... 
55 
Chapter 3: Literature review ....................................................................................... 57 
Economic perspectives on health insurance .................................................................... 
58 
Social perspectives on health insurance .......................................................................... 69 
International policy statements and reviews on CBHI .................................................... 
84 
Review of Indian schemes ............................................................................................... 
89 
Conclusions 
................................................................................................................... 
100 
Chapter 4: Research objectives and methodology ................................................... 103 
Aims and objectives ...................................................................................................... 
103 
Development of the methodology ................................................................................. 
104 
Study setting .................................................................................................................. 
109 
Data collection, entry and analysis ............................................................................... 
122 
Criteria for assessing quality of case-study research .................................................... 
134 
Section 2: Tribhuvandas Foundation's Hospital Referral Scheme ........................ 137 
Chapter 5: Impact on hospital utilization and expenditure: results of a Household 
Survey ........................................................................................................................... 138 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 
138 
Introduction 
................................................................................................................... 
138 
Methodology 
................................................................................................................. 
1 ý9 
Results 
........................................................................................................................... 
145 
Discussion 
..................................................................................................................... 
153 
4 
Chapter 6: Evidence from 8,463 bills submitted by Shri Kishna Hospital. 
1996-2000 ...................................................................................................................... 160 Summary 
....................................................................................................................... 160 Introduction 
................................................................................................................... 161 Methodology 
................................................................................................................. 162 Results ........................................................................................................................... 163 Discussion 
..................................................................................................................... 170 Chapter 7: Perceptions of, and experience Tribhuvandas Foundation's Hospital 
Referral scheme ........................................................................................................... 175 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 175 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 176 Methodology ................................................................................................................. 176 Results ........................................................................................................................... 177 Discussion ..................................................................................................................... 188 
Section3: The self-employed women's association s medical insurance fund ....... 197 
Chapter 8: Impact on hospital utilization and expenditure: results of a household 
Survey ........................................................................................................................... 198 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 198 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 198 Methodology ................................................................................................................. 200 Results ........................................................................................................................... . -105 Discussion ........................................................................................................ 
III 
Chapter 9: Evidence from 1,930 insurance claims ................................................... 219 
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 
219 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 
220 
Methods ......................................................................................................................... 
221 
Results ............................................................................................................... 
123 
Discussion ........................................................................................................ Chapter 10: Exploring the social consequences and determinants of CBHI: 
perceptions of SEWA's medical insurance fund among participants .................... 238 
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 
238 
................................................................. . ...... Introduction 
239 
......................................... . . Methodology ................................................................................................................. 
239 
Results ........................................................................................................................... 
240 
Discussion 
........................................................................................................ 
'251 
Section 4: Discussion, conclusion and policy implications ...................................... 258 
Chapter 11: Discussion of findings ............................................................................ 
259 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 
259 
Methodological and data issues ..................................................................................... 
260 
Summary of findings ..................................................................................................... 
267 
Discussion of key overall findings from the case studies ............................................. 
274 
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 
294 
Chapter 12: Conclusions and policy implications .................................................... 296 Substantive conclusions on the two case-study CBHl schemes ................................... . 196 Theoretical conclusions ................................................................................................. ý02 
308 Contributions to theory .................................................................................................. Policy implications for developing countries ................................................................ 314 
1- Recommendations for future research ........................................................................... ý) II 
References .................................................................................................................... 321 
Appendix 1: Gujarati household interview questionnaire ............................................. . 
336 
Appendix 2: English household interview questionnaire .............................................. 359 Appendix 3: The economic status index (ESI) and its reliability ................................. . ý74 Appendix 4: List of surveyed villages, including inflation factors ............................... 378 Appendix 5: Qualitative interview schedules ................................................................ 380 Appendix 6: Household-level analysis of utilization and expenditure, TF ................... 382 Appendix 7: Regression results for equation 2, the probability of being hospitalised 
within the last year, restricted to household heads ................................... 386 Appendix 8: Analysis of household reinterviews ......................................................... 390 Appendix 9: Saradar Patel insurance scheme ............................................................... 395 Appendix 10: List of qualitative interviews conducted ................................................ 
396 
Appendix 11: Additional qualitative results .................................................................. 398 Appendix 12: Related publications ............................................................................... 408 
6 
List of tables 
Table 2.1 India's share of the World's health problems (percent) .......................... 27 Table 2.2 Estimate of total health expenditure in India, 1990-91 ........................... . 15 Table 2.3 National health spending: sources and uses; percentage of national health 
expenditures (and percentage for each source) ....................................... 42 Table 3.1 Summary of studies looking at the impact of CBHI schemes on utilization 
and out-of-pocket expenditures ............................................................... 63 Table: 3.2 How social capital can ameliorate nsks to the financial viability of non- 
governmental, non-profit health insurance schemes ............................... 83 Table 3.3: Inventory of non-government, non-profit health insures in India ........... 90 Table 3.4: Potential impact of health insurance schemes, and factors that may 
influence impact .................................................................................... 102 Table 4.1 Select social, economic and demographic indicators for Kheda (now 
Anand and Kheda) District, Gujarat and India ...................................... 110 Table 4.2 Health system input, process and outcome indicators for Gujarat, -\Il-lndia, 
Kerala and Uttar Pradesh ....................................................................... III Box 4.1 Services Offered by TF, 1997 to present ............................................... 113 Table 4.3 Annual debt incurred by Shri Krishna Hospital in providing concessions to 
TF patients, 1996/97 to 1998/99 ........................................................... 115 Table 4.4 Ratio of premiums to claims under SWEA's Medical Insurance Fund 119 
Table 4.5 Description of context, design and management, TF's hospital referral 
scheme and SEWA's Fund .................................................................... 120 Table 4.6 Seven types of households included in the survey ................................ 126 Table 4.7 Criteria for assessing quality in quantitative and qualitative research.. 136 
Table 5.1 Independent variables included in the regression analyses ................... 143 Table 5.2 Sample characteristics ........................................................................... 146 Table 5.3 Hospital utilization, and expenditure per hospilization, among TF 
members and non-members .................................................................. 147 Table 5.4 Regression results for Equation 1, the odds of being a TF member based 
on socio-demographic variables: logit model ....................................... 148 Table 5.5 Regression results for Equation 2, the probability of being hospitalised 
within the last year: logit model ............................................................ 150 Table 5.6 Regression results for Equation 3, avg. annual cost of hospital care, log- 
linear model ........................................................................................... 152 Table 6.1 Frequency of hospitalization, by year ................................................... 164 Table 6.2 Total number of hospitalizations at Shri Krishna Hospital, and frequency 
of utilization per 1,000 population per year, by cgender and age ........... 166 Table 6.3 Cost of hospitalization and amount reimbursed .................................... 168 Table 8.1 Independent variables included in the regression analyses ................... 
204 
Table 8.2 Sample characteristics ........................................................................... 
206 
Table 8.3 Hospital utilization and expenditure per hospitalization by SE%k*. -\ 
coverage ................................................................................................ 
20- 
Table 8.4 Regression results for Equation 1, the odds of being SEWA4NS based on 
socio-demographic variables: logit model (n=987) .............................. 
7 
Table 8.5 Regression results for Equation 2. the probabillity of beling hospItallsed 
within the last Year- logit model (n=98-1) .............................................. .1 10 Table 8.6 Regression results 3, the average total cost of hospitalization per person 
hospitalised: log-linear model ............................................................... 213 Table 9.1 Self-reported, annual household income of claimants .......................... 2 24 Table 9.2 Cost of hospitalizations and amount reimbursed .................................. 225 Table 9.3 The financial burden of total costs and costs borne by the claimant after 
reimbursement *reimbursed claimants only) ........................................ 226 Table 9.4 Lag time (days) from discharge to reimbursement ............................... 229 Table 9.5 Frequency of claims submission by membership type (lifetime and annual) 
and year ................................................................................................. 23 1 Table 12.1 The impact of TF's hospital referral scheme, and factors that have 
influenced impact .................................................................................. 297 Table 12.2 The impact of SEWA's Medical Fund, and factors that have influenced 
impact 
.................................................................................................... 298 
Table A3.1 Scoring factors and summary statistics for variables entering the 
computation of the first principal component ....................................... 374 Table A3.2 Percent of households with assess, by ESI quintile .............................. 375 Table A3.3 Comparison of the full (22 variable) index with the reduced (15 variable) 
index and other estimators of wealth ..................................................... 376 
Table A6.1 Independent variables included in the household-level regression 
analyses ................................................................................................. 381 Table A6.2 Sample characteristics at household level ............................................. 383 Table A6.3 Hospital utilization and expenditure per household by TF coverage .... 384 Table A6.4 Regression results for Equation 1, the odds of a household belonging to 
TF based on socio-demographic variables: logit model ........................ 385 Table A6.5 Regression results for Equation 2, the odds of one or more hospitalization 
in the household within the last year: logit model ................................ 386 Table A6.6 Regression results for Equation 3, the net animal hospital expenditures per 
household where there was one or more hospitalization: log-linear model 
............................................................................................................... 387 
-. 0 () -) Table A8.1 Response errors for select binary and categorical variables ................. .1- Table A8.2 Response errors for select continuous variables ................................... 
393) 
8 
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1 Relations between function and objectives of a health svstem ............... 
2S 
Figure 2.2 Public sector spending on health, 1985-86 to 1999-00 ........................... . Figure 2.3 Health expenditure as a percentage of GDP (estimates for 1997 ): select 
Asian countries (1997) ............................................................................ 33 Figure 2.4 Financial relationships among main actors in the Indian health sector.. 34 
Figure 2.5 Public and private sector shares in service delivery across in India, 1995- 
96 ............................................................................................................. 42 Figure 2.6 Public and private sector shares of hospitalization, by income quintile. 5_1 
Figure 2.7 Public expenditures on curative care, by income quintile ....................... i Figure 2.8 Income bias of public spending on hospital and primary health centre 
care .......................................................................................................... 
53 
Figure 2.9 Sources of financing for private expenditures on hospitalization in India 
by income quintile, 1995-96 .................................................................... 54 Figure 3.1 Objectives and contextual determinants of success for CB HI schemes.. 58 
Figure 3.2 The demand for insurance by a rational, risk-averse indi"'-idual ............. 60 
Figure 3.3 The personal demand for health care ...................................................... 6-1 
Figure 4.1 Interplay between quantitative and qualitative methodologies ............. 107 
Figure 4.2 Objectives, methods and results chapters .............................................. 124 
Figure 6.1 Use of Shri Krishna Hospital by TF members .,, ersus frequency of 
hospitalization in Gujarat (various sources) with 95% confidence 
intervals ................................................................................................. 
165 
Figure 6.2 The frequency of utilization of Shri Krishna Hospital (admissions per 
village over four years) by taluka of residence ..................................... 
167 
Figure 6.3 Mean out-of-pocket expenditure and discount by quintiles of total cost of 
hospitalization ....................................................................................... 
169 
Figure 9.1 Mean amount reimbursed and not reimbursed, by quintiles of total cost of 
hospitalization ...................................................................................... 
227 
Figure 9.2 Frequency claims and hospitalizations in Gujarati women (various 
sources) with 95% confidence intervals ................................................ 
2 
Figure 11.1 Objectives and contextual determinants of success for CBHI 
schemes ................................................................................................. 
9 
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS 
(January, 2002) 
Currency Unit - Indian Rupees (Rs) 
UK f 1.00 = Rs 70.00 
US S1 . 00 = Rs 48.31 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ACCORD Action for Community Organisation, Rehabilitation and Development 
AKES Aga Khan Health Services 
CBHI Community Based Health Insurance 
CHC Community Health Centre 
CHF Community Health Fund 
CGHS Central Government Health Scheme 
DALY Disability Adjusted Life Year 
DftD, Department for International Development 
ESI Economic Status Index 
ESIS Employee State Insurance Scheme 
FGD Focus Group Discussion 
GIC Government Insurance Company 
GOI Government of India 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNP Gross National Product 
GTZ German Technical Cooperation 
HIPCs Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
lis Integrated Insurance Scheme 
ILO International Labour Office 
KSSS Kottar Social Service Society 
LSHTM London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
MHO Mutual health organisation 
NGO Non-governmental Organisation 
NRC Nutritional Resource Centre 
ODA Overseas Development Administration 
PRIs Panchayati Raj Institutions 
PI Principal Investigator 
RA Research Assistant 
RAHA Raigarh, Ambikapur Health Association 
SSSS Saheed Shibsankar Saba Samity 
SEWA Self Employed Women's Association 
SWRC Social Work and Research Centre 
TF Tribhuvandas Foundation 
U11C United India Insurance Company 
VHW Village Health Worker 
WDR World Development Report 
WHO World Health Organisation 
WHR World Health Report 
10 
AcICNOWLEDGEMEN'TS 
It is incredible to look back on what at times seemed a lonel-v joume,,. onl,, - to realise that 
I was supported each step of the way by family and friends, old and ne\%. 
Many people gave of their time, energy and ideas in helping me to conceive and carrý- out 
this research. I am particularly grateful to Anne Mills (LSHT%I) and Ramesh Bhat 
(Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad) for their supervision. Staff and members 
of the Tribhuvandas Foundation and the Self Employed Women's Association were 
unfailing in their support. In particular, I would like to thank Pragnesh Gor and Nikhil 
Kharod at TF, and Mirai Chattedee, Sayeeda Chauhan, Shilpa Pandiva, and J--,, oti 
Macwan at SEWA. Research assistance of the highest calibre was pro, ý, -ided by: Swan 
Vyas, Dimple Save, Nimisha Sukhadia, Mehul Sheth, Richardson %, Iacwan, Pratiksha 
Bhaskarray Bhatt, Dabhi Varsha Dalpatsing, FaIguni Daiji. Urmila Gonadallya. Amna 
Mayavanshi, Rana Sonal Navinkurnar, Archana Vyas and Samir ', 'vlacwan. Thanks to 
Sara Bennett, Arnie Cullimore, Kara Hanson, Karina Kielman, Rajesh Mohan, and 
anonymous reviewers at Bulletin of the Uorld Health Organisation for stimulating 
review comments. Chris Frost, K. R. John, Tom . 10arshall and Sunil Nandraj all helped 
bý 
providing their conunents around the methodology. 
My studies at LSHTM were funded by the British Council in the form of a 
Commonwealth Scholarship. Financial support for my field-work was provided by the I 
India desk of the British Department for Intemational Development (MID). and . -aluablc 
comments provided by Bob Fryatt and Padma Kumar. 
Finally, a huge thank-you to my family and friends. without whom I might not have had 
the motivation or the means to embark on, or complete, this study. Thanks to: Mom. 
Dad, Keri and my grandparents; my adoptive family in India, Rakesh Panchal and family. 
Divyang Sailor and family, Jignish Zala, K. F. Macwan and family, and D. K. Patel and 
family; fellow students and friends in London, particularly Anne Philpott and Nicola 
Lord. 
12 
SECTION 1: BACKGROU-ND 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND 
For over two decades, there have been calls for communities in de%-eloping countries 
to participate in the planning, financing, organising and operating of health care 
services. The Declaration of Alma Ata (International Conference on Primarv Health 
Care 1978) implied that community participation was integral to the achie%, ement of 
health for all, and stated that "primary health care requires and promotes maximum 
community and individual self-reliance and participation... making fullest use of 
local, national and other available resources". The Bamako InitiatiN-e aimed to make 
primary health care universally accessible through community financing and 
management (McPake, et al. 1992). But questions remain as to whether, how and 
how much poor people in poor countries can or should be expected to contribute 
towards the provision of health care. 
The issue is of greater importance to nobody than to the poor themselves. Material 
wealth, health and the ability to cope with adverse health events are intimately 
related. The World Bank defines poverty as "encompassing not only material 
deprivation but also low achievements in education and health... (and) vulnerability 
and exposure to risk... " (World Bank 2001c, p. 15). An individual of low income 
may be unable to afford preventive care, or curative care in the event of illness, 
which may result in the worsening of his or her state of health. In the event of 
serious illness, the poor are particularly vulnerable to the financial burden resulting 
from lost income and out-of-pocket medical expenditures as they have low levels of 
the assets (physical, natural, and financial) necessary to cope. Disease or illness can 
cause an individual or household to enter a vicious downward spiral in which poor 
health results in the depletion of assets and low levels of assets lead to %vorsening 
health and the inability to cope with future illness episodes. In theorý-, government 
provision of health care should cover the poor, but in practice if often does not. 
Thus, there is a need to find %vays of protecting the poor from the costs ofmedical 
care. 
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Community-based health insurance (CBHI) is a mechanism that allows for pooling 
of resources to cover the costs of future, unpredictable health-related events. It 
offers individuals and households protection against the uncertain risk of 
catastrophic medical expenses in exchange for regular paýTnent of premiums. 
Prepayment (even in the absence of pooling) can facilitate access to expensiVe 
medical care because it spreads the expenditures over time, and pre%ents people 
from having to pay out-of-pocket at the time of treatment seeking. Through pooling 0 
of resources, health insurance can have a beneficial impact on equitv, access and 
financial protection. Risk sharing occurs when the insurance premium is unrelated 
(or not completely related) to the likelihood that the insured %vill fall ill. and benellits 
are provided on the basis of need, hence, payments go to the sickest people. 
Because lower income and less educated people tend to have poorer health, they 
stand to gain more from insurance claims (Griffin and Sham., 199-5). Cross- 
subsidisation occurs when premiums are indexed to income and access to health care 
is as good (or better) among the poor as the wealthy. In such a scenario, the'ývealthy 
subsidise the health care costs of the poor. 
Policy makers hope that CBHI will contribute to the "final" health systems goals of 
better health, fair financing and responsiveness as proposed recently by the WHO 
(WHO 2000). In many developing countries, the potential for expanding or 
improving the health sector through increased government funding is limited due to 
a narrow tax base (Mills 1983). CBHI allows for pooling in those settings where 
institutional capacity is weak to organise nation-wide risk-pooling. This maN allow 
a health sector that is starved for funds to tap resources that would otherwIse not be 
available to it. A fundamental question is whether CBHI ývill be able to expand to 
cover suff iciently large populations to put to use the pooling function', -- nisk-po-01 ing C" 
and cross-subsidisation. 
Health insurance can also contribute to economic efficiency and equity bý replacmg 
some of the government funding for secondary and tertiai-v hospital sen-ice, ý. This 
Ii 
may allow governments to di-,, -ert resources to public health. preventi% e. and primary 
services that benefit the poor (Griffin and Shaw 1995, Normand 19()9). ' 
Furthermore, insurance can improve efficiency by consolidating the purchasing 
power of many individuals. This may facilitate the "strategic purchasing- of health 
care services (WHO 2000). An insurer that is acting in the best interests of its 
members may be willing to spend on preventive and health promotion activities. or 
it may negotiate with health care providers on the price and quality of services (van 
Ginneken 1998). 
CBHI schemes are most frequently studied by economists and examined from an 
economic perspective. Goals and objectives are typically defined in terms of cost 
recovery, service utilisation and financial protection and success or failure typically 
attributed to scheme design and management (Bennett, et al. 1998). However, there 
may be much to learn by taking a more holistic look at CBHl, for example, by 
investigating these schemes from a social perspective. Health insurance is likely to 
have social costs and benefits that are excluded from the traditional economic 
perspective. The theoretical literature (Chapter 3) suggests that CBHI may impact 
on social networks, values and norms by changing: the locus of medical decision- 
making; the status of the allopathic medical profession; access to medical care; 
mechanisms of gift-giving; and the nature and prevalence of risky behaviour. And 
underlying the success or failure of a health insurance scheme are likely to be: 
aspects of scheme design and management, the nature of roles played by, and 
relationships between, participantS2 in the scheme, and a complex milieu of factors 
related to social, economic, cultural. political and health sector context. ldentifý-Ing 
and gaining some insight into the relative importance of these factors ý%-Ill help to 
optimise the success of existing and proposed CBHl schemes. S(xial context 
This is an argument frequendy made by CBHl advocates, but it makes optimistic aý%, umptions aK)ut 
the size. eqwty and effectiveness of CBH1 schemes, as well as the equitý of gu%ernment financing 
and provision and poli6cal economy issues that affect government resource allocauon decision, 
2 Throughout the thesis. "'participant" is used to describe the %anous people. groups or agencies %%ho 
are act: ive, in one way or another, in CBHI schemes. It refm mo,; tly to beneficiaries wr mcilhcr%). 
health care providers and scheme administrators. but also to govei-rimcrit and donor represtritative% 
who play some role in the schemes. 
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(embodied in the concept of social capital) in particular has been cited as a t'-,,: tor 
important in the success of various institutional arrangements. including micro- 
credit schemes based on indigenous structures Ovan Bastelaer). 
Health insurance can benefit India's health sector 
Health insurance programmes stand to benefit the people of India, particularly the 
poor. Problems with India's health sector that might be helped by health insurance 
include: the burden imposed by out-of-pocket medical expenses. inequity, 
inefficiency, and poor quality. 
Out-of-pocket medical expenses impose a tremendous burden, particularly among 
the poor. In India, private expenditure accounts for over 800'0 of total health care 
spending, and almost all (97.3%) of this represents out-of-pocket spending bý 
households (Ellis, et al. 1996). In India, members of lower socio-economic g"roups 
tend to spend a greater share of their annual income on health than do more 
advantaged groups (Berman 1995-, Hsiao and Dave Sen 1995, Mathiyazhagan 1998). 
Studies amongst poorer populations suggest that 6 to II per cent of annual 
household consumption expenditure is devoted to health care (Bhat 1993, 
Mathiyazhagan 1998). A single episode of non-hospitalised illness costs about 10 
percent of average monthly consumption expenditure (Berman 1995). The costs of a 
single illness requiring hospitalisation can be devastating: the average cost of a 
hospitalisation (in a government hospital) varies between 40 and 160'% of annual per 
capita consumer expenditure (Krishnan 1996). 
The allocation of existing resources needs to be rationallsed. Data from the late 
1980s shows India to have a far higher mortality rate from communicable diseases 
and materrial and perinatal causes than demographic ally developing countnes 
overall (470 compared to 253 deaths per 100.000 population. standardised for 'Ige. 
World Bank 1993). Nonetheless, secondary and tertiarý, inpatient care (as opposc(i 
to preventive and primary outpatient health care services) account for 43% of total 
public spending and 36% of private health spending (World Bank 109-5. Berman 
1995). Approximately 72% of India's inhabitants are rural (World Bank 200 10. ý et 
less than half of public health care resources are spent in rural areas (Rao. et al. 
1993). Household spending on health, in absolute terms, is roughlý- equal between 
urban and rural areas; however, income levels are substantial I,,, - lower in rural areas 
(Berman 1995). Public health spending per capita is sigmficantlýý lower in the 
poorer states, which also have poorer health status (Berman 1995). These pattern-, 
of resource utilisation suggest that health care spending is both inefficient and 
inequitable. 
The poor quality of health care sen-ices is also a major issue in India. Problems with 
public sector facilities include: understaffing, poor hotel aspects of care and physical 
conditions, inadequate supply of drugs, and poor quality of drugs (Duggal, et al. 
1995; Bennett and Muraleedharan 1998). Private facilities are generally perceived 
to be of higher quality than public, and this is reflected in the fact 80% of all 
outpatient visits are made to private facilities (Duggal, et al. 1995, Bennett and 
Muraleedharan 1998). However, "analysts, policy makers and patients alike have 
the impression that the nature and quality of care delivered privately varies 
considerably, but includes many providers who offer very poor quality services" 
(Bennett and Muraleedharan 1998). Studies of private sector physicians have found 
that many prescribe medicines and injections so as to maximise profits, often putting 
the patient at danger (Uplekar 1989a; Uplekar 1989b). A study conducted in 1990 in 
Uttar Pradesh found that only half of rural private practitioners were qualified in 
any system of medicine (Duggal, et al. 1995). A number of regulations have been 
passed to promote quality of care in the private sector (Bhat 1996) ho%%-e%er 
enforcement is largely ineffective. 
Health insurance coverage in India is limited 
Private for-profit health insurance. only recentlý- allowed in India under the 
Insurance Regulatory Development Authority Act of 1999. is largely unavailable. 
The Government of India's social and voluntarý, - insurance schemes (deschbed in 
Chapter 2) target workers in the organised sector. xvho comprise not more than ten 
18 
percent of all workers (van Ginneken 1998). Together. these schemes cover 
approximately 42 million people. The onl,,,, government initiame to co%er the 
informal sector has occurred in Goa (1991 population of only 1.1 .1 millioni. where 
the State Government has purchased insurance through the Go%-ernment Insurance 
Company (GIC) to cover the hospitalisation needs of all permanent residents with an 
annual income below Rs 50,000 (Wyatt and Bhat 1997). In total I It . no more than '. 3' o 
of total health care expenditure flows through the vanous governmental health 
insurance schemes (Berman 1995). Expansion of government schemes outside of 
the formal sector is unlikely both due to logistical difficulties in organising premium 
collections and targeting subsidies (Kutzin 1997), and because insurers view the 
poor as "bad risks" and an unreliable source of premium payments (Hauck 1998). 
Non-govern mental, non-profit organisations can provide health insurance to 
the informal sector 
Community based health care programs which combine insurance with 
provision of services offer the best hope for reducing the financial burdens 
of the large segment of India's population in the inforrnal sector Vi"hile 
rationing scarce resources (Ellis, et al. 1996, p. 26). 
Non-governmental, non-profit organisations provide health care to approximately 
5% of the Indian population (Hsiao, and Dave Sen 1995). Some of these NGOs have 
implemented prepayment health insurance schemes (described in Chapter 3). There 
are a number of reasons as to why NGOs should make good insurers for poor 
populations (adapted from van Ginneken 1998): 
* they know the needs of their client groups so they can develop appropriate 
strategies to assist them, 
e they typically involve beneficiaries in the design and implementation of 
programs; 
9 effectiveness of health insurance schemes may be enhanced by other aspects of 
the NGOs' work, for example, in the fields of employment and education. 
0 because they are non-profit, they can provide health insurance at lo%ver cost than 
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for-profit insurers. 3 
In their paper, Hsiao and Sen (1995) suggested that social capital might facilitate the 
success of health insurance schemes in India. This issue has not been addressed in 
subsequent empirical work. 
Knowledge gaps 
Cost may make health care unaffordable to the poor, and in the event of s nous e 
illness, the poor are particularly vulnerable to the financial burden resultina from Z' 
lost income and out-of-pocket medical expenditures. In developing countnes, 
governments often fail in their responsibility to cover the poor, as in India where the 
bulk of health care spending is private, out-of-pocket spending by households. 
CBHI has the potential to offer individuals and households protection against the 
uncertain risk of catastrophic medical expenses, but it is not ý, videly available in 
India or elsewhere. Fundamental questions remain regarding the impact of CBHI, 
the factors underlying its success or failure, and whether it v611 be able increase 
coverage of the poor. 
A number of investigators have documented the non-governmental, non-profit 
health insurance schemes in India and elsewhere (Chapter 3). Most primary studies 
of CBHI schemes have failed to assess impact beyond superficial indicators on 
which data are easily accessible. For example, arguably the most thorough 
evaluation of non-governmental, non-profit health insurance schemes in India (Dave 
1993) measured equity based on whether or not schemes graded premiums 
according to income, and evaluated nsk-sharing based on whether or not there ý% ere 
mechanisms in place to prevent adverse selection. Stinson (1982, p. 11) in his 
pioneering review of community-based financing initiatives, commented: -studies of 
successful community finance must consider both process and outcome: this rc% ic%%- 
found few details about either. " Have CBHI schemes improved access amons-, the 
poor to expensive medical services? Has CBHI protected these populations from the 
3 There is an opposing line of argument that NGOs are less efficient as thev are not motj%atL-d to 
produce a profit. 
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high costs of medical care'! Aside from these economic for CBH I. do the main 
actors envision any social consequences - for example. creating a preference for 
allopathic versus traditional forms of medicine, or increasing the empowennent to 
partake in medical decision-making? What kinds of factors, in terms of scheme 
design and management and the broader context in which the schemes operate, help 
or hinder progress? How important is the social context, and social capital more 
specifically? It is these questions that this thesis, in a small way. attempts to 
address. 
]PURPOSE AND CONTENTS OF THESIS 
Purpose 
The aim of this research is to contribute to the body of knowledge regarding the 
potential consequences of health insurance and the factors that may determine the 
performance of health insurance schemes. The new information generated is 
intended to be useful to policy makers both in choosing between different 
mechanisms of health care financing, and in optimising the design and management 
of CBHI schemes and allowing for the broader context in which they operate. Gaps 
in previous research are addressed by six specific objectives: 
I/ To evaluate two Indian CBH1 schemes in terms of their impact on the 
frequency of hospital isation. It is kvpothesised that CBHI ývill zncreaýic the 
frequency with which members are hospitalised by removi . ng some component ofthe 
financial barrier to seeking inpatient care. 
2/ To evaluate the two CBHI schemes based on the extent to which they protect 
member households from the costs of inpatient care. The h. ipothtcsis rclatcd to thi. ý 
objective 1S that the costs ql'inpatient care arefinancialýi, hurdensonit, (i. e. rt sulting 
in indebtedness. impoverishment) and that by coveri . ng, sonit, portion ()/ thc se co. s , N. a 
CBHI scheme i4, ill conjt". -rfinanclal protection. 
To further assess the schemes on the basis of coverage (inclusion of the poor) 
and equity of access to scheme benefits. It iýý h. ipothesi. ý, --d that ýteg. 
'ýarc-orzcnted 
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CBHI schemes will include the poor in their membership and -will emsure Mat th, 
poor use services provided under the scheme. 
4/ To examine whether or not there are additional goals that participants in the 
CBHI schemes (including target populations, scheme administrators. health care 
providers, governments and external donors) feel these scheme-, should fulfil. The 
hypothesis related to this objective is that traditional cc onomic indicators of_. ýucccss 
do not capture thefull effects of health insurance schemes as they arc, anticiPated or 
perceived by participants (e. g. empowerment. communi . ty parti . cl . pati . on. social 
cohesion). 
51 To explore contextual factors, and aspects of the CBHl schemes' design and 
management, that participants associate with the schemes' success or failure. Tile 
hypothesis related to this objective is that aspects of the social. political, economic 
and health systems environment, along vt, ith scheme design and management. 
contribute to the success of CBHI schemes. Social capital, in particular, is 
hypothesised to facilitate enrolment in, and financial sustainabilitY of CBHI 
schemes. 
6/ In the light of research findings, to identify implications for NGOs, 
government and external aid agencies as to whether CBHI schemes of the typc 
studied should be expanded or replicated, and it'so. the contextual factors that will 
facilitate their success. 
Contents 
The thesis is divided into four major parts. The remainder of Section I provides 
background information and outlines the purpose, scope and methodology of the 
research. Chapter 2 describes patterns of health care financing and resource 
allocation in India, and evaluates these functions in terms of resource mobilisation. 
efficiency, equity and financial protection. Chapter 3 identifies goals and objectives 
of non-governmental, non-profit health insurance schemes, and the factors that 
underlie their success or failure. based on theoretical and empirical literature from 
India and elsewhere. Chapter 4 describes and justifies the choice of' research 
methodology. 
Section 2 presents results pertaining to Tribhuvandas Foundation's (henceforth TF) 
hospital referral scheme. Chapter 5 assesses the impact of TF's hospital referral 
scheme based on data collected from households in Kheda District using an 
interview-adminýistered questionnaire. Impact is measured in terms of: (1) 
population reach, particularly inclusion of the poor, (2) hospital utilisation dunno 
the one-year period preceding the survey: and (3) annual cost of hospitalisations. 
conditional on reporting one or more hospital 1 sat ions. Chapter 6 assesses the impact 
of TF's hospital referral scheme based on an analysis of all bills submitted by Shri 
Krishna Hospital for the fiscal years 1996 97 through 1999 -1000. Chapter 7 
explores the goals and contextual determinants of TF's hospital referral scheme 
based on focus-group discussions and in-depth inteniews conducted with 
participants. 
Section 3 presents results pertaining to SEWA's Medical Insurance Fund. Chapter 8 
. sino the results of the uses the same impact indicators as Chapter -5 in anal,, 
household survey. Chapter 9 assesses the impact of the Fund based on an analysis 
of all claims filed after July I st, 1994. Chapter 10, like Chapter 7, presents results of 
the focus-giroup discussions and in-depth interviews. 
Section 4 consists of two chapters. Chapter II discusses the strengths and 
weaknesses of the study's methodology and compares findings between the w, -o case 
studies. Chapter 12 presents substantive conclusions about the two case studies as 
well as theoretical conclusions that are of relevance elsewhere. Policy implications 
and areas for further research are then suggested. 
The results chapters (Sections 2 and 3, Chapters 5 through 10) each present a 
particular sub-study, and are presented largely as free-standing scientific papers. C" 
each with a summary, introduction, methodology. results and discussiori scction. 
To 
avoid excessive repetition. the introduction and methodolov sections are kept Ver'%, 
brief. as the relevant infonnation is provided in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
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respectively. The results chapters include discussion around the scheme-specific 
findings presented in that chapter. while discussion that compares the mo schemes 
is presented in Chapter 11. 
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CHAPTER 2: HEALTH CARE FINANCING AND RESOURCE ALWCAIION 
IN INDIA 
SUMMARY 
This chapter describes patterns of health care financing and resource allocation in 
India, and evaluates these functions in terms of resource mobilisation. etricienc'.. 
equity and financial protection. In India. there are two predominant pathways of 
health care financing. The bulk of resources (roughly 85'o) flow from individuals 
and households directly to health care providers (predominantly pn%-ate) in the form 
of out-of-pocket payments. Public resources, the second most important source of 
health care financing (central, state and local govenunents contribute 13'o) are 
typically used for the provision of health care through the multi-tiered system of 
public providers. 
Total resource mobilisation for health care (public and private combined) is more 
than 5% of gross domestic product (GDP), which is high in companson to other 
low-income countries. However, public spending in India is comparatively low at 
only 0.7 to 0.9% of GDP. Both pnvate and public systems are allocatively 
inefficient, as most spending is on curative care, which fails to address adequatelý 
major disease threats. Technical efficiency of both systems is low because of the 
variable, but generally poor, quality of care available through the private sector, and 
poor input mix (with high expenditures on salaries) in the public sector. The system 
overall is highly inequitable. As a percentage of their income, the poor pay more to 
finance health care; direct taxation to finance the public svstem. is progressi%e. but 
out-of-pocket expenditures - for example, on user-fees. medicines, transportation - 
are generally regressive. Rates of health care utilisation. both anibulatory and 
inpatient. are far higher among the wealthy than the poor. and the poor use care of 
lesser quality. Because most health care spending is out-of-pocket. opportunities for 
risk-pooling and cross- subsid i sation are limited. Thus. health care expenditures. and 
those for inpatient care in particular. pose a tremendous burden on households. and 
are a major cause of indebtedness and impoverishment. particularly amon, -, the pt-Wr. 
2i 
Community based health insurance (CBHl) has the potential to impro%e health care 
financing and resource allocation in India. Aspects of CBHI that are particularl,. 
important to its success in impacting on health system goals include: prepayment for 
health care, pooling of resources that is horizontally and vertically equitable (thus 
allowing for cross- subsidisation firom low-risk to high-nsk. and from wealthý to 
poor), and strategic purchasing. 
INTRODUCTION 
India has a population of over one billion. Gross national product (GNP) per capita 
is approximately 450 USS (1999) and GNP at purchasing, power parity is 2,14() USS 
(1999), comparable to that in Armenia (2,210 US$), Nicaragua (2.1-54 USS) and 
Indonesia (2,149 USS) (World Bank 2001c, Table 1). Of the 63 countnes ranked by 
the World Bank as "low income", India has the eighth highest GNP measured at PPP 
(of the 56 for which data were available; China ranks number one). According to 
World Bank figures, in 1998 there were more people in India living on the 
equivalent of less than $1 a day (in terms of 1993 purchasing-power parity) than in 
any other country. India accounted for 400 million of 1,175 million living on less 
than $1 a day globally (Working Group 5 of the Commission on %lacroeconomics 
and Health 2001, p 10). 
In terms of levels of health, India is characterised by tremendous diversity: 
Some states compare it-cll 'ývith middle-income countrics, whereas other'ý 
fare much worse. Kerala is a clear outlier-its health status is comparablt, 
to that of tipper middle-income countries such as Trinidad, Ar. (, 'cntina. and 
Mauritius. Most Indian states, b"v contrast, are comparable to lower- 
middle-income countries such as Brazil, Egypt, and Peru. The poorcsi 
performing states compare with poor countries such as Sudan. Nigeria, and 
Tan:: ania (Peters. et al. 2001, p. 149). 
Similarly, within states, health status ditTerentials between urban and rural 
populations and between higher and lower income groups remain quite large. In 
general, relative to its population. India shoulders a large portion of the %%()rld*s 
disease burden (Table 2.1), particularly child and materrial deaths. and disease 
burden due to tuberculosis, leprosy. and immunizable diseases. 
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Table 2.1: India's share of the World's health problems (percent) 
Population 
Total deaths 
Indicator Pcrcent 
Child deaths 
Maternal deaths 
Disability-adjusted life years lost 
Childhood vaccine preventable deaths - Persons with HIV 14 
Tuberculosis cases ,ýo 
Leprosy cases t)X 
Sources: Adapted from Peters, et al. 200 1, p. 144 
The World Health Report 2000 describes four main functions, and three main 
objectives of a health system (Figure 2.1; WHO 2000). This provides a useful 
framework insofar as it illustrates how the functions of a health care system can be 
evaluated in terms of "final outcomes" (or "objectives"), and generates thought 
around "instrumental variables" that might be more easily assessed. The purpose of 
this chapter is to describe and evaluate the patterns of health care financing and 
resource allocation in India. Financing refers to the raising of revenue to pay for the 
operation of the health system. More specifically, I will look at: the sources of 
financing (the various entities who provide resources for the system): the agents or 
intermediaries who collect money to pay providers on behalf of consumers; and the 
methods used by sources and agents in mobilising resources., Resource allocation 
refers to the flow of resources to health care providers, either from sources or agents. 
including the mix of services purchased and how these services are paid for. In the 
WHR 2000, it is argued that the "final goals" of health, responsiveness and fair 
financing, are each intrinsically valuable, and should be used as indicators of health 
system performance (p. 24). The report acknowledges that "instrumental -.; oal, ý- =I 1: ý 
such as affordability, equity, accessibility. sustainability and quality are often used 
as performance indicators where data on the final goals is unavailable. This chapter 
will evaluate health financin4i, and resource allocation in India based on I*our .0 
The term "agent" is used throughout the thesis in reference to entities that collect monc', to 
providers on behalf of consumer-, 
'7 
instrumental goals: resource mobilisation. allocative and technical efficiency of 
resource use; equity-, and financial protection of individuals and households (the 
latter two are very distal indicators, and together comprise "fair financing" as 
defined by the WHO). 
Figure 2.1: Relations between functions and objectkes of a health sýstem 
Source: Adapted from WHO 2000. p. 25. 
Section I describes the recent evolution of the health care system. Section 2 
examines the financing function of' India's health system and Section 3 the resource 
allocation function. Section 41 discusses the implications of the current patterris of 
financing and allocation in terms of resource mobilisation. efficiency, equity and 
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Functions the system perfon-ns Obje,. tl,, cs of the Ystcm 
financial protection. 2 Finally, Section 5 discusses problems of' the sNstem 
(categorised by the four instrumental goals from Section 4) that might be addressed 
using community-based health insurance (CBHI). 
The data presented in this chapter are generally drawn from the published literature. 
In some cases, values drawn from different sources (for example, for public sector 
spending on health as a percentage of GDP) are inconsistent or contradictory. These 
inconsistencies highlight the problems with data availability and qualit", that hinder 
any attempt to evaluate health care financing and resource allocation in India. To 
avoid confusion, an attempt has been made in this chapter to comment on any 
inconsistent data that are presented. 
EVOLUTION OF INDIA'S CURRENT SYSTPO OF HEALTH CARE FINA. NCING 
Today, health care in India is largely privately financed, indiN-iduallv purchased by 
fee-for-service payment, privately produced, and unregulated. Since Independence 
(1947), the Government of India has fairly consistently espoused a philosophy of 
heavy state responsibility for providing health care. to the extent that the Indian 
health system was classified by Roemer (1991) as "welfare oriented". In fact, with 
its heavy reliance on the private sector, and its laissezfaire regulatory environment, 
it seems to fit best into Roemer's category of "entrepreneurial and permissive". This 
section will highlight some of the factors that have shaped India's health care 
system, including: 
Under- investment by central and state governments in companson to the 
growing population's health care needs. 
Policies that have either Ignored or helped the private sector: 
A growing middle-income class: and 
0 Private sector's involvement in curative care. 
2 Section 4 draws heavily on analyses recenflý conducted by Peter-,. et al. (2001) at the World Bank. 
Delhi. 
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The British Imperial government provided medical care out of concern f'or its own 
armed forces and civilian administration (Duggal and Antia 199-1ý). With the advent 
of provincial governments after the Government of India Act 1911). a medical 
network developed. As in many other colonised countries, the provision of health 
services became associated with the state. Thus, by 1941.2.1 A hospital-, and 5.291 
dispensaries were in existence, and only 7.6 per cent of all institution.,; were in the 
private sector (Duggal and Antia 1993, p. 54). 
The Bhore Commission Report (1946) laid down the principle that primary health 
care is a basic right to which people should not be denied access due to inability to 
pay or other socio-economic: reasons. The Commission established primary health 
care as the foundation for the national health care system, and developed the first 
patterns for primary health care facilities and health personnel in the public sector 
(Peters, et al. 2001, p. 25). Various articles in the Indian constitution refer to the 
state's obligation to provide effective provision of health care and to regard the 
raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the 
improvement of public health as among their primary duties (article 47 as described 
by Bennett and Muraleedharan 1998). From the very beginning, resource 
allocations from the government for health \vere vvell below %%-hat ýxas advocated by 
the Bhore Committee (Berman and Khan 1993). 
In part responsible for under- investment in health after independence was the 
Bombay Plan written by five of India's top businessmen in 1944 (including J. R. D. 
Tata and G. D. Birla, hence the plan is also known as the Tata-Birla Plan). The Plan 
influenced Nehru"s economic policy after independence, resulting in investment in 
heavy industry and economic infi-astructure under the belief that such participation 
by the state in economic production would evolve a socialist societý . As a result 
there was under- investment in the welfare sector (health, education, social secuntý, 
and so on). In the health care services sector, the government allowed the Pnvatc 
practice of medicine to flourish. Further. the government subsidised the _izrowth of 
private medical practice by financing the training of medical personnel in excess 
4 
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the number that could be employed (at salanes Competiti%-e to those in the pnvate 
sector) in the public sector (Duggal and Antia 1993, p. _55). As well. a large 
percentage of doctors employed in the public sector practice pmately. often using 
government hospitals to treat their private patients (Nandraj 2000. p. 14). 
With rising incomes (in certain population groups) and educational opportunities 
since independence. there has been a rapid increase in the availability of private 
health care and the ability to pay for it. This is reflected in the growing number of 
qualified allopathic physicians in urban (and to a lesser extent rural) areas and the 
private hospitals and nursing homes that they have created. In 1974 16.00o of all 
hospitals were in the private sector (16.2'o of beds) but, within a decade. in 1984 
private hospitals had grown to 42.3"o of all hospitals (26.7% of beds), and by 1988, 
the proportion of private hospitals had further increased to 56.01o and hospital beds 
to 30.0% (Duggal and Antia 1993, p. 56). 
Public spending on health care has long been outweighed by private spendim". 
Duggal and Antia (1993, p. 60) report that public spending accounted for 13ý'o of 
total health spending in 1944, and four years after independence in 1951-52 this 
figure remained unchanged. Recently, since 1991, India has been implementing a 
series of economic reforms involving greater reliance on market mechanisms, 
including deregulation and reduction of government controls, greater autonomy of 
private investments, less use of the public sector, and opening up of the economy to 
international trade. It is perhaps not surprising then that public sector spending, 
relative to GDP, continues to fall (Figure 2.2). 
These national averages of health care spending mask considerable variation 
between and within states. State and local governments also play an Important role 
in managing and financing health care. -kccording to Article 47 of the Constitution 
of India, health is a State subject (Rao Seshadn 2001. p. 9) and this is reflected in 
public health care spending. the bulk of which comes from state (as opposed to 
central and municipal) governments. While the central government does initiate and 
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finance some health programs, it is the state go%ernment's responý'Ihilitý to 
implement such schemes. Each state can formulate its own health poll': Ies. In 
practice state governments function within the parameters of the National Health 
Policy (1983), which is based on the assumption that primarý care i,,, a basic right, .0 
and it is the business of government, through the public pnmar-,,, care network. to 
provide the necessary services (Rao Seshadri 2001. p. 9). 
Figure 2.2: Public sector spending on health, 1985-86 to 1999-00 
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Local governmental bodies have also played a role in shaping the health care system. 
Wherever in India political parties have been successfully organised at a local level. 
the improvement of health facilities has been used as a means of gaining political 
ground. The most obvious examples are Kerala and West Bengal. Meanwhile. in 
parts of India (like Bihar) with dormant local democratic institutions. rural primary 
"). The 71" health facilities have received less from government (Jeffery I QQ-I. p. 22- 
Constitutional Ainendment (1993) empowered the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) 
and laid down guidelines for the devolution of powers to the PRIs- This system 
operates councils at the district. block and village levels which should ultiniatelý 
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adopt responsibility for a vanety of local-level functions including health care. 
Health is an important area for such devolution of financial and Implementing 
powers, but the provisions of the 7-")'d Amendment have not been uniformlý 
implemented in all states. 
SOURCES, AGENTSAND MECHANISMS OF FPS kN(*I*NG 
Sources of financing 
Total expenditure on health as a percentage of' Gross Domestic Product is currently 0 
estimated at 5.2/'0 (WHO 2000). This is high in companson to other low-income 
countries (Figure 2.3) - India ranks 15"' in terms of total health expenditure among 
the 63 countnes classified as low-income by the World Bank (WHO 2000). Total 
hcalth care spending in neighbounng counthes is generally lower: 2.7'o ofGDP in 
China, 4.0'//o in Pakistan, and 4.9% In Bangladesh. 
Figyure 2.3: Health expenditure as a percentage of GDP (estimates for 1997): P% 
Select Asian countries (1997) 
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-een the main financing. , our Figure 2.4 illustrates the flow of resources bem and 
agents and health care providers. Today, there are t,, %-o main pathways of 
health care 
financing. The bulk of resources flow from individuals and households directly to 
health care providers (predominantly pnvate) in the form of out-of-pocket payments. 
Public resources, the second most important source of health care financing. are 
typically used for the provision of health care through the multi-tiered system of 
public providers. 
Figlure 2.4: Financial relationships anion(-, y main actors in the Indian health 
sector 
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There are four major sources of financing, in the Indian health system: govemment 
=0 .III revenues (national, state and municipal) make up roughly 
20'o- foreign aid makes up 
less than 10o. employer conti-ibutions make up 2"o, and household expenditures 
make up 75% (Table 22.2). ' Figures from the World Health Organisation (2000. p. 
193) suggest that by 1997 there was an even greater reliance on private sources, with 
some 87.0% of total health expenditure pn%-ate and orib. - I public (as in Figure 
2 3). 
Table 2.2: Estimate of total health expenditure in India, 1990-91 
Source Total Per capita ", ) of total of GDP 
(R. s. crores) (Rs. 
PI; Bl-l(' Sl--, C'f (W 
Center 554 6.6 2.1', o 0.1 
States 4,981 59.3 18.6? 0 1.1 
Municipalities 126 1.5 0.5ýo <0. I 
Extemal aid 118 1.4 0.4% <0. I 
Sub-total 5,779 68.8 21.5% 1.3 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
Out-of-pocket 20,160 240.0 75.2' 4.5 
Private employers 319 3.8 1.2 ý,, o 0.1 
ESIS contnbutions 202 2.4 0.80 ý <0. I 
Other sourcc,,,, 361 4.33 1.30o 0.1 
Sub-total 21,04- 250.5 C, 4. - 
TOTA 1, 2 (i, X 21 319.3 100.011 6.0 
Source: Berman 199-5 
High levels of out-of-pocket spending are fairly common in low income countries, in 
30',,, o ofcountries at incomes below S 1,000 per capita, out-of-pocket is 601, o or more 
of the total vy-hereas less than I 00'o of middle and high income countnes depend so 
lica,, ily on out-of-pocket financing (WHO 2000. p. 96). Globally, only f0ur low- 
income countries (Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo. Myanmar and Sierra 
Leone) have higher dependence on pnvate financing of the health sector (WHO 
2000). Surveys sug-gest that 77 to 90o of annual household consumption expenditure 
in India is on health care (Bhat 1993. p. I 
Data from 1900-01 are presented here. a-s this is the most recent year for %%hich such a 
comprehensive breakdown of sources \%, as a\ ailable. Note that total -, -pending on health in 
1990-91. at 
6.00o of GDP (Ttjble-'. -') was higher than in 
IQo-. at-i. -'OoofGDP(ý\'HO200O. p. 
193). 
Public funding of the health care system (central. state and lcwal, combined) ill 
low in comparison with international norms, and with some neighbouring, 
developing countries. Public expenditure on health care represents, only 0-70o of 
GDP and 3.9% of total public expenditures (WHO 2WO, p. 193 ). 4 Figures ot'public 
health spending, as a percentage of GDP, for some of India's neighbours include: 
2.3% in Bangladesh, 1.9% in Thailand. l"'o in Vietnam. 0.9'o in Pakistan. and 0. -0 0 
in China (WHO 2000). 
The source of most public funding in India is the state govemments. Central 
funding for public health services constitutes less than 25% of the total expenditure 
for such services while states cover more than 75'. o of direct health service provision 
(Naylor, et al. 1999; Peters, et al. 2001, Duggal, et al. 1995). However, this 
breakdown varies considerably from one state to another. as states varx., up to tenfold 
in their per capita spending on health according to Naylor, et al. ( 1999, p. 3) versus a 
maximum of fourfold according to Peters, et al. (2001, p. 141) and Berman (1995). 
Peters, et al. (2001, p. 128) report that public spending in states like Kerala and 
Punjab is twice that in Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. The poorest states 
in India (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh) spend the least on health care 
services. The central share of health spending is considerably more equally 
distributed (on a Rs. per capita basis) but is slightly tilted away from the poorer 
states. In the states, investment has declined from 71o of total state budget to -5.5% 
during the 1990s (Kumar 200 1). 
Financing of care by local bodies ("municipal bodies" in larve cities) also constitutes 
a small but important source of public funds. These local bodies pro% ide less than 
1% of health sector resources nationalk, (Table 2.2). Ho%%ever, studies have shown 
that these municipal bodies spend approximately 40% of their total expenditures on 
health, including water supply (38% in a 1989 study of 157 municipal bodies and 
4 These estimates are for 1997, and differ for the estimate for 1900-91 presented in ýable 2 2. 'ýomc 
other recent estimates suggest that public spending is ;I ightly higher, at 0.9*10 of GDP in I Q14Q (Kumar 
2001). 
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40.20 percent in a1974-75 study of 1,5333 municipal bodies, Duý---, jl and Antia 1093. 
p. 62). In Bombay City (1993-94 data) 10"o of expenditures by the Municipal 
Corporation were on public health (not including water suppl,,, -). representin, _, 8-"Oo of 
total public health spending (Chauhan, et al. 1997, p. 69). 5 
Other sources are of lesser importance. The private corporate sector reportedly 
provides benefits to tens of millions of Indians (Duggal and Antia 1993: Ellis. et al. 
1996). However, no significant study of this sector's financing of health care has 0 
been done. 
Agents and mechanisms of collecting resources 
Agents are of relatively little importance in India. Almost all of household (or 
"private") health expenditures are made as out-of-pocket expenditures directly to the 
health care provider. The World Health Organisation (WHO 2000) estirnates that 
85% of total health expenditures in India are made "out-of-pocket" by consumers. 
Thus, a maximum of 15% of all health care resources are channelled through agents. 
Central government revenues are collected (1991 data) bý- goods and services taxes 
(35.5%), tax on international trade and transactions (28.8", 0) and income, profit and 
capital gains taxes (15.4%; World Bank 199-3, Table 12). Most public funds are 
transferred directly to the Ministi-y of Health and Family Welfare. A small 
percentage of government health moneys will flow through social securit-v plans - 
this was 6.7%. central and state combined, in 1982-83 (Rao, et al. 1993), and some 
small portion is undoubtedly contributed to non-goverrunental organisations. 
Social insurance coverage in India is limited. Most is proý-ided through the Central 
Government Health Scheme (CGHS) and Employee State Insurance Scheme (ESIS). 
CHGS is a contributory health scheme, introduced in 1954, that pro%ides 
comprehensive medical care to the central government employees and their 
3 Bombay is a relatively wealthy municipality. 
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dependants. Some 4.4 million beneficiaries were co%-ered under the scheme in 1,406 
(Peters, et al., 2MI, p. 135). The GOI heavIlv subsidises the CGHS. The 
contribution from employees varies from Rs. 5 to 50 per month (it Is unclear 
whether this is income related). The ESIS, which became operational in 1952. is an 
insurance system providing both care and medical benefits to poor factory %%orkers 
and dependants. Coverage as of 1998 "-as 35.4 million people (Peters. et al.. 2001. 
p. 134). Employers contribute to the ESIS an amount equal to 4.7-50o of the %kages 
payable to employees, while employees contribute 2.25'o of their wages. State 
governments contribute a minimum of 12.50o of the total ESTS expenditure on 
medical care in their respective states (Naylor. et al. 1999, p. 10). 
Private insurance coverage is very limited. Four national insurance companies 
(falling under the control of the semi-autonomous General Insurance Company, or 
GIC) offer a full range of insurance types with health being a very small share of 
their total. As of the end of calendar year 1995, there were 1.8 million persons 
covered under the GIC's Mediclaim (medical insurance) policy. Premiums are 
generally provided directly by households, and in 1996 ranged from Rs. 175 to 5,770 
per year (for coverage from Rs. 15,000 to 300,000 per year, Naylor, et al. 1999). 
Individuals are eligible for a rebate on income tax up to a sum of Rs. 10,000 per 
year. 
Managed care also exists to some degree. Several large hospitals have developed 
prepayment insurance schemes to attract and retain patients. For example, the 
Apollo Hospital in Madras set up the Apollo Health Association in 1986. Under this 
scheme, a family of four members is entitled to hospitalisation cover of up to Rs. 
17,600 for an annual premium of Rs. 999. According to the current managiw-, 
director of GIC the company will move into managed health care, tving up 'Alth 
hospitals and settling bills directly with them (Mayur 1998). Nianaged care is also 
available through a number of voluntary organisations, and is discussed below. 
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Ellis, et a]. (1996) estimate (based on minimal data) that 10 million people ma.,. 
presently be enrolled in some form of NGO prepaYment -plan-. NC3()s have 
reportedly used a variety of innovative financing mechanisms to reco%er costs and 
yet at the same time provide for poor populations (Bhat 199", 11 dh r ': Dave 1993: ( ri a 
1993; Pachauri 1994). No recent study of total health spending by NGOs in India 1-ý 
available. Peters, et al. (2001, p. 135) state that, *Alost are financed frorn patient 
collections, government grants, donations, and such miscellaneous items as interest 
earnings or employment schemes. 
REsoURCE ALLOCATION 
In this section, I will examine patterns of resource allocation b,, - three purchasers of 
health care: indiv iduals/househo Ids, government (through the MOH&Fýký and 
NGOs. I will focus on the broad types of goods and services purchased. and how 
these are paid for (e. g. fee-for-service, capitation, global budget, etc). 
Types of health care purchased by individuals/households 
In general, private health care is more widely and readily available than public 
health care, in both rural and urban areas. Private providers include outpatient and 
inpatient facilities; unqualified and qualified doctors, and practitioners of allopathic 
and traditional systems of medicine. It has recentlý- been estimated that there are 
67,000 private hospitals in all of India, comprising 930o of all hospitals and 640, 'o of 
the hospital beds nation-wide (Peters, et al., 2001, p. 21 ). In addition to these 
allopathic inpatient facilities, it is estimated that there are another 2,800 hospitals 
(and 46,000 beds) under the Indian systems of medicine, the vast majority of which 
are in the private sector. Current estimates are that there are between 400,000 and 
470,000 allopathic doctors, with about 80 to 850jo working in the private sector 
(Peters, et al. 200 1, p. 2 1). As well, as many as 85'o of -public sector" dcx: torN are 
also practicing in the private sector (Peters, et al., 200 1. p. 2 1, citing Cha%%-Ia -2000). 
Of the 120,000 doctors estimated to be practicing, Indian systems of medl,: Inc in 
1981 (ayurveda, unani, siddha. amchi. naturopahy. and %-o,, a as %%ell as 
homeopathy), about 850, o are in the private sector. "'Consen-ative estimates" put the 
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number of non-qualified rural medical practitioners at 1.25 million. almost all are 
solo practitioners located in outpatient settings (Peters, et al.. 2001. p. 21. citing 
Rohde and Viswanathan 1995). The majority. of qualified solo practitioners practice 
in urban areas. Unqualified practitioners, faith healers, traditional birth attendants. 
priests and local medicine women and men largely cater for rural areas (Nandraj 
2000, p. 5). 
In both rural and urban areas, the majority of people (oNer 801o) use the pn%ate 
sector for outpatient curative services, and some 561o use the private sector for 
ý -)nd hospitalisation (Figure 2.5; Peters, et al., 2001, p. 22, citing -- 
Round NSSO 
survey). People of higher income are more likely to use private health facilities. 
Sundar (1995) found that among those in the highest income cateorory (over 1993 
Rs. 54,000 annually), private facilities accounted for 690,0 (rural) and 7/ 50-o (urban) of 
providers, while corresponding figures for those in the lowest income category 
(below 1993 Rs. 18,000) were 51% and 520 0. There is evidence from many studies 
of the poor quality of care provided by the private sector, including: "'problems with 
diagnostic and treatment practices, inadequate facilities and equipment, over- 
prescribing and subjecting patients to unnecessary investigations and inten entions. 
charging patients exorbitantly, unethical and irrational practices, and failure to 
provide information to patients" (Nandraj 2000, p. 6). Principal advantages of 
private facilities are their accessibility, with better locations and more con%-enient 
hours; better sanitation and maintenance; and more courteous treatment. In the 
public health facilities, the availability of medicines is frequently negligible, the 
equipment in many hospitals is often obsolete and unusable, and the buildings are in 
a dilapidated state (Shanna 2001). 
Most private health care resow-ces are spent on provision hy the private sector. and 
on primary curative care in particular. An estimated 70'1, ý of direct household 
expenditures go to private practitioners (Dugggal and Antia 1993). 
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According to Bhat (1999) one-third of private health care expenditure is on 
secondary and tertiary in-patient care, the rest meeting curative needs at the pnmary 
level. This is consistent with figures provided by the NVorld Bank ( 1995) su-g-gresting 
that two-thirds of household health spending is on primary care (Table 2. ý': note that 
this table does not distinguish between public and prIvate health care pnrviders). 
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How health care is purchased by indi A dual s/ho u seholds 
Most payments to private providers are either by consultation fee or payment for 
medicines only. Bhat (1999) found that 70% of private allopathic physicians (in 
Ahmedabad City) charged a fee-for-service and the remairuing 330'o charged on a 
case basis in which the total charges depend upon specific ser-, -ices procedures (it is 
not clear how this is different from fee-for-service). For inpatient care. most 
hospitals allow doctors to set their own fees (Muraleedharan, 2000). Tarift's are 
rarely published, making it difficult for the consumer to compare prices or to know 
what to expect. For alternative private practitioners (practitioners of Indian systems 
of medicine and untrained/unqualified allopathic practitioners) user fees are the main 
source of income for nearly 90% (Peters, et al., 2001, p. 89). User-fees are also an 
important source of revenue for the NGO providers. Many doctors do not charge a 
consulting fee, but instead charge for the sale of medicines (Kapil 1988,1990). This 
may lead to irrational and potentially harmful treatment. e. g. the overuse of 
injections and antibiotic medications. 
Types of health care purchased by the public sector 
Most public spending flows directly from the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 
to the multi-tiered system of public providers. The central goverriment budget 
almost entirely finances the direct costs of the family welfare program, a primary 
care program focussed on family planning and population control (Naylor, et al. 
1999). The central government is responsible for health in the Union Territories and 
plays an important role in supporting and assisting state governments with health 
care planning, policyrnaking, and delivery. In addition, the Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare oversees several disease control programs that are national in scope. 
including malaria, tuberculosis, blindness. leprosy and HIV AIDS (Naylor, et al. 
1999). Approximately 65(1,0 of resources from the central government are allocated 
to preventive care (Table 2.3). The state govenurients provide the majority of 
funding and management for tiered systems of rural health services: subcenters. 
primary health centers, community health centers, and rural hospitals. States also 
have the responsibility for urban health services. which generally include larger 
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referral hospitals and some publicly funded primary care ser,. ice-s I\aylor, et al. 
1999). The bulk of resources from state governments - roughly - 540 -N o (Table 2. ') - 
are spent on secondary and tertiary care. Government contracting with pinvate 
providers is rare, and has generally been limited to support ser,, ices (e. g. hospital 
maintenance, catering, laundry) and diagnostic sen-ices (Mills, et al. 2001. p. 122-3). 
The amount of public resources received by tertiary hospitals is disproportionately 
high relative to "need" for these facilities (Mahapatra and Berman 199-5). Hospital's 
consume 34% of health care expenditure in Andhra Pradesh. Of this, secondary 
level hospitals consume 17% and tertiary level hospitals 16%. Thus, the tertiarý 
hospitals drew about 49% of total hospital expenditure. . -\ccording to calculated 
"norms", the maximum share of tertiary le-vel hospitals in hospital expenditure 
should have been 34%. A review of government health department's plan 
expenditure on hospitals revealed that the secondary level hospitals were 
consistently allocated a lower share of plan resources. A case study of Rajasthan 
shows that in 1990-91, one-fifth of the total State health bud,, et was taken up by the 
medical colleges alone and their attached teaching hospitals (Gupta 1997, citing 
Purohit and Rai 1992). 
Public spending is biased towards urban rather than rural areas. The additional 
investment in health care in urban areas by municipal bodies contributes to this bias 
(Duggal, et al. 1995). Rao, et al. (1993, p. 107) estimate that in 1982-83, public 
expenditure (central and state, but excluding municipal) m,, as spent predominantly in 
urban areas, with 54 to 65% of all funds being spent in urban areas. Berman ( 1995). 
based on 1991 data collected by the National Council for Applied Economic 
Research in 1991, estimated that government health spending per capita in urban 
areas was, on average, almost three times higher than in rural areas. This dif1erence 
was accounted for entirely by hospital-based sen-ices (which includes inpatient care 
plus primary ambulatory treatment. obstetric and family planning services). 
expenditure on non-hospital services was almost identical in per capita terms 
between niml and urban areas. k1though 7/5? o of India's population li-ve in rural 
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areas, rural residents capture just 67.6% of the net benefits from curati% e care 
(Peters, et al. 2001, p. 120). This figure seems generous, but probably reflects the 
fact that rural residents make up a significant proportion of the beneficiaries of urban 
spending (Berman 1995, p. 12). 
A relatively small (? ) percentage of MOHFW expenditures go to NGOs: ho%%-e% er, 
this is a very important source of financing for the NGOs. Berman and Dave (1996) 
report that, "the government's involvement in financing of the NGO health sector 
within India is widespread and significant" (p. 37). In this study of four NGO's 
providing health care services in different parts of India, the other major source of 
financing (than government) was user-fees. According to this study, government 
support for NGO health programmes has developed in an ad hoc manner. The 
NGOs have responded to various schemes and opportunities for public financing as 
they became known or were made available to them. Public financing may range 
from grants earmarked for, or tied to, certain services to large general budgetary 
support or deficit grants. Government financing mechanisms vary significantly from 
state to state and reflect a mix of objectives including medical training, inpatient care 
for the poor, family planning, and community-based nutrition programmes, among 
others (p. 39). 
How health care is purchased by the public sector 
A large percentage of public spending is in the form of salaries to government 
employees. "Typically, within a state's health budget more than 700, 'ý would go for 
recurrent expenses such as salaries and administrative costs (Bennett and 
Muraleedharan 1998). Rao, et al. (1993, p. 119) estimate that about half of the total 
public expenditure in 1982-8-3) was used for the payment of salaries, while about 18 
per cent was spent on drugs and materials. Duggal, et al. (1995. p. 836) in their 
study of seven public programmes in eight states, found that general salanes 
consume to-an exceptionally large proportion of expenditure on all activities- with 
programme-specific means ranging from 5-5016 to 830, 'o. 
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Health care purchased by NGO agents/insurers 
Compared with public and private- for-pro fit hospitals. NGO-owned hospitals are 
more likely to be located in rural areas and seem to be relatively efficient (Bhat 
1993; Bhat 2001). In 1987, about 10'e; o of the hospitals in India were owned by 
voluntary agencies, accounting for 13% of the system's hospital beds. There is 
limited evidence to suggest that NGOs are more efficient in their allocation of' 
resources. Bhat, et al. (2001) found that in Gujarat State, grant-in-aid hospitals (i. e. 
non-profit, NGO-run hospitals that receive goverrunent funding) are relatively more 
efficient (they looked both at technical and allocative efficienc,. -) than district level 
(public) hospitals. Berman and Dave (1996) found that NGO hospital serviceh were 
operating at lower costs than public hospitals, but within the range reported for 
private- for-profit hospitals. 
RESOURCE MOBILISATION, EFFICIENCY, EQUITYAND FINANCIAL PROTECTION 
Resource mobilisation 
Total health spending in India is high in comparison to most other low-income 
countries. However, many argue that current public health spending is not sufficient 
to achieve health system goals. And state government resource constraints persist as 
a major impediment to increasing health spending in the poorest states. According 
to the World Bank's Health, Nutrition and Population Sector Strategy (199-0, 
##, concern is warranted if public expenditure is less than 2"o of GDP.... Such 
countries are probably not allocating a sufficient share of national resources to 
providing poor populations and other vulnerable groups with protection against 
illness" (p 24). A recent analysis by Gupta, et al. (2001) estimated that if Fleavil, -, 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) are to achieve International Development Cloal, " 
(commitments made by the UN membership at global conferences in the first hall"of 
the 1990s) through increased public spending alone, public spending would need to 
rise in HIPCs from an average of -10, o in 1999 to 
120o in 2015 (note that India is not 
one of the HIPC countries). Under the new national health policy, aggregate health 
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expenditure would be increased to 60o of GDP by 2010 from the current -i. -"-o 
(Sharma 2001). 
Efficiency 
It is very difficult to assess the efficiency (both allocative and technical) of' the 
resources that flow from households directly to health care pro% idenii. Data from the 
late 1980s show fndia to have a far higher mortalit-y- rate from communicable 
diseases and maternal and perinatal causes than demographically developing 
countries overall (470 compared to 253 deaths per 100,000 population. standardised 
for age, respectively) (World Bank 1993). Despite this, a low percentage of private 
health spending (3%; Table 2.3) is accounted for by "primary-preventive and public 
health 910 services. Patients, due to a lack of information about their own health and 
the costs and benefits of health care, are generally believed to be in a ýveak position 
to be strategic purchasers. The technical efficiency of monies spent on pri%-ate swor 
health care will vary tremendously between providers, but may be low where the 
quality of health care is low. 
Most private providers in India are paid by fee-for-service. In settings- where the 
demand for health care exists, fee-for-service payments create perverse Incentives 
for health care providers to expand the number of cases seen and the Intensity of 
service provided, and to provide more expensive services and drugs. Allocative 
efficiency may suffer as the provider may provide the mix of actiý-Ities that wIII have 
the greatest impact on his/her income rather than on the patient's- health. For 
example, two studies (see Muraleedharan 2000) have attributed "alarmingly" high 
caesarean delivery rates to the fee-for-service payment system prevalent in private 
hospitals. Those doctors who are paid only for medications have the incentive to 
medicate irrespective of diagnosis. One study in Satara district. Maharashtra (data 
from 1991 to 1994) found that "private doctors more frequently prcs,: nbed 
irrationally, relied on drug manufacturers for their -continuing medical education" 
(which inevitably diverted practice away from national health programmeo. and W 
selected medicines for commercial rather than clinical reasons.. -pn% ate 
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prescriptions of ineffective injections or unnecessanlý expenso. e brand narrie 
products are commonplace" (Collier 1996). In a suneý of pn%ate allopathic 
physicians in Ahmedabad City. Bhat (1999) found that the -o%er-prescription of 
drugs" was the undesirable practice cited as being most prevalent in the pn%ate 
sector (p. 31). 
The allocative and technical efficiency of public health expenditures in India appear 
to be low (at least at the state level). Contnbuting to this Is what Mills. et al. (2001. 
p. 36) refer to as, "over-complex and unmanageable financing systern-s- created b%, 
the mix of state and federal financing for health care: 
Furthermore... bureaucratic s' vstemý focused upon control (b *v the ce-rare) rather than enabling local level action. Ihis control fi)cus meant that 
bureaucratic rules, particularly relating to bucketary and financial 
systems, were commonly venI cumbersome (Mills, et al. 200 1. p. 36). 
Almost one-half of public health spending (43%, Table 2.3) is on sccondary and 
tertiary inpatient care. Public health spending per capita is lower in the poorer states 
and in rural areas, which also have poorer health status. A 1992 report by the World 
Bank noted that: 
... public 
health financing in India is characterised b, v tin emphasis on 
"hospitals " (all institutions abovc communiýv health cciacrs, CHCV). 
rather than "primai-v care" (all senw-cs from CHCs down): urban rather 
than rural populations, medical oj icers rather than paramedics (agal? l 
with an urban bias): services that have larger private rather than social 
return; and jamiýv planning and child health to the exclusion of' wider 
aspects of women's health (Banerji. 1994, p. 154). 
The Government of India is soon to update its national health policy (the first update 
since 1983). The draft policy acknowledges past inefficiency. and states that 55'0 of 
government's investment in health care should go to primary care. %k-hile secondar-% 
and tertiary sectors would get 350o and 101o respectively (Kumar 2001, Sharnia 
2001). Government expenditure on medical research will be raised from currentlý 
0.30, o of total health spending to Po by 2005 and 20o by 2010. Both technical and 
allocative efficiency are hindered by the very large percentage of resources that are 
committed to staff salaries - resources cannot easily be shifted from one inter% ention 
48 
to another, one geographic area to another. or from --. staff to other categone" ot 
expenditure (e. g. medicines, physical infrastructure. medical supplies. etc. ). 
According to Mills, et al. (2001, p. 33), "it was widel- gI v reco nised that -overnment 
employed an unnecessarily (Inefficiently) high number of unskilled staff in its health 
facilities" and "remote primary health centres were unable to fill many posts 
whereas facilities in urban areas were often overstaffed"'. 
Equity 
Overall, the health care system in India is highly inequitable. The equity of a health 
system is optimised when there is both equi ion and equity of ity of financial contributi 
access to benefits. Equity of financial contribution occurs when payments into the 
system correlate with one's ability to pay - so that the wealthy pay an equal, or 
larger percentage of their income than do the poor - and payment is unrelated to the 
probability of falling ill. Equity of access to benefits means that benefits are 
provided on the basis of medical need, and are at least as accessible to the poor 
relative to the wealthy. 
In India, out-of-pocket spending on health care is generally regressive. This means 
that for the same service, lower income groups pay a higher share of income than 
higher income groups. An NCAER study of 1990 found that the poorest 40% of 
rural households spent, on average, Rs. 157 per illness when receiving care from 
government doctors and Rs. 131 when purchasing care from private doctors. The 
richer 60% of the population paid less for goverrunent doctors, Rs. 137, and more 
for private doctors, Rs. 215 (almost certainly, the cost of both public and pnvate care 
would be demonstrated to be regressive if expressed as a percentage of income). 
Similarly, data collected by the NCAER in 199") suggest that expenditure per illne'; s 
episode of ambulatory care is regressive. The difference in average income bet%%een 
the poor (annual income of 1993 Rs. 18,000 or less) and the wealthy (annual income 
of 1993 Rs. more than 54,000) is at least 33-fold. while the average expenditure per 
illness episode was offly 1.7 times higher among the wealthy. both in rural and urban 
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areas (Sundar 1995. p. 82). 
taxation is fairly progressive. 
It is likely that the collection of resource-, thn)ugh 
Despite lower rates of utilisation among the poor (discussed belo%k-), total health care 
expenditures account for a greater percentage of total household spending, arriong the 
poor. A study from Kerala (1996 data. reported bY Muraleedharan 2()00. p. 16) 
found annual per capita medical expenditure to be ) 39.630'o of income amo%, the 
poorest "segment"' and 2.44% among the richest. A national sample survey bý 
Sundar (1995, data from 1993) found that poor households (annual income of 1993 
Rs. 18,000 or less) spent 7.660,0 of income on curati% e health care, compared to 
2.66% among the wealthiest group (income greater than 19931 Rs. 54,000). This is 
doubtless a function of much lower incomes among the poor, but probably results 
also from inequitable costs outside of user-fees (for example, medicines, supplies, 
transportation, etc. ). Results of the 42 nd Round of the National Sample Sun-ey 
suggest that the percentage of household consumption expenditure which goes to 
health in rural areas is more than twice than in urban areas (-5oo compared to 2. )'o: 
Berman 1995, p. 16). 
Access to health care - through both public and private systems - is highly 
inequitable. On average, the poorest quintile of Indians is 2.6 times more likeh'- than 
the richest to forego medical treatment when ill (Peters, et al. -1001, p. 
158). Aside 
from cases where people believed that their illness was not serious (which comprised 
more than half of all cases), the main reason for not seeking care was cost, 
particularly for the poor. The richest quintile of the population is six times more 
likely than the poorest quintile to have been hospitallsed in either the public or 
private sector (see Figure 2.6). 
Due to inequitable access to health care, the poorest 200, o of the population captured 
only about 10% of the total net public expenditure from publicly provided cllnl,: al 
services (Figure 2.7). (In part. this bias also reflects longer hospital stavs the 
rich, and possibly higher quality of care, for example pn,. -ate rooms. ) 
The nchest 
quintile received more than three times the subsidy recei,. ed by the poore,, t quintile. 
indicating that publicly financed curative care services are unambiguously pn)-nch. 
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Figure 2.6: Public and private sector shares of hospitali/. ation. bý income 
quintile 
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Figure 2.7- Public expenditures on curative care, b% income quintile 
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This pro-rich bias vanes across t,.., pes of health spending (Fi, -, ure A 
concentration curve below the diagonal line indicates that the nch receive a more 
than proportional share of public health spending, a concentration cur%-e above the 
diagonal line indicates a pro-poor bias. Outpatient care in the primar--v care facilities 
shows a slight pro-poor bias, while spending on both inpatient and outpatient 
hospital care is biased toward the rich. 
Figure 2.8-. Income bias of public spending on hospital and primary health 
center care 
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Financial protection 
A single episode of non-hospitalised illness costs about 10 percent of a% erage 
monthly consumption expenditure and a single hospitalised episode generall-y costs 
more than one month's average consumption expenditure (Berman 199-5). Krishnan 
(1996) found the cost of hospitalisation (in a government hospital) to be even more 
burdensome, varying between 40 and 160% of annual per capita consumer 
expenditure. Consultations with the poor in India (Peters, et al. 200 1. p. 154. : Iting 
Narayan, et al. 2000) revealed that after illiteracy and unemployment. spendint! on 
health care was the greatest precursor to poverty amoncy poor households and die 
greatest impediment to continued household secunty. Analysis of the NSSO data 
shows that the cost of a hospitalisation for nearly all people is extremely high 
compared to their total annual expenditures, averaging 581o (Peters. et al. 2001. p. 
155). 
An analysis of sources of financing for hospital isations sho,, %s that large proportions 
ofall people borrow money or sell assets to pay for hospi II italisation (401o). but that 
doing so is more common among the bottom four income quintiles than among the 
richest (Figure 2.9). According to an analysis hy Peters, et al. (21001, p. 15-), at least 
24% of all people hospitallsed in India in a single year fell below the poverty line 
because they were hospitalised (not clear whether this takes into consideration the 
fact that other household members would serve as a buffer against poverty). 
Figure 2.9: Sources of financing for private expenditures on hospitaiii. ation 
in India by income quintile, 199-5-96 
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How MIGHT CBHI ADDRESS PROBLEMS OF FINANCING A. ND RESOL RCE 
ALLOCATION? 
CBHI, theoretically, has the potential to improve health care financing and resource 
allocation in India. Aspects of (large-scale, wel I- functioning) CBHI that may allow 
it to improve health care financing and resource allocation in India include: 
prepayment for health care, pooling of resources that is equitable (thus allmh-ing t-or 
cross- subsidisation from low-risk to high-nsk. and from vvealthy to poor). and 
strategic purchasing (WHO 2000). 
Resources spent on health care in India (expressed as a percentage of GDP) are high 
relative to other low-income countries. CBHl is likely to have little impact on the 
total resources available for health care. This is both becausc these schemes in India 
tend to be rare and to cover only small populations (see Chapter 3) and because 
CBH1, while bringing money into the health care system in the form or premiums, is 
likely to reduce out-of-pocket expenditures on health care. 
Public and private health care resources are spent inefficiently in India, as most 
spending is on curative care, which fails to adequately address major disease threats. 
A CBHI scheme may be better able than individuals to purchase health care 
interventions that will achieve health system goals. Scheme managers may be better 
informed about the nature and burden of disease among the beneficiary population. 
and the providers and interventions available to address them. Furthermore, a CBHI 
scheme may be able to improve the technical efficiency of private health care 
spending by improving the quality of health care available. A CBHI scheme can 
take advantage of economies of scale and better bargaining capacity, thus optimising 
the price, quality and opportunity of services. The CBHI scheme can use external 
incentives to providers (through contracting, budgeting and payment mechanisms) to 
influence the quality of services provided. 
India"s health care system is currently inequitable. both in terms of financing and 
access to health care. When people contribute resources to a CBHl scheme. it 
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provides the opportunity for pooling of risks and resources. When the rich : oninbute 
a larger percentage of their income than do the poor, the contributions are : onsidered 
to be progressive and (if benefits under the CBHI scheme are equitabl,, distributed) 
the wealthy help to subsidise health care for the poor. CBHl ma,. - impro% e equity of 
access to health care by removing some component of the financial barrier (i. e. the 
user-fee) that prevents poorer households from seeking health care. 
Health care expenditures in India, and those for inpatient care in particular. place a 
tremendous financial burden on households, and are a cause of indebtedness and 
impoverishment. Prepayment through a CBHl means that the expenditures on health 
care are spread out over time, and are less likely to push a household into poverly 
than if the same expenditures had to be made all at once, at the time of a medical 
emergency. Furthermore, the pooling function of CBHI allows for risk-sharing. 
such that those who are healthy (and do not require expensive health care semices) 
share the costs of those who fall ill. Thus, households are provided some protection 
against the potentially catastrophic costs of health care. 
As is discussed in the following chapter (Chapter 3) there is a real shortage of solid 
empirical evidence as to whether CBHI schemes are effective and sustainable. 
Those studies and reviews which have been undertaken suggest that many schemes 
are short-lived and fail even to meet the goals which they set for themselves. Z:, - 
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CHAFTER3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The aim of this literature review is to identify goals and objecti I *N-es (or indicators of 
success) of community-based health insurance (CBHI) schemes. and the tactors that 
underlie their success or failure, based on theoretical and empirical literature from 
India and elsewhere. Figure 3.1 (adapted from Bogg. et al. 1996) illustrates some of 
the elements of CBHI that will be covered in this chapter, including the objectIN-es of 
CBHI (economic and social), the participants, the design and management of the 
scheme (including the roles played by different participants). and the context in 
which the scheme operates. The literature re,, -iew is ordered as follows: (1) an 
introduction to the (traditional) economic perspectives on health insurance. 60 a 
discussion of the social perspectives on health insurance, including social 
consequences of health insurance and social capital as a determinant of success; (111) 
a discussion of international policy statements and reviews on CBHI. 0%. ) a reN-iew 
of existing CBHI schemes in India; and (v) a brief summary, including a theoretical 
framework for the research methodology, which e-v, olves out of the literature 
review. 1,2 
This chapter does not review the experience of non-Indian health insurzince scheme-, lur the 
informal sector. For a recent review of 82' schemes (including several of the Indian cherries) %cc 
Bennett, et al. ( 1998). 
Although it may seem countenntuiti%e to discuss consequences of health inurance pnor to 
determinants. we have used this order consistently throughout the thcsl.,, -. It is important to 
firNt gct 
some fýel for how success is being defined before discussing the factors that contribute to ýucce%, 
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H gu re 3.1: 
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The purpose of this section is to review the economic theory behind health 
insurance, nsks to the financial viability of an insurance scheme, and design 
mechanisms that can be put in place to ameliorate these nsks. 
Why people buy health insurance 
When I take out insurance, thc commodirl. I am hil I I'll. - I-S 
Barr 1998, P. L 
The ILO defines insurance as "the reduction or elimination ofthe uncertain nk of 
loss for the indi%idual or household by combining a larger number of similark 
58 
exposed individuals or households who are included in a cornmon fund that niak. -,, 
good the loss caused to any one member" (Criel 1998a. p. 59). Why might someone 
buy insurance? Figure 3.2 shows the utilio., function of income for an indiý idual 
who is risk averse (i. e. it assumes diminishing marginal utility for i Cý income). Let us 
assume: (1) that for any given period of time, the insurance company knovýs the 
probability that this individual will fall ill, and the average expense that this will 
involve; and (ii) that there is no loading cost to the insurance (i. e. the premium dcvs 
not cover the costs of producing the insurance or normal profit). Let I be the 
disposable income of the individual in the absence of illness, let p be the probability 
of the illness occurring during a given period of time, and let E be the expected 
average expense incurred due to the illness. An individual with insurance will ha%e 
a certain income of I-pE, and a corresponding utility of U(I-pE). During any one 
period of time, an individual with no insurance will have an uncertifin income of' 
either I or I-E. Expected utility without insurance (shown by the dotted line in 
Figure 3.2) is the weighted average of the utilities of expected income in health (1) 
and in sickness (I-E), which is (1-pW(b + pLW-E). In this scenanO. provided that p 
is greater than 0 and less than 1, the individual's utility will be higher with insurance 
than without. This is the 'utility maximising model' (. Arrow 1963, Culyer 199"'1). 
Based on this model, it is easy to see why "an individual's demand for private health 
insurance will be determined by factors such as the price of insurance, that is the 
premiums to be paid, the individual's assessment of the probability of loss 
(especially financial) resulting from the illness: the likely magnitude of that loss-, his 
income, and most especially, the degree to which he is risk adverse (Feldstein 
19714 
cited in Mills 1983, p. 67-8). 
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Fig, ure 3.2: The demand for insurance by a rational, risk-a% erse IndIN IduA 
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Traditional Indicators of Success 
According to tile Litility maximising model. the effect of' health insurance on the 
demand and supply of health care is predictable. "'hen an individual with health 
insurance falls ill, s/he is faced with a lower price per unit of' health care (P2 in 
Figure 
_33.3) than in the absence of 
health insurance (PI). This reduced pnce (P2) 
falls somewhere betvveen : ew and PI and depends on whether co-insurance or a 
deductible is charged (discussed below). The sick individual will increase 
I nvate , inal pri consumption of health care from 01 to 0' (the point at which marg 
ý1 rivate costs). 
If the providers can fully recoup their benefit is equal to marginal p 
expenses from the patient and the insurer, they have every reason to supply this care. 
Thus, health insurance is expected to result in increased utillsation of health care. 
and decreased price per unit ofhealth care faced by the consumer. When assming 
the impact of health insurance schemes, it is common to use the vwo-part model 
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developed as part of the Rand Health Insurance Experiment (Duan, et al. 10, ý-': 
Manning, etal. 1987) that estimates (Part I)probabilit--vof healthcare utilisation and 
(Part 2) incurred level of out-of-pocket expenditures, conditional on positi%e use of 
health care services (Jakab, et al. 2001, Yip and Berinan 2001). 
Numerous studies have found CBHI schemes to increase utilisation \Vhile (or as a 
result of) decreasing costs to the consumer (Table 3 '. 1). Schemes that coNer hospital 
inpatient care have resulted in increased rates of utilisation in such diverse settings 
as: China (Bogg, et al. 1996), Democratic Republic of Congo (Criel and Kegcls 
1997), Ghana (Atim 1999), and Kenya (Musau 1999). In Bwamanda district, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Criel and Kegels ( 1997) found that rates of hospital 
utilisation by members of a voluntary insurance scheme for hospital care were twice 
as high as for the non-insured (49 versus 24.9 per thousand per year). The Nkoranza 
Community Financing Scheme in Ghana (Atim 1999) covers 1000o of the costs of 
hospital isation. Members of the scheme were consistently more likely to be 
admitted to hospital (4.6 to 6.3% admitted per year) than non-members (1.5 to 2.60o 
per year). 
There are many econometric studies from developing countries that have looked at 
health insurance (may be private, social, CBHI, but rarely specified) as one of the 
many determinants of health care utilisation. Almost all studies that did include an 
indicator of insurance status found that insurance affected whether an indi% idual 
sought care, and the type of care accessed. Ellis, et al. (1994) found that the insured 
(most covered by the government's mandatory Health Insurance Organisation for 
government and large employers) were more likely to seek outpatient care from 
public facilities (versus pnvate. charitable) and were more likely to ha%e reporied 
hospital isation. Insured women in the Philippines were more likely to choosc 
private practitioner deliveries, as opposed to delivenes assisted by public, traditional 
or no practitioner (Schwartz, et al. 199)). Both adults and children covered by the 3 
social security scheme in Bolivia (for formal sector workers and their dependants) 
were more likely to access the social security facilities (11 1996). Even "potential 
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assistance from relatives", an informal insurance mechanism. was found to be 
associated with increased probability of seeking care and increased probability of 
seeking care from an allopathic practitioner as opposed to a tradi I doctor or 
dru( Y vendor (Manam 2000). 0 
Figure 3.3: The personal demand for health care 
Price 
PI 
P2 
Quantity 
e. g. inpatient days 
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Table 3.1: Summary of studies lookin-pri., at the impact of CBIII schernes on 
utilisation and ont-of-narket Pynpndihirpc 
Study of study Utillsation 
I 
Expendit= 
Rwanda (Schneider & 
' 
Fifty-four pre-payment Increased probabflitý Dec rca-, cd ý by appro x 1001) Diop - schemes in 3 districts (6.6 Urnes) of "at least W116) 11toud out-of- 
covered some outpatient one visit to professional pocket paýnwnt per 
and inpatient costs. health care providef'. illness eptsode". 
Largely restncted to 
outpatient care. Sample 
size of 11,583 (2,518 
HH). Data ftom 2000. 
Senegal 06tting 2001) Three Mutual Health Increased "Proportion of Docreascd "out-of. 
Insurance Schemes that sample with at least one pocket spending on 
covered part of the costs hospitalisation". hospitalisation" (480. ). 
of hospitalisation. 
Sample size of 2.987 
(346 HH). Data from 
2000. 
India (Gumber 2001 )3 SEWA, co,, ered hospital Decreased likelihood No change in "total 
costs only, to Rs. 1,200. (do %k n bv 6Y o) of annual cost (direct and 
Sample size 1,200 HH seeking ambulatory care indirect) of health care 
in non-randomly in case of illness. use". Neither 
selected clusters. Data (Perhaps women were ambulatory nor 
from 1998-99. "jumping the queue'-! ) inpaticrit. 
Democratic Republic of Distnct-level scheme Rates of liospitalv; ation 
Congo (Criel & Kegels that co%ered 9010 of were consistently higher 
1997) hospitalisation costs at (1.5 to 2 time-, ) arnong 
referral hospital. the insured. 
Routinely collected 
hospitalisation data. 
Ghana (Atim 1999) Nkoranza community Mcmbers A ere 
financing scheme. consistently more likely 
Covered 100'o of (2.3 to 4 times) to be 
hospital costs for admitted to hospital than 
referred patients. non-members. 
Hospital data from 1902 
to 1004. 
China (Bogo, et al. Comprehensi\e health Evidence for increased 
1996) utsurance svstem in utilisation of inpatient 
Jintan countv. Panial care. 
reimbursement for 
drugs. outpatient and 
inpatient visits. Data 
from 11)86 to lQQ4. 
Niger (Diop, et al. 1995) Bobove district. The number of initial Total illness related 
Mandator\ taxation. visits (outpatient) expenditure dropped by 
Coverage of drugs. increased by 40'0 during 4810. 
Loneitudinal data. the ýear following 
implementation. 
Sow-ce: Format adapted Irom Jakah. et al. ! Uu I 
HH = household 
Note that this eaflier study of the SEWA scheme did not examined the impact of Lhc ',:, 
"c"nc On 
6-1 
These analyses shed no light on ho%-. - health insurance might impact on the comple\ 
processes of intra-household resource allocation - the procesý, e, ' by which time 
money, and other resources are allocated among individuals. In fact. most 
economists (and most econometric analyses) view the household as a -colle-.; five of 
individuals who behave as if they are in agreement on how hest to combine time, 
goods purchased in the market, and goods produced at home to produce 
commodities that maximise some common welfare index" (QuIsumbing and 
Maluccio 1999, p. 10). This unitary approach is based on the assumption that all 
household members share the same preference function. The unitary model does 
allow for differences in well-being and consumption patterns within households, but 
assumes that resources are differentially allocated so as to maximise household 
utility. While the unitary model does allow person-specific prices (for goods and 
leisure, for example) it assumes that all household resources are pooled. 
Using the unitary model as the basis for health policy prescription', can lead to 
policy failures. For example, policy makers assume that by reducin-, 21 povert,. v I for an 
individual, they can alleviate poverty for the household, or that individual poverty 
can by reduced without taking the actions of other household members into account 
(Haddad et el. 1997). But the assumptions that uriderlie the unitary model are 
erroneous in a number of ways (Quisumbing and Maluccio 1999): 
0 First, resources are unlikely to be "'perfectly" pooled. For example, after a 
severe drought in the Sudan and the Sahel in 1975, herds were restored by 
granting cattle to male household heads. This programme failed to acknowledge 
that within the household, some cattle are owned by women who separately 
control their products, and that the women's loss xas as serious and important to 
rectify as the men's (Cloud 1978 as cited in Lorge Rogers 1990). 
0 Second, the unitary model predicts that information - like other resourýcs within 
the household - will be shared or pooled. However. numerous reai-%%orld 
examples have shown that targeting information and education to one individual 
hospital utilisation. 
64 
versus another (for example, husband vs. wife) has consequenc. -, t'()r the extent 
to which a policy will be adopted. 
Third, the unitary model fails to take into consideration the consequences to. and 
response of, non-recipients of a resource transfer. Under tile M%%ea-Tebere 
irrigated rice resettlement scheme in Kenya. children were sent a%% a% to school 
as a project benefit. The loss of children's labour time resulted in a greater 
burden on their mothers (Hanger and Mons 1973 cited in Lorge Roger, 1990). 
Different models have been proposed to address the weaknesses in the unitan, 
model. Quisumbing and Mulaccio (1999), for example, propose a "collective 
model" that posits that individuals within households have different preferences (i. e. 
different preference functions) and do not pool their income.,,. According to this- 
theory, conflicting preferences of individuals within the household are combined in 
various ways to reach a collective choice. Their empirical tests, using data from four 
different countries, consistently resulted in rejection of the unitarý- model in favour 
of this collective model. They found, for example, that assets controlled by worrien 
(relative to men) have a positive and significant effect on expenditure allocations 
towards the next generation. Similarly, empirical work presented in Haddad et al. 
(1997) supports the finding that household allocation decisions depend greatly on 
the person being targeted. The implication is that when policies to reduce household 
poverty - including insurance schemes - are designed and implemented, careful 
attention must be paid to the 'impact on intra-household resource allocation. 
According to Rosenzweig (1990, p. 41-2), the current bindin(-, constraint to the 
fin-ther development of economic models of household behaviour is the state of 
existing data: 
The theoretical framework provides a clear indication oj- the kinds (; I data 
needed for improving our knovvleLý(,, -e in order to anticipate th'. 
consequences of interventions, givcn intra-household behaviour: It"nt data 
sets meet these requirements... Poor integrati . on sun-cY dc, 4gn and 
modelling sofar have been critical impediments to knowledge. 
Rosenzweig (1990) states that increased data should be collected on: sources 01 
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income, by Individual; price variabl lity when there are alterations in the en% in)nment 
in which households exist; and increased information on the effects of inten, entions 
on the outcomes of interest (e. g. health, morbidity. schooling). 
Risks to the financial viability of health insurance schemes and tools of riA 
management 
Traditional economic theory is based on the assumptions that: people are Informed 
and rational, tastes are exogenous to the economic system. and that the purpose of all 
economic activity should be to satisfy the wants of consumers. In reality. there arise 
many situations in which these and other assumptions of the utility maximising, 
model are not met. Failure to meet these assumptions may threaten the financial 
viability of the health insurer. 4 
Adverse selection arises when the people who might take out insurance are better 
able to assess their 'riskiness' than are insurers (Barr 1998). The individual might 
have 'hidden knowledge' about the probability that he xxill fall ill. Those who are at 
greater risk, or who are already ill, will be more likely to subscribe to a health 
insurance scheme than those who are at less risk. Thus, the population that 
purchases insurance will be skewed towards the high risks and the insurer %vill tace a 
net financial loss. Insurers can counter adverse selection either by making 
membership compulsory, imposing a waiting period between enrolment and 
eligibility for benefits, or rating individuals according to their level of risk, and 
charging them accordingly for insurance. The latter strategy maý, not be particularly 
successful as there are inevitably pieces of information that cannot be accessed bý- 
the insurer. 
Moral hazard occurs when people change their behaviour, as a result of having It-- - 
insurance. in such a way that makes the event covered more likely or rnore 
4 In certain circumstances, failure to meet these assumptions may impro%e the financial %iabilitv of an 
(, f 'lln irL,; urancc scheme. For instance. individuals who are poorly informed ab%., ut the r n,, k I ma 
purchwe more insurance than they would if they were perfectly informed of their risk. 
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expensive. Moral hazard is a phenomenon that can be initiated by the patient 
himself or by the health care provider (provider- induced demand). There are 
methods used by the insurance industry to combat moral hazard (Ntills I L)S'N). Co- 
insurance requires that the insurance beneficiary pay a percentage of health care 
costs. Deductibles make the insured pay for the initial expen. se,, up to a 
predetermined sum, and fixed indemnity means that the insured is onl,. - co%ýered up 
to a predefined amount, or number of illnesses. Nioral hazard can also be dealt with 
by affecting the behaviour of providers. For example. insurers can pay pro%-iders by 
capitation, whereby the provider receives a fixed amount to provide all health care to 
a patient over a specific period of time. In many developing countries there are 
barriers that limit health care utilisation, so moral hazard may not be as important an 
issue: 
Given that the process of obtaining health care in most low-income settings 
is... associated with long journeys on foot and or, relatii, eýv, expensive hilt 
uncomfortable travel by road, long hours of queuing, and loss oJ' 
production for almost a dqv, there is little justýfication to include measures 
such as co-payments to reduce possible moral hazard (Arhin-Tenkoran 
2001). 
Inadequate risk pooling (under- enro I ment) increases the chance that an insurer wIII 
face large losses. As more people enrol in a health insurance scheme the actual 
probability of illness in the enrolled population approaches the probability ofillness 
in society at large. The smaller the number of people enrolled, the greater the risk 
that the frequency of illness will be different than was expected by the insurer. This 
may result in unexpected profits (if the frequency of illness is low) or debt and 
bankruptcy (if the frequency of illness is high). Under-enrolment can be combated 
either by increasing demand for insurance or by making enrolment in a scheme 
mandatory. Demand for insurance can be increased either by increasing willingness 
to pay (say through advertising) or ability to pay (by lowering the price of insurance, 
or providing subsidies). 
High costs of production (and administration) will limit the ability of an insurer to 
make a profit. The cost of producing insurance is a function of- ý 1) marketing cosb: 
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(2) processing costs (include the costs of actuanally determining premiWils). (3) 
reimbursement costs (not the costs of care. but the costs of checking claims. 
pursuing fraud, and reimbursing either providers or patients). (4) the degree to which 
premiums are set above the minimum cost (as would occur with monopuly premium 
setting); (5) and scale and scope of the insurance program (Culyer 19()1). Sound 
financial management is required to ensure that *loading' costs %xill co%er the costs 
of producing the insurance and normal profit. Corruption (misuse of funds b% a 
member of the staff of a health insurance scheme for personal gain) directl. -y add-s to 
costs of production. In the short term, corruption will have a direct, negatl%e impact 
on profits. Over the longer term, corruption may result in an increase in the loading 
cost. Corruption might be prevented (or minimised) by makin, -, morc than one 
person responsible for managing the insurance fund, establishing a supcrvisory 
committee, or allowing for regular external audits. 
Free riding refers to people who take advantage of the benefits of insurance without 
paying the premiums. Closely related to free riding is fraud. The payment of health 
insurance is linked to the occurrence of illness. While it might be relati%-ely 
straightforward to check whether an individual has broken a limb (with x-rays, for 
example), it might be difficult to check whether a person has actually suffered a 
seizure. Fraud refers to situations in which the insured claim benefits to which theý 
are not actually entitled. Free riding and fraud can be deterred by carefully 
investigating claims made to the insurance scheme, and imposing penalties for those 
who are found to abuse the system. 
Summary: the economic perspective 
Economic theory explains individuals' demand for health insurance in term.,; of their 
desire to maximise "'utility". Under this model, factors thought to determine 
individuals' demand for insurance include price of insurance. assessment of the 
probability and magnitude of financial loss resulting from illness, income. and the 
degree to which they are risk averse. Economic theory suggests that indl'. iduals 
with health insurance will face a lower price per unit of health care. and thus will 
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increase their utilisation of health care. Econometric studies of' health insur, ince 
schemes have traditionally assessed impact in terms of probability of health : are 
utilisation and level of out-of-pocket expenditures. There anse manv situations in 
which the observed behaviour of individuals does not meet the assumptioný of the 
utility maximising model required to avoid market failure. Failure to meet these 
assumptions (and inefficiencies of production) may threaten the financial N-labilit", of 
the health insurer. Various mechanisms can be empio,., -ed to protect fillancial 
viability. 
SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON HEALTH INSURANCE 
Potential social consequences 
Health insurance is likely to have social costs and benefits that are excluded from the 
traditional economic perspective. This section will review evidence for the impact 
of health insurance on: (i) the locus of medical decision-making: (ii) the status of the 
allopathic medical profession-, (iii) access to medical care; (k) mechanisms of gift- 
giving; (v) and the nature and prevalence of risky behaviour. Almost all of the 
literature in this section is from developed countries, and most of it from Western 
Europe. 
Health insurance may impact on the processes of medical dec ision- making, and the 
relative power of individuals or groups to make such decisions. Health insurance 
can reduce conflict amongst friends and family of the sick by transfeMng the 
responsibility for decision-making to physicians and insurance companies. **The 
dynamic of an insurance-oriented society (is) toward a greater social direction and 
administration" (Rushing 1986. p. 6). As well, health insurance can change the 
relationship between patient and provider-, a provider who is paid bý- an insurer rnaý 
have an incentive to please the insurer rather than the patient. There is disagreement 
as to whether conflict bet-%%, een patient and provider increases or decreases ývlth 
health insurance, and this seems to depend in part on the nature of the contract 
between insurer and provider (Heimer 1985. Rushing 1988). Health insurance 
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schemes vary tremendously in terms of the involvement of the community in 
making major decisions (Atim 1998, Dave Sen 1997). According to Atim, mutual 
health organisations, (MHOs) serve to empower communitV members (1998. p. 6) 
"as intermediate bodies between the state and the citizen (\IHO,, ) help in the 
development of democracy". 
Health insurance, by bestowing physicians with increased income and decision- 
making capacity, may improve the status of the allopathic medical profession. 
According to de Swaan (1988, p. 238), "the medical profession owes its position in 
contemporary society to its struggle for establishment and (in part to)... the 
emergence of a mass market for medical services financed by transfer capital in the 
form of social security, social assistance and health insurance. " Health insurance 
may also be associated with a decline in status of 'traditional' systems of medicine. 
Health insurance has social consequences by changing the access that various 
individuals and groups have to medical care. Health insurance enhances social 
integration by providing access to medical care to those who would otherwise be 
disabled by illness. 5 For example, health insurance permits the elderly to function at 
higher levels than would otherwise be possible, and to participate in the normal 
activities of society (Rushing 1986). Health insurance enhances cohesion by 
equalising access to health care among different socio-economic and demo_=phic 
groups. For example, health insurance has helped to ease conflict between the 
6proletariat' and their employers (Rushing 1988, de Swaan 1988). Availability of 
health insurance may impact on decisions around retiring or changing one's =1 
employment. 'Job lock' refers to a decrease in voluntarý, movement from one job to 
another, and it has been shown to result from the risk of losing employer-provided 
insurance (Monthly Labor Review 1998). 
Social integradon refers to "participa6on in activities with others** and social cohesion r-efcr-, to 
-a 
isolabon. and alienadon. and in : -,, nscqucnce. a 
10, 
minimum of individual discontent, individual 
level of conflict in social relations" (Rushing 1986, p. 148). 
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Health insurance changes society by establishing norms for the altruistic transfer of 
resources within society. Titmuss (1997, p. 292). drawing on his study of hlood 
donation, supports the idea that social security. like other social institutions "can 
encourage or discourage the altruistic in man, such systerns can foster integration or 
alienation". There is disagreement as to whether the 'institutional I sat ion' of giving 
through health insurance has a net positive or negative impact on societ%-. On the 
one hand, health insurance may provide a sense of well-being and enhance social 
cohesion by allowing the insured to make a unilateral transfer of resources-. On the 
other hand, health insurance may be detrimental by undermining traditional svsstenis 
of reciprocal giving (Rushing 1986). This is reflected in concerns %-oiced in the 
WDR 2000/2001 that government-provided insurance may "displace self-insurance 
or group-based mechanisms" (World Bank 200 1 c, p. 148). 
Health insurance may result in a change in the nature or prevalence of risky 
behaviour. It does so by changing societal values regarding life and health. On the 
one hand, preventive activities endorsed by the health insurance scheme wIII 
discourage behaviour that is risky to one's own health, or to the health of others 
(Kimball 1960). Similarly, there may be some degree of 'social control' whereby 
enrolees discourage fellow enrolees from engaging in activities that will result in 
over-utilisation of the scheme's benefits. On the other hand, economic theory 
suggests that individuals with insurance are less likely to take precautions so as to 
avoid the insured event (ex-ante moral hazard). 
Social capital as a determinant of the success of health insurance 
This section will examine the potential association between social capital and the 
financial viability of private health insurance. Social capital was chosen as the focus 
because it has recently leapt to prominence as a potential determinant of %anous 
institutional an-angements, including micro-credit schemes in developing countric" 
(van Bastelaer 1999; Woolcock 1998). The purpose of this section is to describe- 
the origins of the term, social capital, how social capital constitutes a resource. the 
extent to which social capital can be intentionally generated. attempts to 4uant 
fY 
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social capital; and how social capital may underlie the succes, emmental. ol non 
non-profit insurance schemes. 
Social capital can be defined as "features of social organisation such as networks. 
norms, and social trust that facilitate co-ordi I and co-operat on t')r mutual 
benefit" (Putnam 1993b, p. 35-6). 6 Used in its this sense. the term "social capital" 
first appeared in the published literature in 1916. L. yda I. Hanitan. a superintendent 
of schools in West Virginia, used the term in describing the importance of 
community involvement to successful schools: 
... those tangible substances [that] count for mo, q in the daiN lives (? f 
people: namely good will, fellowship, sympath ' y. and social 
intercourse 
among the individuals and families who make tip a social unit... If[an 
individual comes] into contact it'ith his neighbor, and the ' i, it-Ith other neighbors, there will be an accumulation qf social capital. which ma ' I. immediately satisfy his social needs and which ma ' i, 
bear a mci . (I/ 
potentialiýy sufficient to the substantial improventent qf living condilions ill 
the whole community (Hanifan 1916, p. 130). 
James S. Coleman was the first to develop the theoretical framework around social 
capital (Coleman 1988). Coleman acknowledged that economists and Sociologists 
had previously attempted to characterize the interactions between individuals' 
economic behaviour and the corresponding social context. He was critical of these 
attempts, suggesting that they were too simplistic in that they "maintain the 
conception of rational action but ... superimpose on it social and institutional 
organization" (p. S97). Social capital was introduced as a conceptual tool to sho%;, - 
how, --purposive action... in conjunction with particular social contexts. can 
account not only for the actions of individuals in particular : ontc\ts but al-so for the 
development of social organization" (p. S97). According to Coleman. social capital 
is a "'variety of different entities. with two elements in common: they all consist of 
some aspect of social structures (they exist within social structures), and the-v .0 
6 One interpretation of this (and most other) defiruition(s) of social capital i, that ocial capital Ls 
every-thing social that is alsofimctional or capable of being used to%%ards some desir-able outcomc 
Indeed, we have found no instance in the literature %%here social capital was not of bcrcfit to tho-x 
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facilitate certain actions of actors-whether persons or corporate actorý-%% ithin the 
structure. " Robert Putnam has enhanced the theoretical framework. and illustrated 
the practical applications of social capital in his anal. %sis ofthe Ie cces diff rential su s 
of regional govenunents in Italy. Putnam has redefined social capital in a more 
concrete manner, suggesting that the 'different entities' eluskely referred it) by 
Coleman can include "networks, norms and social trust" (Putnam 199`ý)- 
Hanifan, Coleman and Putnam have given a new name, and expanded upon. a 
concept that has been discussed in many different disciplines under man%- different 
names. For example, in 1967, the French sociologist Emile Durkheim, wrote of a 
distinct form of 'psychical entity' which anses from associated individuak and is 
inversely related to the incidence of suicide: 
"It is true indeed that sociqv has no other acting. forces than those of 
individuals 
.... (But individuals) in c-oming together form a psýivhical entitý, 
of a new kind, which... possesses wa , ys of 
thinking andftehij, iz of its own.... 
The group formed by the associated individuals is a realiiy of a di/ferent 
order from each individual taken sing4v.... The col/ccii . i'e states are 
grounded in the nature of the group and are in existence hdOre theY call 
affect the individual as such and bring about in him, h*v, achieving a new 
fiorm of organization, a pureýy self-contained existence. - (Translation of' 
Durkheim 196 7, found in Poggi 19 72) 
Putnam remarks, "the parallels (i. e. the association between the concept of social 
capital and better society) across hundreds of empirical studies in a dozen disparate 
disciplines and sub-fields are striking" (Putnam 1995) p. 67. Other terms used to 
describe this (or similar concepts) have included: 'embededness', *sense of 
community', 'sense of worth at the level of the community', 'social cohesion' and 
kcommunity competence'. 
A community which has civic networks. norms and social trust can make 
achievements which would not have been possible in their absence. or perhaps ()nl-% 
at a higher cost. Social capital is a resource insofar as it involves (Coleman 19, S8. 
Putnam 1993a, Putnam 1993b, Putnam 1995): norins of generalised reciprocit%. 
who have it. 
- -. 1. 
exchange of information, behaviours compliant ý%ith norms, and grounds for 
collaboration and co-operation. Norms of reciprocit% are advanta, _, eous in that the 
value of a favour is amplified as it is usualk I done when the recipient Is most in 
need. Exchange of information is important in pro% iding, a basis for rational action. 
For example, the sharing of gossip allows individuals to avoid opportunism and 
malfeasance (Putnam 1993b). Behaviours compliant with norms will benefit a 
community as such behaviours typically ha-ve beneficial effects on othcrs. Finallý-, 
collaboration and co-operation facilitate the resolution of future dileninias of 
collective action. 
According to Putnam, levels of social capital are deeply rooted in history 
Stocks of social capital, such as trust, norms, and nem-orks. tend to be self- 
reinforcing and cumulative.... As with conventional capital, those %;, -ho 
have social capital tend to accumulate more-them as has, gcts (Putnam 
1995, p. 37). 
Change in social capital needs to be measured over decades. and once on a particular 
path - either the downward-spiraling 'vicious circle' or the self'-reinforcing 'virtuous 
circle' - change may be difficult to impossible. Robinson and White ( 1997) use the 
term 'Putnam paradox' to refer to the fact that those communities that are in greatest 
need of social capital are least likely to be able to generate it. Putnam ackno%% ledge-, 
that building a more civic society is neither easy not is it something that can be done 
ovemight. 
Nonetheless, authors certainly have tried to devise concrete suggestions as to hoN%- 
social capital can be generated. Lomas. for example, suggests inter-v entions that can 
add to "social cohesion' or social capital (Lomas 1998). His suggcst ions include: 
improving income and power distributions, advocating for increased leisurc time to =1 
facilitate social interaction. changing planning by-laws to create more public spaces Cý , 
or to encourage verandahs on the front of houses rather than patios on the back or 
increasing subsidies and support for locally-based clubs and associations. Based on 
their analysis of data from 29 countnes. Knack and Keefer suggested that 
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social capital can be enhanced by: institutional reforms pro% iding bcrcr tonlial 
mechanisms for the reliable enforcement of contracts and to credi,,. Their 
results suggest that promoting honzontal associations through encouraging the 
formation and participation in groups may be counterproducti-, c. Bro-,. %-n and 
Ashman (1996) found that cooperation across sectors (NGO, public and pnvate-for- 
profit) in carrying out development-oriented projects produced social : apital: 
In the source of these programs, local organkations is cre arengtht'ncd or 
created; bridging NGOs expanded their activities and their L-r, --dIhij'; 1 ' I- it 
ith 
other actors; norms of reciprocity, cooperution and tnist i%$Cre establishcd I 
among previously unrelated or antagonistic parti cs t)". 47 7). 
The concept of social capital remains contested and cannot be unprohlematicallý 
applied. Some argue that the term social capital Is simply too vague to be 
analytically useful, and thus needs to be broken down into sub-cateogies. Hamss 
(1997), for example, suggested the following six categories as the first le%el of 
breakdown: 
Family and kinship connections; 
(Wider) social networks, or 'associational life', including participation in local 
roups and organisations; 
Cross-sectional linkages, or 'contacts spanning differences in sector and power 
(also referred to as 'networks of networks', 
Political capital, or the norms and networks that shape relations between civil 
society and the state, 
* Institutional and political framework, or the set of formal rule-, and nornis 
(constitutions, laws, regulations, policies) that regulate public life In a skxietx.. *: 
9 Social nonns and values defined by widely shared cultural belief's and the effects 
these have on a functioning of a society as a ývhole. 
This list illustrates how .,, aried a group of sub-concepts social capital is intended 
it) 
include, as well as the potential for different authors to be describing cntirelý 
different things under the term social capital. 
Others argue as to what should or shouldn't be included under the social : aP'tal 
-'5 
umbrella. Foley and Edwards (1999, p. 162). for example, ir,! ue that -nerailsed 
social trust"" should not be considered a part of social capital. as -there IN little 
evidence that greater or lesser proportions of a population expressing themselves 
trustful of people in general has any bearing on the health of' dernocrac-v or the 
prospects for economic achievement in a given countr%, --. Instead. the". ar,, ue for a 
focus on social structural interpretations of social capital. xith a focus on m-)Clal 
networks and resources within a specific context community. 
Still others argue not so much with the definition, but its narrow interpretation. 
Putnam's arguments, for example, "have been attacked for neglecting the *dark' side 
of social capital (such as rent seeking and suppression of innovativeness), aNolding 
politics and political structure, and under-esti mating the role of large-scale economic 
changes in under-mining civic engagement in the United States and elsewhere" 
(Foley and Edwards 1999, p. 145). Beall ( 1997, p. 960), based on empirical W-ork 
around solid waste management in India and Pakistan, %%-arns that -the diffusion of 
the social capital concept to development needs to be treated with caution". 
Consistent with the findings of Brown and Ashman (1996). for example, she 
concludes that "causal linkages between prior endowments of social capital and 
positive developmental outcomes need to be looked at as a two-wav street". She 
also finds that power relations influence whether intersectoral or interorganisational 
cooperation will result in benefit - and for whom. 
There is no accepted tool' for measuring social capital, which some feel limits its 
usefulness: 
nether social capital w-ill come to be as useful a quantitative C oncept 
social science as are the concepts Offinancial capital, phývu'cal capital, and 
human capital remains to be seen: its current value lies prilliariN ill it, S 
usefulness for qualitative anali-ses of' social sysicins and Jor thos" 
quantitative analyses that emphýv qualitative lndicatorý (Colernall 1990. 
305-6). 
as 'rue or In fact, some would argue that social capital should not be me ured. a., a '* 
valid measure is probably not possible. Past attempts at measuring social capital 
have generally broken it down into component parts. and tncd to measure such 
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things as 'trust7, 'civic cooperation' and 'Participation in c1% Ic onpnizations* (Kna,: k 
and Keefer 1997). Difficulties arise because measuring these inherently ambl, lu )w kS 
factors is problematic. Further, combining the measures from these various domains 
may not possible; it is held by some that social capital may be greatcr that the sum tit 
its component parts. 
Examples of tools used to quantify social capital include the follovving- 
9 Putnam (Putnam 1993a), in examining social capital in region,, of ltalY, used a 
composite index of newspaper readership, the density of sports and cultural 
associations, turnout in referenda, and the incidence of preference voting. 
* Knack and Keefer used data collected by the World Values Surveý, to examine 
the association between countries' social capital (specifically, trust, ci,. iic norms, and 
memberships in formal groups) and economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1997). 
The question used to assess the level of trust in a society was: "Generally speaking 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in 
dealing with people? " The strength of norms of civic cooperation is assessed based 
on whether people feel that each of the following behaviours "can alwavs be 
justified, never be justified or something in between. ": 
(a) "'claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to" 
(b) "avoiding a fare on public transport" 
(c) "cheating on taxes if you have the chance" 
(d) "keeping money that you have found" 
(e) "failing to report damage you've done accidentally to a parked . -ehicle. " 
Interestingly, these authors were able to validate pari of this measure of civic 
cooperation. To do so, they compared results of qucstion (d) abo%e to results ot'd 
study conducted in 15 countries in which wallets containing money and the 
addresses of their owners were "accidentally" dropped. The number of wallets 
returned with their contents intact was recorded for each city. The 
beha% ioral 
evidence supported the survey measures. Finally, paricipation in ci% i,: 
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organizations was assessed by asking, whether or not PeOPIe parlicipited in mclv 
of types of organizations (e. g. education. arts, music, or cultural acti% ities. ti-atic 
unions-, etc). Again, they were able to validate the result-s by comparing them %vith 
data on union membership available from another source. 
A survey of women in Mali was conducted to assess their social support_, ý, social 
networks and health seeking behaviors (Personal Communication with Sarah 
Castle). In order to explore social supports and networks, subjects were asked ahout 
practical support ("who pounds millet for you or fetches water when you are bus%. 
sick or absent? "); economic support ("who can you ask for money or milk if ýou 
don't have any? "); emotional support ("who is dear to you, or *heavy' to you? ") - 
literally "who makes your heart cool? "); and advice net,. %-orks ("if your heart is 
stirred up, who can you go to? "). 
9 Coleman looked at the effect of the lack of social capital a% ailable to high school 
sophomores on dropping out of school before graduation is carried out (Coleman 
1988). His measures of social capital (within families) included: number of siblings 
(a proxy for dilution of adult attention to the child), single versus two-parent family, 
ratio of adults to children, and number of moves since grade 5. 
0 Recent studies have looked at the association bem, een social capital and 
mortality and firearm violent crime (Kawachi, Kennedy et al. 1997: Kennedy. 
Kawachi et al. 1998). Here the authors measured social capital based on the 
weighted responses to several items from the General Social Survey: 
Per capita number of groups and associations (e. g. church groups. labor 
unions. sport groups, professional or academic societies, school groups. political 
groups, and fraternal organizations) 
"Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you iftheN got a 
chance, or would they try to be fair? "' 
"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be tru, ýted or that 
you can't be too careful in dealing with people"" 
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"Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful. or are hcý 
mostly looking out for themselves? " 
The majority of studies of social capital have looked at its association with specific 
outcomes (e. g. economic growth, illness. human capital). In the field of public 
health, the focus has been on associations bem-een social capital (as a protcct1%C 
()4 factor) and mortality or morbidity. For example, low s cial capital was found to he 
associated with higher rates of mortality. as well as rates of death from coronary 
heart disease, malignant neoplasms, and infant morlalitv (Kawachi, Kennedy et al. 
1997). Similarly, low social solidarity was associated with a higher mortalitv rate 
from myocardial infarction (Egolf, Lasker et al. 1992). Violent crime. and resulting 
mortality, has been found to be inversely associated with levels of social capital 
(Kennedy, Kawachi et al. 1998). In empirical studies, social capital or its 
components have been found, rather consistently, to be associated with good 
outcomes. 
Brown and Ashman (1996) conducted a study across thirteen different development- 
onented projects (in Africa and Asia, two of the thirteen focused on health sector 
interventions) to assess the association between social capital and successful inter- 
sectoral collaboration. They assessed social capital in terrns of. (i) the existence of 
local organisations and networks and, (ii) the existence of relationships or contacts 
among the parties that span differences in sector and power. They found that there is 
"some support for the idea that social capital is associated with program success... 
(However), There were cases of clear and mixed success characterized by medium 
or even low levels of social capital as indicated in dense networks of effective lo%: al 
organizations. " "Intersectoral relationships (or "bridges") appear to be linked to 
success in cooperative intersectoral problem sotving... (However. again) Soinc clear 
and mixed successes displayed medium or even low levels ot' intensectoral 
relationships. " Authors suggest that these two fonns of social capital, 'tK)ndjng- 
and "'bridging" may act as substitutes. "Strong grassroots voice may compensate I'or 
low levels of intersectoral contact and credibility. and etTecti%c 
bridging 
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organisations, may compensate for low levels of grassroots organisation" (p. 
Surprisingly little empirical work has looked into the determinants of sc III 'Cial capita' 
Such research will be necessary to devise effecti,. e policies interventions for 
enhancing social capital. 
There are a number of ways in which social capital might enhance the success of' 
health insurance schemes. Social capital facilitates enrolment in health insurance 
schemes, helping to avoid inadequate risk pooling. Accordincy to one perspectiVe 
participation in health insurance schemes is "motivated by altruistic feelings 
between members of a neighbourhood or social class" (Besley 1995. p. 2165). High 
levels of social capital in a society might mean that people have greater trust in a 
CBHI type scheme, are less likely to think that their money may be misused, and 
because of this may be more inclined to join. 7 Further, traditions of collaboration 
and co-operation increase the likelihood of success in future collaborative efforts. 
Hence, people will be more willing to enrol in an insurance scheme xith others in 
the community. Finally, due to the exchange of information that is associated with 
social capital, people will be more likely to understand the concept of insurance, and 
this knowledge may increase demand for insurance. 
Social capital may be a more important determinant of demand for some kinds of 
CBHI than for others. Bennett, et al. (1998, p. 11) found that degree of 
64cohesiveness" was more important to membership in Type 11 schemes (Co%-enng 
low-cost, high-frequency events, typically outpatient sen-ices or medicines) than in 
Type I schemes (covering high-cost, low-firequency events, such us unexpected 
hospital isations): 
Personal risk aversion was more likeýv to form the basis qj'dounand fi)/- 
membership of Type I schemes than for membership QfType 11 sL, heme. ý. 
Membership of Type II schemes appeared instead to relate more to a 
Trust in the insurer could be considered a form of vertical social capital if the insurer iN in orne wa% 
part of the community, perhaps an NGO or a local health care provider. If the in-, urer %%ere a 
familiar organisation, perhaps located some distance away. it might seem less appropriate to cl&ssifý 
trust in the organisation as social capital. 
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commitment to securejoint benefits tor the communiý,. -. Lack oj . 4, co; icsite 
community was thus much less of an issuefor Tipe I v-huncs thanP)r P-pe 
II schemes. Moreover, beneficiaries of Type I . ýL'hemes t,, ndel to h" distributed over a wide area, relativelv heterooeneoaý and therciorc less likely to experience strongfeelings of sOlidaritY. 
Social capital may decrease adverse selection. Higher le% els Of Social consciou-'riess 
or solidarity mean that low risk individuals will be Nvilling to pay the same 
premiums as high risk individuals, despite being less likely to benefit directly from 
the insurance. Criel says that solidarity means that, "people accept that the size of 
the return may not match the resources they have put ex ante in the system" (Cnel 
1998a, p. 64). Hsiao (2001) also argues that social capital can counter adverse 
selection: 
Prepayment implicitly involves risk pooling, cross subsidising bctýtecn the 
healthy and less healthy, and between the rich and the poor. Theyoung 
and healthy people by pure economic calculus would noi enrol y theY have 
to prepay similar amounts as the elderly and the less health. v people. But 
sociologists have long argued that social capital is an important 
determinant of people's willingness to cooperate with each other (Hsiao 
2001, p. 6). 
There are two main mechanisms by which social capital can counteract moral 
hazard, free-riding and fraud. Firstly, in a society with high levels of social capital. 
there will be an 'extrinsic' restraint on cheating; the free exchange of information 
means that those who cheat (or unconsciously over-utilise) are more likely to be 
caught (Yarrow 1993). Secondly, there will be an 'intrinsic' restraint in the form of 
loyalty to society, and perhaps to the insurance scheme (Burchardt and Hills 19,97). 
Social capital can decrease the costs of producing insurance. Less fraud in a 
community means that the insurance scheme will spend less on avoiding fraudulent 
claims. Secondly, the risk of corruption will be lower in a communitv %%-ith Iiieh 
social capital, secondary to enhanced social proximity and trust. and strong norm,, 
and sanctions aimed at prohibiting nefarious behaviour (Burchardt and Hill-,, 
19'0-). 
It has been suggested by some that social capital may actuallý be in%erýcly 
81 
associated with the success of health insurance scheme,. A,:,: ordirg to one 
hypothesis, social capital may actually be a substitute for voluntary health insurance. 
through facilitating access to informal credit and risk-sharing mechanisms (Jowett 
2000). This is a point of view expressed on the World Bank's social capital web,, ite: 
We know that the poor use social capital - net-vi-orks ol'trzo r and rccirroL ity 
- as an insurance mechanism which enables them to sunli, t, dqýv-do-da. ý 
when individually they cannot (World Bank 2001h) 
"en the state is weak or not interested, civil sociqv and the ýocia! Capka. ' 
it engenders can be a crucial provider of informal social insuranct, and L-an 
facilitate economic development (Korld Bank 2001a) 
Social capital may also have a negative impact when -communities and networks 
become isolated or parochial or work at cross-purposes to societal collccti%*e 
interests (e. g., ghettos, gangs, cartels)" (Preker, et al. 200 1, p. I I). For example. 
high levels of social capital among private health care providers might enable them 
to harm a CBHI scheme if they perceive such a scheme to threaten their livelihood. 
To date, few studies have looked into the association between social capital and the 
demand for voluntary health insurance, and the results of existing studies are 
inconclusive. According to Hsiao (2001, p. 7), an unpublished study by Liu (2001) 
has "found statistically significant association between these social capital kanables 
(such as degree of mutual assistance a household has gik-en and participation in ci%, ic 
activities in the villages) and people's willingness to pay and their actual enrolment 
in community financing schemes. " The results of a household sur%, ey in Vietnam 
(Jowett 2000) showed a significant positive association between an aggregate 
measure of associational behaviour, or membership in voluntary associations, and 
demand for (state- sponsored) voluntary health insurance. There was. however, no 
significant association between "'perceptions of social cohesion" and demand 
for 
voluntary health insurance. The author of this study suggests that "the philosophy of 
Confucianism, which stresses hierarchy and duty towards the State" along with 
"political ambition" may provide a motivation for membership of a mass 
('*'voluntary") organisation and possibly for the purchase of a %ýoluntary 
health 
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insurance policy (i. e. the fOrmer indicator was actually measuring duty to state mther 
than social capital). A small household sun-eY In Senegal (Jutting 2000) found that 
members and non-members of mutual health insurance schemes judge the degree of 
trust and solidarity in the villages on a similar level. 
Table 3.2 surnmanses the ways in which social capital may ameliorate the risks to 
the financial viability ofinsurance schemes. according to the literature 
Table 3.2. How social capital can ameliorate risks to the financial Niability 
of non-P-overn mental, non-profit health insurance schemes 
Risk to Financial Viability flow Social Capital May Anichoratc 
Inadequate nsk pooling, t-'nder-enrollment 0 Mtrul, stic fechil", 1, Ct%%CC11 mcmhmý of a 
ncighborhood or social cla. -, s 
-I radition of collaboration and cooperation 
F\change of information people are more 
likek to understand the concept of in-surance 
High cosLs of'production Less mone,, spent n avoiding fraudulent clairms 
Lower nsk of corTuption secondar)' to strong 
norms and sanctions 
Ad,. erse selection Solidant,., sccial consciowsricsis - low-nsk 
indiViduals are \, tiling to subsidize costs of care 
to high nsk indoiduals 
Moral hazard. Free riding & Fraud 0 Exchange of information, reputatiorLi 
0 Norms and sanctions which prohibit such 
I 
bchaý ior 
The idea that social capital can enhance the success of CBHI schemes can be linked 
to an area of economics known as the Neýv Institutional Economics, or 
NIE 
(Leonard 2000). NIE examines how social structures (or institutions) can be used to 
overcome barriers to the high powered Incentives assumed to operate in the 
neoclassical market. These barriers are termed transaction costs. **Thev are the 
costs in the exchange that do not benefit either of the parties to the transaction. they 
simply make it more difficult and less attractive" (Leonard 2000, p. -39. 
In the case 
ot' CBHI. the -community base" (or the social capital) may 
decrease transaction 
costs in exactly the xN, -avs deschbed above. for example, 
by increasing the probability C" 
that people of all risk-levels Nvill join, by minlinising information asymmemm 
reducing, fraudulent behaviour. etc. 
8-1) 
Summary: the social perspective 
In summary, there is ample theoretical literature to suggest that heai-ýh inurance 
might have far-reaching social consequences, and that soýcial context maý irripact on 
the success of health insurance schemes. Failure to take social consequences into 
account, and instead focus narrowly on economic consequences, Is likeIN to rcsult in 
policy decisions that fail to maximise social xelfare. The theoretical literature 
suggests that levels of social capital are likelý- to be positivelý a. ss(, K: iated %%-Ith die 
success of health insurance, although there are arguments to the contrarý-. Very fe%%- 
empirical studies have investigated the social consequences or determinants of 
health insurance. As is discussed in the methodology chapter (Chapter 4) the 
paucity of empirical work may reflect difficulties encountered (including lack of 
accepted or standardised tools) in identifying and measuring social consequences- 
and social capital. 
INTERNATIONAL POLICYSTATENIENTS AND REVIENN'S ON CBHI 
Over the last twenty years there has been growing interest in health Insurance for the 
informal sector in developing countries. The purpose of this section is to re% iew the 
international literature, focusing in particular on the reasons invoked for encouraging 
health insurance schemes and the factors cited as contributing to their success. 
Policy statements 
In 1986-87, the World Bank recommended increased cost-recovery for financin,, 
publicly provided health services in developing countries (Akin, et al. 198-). This 
strategy included the development of health insurance schemes. In a 1986 
background paper, de Fen-anti argued that nsk-sharing concepts have high cost- 
recovery potential, and that they "could be made more equitable than "otne othcr 
types of policies" (p. 73). However. based on the available e%ldence dargclý 
Stinson's work, descnbed below), he concluded that "community financing %%ill 
dc Ferrant ull costs of local services" (p. S- rarely be able to cover the fI 
emphasised that outside financial and organisational support is vital to the ýuccess of 
such schemes. The policy report stated that "reforms in financing, health care %%, Ill 
84 
have little impact without a political commitment by the lovemment -. t) making the 
sector more effective" (Akin, et al. 1987, p. 47) 
The high-profile 1993 World Development Report (World Bank encouraged 
governments in developing countries to finance "a limi package ot'public health 
measures and essential clinical interventions ... redirectin, ý resources from 
interventions that have high costs per DALY gained to those that cost little" (p. S). 
The report had little to say about the financing of medical care bcýond the "essential 
package". The report suggested that governments in low-income Countries should 
encourage "increased community control and financing of essential health care" (p. 
158). The authors, however, appeared to be referring to u. ser charges and 
prepayment for frequent, low-cost events, such as the re%-ol%lng funds for drug 
purchases under the Bamako Initiative (p. 159). 
In the 1995 World Bank publication "Financing Health Sen-ices through User Fees 
and Insurance", the focus was primarily on health insurance for the formal sector 
(Shaw and Ainsworth 1995). The authors discussed potential benefits of insurance, 
including revenue mobilisation, economic efficiency. fairness or equit", -, as well as 
greater pluralism in the financing and delivery of health services. The,, stated that 
the main issue in extending health insurance to rural areas of developing countries is 
the difficulty in collecting premiums. They argued that programmes are more likely 
to be successful if premiums are collected through pre-existing groups. 
Furthermore, the authors identified the following as factors underlying the success 
of a rural health insurance scheme: quality health services-, user fees at hospitals, so 
that there is an incentive to pay for insurance, and, an affordable premium adjusted 
to keep pace with inflation. 
The World Development Report 2000i2001 stated that -poor people are e\posed to a 
wide array of risks that make them vulnerable to income shocks and losses of %%ell- 
being" (World Bank 2001c, p. 158) and made the argument that "the state has a 
special role in providing or regulating insurance and setting up safet%- nets" (p. 159). 
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While authors of the WDR 2000/2001 did not explicitly promote the idea -)t'('BHI. 
they did caution that "Concerns that formal (public) safetY nets %%III displace clf- 
insurance or group-based mechanisms also need to be considered- (p. 14S). For 
example, government-provided health insurance might result in the collapse of' 
charitable networks wherein the wealthy donate mone-, to pay t'or the health care 
costs of the poor. Government-provided health insurance that covers only specific 
types of people (the elderly, women, etc. ) creates an incentive for these people to 
drop out of pre-existing group schemes, which may in turn result in the collapse of 
such schemes. 
In general, World Health Organisation publications have had little to say on the 
topic of CBHI (excepting the review by Bennett, et al. 1998. see below). Two %VHO 
documents have reviewed mechanisms of health care financing, "-ith a focus on 
developing countries, and identified research needs (WHO 1978, WHO 199 It '). In 
both, discussion of insurance was largely restricted to mandatory s(xial insurance, 
and community financing has generally referred to user-fees and the revolving drug 
funds promoted under the Bamako Initiative. 
The World Health Report 2000 (WHO 2000) explicitly promoted CBHl as a means 
towards the objectives of better health, fair financing and responsiveness: 
In low income countries, where there are usualýt, high levels ofout-of- 
pocket expenditure on health and it-here organisational and institutional 
cqpaciýv are too weak to make it viable to reýv mainýy on general ta-Catiorl 
to finance health, this (the separation of contribUtiOW from utilisation) 
means promoting job-based contribution systems it-here possible, and 
facilitating the creation of communiýy or provider-based prcpcýi-rnent 
schemes (WHO 2000, p. 98). 
"ere there is nofeasible organisational arrangement to boost prepayment 
levels, both donors and governments should explore wai's of buiifdin. iý 
mechanisms for the development or consolidation of large risk pools. 
Insurance schemes designed to expand membership among the Poor ofrer (I 
path for government - with external , 
Jýnding partner,; - to a rapid 
improvement in the health of the most vulnerable (WHO 2000. p. 1-")i 
The repon of Working Group 33 of the Commission on %lacroeconomics and 
Health 
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presented evidence, from both the micro and macro le%ei.,. to arue '. 11hat CBHl -,: an 
provide an incremental, albeit first step, to improve financial protcction and access 
to essential health services for the poor" (Working Group 'ý p. 6). The data 
presented provide weak evidence for the beriefits of CBHI (pnmanly in terms of 
resource mobilisation, financial protection and access to health care scrN ic cs. ). Fheý 
concluded that four key areas of policy can be used to strengthen and improvo the 
effectiveness of community involvement in health care financing: ( 1) increased and 
well targeted subsidies to pay for the premiums of low-income populations. (2) use 
of re-insurance and other mechanisms to enlarge the effective size of the nsk p(x)l: 
(3) assistance in strengthening the management capacity of the schemcs: and (4) 
stronger links to the benefits of existing formal financing and provider networks. 
Reviews of international experience 
Based on the Alma-Ata Declaration's call for resource mobilisation, Stinson (1982) 
conducted the first thorough review of communitN" financing experience,, -, in 
developing countries. According to Stinson's review, the primar-ý, goal of 
community financing is to mobilise private resources to fund public sector health 
care. The author acknowledged that community financing can serve other purposes 
(for example, to change the scope and accessibility of services). Overall, Stinson 
regarded prepayment schemes as having failed to meet their objectives. He 
concluded that "the viability of voluntary (personal prepayment) plans is 
questionable because people often do not want to pay for health care bet'Ore theý 
need it"', and that although production-based prepa%rment is more stable, it is -rnore 
restricted in potential because communal organisation is a prerequisite. " 
Stinson identified the following factors as enhancing the success of insurance for the 
informal sector: co-payments to help limit overuse and generate additional rcvenue. 
clear policies regarding exemption from payment. mechanisms to promote bwad 
enrolment, and the presence of funds that can be used to cover deficits. Further. 
he 
concluded that mobilisation and liaison etTorts, technical and managerial assistancc 
and back-up financial resources from the outside communitN- are essential to the 
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success of community financing efforts 
Bennett, et al. (1998) reviewed 82 health insurance schemes for the informal se, ý-,, -)r. 
Schemes were evaluated in terms of efficiencN,, equit). '. consumer satisfaction and 
sustainability. Their results were similar to those of Stinson. "Many of the ;,: hemes 
examined had been poorly designed and had encountered a range of probleni-ý is a 
result" (p. 61). Bennett, et al. concluded that "schemes are unlikel%, to be suitable 
for widespread 'self- financing' of health care" and that "insurance should thus be 
seen as a supporting strategy rather than as an exclusive 'financing alternative*" (p. 
62). Further, the authors suggested that many problems of existing schemes stem 
8 from their voluntary nature. 
Bennett, et al. pointed to a number of contextual factors that may Contribute to a 
scheme's impact: "... political and economic situation, the structure and performance 
of the health care system, and links between the scheme and other community 
development activities. " (p. vii). Their analysis suggested that govemment has an 
important role to play in facilitating the success of schemes by: developing a clear 
policy framework; facilitating scheme development, monitonn, -, and replating the 
schemes and providing subsidies. They also pointed to the importance of' factors 
related to scheme design and management, including: mechanisms to prevent 
adverse selection and facilitate equity: development of an investment strategy: using 
the purchasing role to negotiate for improved quality. cost and effliciency of ser-"Ice. 1". 
and responsiveness to consumers. 
Summary of international policy statements and reviews 
Review of this international literature reveals several key findings. Firs the 
most commonly cited for health insurance were resource mobilisation. 
financial 
protection of individuals and households. and impro,. ed access to health : are 
Unfortunately. there are very few documented CBHI ; chemes where enrolment hxs 
bcc,. mandwor- 
Where data do exist. they suggest that implementing a mandator% schcrnc require, C,, r. jjdcr3blc 
administrative capacity (to identify househol(N and ensure that they all pay) 
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services. Secondly, this literature su_i_, (,,; ested that schemcs ha,. c not been %er. 
successful in terms of resource mobilisation, although mandatorý- schemes haý e ý)cc: -. 
more successful in this regard than voluntary schemes. Thirdl, v. little empir. ':, Jý 
evidence was cited regarding other potential consequences of health inurince 
schemes. Finally, many broad contextual factors as well as more specifi,: faczors 
related to scheme design and participant roles were identified as Contributing to the 
success of health insurance schemes. There seems to be increasing rcco-nition clut 
government support of such schemes - financial and otherwise - Is of great 
importance. 
REVIEW OF INDIAN SCHEMES 
India is known for its diversity of cultures, languages, socio-economic classeý,, 
climates and terrains. It may not be surpnsing then, that India's experience with 
insurance schemes for the informal sector has been tremendously rich and vaned. 
Twenty Indian, non-govenunental, non-profit insurance schemes %%-ere encountered 
in this literature review (Table 3.3). 9 The purpose of this section is to pro%ide 
examples of criteria based on which schemes have been evaluated and factors cited 
as contributing to success or failure. 
" Several problems were faced when selecting schcnies for inclusion 
Fjr,; tlý. a number et" . chcmc,, 
are mediated (and typically subsidized) by an NGO. but the insurance pohcý is purcha, 
& I-rurn the 
GIC (denoted in the first column of Table 3 _, '). 
Neverthcless. these ha%c bccn inc4ted . 1, non- 
governmental schemes. Secondly. in at least one case. a 
for-profit hospital prufc%-; ý- to run a not-for- 
profit insurance scheme (see the Medinova Health 
Card Scheme bclo%0- Onlý th'--c : n%ur;.,.,.. 'C 
schemes specifically described as non-prolit are included in thiý, rc\ ic\% 
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The schemes varied tremendously in terms of their age. the oldest -, tartim: in 105,; 
(Students' Health Home) and the youngest in 1996 (Aga Khan Health Ser%ices). 
Doubtless there are younger and short-lived schemes that were not reporied in the 
published literature. The smallest schemes covered onlý hundred., of people. and the 
largest more than a million (Students' Health Home). Membership in alinost all of 
the schemes was voluntary, with only a few schemes ha% ing some component of 
mandatory enrolment (Aga Khan Health Services. Mallur Milk Co-operatl%c. Social 
Work and Research). The premiums paid to the schemes %%-ere generally flat-rate 
premiums paid on an annual or monthly basis. Hwxever. a few of the skýhernes had 
premiums that were graded according to income (Saheed Shib-sankar Saba Samity, 
Sewagram, and Voluntary Health Services). Services were generall), provided 
directly by the insurer (16 of the 20 schemes reviewed). The ser,. ices covered vaned 
markedly between the schemes, with roughly one-third covering outpatient care 
only, one-third covering inpatient ser-6ces only, and one-third covering both 
outpatient and inpatient services. 
Outcomes based on which schemes were evaluated 
Cost-recovery was the most common measure used to determine the success of 
Indian health insurance schemes for the informal sector. Rates of cost-recovery 
varied tremendously. Premium revenues represented only 4% of total re%enues at 
the Voluntary Health Services scheme (1987-88 data. Bennett. et al. 199S) while all 
health care costs of members of the Ivlallur Milk Co-operatIve scheme were full, " 
covered by interest on past contributions (Purohit 1995). lnterestinglý-, the two 
schemes most successful at recovering costs were co-operative based (the Mallur 
Milk Co-operative and the Aga Khan Health Services' %Ielqj Milk Co-operati%e), 
with mandatory enrolment for all co-op members (Dave Sen 19()-,, Fairbank and 
4D Putney 1998, Purohit 1995). Rates of cost-recovery \%ere particularl% 
lo%%- among 
the three NGO-based schemes that covered onl,. - outpatient services (Barpall. 
and SWRQ. 
146 
Other outcomes based on which schemes were e%aluated included: consumer 
satisfaction, protection of members from financial risk, and impact on utilisation. 
quality and efficiency of health care services. Several of the schemes that %%ere 
managed jointly by an NGO and the Government Insurance Company t. ailed in 
achieving consumer satisfaction. For example, consumers abandoned the Ar-"Nllo 
Hospital Association scheme over its refusal to co,.,, er chronic ailments and rion- 
hospitalised treatment (International Labour Office 1998). Chanedee and Vya-s 
(1997) were the only authors to evaluate a scheme in terms of its ability to protect 
members from financial risk. They found that the SEWA scheme fully Covered 
medical costs in only 50% of hospital isations. The %leloj Milk Co-operativescherne 
improved the utilisation of (AKHS) health care services from 25"o of co-op 
members to 90% (Fairbank and Putney 1997). The %lallur Milk Co-operatke 
scheme was successful in improving the quality of health care ser-%-Ices, to the extent 
that members chose to use the Mallur Health Centre rather than the nearby 
government (theoretically free) health center (Dave 1997). The Sewagram scheme 
was hailed by one author as having enhanced allocative efficiency by increasing the 
utilisation of preventive and promotive care. According to Jajoo ( 1992, p. 193). "no 
vaccine-preventable illness was reported in children or mothers sincc mass 
inununisation was instituted under the (Sewagram) scheme" 
The social consequences of health insurance were mentioned by only two authors. 
Ortzanisers of the Students' Health Home scheme had apparently set as an objective. 
"to develop in (students) the idea of civic responsibilities towards themsek-es and to 
the community" (Banedi 1995, p. 2). No indication was given as to whether or not 
this objective was achieved. JaJoo (1992, p. 174) stated that the Sewagrarn s-cherne 
has had positive social consequences bv, fostering "a perception b% people that they 
have a right to demand health care of high quality- and by stimulatiný, _, **self- 
confidence, organisational ability. and development activities. " 
Factors underlying success 
A number of broad contextual factors were cited as having influenced the outcome 
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of the Indian insurance schemes. For example. the Mallur Milk Co-operatl%"ý4 
scheme benefited ftom the strong economic condition of the community, the 
political power of the milk co-operative, and a supporti,. e political environment 
(Purohit 1995; Dave Sen 1997). Stinson (1982) suggested that the Barpall Village 
scheme failed in part due to the opening of a new government clinic in the same 
geographic area. 
In large part, authors attributed the success or failure of Indian schemes to aspects of 
scheme design and management. 10 Mechanisms seen as having a poslti"ýe impact on 
equity of financing included: the income adjusted fee schedule at Saheed Shibsankar 
Saba Sarnity (Dave 1993); the provision of subsidy for the payment of premiums at 
the ACCORD scheme (Prasad 1998), and the Sewagram scheme's flexibility in 
allowing people to pay in cash or kind (Jajoo 1992). 11 Dave (1997) suggested that 
the Tribhuvandas scheme improved equity of health care delivery by providing free 
outpatient care to the non-enrolled. A variety of mechanisms were cited as having 
limited adverse selection and moral hazard. For example, the two-month waiting Cý 
period prior to entitlement to benefits at Raigarh, Ambikapur Health Association 
(Dave 1993), and the minimum membership of 75% of households under the 
Sewagram scheme, were thought to have limited adverse selection. Dave (1991) 
suggested that the Sewagram scheme benefited from its policy of strictly excluding 
the non-enrolled from scheme benefits (i. e. preventing free-riding). 
Managerial (and actuarial) skills appear to have been important to the success of 
Indian insurance schemes. Both the Social Work and Research Centre scheme 
(Stinson 1982) and the Students' Health Home scheme (Baner]i 1995) 
failed in 
I-I- recovering costs as a result of premiums being set too low. Fairbank and 
putilev 
(1998) pointed to low managerial costs, and premiums that are calculated in a simple 
and transparent manner. as being beneficial aspects of the AKHS 
Mel j scheme. 
CI 
01 
10 In fact, many authors, labelled schemes as successes or failures 
based solely on ,. --hcme dcm, L:! i. 'A ith 
little regard for actual impact or outcomes. 
11 Although according to Giridhar, 1993, contributions in kind did not work- paracularl% 
%kcil 
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Both the Mallur Milk Cooperative (Dave Sen 1997) and the Se\, %-agram scheme %%ere 
seen to have benefited from strong and dynamic leadership. Organisers of the 
SEWA scheme emphasised the importance of trust in the scheme Is management and 
leadership: ".. -the key (to success), apart from quality and timeliness. is the faith 
and trust in the institution which organises these services" (Chattedee and Vý-as 
1997). 
Very few factors related to the role of beneficiaries, health care providers, 
govenu, nent and external donors were cited as contributing to the success, or failure 
of the Indian schemes. Successes of the Mallur Milk Cooperative scheme (Dave 
Sen 1997) and the ACCORD scheme (Prasad 1998) were attributed in part to 
community organisation, ownership and participation. Lack of community 
participation, and isolation of the scheme from traditional and political leaders in the 
area, may have contributed to the downfall of the Barpall Village Scheme (Stinson 
1982). Jajoo (1992) alone commented on the importance of the (perceived) qualitv 
of health care, arguing that success of the Sewagram scheme was related to trust of 
the villagers in the health care services. The Mallur Milk Cooperative scheme 
benefited from technical support provided by a nearby medical college (Dave Sen 
1997). 
Several generalisations can be made based on this re,,,, iew of literature on Indian 
insurance schemes. Firstly, cost-recovery was the measure most commonlýý 
employed in determining whether a scheme succeeded or failed and social 
consequences were seldom described. Secondly, the success or failure of an 
insurance scheme was often attributed to its design or management. However. social 
factors, such as community participation, were considered important by somc 
authors. Finally, there did seem to be a bias towards looking at the positi%e 
consequences and chmctenstics of insurance schemes, perhaps in part because the 
authors were, in some cases, insurance scheme organisers or administrators 
(for 
example, Chatterjee and Vyas 1997 and Jajoo 1992). Hence, this review may not 
be 
particularly useful in identifying areas (and ways) in which the negative 
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consequences of health insurance should be further studied. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Review of the Indian and international literature confirms that the economic 
perspective predominated in evaluations of CBHI schemes. The measures most 
commonly employed in evaluation included cost-recovery. resource mobilisation, 
financial protection of individuals and households, and health services utilisation. 
The success or failure of CBH1 schemes was often attributed to scheme design or 
management, although many broad contextual factors were also recognised as being 
of importance. For example, there seemed to be increasing recognition that 
government support is an important determinant of success. There is ample 
theoretical literature (although most of it from developed countries) suggesting that 
health insurance may have far-reaching social consequences, and that social context 
may impact on the success of health insurance schemes. Few empirical studies ha%-e 
investigated the social consequences or social factors underlying the success of 
health insurance. 
Table 3.4 summarises the findings of the literature re,,, -iew. This table adds detail to 
the framework illustrated in Figure 3.1, and it serves as the theoretical framework 
for the research methodology. The first column describes aspects of the social, 
economic, political and health sector environment that were described (or 
postulated) as being related to the success of insurance schernes. The second 
column represents more direct (or proximal) determinants of success. including, 
specific aspects of scheme design and management. The final column lists some of 
the potential consequences of a health insurance scheme, broadlý- classified as 
economic and social consequences. 
Based on the literature reviewed in this section, one can be, -, in to add 
detail to a 
model of the association between contextual factors and the consequences of health 
insurance schemes. For example, both the international literature and re% iews of the 
Indian insurance schemes suggested health insurance may be niore successful in 
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communities where communal organisations exist. This is consi,, tent %% ith : hecr% 
around social capital and economic theory. Accordin(-, to social capital thcorý, a 
history of collaboration and co-operation wIII allow members of a comniunal 
organisation to work successfully ývith one another on new venture". A': ': OrdIng "') 
economic theory, mandatory enrolment (enforced through the co-operative) can be 
used as a mechanism to enhance the financial viabihtý of a health insurance scheme. 
This literature review has identified a number of gaps in current knowle&-, e around 
CBHI. Little empirical evidence is available regarding the consequences of CBFIl 
schemes, and this is generally limited to economic indicators, particularly those tor 
which data are easily available (for example, cost-reco%-cry). Virtually no attempts 
have been made to explore the potential social consequences of health insurance in 
different settings. While there does seem to be a consensus on the importance of 
certain aspects of scheme design and management, there are fe%%- data on other 
factors that may contribute to the success of health insurance schemes - for example, 
the roles played by beneficiaries, and broader contextual factors like levels of social 
capital. Without these data, it is difficult for health policy makers in developing 
countries to make informed choices between available mechanisms of health care 
financing. Policy makers should be made aware of the likely costs and benefits- of 
CBHl in order to choose strategies aimed at maximising social ývelfare. Data on the 
factors that help or hinder CBHl schemes will enable scheme administrators to 
optimise aspects of scheme design and management. Furthermore, government, 
donors, NGOs and scheme managers require information on the context and target 
populations among whom CBHl schemes are most likely to succeed. and the 
contextual factors that can be changed in order to optimise the success of 
CBHI 
schemes. The following chapter describes in detail the specific research objectivc. 'N 
and the methodology that has been used to address them. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH OBJECTIVESANDMETHODOLOCY 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and justify the choice of research 
methodology. The fust section reviews the aims and objectives of the studY. The 
second section justifies the choice of a case-study approach that combines 
qualitative and quantitative methods. The third section briefly describes the study 
setting. The fourth section provides details of the methods used in collecting. 
entering and analysing data. The fifth and final section outlines the criteria used in 
later chapters to assess the quality of the research. 
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
Aims 
The aim of this research is to contribute to the body of knowledge regarding the 
potential consequences of health insurance and the factors that may determine the 
performance of health insurance schemes. The new information generated is 
intended to be useful to policy makers both in choosing between different 
mechanisms of health care financing, and in optimising the design and management 
of CBHI schemes and allowing for the broader context in which they operate. Gaps 
in previous research are addressed by six specific objectives: 
I/ To evaluate two Indian CBHI schemes in terms of their impact on the 
frequency of hospitalisation. It is kvpothesised that CBHI will increave rhe 
frequencv with which members are hospitalised b. v removing some component ofthe 
financial barrier to seeking inpatient care. 
I/ To evaluate the two CBHl schemes based on the extent to which they protect 
member households from the costs of inpatient care. The hypothesis related to this 
objective is that the costs oj'inpatient care arefinancial4i, burdensome ti. C. rcý1111111g 
in indebtedness, impoverishment) and that hv covering sorrie portion of these co \ t. ý. a 
CBHI scheme will conferfinancial protection. 
3/ To further assess the schemes on the basis ofcoverage (inclusion of the p(-x)r) 
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and equity of access to scheme benefits. It is kypothc-u'sed ! hat nit'l 
CBHI schemes will include the poor in their membership and Will ensure that th, 
poor use services provided under the scheme. 
4/ To examine whether or not there are additional goals that participants in the 
CBHI schemes (including target populations, scheme administrators. health care 
providers, governments and external donors) feel these schemes should fulfil. The 
hypothesis related to this objective is that traditional economic indicators o1success 
do not capture thefull effects of health insurance schemes as they are anticipated or 
perceived by participants (e. g. empowerment, community participation. social 
cohesion). 
5/ To explore contextual factors, and aspects of the CBHI schemes' design and 
management, that participants associate with the schemes' success or failure. Vic 
hypothesis related to this objective is that aspects of the social. political. econonlic 
and health systems environment, along with scheme design and management. 
contribute to the success of CBHI schemes. Social capital, in particular. i. ý 
hypothesised to facilitate enrolment in, and financial sustainability ol. ' CBHI 
schemes. 
6/ In the light of research findings, to identify implications for NGOs. 
government and external aid agencies as to whether CBHI schemes of the type 
studied should be expanded or replicated, and if so, the contextual factors that wIII 
facilitate their success. 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE METHODOLOGY 
Theoretical framework for the research 
The literature reviewed in the previous chapter was used to develop Table ', s. 4. I his 
table provided the basic framework for the study's methods and data collection. 
Choice of a case study approach 
The nature of the alms and objectives led to the choice of the Case studý appmach. 
and to the use of both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. =11 - 
The tollo%%ing - 
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aspects of the aims and objective led to use of the case-study approach: 
I/ The objectives are broad and complex and require "an investigation of a real 
life intervention in detail, where the focus is on how and why the intervention 
succeeds or fails, where the general context will influence the outcome and where 
researchers asking the questions will have no control over e% ents" (Keen and 
Packwood 1995, p. 2 of 7). 
2/ CBHI depends "for its success on the involvement of several different 
interested groups. Each group may have a legitimate. but different, interpretation of 
events; capturing these different views is often best achieved by using interviews or 
other qualitative methods within a case study design (Keen and Packwood 199-5. p2 
of 7). 
3/ Parker (1975) argues that the case study is most appropriate for testing a 
hypothesis when"the size of category of phenomena to which cases belong" is small 
(p. 15). According to the published literature, there currently exist fewer than 20 
non-governmental, non-profit health insurance schemes in India. 
Once a broad research question has been identified, there are two approaches to the 
design of case study research (Keen and Packwood 1995, p. 3 of 7). In the first 
approach (deductive, realist), precise questions are posed at the outset of the rcsearch 
and data collection and analysis are directed towards answering them. The second 
approach (constructive, inductive) starts by asking broad questions such as -What is 
happening here? " and "What are the important features and relationships that explain 
the impact of this intervention? " These questions are then refined and become more 
specific in the course of the fieldwork and a parallel process of data analysis. Others 
argue that both the "tight" and "'loose" approaches need to be used together: 
That task [describing and anaývsing a pattern of relationshipsj require. ý a 
set oj'analvtic categories. Starting with them tdeductiveýv) or gettim. 
a gradually to them (inductivelv) are both possible. hi the tilt, o 
conceptualisation, we need both approaches... to pull a mass ol hh'ts anti 
findings into a wide-ranging, coherent set of generalisations (Afiles and 
Huberman 1994, p. 17). 
The objectives of the current study are diverse in nature. and require a broad 
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examination of CBHI schemes. Figure 4.1 illustrates how quantitative (A in Fulure 
4.1) and qualitative (B) methodologies can be used to complement one another in 
addressing the study's objectives. Objectives I to 3 involve specific questions (A I 
in Figure 4.1), most of which were known from the conceptual isation of the study. 
like, "What has been the impact of CBHl on frequency of hospital admisslun'. 7 
Such questions may best be addressed using quantitative methodologies (. 42). that 
will generate potentially generalizable findings. However, these specific questions 
may also be posed using qualitative methodologies (BI) and it may happen that the 
results of the quantitative study generate new questions (. -13) that can best be 
addressed using qualitative methodologies (B4). For example, if the study finds that 
CBHl does not increase the frequency of hospital admission. then qualitative 
interviews may be used to determine, "Why not? " Objective 4, on the other hand, 
involves generating theories and hypotheses, based on the real experiences of the 
participants, as to the goals that should be fulfilled by CBHl. Thus, the oniginal 
question is a rather vague one: "What do you feel this CBHl scheme should be 
trying to achieve? "' Through preliminary qualitative data collection and analysis 
(BI) hypotheses can be generated (for example, that CBHI empowers women to 
make their own decisions about health care) and more specific questions can be 
developed for further qualitative (B4) or quantitatl%-e work (. 42), for example, "Has 
CBHI changed the patterns of medical decision making in your household? " 
"A distinctive but not unique feature of case study research is the use of multiple 
methods and sources of evidence to establish construct validity (i. e. to ensure that 
the study measures the phenomenon, or construct, that it was intended to measure)" 
(Keen and Packwood 1995 p. 4 of 7). Triangulation is: 
... a research strategy that 
involves using several mcthocA to reveal multiple 
aspects of a single empirical real'tv... Triangulation assllf? lf-'. ý that 
lookin- 
at an object from more than one standpoint provi(le. ý researchers and 
theorists with more comprehensive knowledge about the object (Miller 
1997, P. 25). 
"at kinds of triangulation can there be? Following Den--in's cilu, 'uic 
distinctions, we can think of triangulation b'v data source (which can 
include persons, times, places, etc. ). by method (obsen-ah . on. intcrview 
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document), by researcher (investigator A B, etc. ). and by theorv. To this 
we can add data ýype (qualitative text, recordings. quantitative). Ho%, to 
choose w, hich" The aim is to pick triangulation sources that have diffierent 
biases, diffierent strengths, so they can complement each other tAfiles and Huberman 1994, p. 267). 
Figu re 4.1: Interplay bet-ween quantitati% c and qualitati% e 
methodologies P" 
To gun better 
widemmuling 
of quanntitive 
msu)ts 
QualitlialiNx data : ollc,: Iwn 
andjndhýcs 
ottantitame 
Outputs 
Quantitative methods have developed largely to confirm or verify theory (Coast n. 
1999). The-v "persuade the reader through de-emphasising individual judgement and 
stressing, the use of established procedures, leading to more precise and 
generalizable results (Miles and Hubemian 1994, p. 41 ). Quantitative methods can 
enhance the qualitative side of a study in a number of \A, -a%-s (Miles and Huberman. p. 
1): 
by finding a representative sample and locating deviant cases, 
by supplying background data. getting overlooked information. and helping 
avold a bias towards high-status respondents. 
Th 
ll-. , 4uc 'I!, [is ED I ul - -I- 
:, 11t, C. 
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by showing the generality of specific obsenations. 
and, by casting new light on qualitative findings. 
The aim of qualitative research is to try to "grasp phenomena in some holistic way 
or to understand a phenomenon within its own context or to emphasise the 
immersion in and comprehension of human meaning ascnbed to some set of' 
circumstances or phenomena" (Coast 1999,346-7). Its weakness. in comparison to 
quantitative research, is that it does not provide empirical data which are statisticallý, 
generalizable to whole populations. Coast (1999) describes a number of %%ays in 
which qualitative modes of enquiry can be used by health econornics* 
0 Inductive development of theory either within the framework of neo-classical 
economics (assumes that man is rational and independent. at least in terms of 
tastes) or altemative philosophical bases, 
0 Used in the development of the survey to ensure that relevant concepts ha,,, e 
been captured and that the language used in questionnaires is comprehensible to 
survey respondents; 
e To improve understanding of the quantitative results obtained. 
In this thesis, qualitative methods are used in all of these ways, although primarily to 
explore the consequences and determinants of CBHl that fall outside the realm of 
neo-classical economics. 
The case study-methodology, mixing quantitative and qualitatl% e methodolo, lies, 
has, 
been used by several other researchers in investigating CBHI schemes. Notabl,,,: 
o Criel (1998a; 1998b) studied several schemes in Central Africa (two in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and one in Rwanda): 
0 Arhin (1995) studied the Carte d'Assurmce Maladie in Burundi and the % illa, -, c 
Abota system in Guinea Bissau. 
o Atim studied schemes in Central and West Africa (Atim 1998. Atim. et al. 
1998). 
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STUDV SETTING 
Choice of study setting 
This study was carried out in Kheda District (recently di-vided into tx%o districts. 
Kheda and Anand, but referred to throughout as Kheda). Gujarat. A single 
geographic area was chosen in order to make the study financiallN, and logisticallN 
feasible. There was found to be clustering of CBHl schernes in three geo-raphic 
areas of India: Gujarat/Maharastra, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. Gujarat was 
selected for this study largely because the Pnncipal Investigator (. %IKR) was able 
meet with, and obtain permission for research from, administrators of TF and SEWA 
during a reconnaissance trip of December, 1998. The Principal Investigator was 
made aware of TF's hospital referral scheme and SEWA as they had been described 
(as "prep ayment/insurance"' schemes) in the published literature, first and foremost 
by Dave (1993). Both schemes involved prepayment for health care, and coverage 
against the costs of hospital isation. 
Geographic location 
Gujarat is situated in north-westem India. It has a long and vaned history, and is 
particularly well known as site of the 51" Republic Day Earthquake (January 26 th , 
2001), the birthplace of Gandhi, and the site of many important events in the life of 
Krishna. In 1991, the population of Gujarat was 89.53'o Hindu, 8.53% Nfuslim, 
1.19% Jain, 0.44% Christian and 0.08% Sikh (Government of Gujarat 1996). Only 3 
states have a higher percentage of Hindus. At the time of the 2001 census, the 
population of Gujarat was 50.6 million (almost 500 of India's total population of 
1,027 million) making it the tenth (of 28) most populous state (Office of the 
Registrar General 2001). Gujarat has an area of almost 200.000 square kilometers. 
and a population density of 258 persons per square kilometer (the average t'()r India 
is 324 persons per square kilometer). Compared to India as a whole, Grujarat is more 
37.40, /o of Gujamfis live in urban areas compared to only 2-. S% of all urban; roughly ) 
Indians (Office of the Registrar General 2001). In general. Gujarat compares 
favourably to India as a whole with respect to social. economic and demographic 
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indicators (Table 4.1 
As is the case for India overall, health care in Gujarat is largely privately financed, 
individually purchased by fee-for-sen-ice payment, privately produced, and 
unregulated (see Chapter 2). In terms of health care indicators - input. process and 
outcome -G *arat tends to be an a,.,, era(-, e performer: it pales in comparison to the Lij . 1-D 
best performing states (for example, Kerala) but does far better than the worst 
performers (for example, Uttar Pradesh. Table 4.2). One of the ways in which 
Gujarat differs most markedly from India overall is in the importance of private 
health care provision (particularky- inpatient). Some 85'o of' hospitals and 58'o of 
inpatient beds are owned by the private sector, compared with 68 and 37'o nation- 
wide (1996 data, Central Bureau of Health Intelligence 1995 & 1996). A 1993 study 
found that 68% of hospital isations among males in rural Gujarat were taken at 
private facilities, compared with '-)'80,, o among rural males nation-wide (Sundar 1995). 
Given that the number of hospitals, doctors and nurses per unit of population is 
relatively high in G *arat (see Table 4.2). and that the private sector predominates, it Ui 
is surprising that private expenditures per capita and medical indebtedness are 
relatively low. 
Ta 1) 1e4.1: Select social, econornic and demographic indicators for Khed. t 11% 
(nmv Anand and Kheda) District. Guiarat and India 
Indicator Anand 
District 
Klieda 
Di,, tn*ct 
Gujarat 
S late 
India 
2001 Population. millions (1) 50.00 1, () 
2001 Densitý. per,; on,,; sq. kin 0 631 4SO 258 
"00 1 `, ý Rural (h IQQ I data) 62.65 
IQQ I "A lindu (1) 87-1) 894-S S-' 41 
1998-91) Per capita income, Rs. (2) NA 14, hS -2 
1993-94 i'vionthly per capita consumption 
expenditure. R. s. (2) 
NA 35 -5 
100 1 Scheduled castes as 0 of total 0 5Q1 -. 41 lh 48 
1 QQI SChCdUlCLf thibes as 0, of total 1 1.11) 14. Q2 S. I )S 
2001 Malc litcracy rate (I iS h. 4- Si 
`00 1 Female literacy rate (I t) i i4. Ih 
2001 Females per 1000 Males (1) 9 QQ QI 
"Oo I Population gro%% th rate o% er pre% i owý 10 
Iý Car-, (I) I 
13. () 1 
I 
1 '. 24 " ". 4S 
-. 
'1 14 
Sow-ce: I= Office of the Registrar General. Government 2001. Government of 
GUjarat (Directorate of Economics and Statistics) 2001 
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Table 4.2: Health ýystern input, process and outcome indicators for Gujarat, 
All-India. Kerala and L'ttar Pradt-sh 
Indicator Gujarat All- 
India 
KaWa Unar 
Pr3dcsb 
Input Indwaton 
1995-96 Per capita public , pending on health R,. (2, n 
129) 
9ý) NA 
1995-96 Per capita private spending (approx. ) R,,,. 1P 
130) 
16() NA 44() 
1991 flo,, pitals per 100,000 rural population t4ý 1 4 1 
1991 1 lospi tal beds per 100,000 rural population 31 . 
34 21)_' Q4 MJ3 
1991 PIICs per 100,000 rural population (4) 1-4 4 
1991 Sub-centers per 100,000 rural population,, (4) 26.41 _(Yt-)() 3 
1991 Doctors per 100,000 rural population (4) 521,981 4-AQ 
1991 Nurses per 100,000 rural population (4) 59. oO Ah'8S, -S. 41 1) 24 
1996 1 lospi tals private '/,, (5) 8ý 6S 'N. 'A 
I Q06 Hospital beds private-'/0 (5) 
1)roccss 
1999 Full prenatal care '. /o (1) 1 
0 1999 Institutional deliveries /, ) (1ý 40 34 16 
1998-91) Full immunization 0//o (1) is 54 S4 44 
1995-96 Public hospitalization rate per 1,000 (1) 7. 't) i NJ 4.40 
1995-Q6 Pnivate hospitalization rate per 1.000 (11 1 Q. 46 Q 11 -8 4,4S 
5.65 
1998-91) DI'T 3 (%0 ol'children age 12-23 mos Mio rec*d 
before 12 mos) (3,1). 209) 
64.1 
_55.1 ISIS. 
0 33.9 
1998-99 ý/, ) ofdclivcries by caesanan section (3) 8.5 7.1 NA N.. \ 
1998-99 % of deliveries assistcd by a health professional 
(3,1). 305 
_5 
3. 
_5 
42.3 Q4 1) 4 
1993) Use of pnýatc facilities for outpatient care (rural 
niales) (6) 
62-2 _5 
4. 
_5 
-1.7 h7,2 
lQQ3 I-Ise of private facilities for inpatient care (rural 
nialcs) (6) 
0- .8 
3 S. 0 35.3 35 1 
Outcome Indicators 
Income bias in public spending on curatiýe careý ratio of 
e (2) subsidy to riche., vs. poorest quintil 
1 14 1.10 4.01) 
. I Hospitalized people beloý% the poverty line \%ho 
financed care in public hospitals from borrowing, or sale 
of assas "o (2, P. 157) 
4S 
1 QQ 5 -()h Hospitalized people below the po%errý 
line \%ho 
financed care in private hospitals from borro%% ing, or sale 
ofassets "o (2, p. 15") 
1) 45 4h _)4 
1908-90 tcrt, 11t,, rate ( 15-41)) (3. P. SO) S4 
1998-01) Total fertilaN rate (I S-44) (3) N. 
NA 
I Q08-01) Infant rnoilalit\ (birth to one %ear) IQ-4i 
I QS -0Q 011 Id niorlalit\ (bct\%ccn 
I" and 5 hiithdaý,, 
1()4) 
24.0 1 3 
-)nd " 00 1 5())' Peters. el A Round (from Petci-.,,. ct al. P. Sow-cc: I= NSSO 
2001: 3= Intemational Institute for Population Sciences and ORC Macro 2000.4 = 
Duggal. et al. 199-5: 5= Central Bureau of Health Intelligencc 1005 
Sundar 1905. 
Tribhuvandas Foundation's hospital referral scheme 
The Tribhuvandas Foundation was established uri 1975. Seed money in the amount 
of 650,000 rupees was provided by Shri Tribhuvandas Patel, the founding chairman 
of Arnul Dairy, "to initiate a project for impro-ving the health of women and children 
in Kheda District" (TF Annual Report 1998-99). The Foundation became functional 
in 1980, servicing some 53 villages during its first two years. Todaý. the Foundation 
provides a broad variety of health and related services, focusing on primary and 
preventive care, in some 644 villages. The Foundation has its head office in , knand. 
It is a "sister" organisation to Kaira District Cooperative Milk Producers' Union 
Limited, and it draws on many of the management and administrative structures of 
the village level dairy co-operatives. 
Today, Tribhuvandas Foundation is operating in some 644 villages. Officially. 
households pay a total of 10 rupees per annum (for the whole household, regardless 
of its size) in order to become members of TF. It seems that the membership fee 
was set in a relatively ad hoc manner in 1980 and has never been changed. 
Membership is most often voluntary and open to all residents of villages where TF 
operates. The TF village health worker (VHW) normally enrols families at the 
office of the village dairy co-operative at the time of the annual bonus distribution. 
However, membership fees can be paid at any time throughout the year. In some 
villages, based on a decision made in the Dairy Cooperative Society general bod, - 
meeting, the membership fee is automatically (mandatonly) deducted from the 
bonus as it is distributed. Upon paying the membership fee, a receipt is filled out in 
triplicate, with one copy given to the member, one forwarded to the nearest Sub- 
centre, and one retained by the VHW or the Dairy Secretary. 
The current activities of TF are many and varied (see Box 4.1). Village-level health 
services are provided by female TF Village Health Workers NHWs). one pCr 
village. VHWs are supervised by some 70 field-workers who visit each village once 
every fortnight. Generally, there is no discrimination between members and non- 
members in terms of the village-level services. That is to say. members and non- 
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members alike receive free community health senices and subsidi,, ed medlication. -, 
irib - -- aa- eq - 
d"% Irle m2 Illmw- . --- 
"VA 19.1. 
-an 
viticb %ilic, ru uv 1L ir, i" i to rresent 
I/ Pregnant and Nursing mothers are provided treatment. 
2/ Malnourished children are provided treatment at home a: % well as at the Child Care Center (Nutrition 
Rehabilitation Center) run by the organisation. 
3/ Children are provided vaccines (DPT, Polio, BCG, Measles. etc. ) 
4/ TB patients are provided treatment at home at free cost. 
5/ Pregnant mothers at risk are hospitallsed at the orgarusation and pro-, ided treatment. 
6/ As part of temporary methods of Family Planning, Nirodh, Copper T and Binh ContnA pilk . 11c 
provided in the villages. 
7/ Every week Family Planning Operation camps are organised at the main contre as %Nell x-; . he suh- 
centres; in which laparascopic and open surgeries are done. 
8/ Pregnant women who want delivery at home are provided with a safe dcllverý kit. 
9/ Gynecologic problems are treated by Shri Krishna Hospital's Gý-necologisLs and Obstetricians at the TF 
sub-centres. 
10/ For advice of specialists and for further treatment, patients are either hospitallsed at the Shn Krishna 
Hospital at Karamsad or seen by specialist in the sub-centre's out-patient department. 
I I/ A Nursery programme Is run in the villages for children below fike years of age. 
12/ Women are provided training free of cost, and supplementarý- income in handicraft, (patch%%ork) sk, 
that they can generate income while sitting at home. 
13/ Women who work in their free time are provided addi6onal income for their families through the 
Patchwork Programme. 
14/ Under the Environmental Sanitation Programme, low cost toilets and cooking sto%es are coristructcd. 
151 The organisation prepares and shows health-related video film, -, to bnng awareness imongst rural 
people. 
16/ With the help of the Blood bank of Shri Krishna Hospital Karamsad, blood donation camps are 
organised in the villages. 
17/ Nutritious food is distributed in the villages at nomýinal cost. 
Source: Derived from TF brochure, 'Health And Rural Development Programme 
TF's hospital referral scheme (number 10 in Box 4.1) is the focus of this study. 
Until late 1999, TF members received a discount for inpatient services at the Shri 
Krishna Hospital, located near Anand town (the largest urban area in Kheda 
District). Individuals who were identified as being particularly ill or malnounshed 
were referred to TF's headquarters (in Anand) or one of TF's four sub-centres. 
TF 
patients who required specialised care were referred to the Shri 
Krishna flospital 
11 where specialists and modem diagnostic facilities are available" (TF 
1999). A TF 
worker was available full-time at the hospital to assist TF members coming 
from the 
different villages. TF members generally received a _500o 
discount on the total 
hospital bill, but this varied according to level of' need (for example. %'ery pcKir 
families would receive a 1000, o discount while wealthier 
families would receive no 
discount). The amount of the discount was left largely to the medical 
doctor heading 
the department to which the member was admitted. TF members are no 
loný, cr 
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receiving special benefits at Shri Krishna Hospital (although children under 5 
continue to receive free care, there is a special scheme for women. and the pix)r ma,. 
be provided with a discount on a case-by-case basis). 
After paying the membership fee, there was no waiting period before members %vere 
able to avail of TF's hospital referral scheme. Nlembers, have al%vays been allo%ved 
to purchase membership after failing ill. 
A" 
As mentioned above, the Tribhuvandas Foundation was started with money provided 
by Shri Tribhuvandas Patel. As well, several domestic and international funding 
agencies (including LNICEF and the Overseas Development Administration. United 
Kingdom) contributed to the Foundation in its early years. Today, the Foundation's 
main sources of income include: Amul Dairy through the National Federation of 
Rural Development, interest on funds, user-fees charged for medicines, membership 
fees, and Dairy Cooperative Society contributions. 
Monthly, the Shri Krishna Hospital forwarded to TF a report (or bill) detailing the 
total cost of TF member hospital isations, and tallying the discounts that were 
provided to TF members. Since the inception of the referral scheme, the 
concessions provided to TF patients at Shri Krishna Hospital have been offset by a 
donation from Kaira Can, a sister concern of Amul Dairy. The amount of the 
payment, however, has been fixed at 500,000 per annum. At least during the last 
five years, no additional payment has been made by TF to the Shri Krishna Hospital. 
Meanwhile, the total amount of concessions provided to TF patients at Shri Krishna 
Hospital has grown considerably since 1980. In recent years the Shri Krishna 
Hospital has incurred considerable financial loss in providing reduced-cost care to 
TF patients (Table 4.3). It was for this reason that the scheme was discontinued late 
in 1999, largely at the insistence of administrators at Shri Krishna Hospital. 
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Table 4.3: Annual debt incurred by Shri Krishna Hospital in pro%idin, ' 
concessions to TF patients, 1996/97 to 1998,99 
Fiscal Year Shn Krishna Donation by Debt Incurred TF Membership 
fees* 
Referral Costs (R-s) Khera Can (Rs) by Shri Krishna (Rs) (R. ') 1996/97 1,771,707 500.000 1,27 1, -i, l - ShQ. L)h- 
1997/98 1,458,624 500,000 958.624 918.600 
1998/99 1,312,886 500,000 812.886 1.018.200 
* Shown only for companson sake, these membership fees are not used to offset the 
costs of referral care at Shn Knshna Hospital. 
It is debatable whether the TF's hospital referral scheme should be defined as a 
health insurance scheme or simply a chanty (and the membership fee as a premium 
or a donation, respectively). It operated like a medical insurance scheme insofar as 
people paid a small amount of money in advance of falling ill, in return the), were 
eligible to receive a discount on hospital costs, and even if they were not 
hospitalised, their membership fee was not returned. It was based on these 
cliaractenstics that the scheme was selected for this study. Hmvever, it was unlike a 
health insurance scheme in several ways. Firstly, the membership fee was extremely 
low (and was often halved or waived completely) and was never intended to cover, 
or even offset, the hospitalisation costs of members. Secondly, people could not 
count on receiving benefit at the time of hospital isation. this was dependent upon an 
assessment of' the member's wealth. Thirdly, it was not managed like a health 
insurance scheme. For example, people were allowed, and encouraged, to purchase 
a membership even after they had fallen sick. and even when they were en route to 
the hospital. 
Appendix 1) describes a ne%N, - scheme. the Sardar Patel Insurance Scheme. which 
th -) 
started functioning (on a very small scale) on January 26 , -001. 
The new scheme 
was not e% aluated under this study. 
SENVA's Medical Insurance Fund 
The SENVA movement was starled by Ela Bhatt in Alimcdahid in "1! 1, a,, 
organisation of p(-)or, self-emploved women workers. These are women who earn a 
I 15 
living through their own Labor or small businesses. They do not obtain regular 
salaried employment with welfare benefits like workers in the organised sector. 
They are the unprotected Labor force of (India)"' (SEWA 1999. p. 9). SEW. -\ Union, 
the umbrella organisation, has two main goals. First, to organise women workers to 
achieve full employment, i. e. work secunty, income security, food security and 
social security. Second, to make (women) individually and collectively self-reliant. 
economically independent and capable of making their own decisions. 
Approximately 68% of SEWA's 215,000 members reside in Gujarat. 
SEWA's Integrated Insurance Scheme was initiated in 1992. This Scheme provides 
life insurance, medical insurance and asset insurance. This study deals exclusively 
with the Medical Insurance Fund. In order to join the Fund, women must be 
between 18 and 58 years of age, and they must be members of the larger SENVA 
Union (membership fee of Rs. 5 can be purchased at the same time as paying the 
insurance premium). Those who pay the annual IIS premium of Rs. 772.5 (1.67 USS: 
Rs. 30 of which is earmarked for medical insurance) are covered to a maximum of 
Rs. 1,200 (28 US$) yearly in case of hospitalisation. Women also have the option of 
becoming lifetime members of the IIS by making a fixed deposit of Rs. 700 (16 
US$); interest on this is used to pay the annual premium and the deposit is returned 
to the woman when she turns 58. Exempted from coverage under the Medical 
Insurance Fund are certain chronic diseases (for example, chronic tuberculosis, 
certain cancers, diabetes, hypertension, piles) and disease caused by addiction. 
Those who are not members of the IIS are strictly excluded from its benefits. 
Annual members pay their premium in cash. Voluntarýv lifetime members usually 
pay their membership fee in cash, but they may occasionally pay by a check 
from 
their SEWA Bank account. Women who take a loan of more than R., -,. 10.000 
from 
SEWA Bank are automatically enrolled in the IIS as lifetime members. and the 
fixed 
deposit is deducted directly from their loan. 
Annual membership fees are collected only from APnl l' to June 
30'h. and annual 
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members are eligible for medical insurance starting on July I". The lit' time tit ed e Ix 
deposit can be paid anytime throughout the year. After paying the fixed deposit, 
women are eligible for benefits on whiche'ver of the following dates comes first: Juk 
I", October I", January I", or April I". The number of members cited bv SEWA 
refers to the number who on July I", the I" day of the fiscal year, have paid their 
annual membership fee or lifetime fixed deposit within the preceding tNvelve months. 
The choice of health care provider is left to the discretion of the SEWA member. 
Members are eligible for reimbursement whether they use private-for-profit. private- 
non-profit or public facilities. After discharge from hospital, the Fund member is 
required to submit the following documents within a three month period: a doctor's 
certificate stating the reason for hospitalisation and the dates of admission and 
discharge; doctors' prescriptions and bills for medicines purchased; and, reports of 
laboratory tests done during the hospital stay. After submission of these documents, 
the member is usually visited by a SEWA employee who verifies the authenticity of 
the claim. All documentation is reviewed by a consultant physician, and a Final 
decision on the claim is then made by an insurance panel. Finally, the Fund member 
is notified of the panel's decision, and when applicable, is paid by check. 
SEWA directly provides limited preventive and curative services through 95 health 
centers (open to SEWA members and non-members). In some instances, the health 
workers at these centers may refer women on to higher levels of health care, and 
they may even accompany women to the nearest hospital. However, the centers do 
not function as an integrated referral network in that they have no direct contact with 
the hospitals and they are not intended to prevent women from seeking 
hospitalisation unnecessaril'y. 
The design and management of the Medical Insurance Fund ha%e oolved 
considerably since 1992. Initially. the Fund was administered joIntly by SENVA and 
the United India Insurance Company. At that time, coverage included on]%- 
allopathic. inpatient care, not including gýmae4; ologic illnesse,,. The maximum 
I 
amount of reimbursement was Rs. 1,000. In 1994 SEW. -\ assumed,: ompletecontrol 
of the medical insurance component. Since then, there have been small. step-wise 
changes in the premium and the benefits package-, these changes seem to have been 
made largely to satisfy the perceived needs of members rather than based on any 
actuarial calculations. In 1995, coverage was expanded to 'include treatment from 
traditional bone-setters, occupational diseases, obstetric and gynaecologric problems. 
and in exceptional cases, homeopathic or traditional medical care (still to a 
maximum of Rs. 1,000). In 1998, the maximum coverage %vas increased to Rs. 
1,200. In July of 1998, administration of the Medical Insurance Fund for Kheda 
District was decentralised, shifting from Ahmedabad to the district office in Anand. 
Throughout the ten districts of Gujarat where it operates, the N'tedical Insurance 
Fund had 23,214 members in 1999-2000. Since the Fund's inception, the premiums 
paid by annual members plus the interest paid from the fixed deposits of lifetime 
members have always exceeded medical claim payments. Cost-recovery (excluding 
administrative costs) varied from 119 to 309 percent (Table 4.4). It is very difficult 
to estimate the costs of administering the Medical Insurance Fund, data on 
administrative costs are poorly recorded and many of the administrative functions 
are shared with the life and asset insurance components as well as with other 
activities of SEWA. A recent study by the International Labour Office (ILO '7000) 
found that basic administration costs accounted for 10.2 to 22.9 percent of IIS 
expenses annually. Interest from a German Technical Cooperation grant (Rs. 
100 
million given in 1993) is used to cover all administrative costs and to provide the 
maternity benefit of Rs. 300. 
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Table 4.4: Ratio of premiums to claims under SENVA's Medical Insurance 
Fund 
1994 1 1995 1996 199,11 1 1908 1 1999 A%g. 6 
Premiums (R-s. -000) 150 450 600 
T 
h0h 
Claims (R-s. -00o) 
1 
125 124 259 
1 
266 3 Q. 3 38 
it recovery ratio Cos 119 309 1 1 225 1 IsO 201 
Source: ILO 2001, p. 77; data not available f'or 1992-94. 
Table 4.5 surnmanses the context, design and manat, ement ofthe t'wo schemes. 
It should be noted that "TF and "TF's hospital referral scheme" are used quite 
interchangeably throughout the thesis. This is largely because membership in TF 
implies membership in the hospital referral scherne. However, this study did not 
cover any of TF's many activities outside of the hospital reterral scheme. With the 
SEWA schenic, on the other hand, "Fund" (or Nledical Insurance Fund) and -IIS- 
(or Integrated Insurance Scheme) are used some-, xhat interchangeably, as the Fund is 
a component of the IIS, and all members of the IIS are autornatically covered by the 
Fund. Flowever, SEWA (or SEWA Union) .sa broader organisation, and while all IIZ, III 
members of the IIS must belong to SEvV, -V the reverse is not true (i. e. women may 
choose to join SEWA Union without joining the IIS). This research looked only at 
the Fund (or IIS functions directly related to it) 
under the IIS or SEWA Union. 
It does not assess other activities 
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Table 4.5: 
referral scherne and SENVA's Fund 
mana, lement. TF'i hospital 
V'ariable I TF*s hospital referral scheme SBk. V, ý, Medical Insurance 
I 
Fund 
Scheme ý()ntext: 
Social capital -- net%,, ork,, Members ha% e in common that SFWA member,, arc 
norm. s, and social trust that they are milk producers, ouL,, Idc homogenous in term-, of facilitate coordination and the dairy co-operative occupauon. Have a lustory of 
cooperation movement (the "White working together. successfully. 
Revolution") limited history of on other projects (e. g. banking. 
collaboration credit. creche. income- 
generation. etc 
Economic context'. 
e Economic condition of target Members are mo,, t often Largelý p%-vr %% omen, but %% ho 
population associated with the milk do have access to banking and 
societies and own milch credit facilities 
animals. a-s , uch they are not 
the oorest in the community 
e Competitiveness of health Nlaný hovitals (go%crnment, Sailic 
insurance and health care pn%ate. and pn%ate-non-profit). 
markets but very few health insurance 
schemes (the go% ernment 
schemes offered through GIO 
Political context: No government Same 
involvement commitment to 
help make the NGO CBFII 
sector more effecti\e 
I lealth sector: 
e Structure and performance of A top- (hospital-) heaýý, niulti- Same 
the health care systcni tier structure, that is 
predominantly prn, ate. 
Considerable problems with 
quality, cfficienc, ý. equity (, ýee 
Chapter 2) 
4, User fees charged for health . -Mmost always. e%en at public 
Slime 
Ser'Vices facilities. patients end up 
paying for medicines, or 
making under- the- table 
paynientN 
. -\, spects of schenle 
desit-TTI 
Year of coninicncement -)Q 
Target POPL11,100fl 'Kheda All households, in tNý ot 
'SLAVA nion in MemberS of -U 
District's ýillages. Gujarat State ( 14-. 618 in 
I QQQ 2000) 
Population co\ eraL: c l6o. 050 households (11)1)0- 
14 lrlkilý IdLials I IQ99-- 
1 2000) (co%crage estimated by 
Dave (1003) was 15 to I t, of 
householdO 
L'nit ofmcnibership llou, ýehold 
Indi\ idual 
Restnictions to rileniber-ship None 
Female. 18 to 58 Ycal's Of age. 
must be a member of the IWIger 
SEWA I *nion (membership fee 
Rs. 5) 
Prenuum Rs. 10 Hh %car Rs, -2.5 -. koman %car 
71 
Description of context. desi<,,, n and 
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Time of Premium payrne-nt 
Benefits package 
Health care benefits 
Eligible facilities 
Exclusions from coverage 
Process of reimbursement 
Method of reirnbursemcnt 
External funding 
Health care services outside of 
"insurance" scheme 
Aspects of scheme management 
Nature of relationship with 
provider 
Roic of govcmment 
Community involvement (in 
scheme design and 
management) 
Role of health care provider 
COIlectcd,, n, e, i . car at *hc 
6mc milk bonuS paymcrits arc 
distnbutcd (a,, well. milk- 
socictý member-, and non- 
mcmbcr, -s can enroll at an-, time 
of year) 
Hospital coverage onlý, but 
may ha% e been pcrcci, ed to 
include preventi%e and pnmar7. 
care through the VHW 
Generallý a 50",, discount on 
total hospital bill, but vaned 
according to le, el of need 
Shn Knshna Hospital onlý 
None (although wealthier 
members expected to paý more) 
At the time of discharge from 
hospital, discount subtracted 
from total bill 
Not applicable 
Kaira Can covers mcmber 
hospitalizations to 500,000. 
with the rest "debt" to Shri 
Krishna Hospital 
Preventi %e and pnimary care 
delivered through %*IlWs and 
health center%. non-members 
had same entitlements to these 
communitv services 
TF and Shn Knshna are sister 
institutions (same Chair- 
pcr%on). 
None 
Limited 
Complex. due to overlap in 
management 
Annual mvrbcr, ýhlp fee 
pa, ýablc rrom Aml lg,,, June 
lifetime fixed dcposit 
pa%abic At an% time chr, lu-hout 
the ý ca r 
Life. mcdicai ant! a--. -, ct. % 
i ms u ranc c 
Up ,,, Ps. 1.2CO ývar 
hospital isation 
Aný, (Olould he regi, tered .% ith 
municipal authorities) 
Certain chmnic di, ca, ýc, an5- 
di%case caucd b%, addiction 
Aftcr hospitalization. %oman 
iubmits claim direct1% to 
SEWA and then a%% aits 
rcimburscmcnt 
Paid bN check 
GTZ co%crs adminvtrawc 
cost-,, only 
Community health %%orkcrs in 
some % illages, pro, idc care it) 
all SFA'A mcmbers (not just 
IIS mcmbers), acti%ltics are 
limited in Khcda Disinct 
None 
Administered jointlý hý U11C 
until lQQ4 
Feedback gi%cn at (annual and 
other) meetings used t,, 
imp ),, c scheme*,, design 
None 
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DATA COLLECTION, ENTRYAND ANALYSIS 
Three different methodologies were used in this study: a cross-sectlonal household 
survey; analysis of scheme utilisation data. and focus-group discussions and in-depth 
interviews. These three methodologies correspond to three results chapters for TF 
and SEWA-IIS each (Figure 4.2). The household sune,, and analysis of scheme 
utilisation data primarily address Objectives I to 3. while the qualitative 
methodologies are used to address Objectives I through 5. ýx-ith an emphasis on 
Objectives 4 and 5. 
In order to address the study objectives outlined above. more specific questions %vere 
developed that could be addressed using the three different methodologies. (The 
specific questions vary slightly between the two schemes, due primanly to 
differences in the utilisation data. ) The cross-sectional household survey addresses 
Objective I to 3 (to evaluate "economic" impact) by assessing the two schemes in 
terrns of their impact on access to inpatient care, protection from the costs of 
inpatient care, and equity. More specifically, it looks at: 
Does the scheme increase access to inpatient care? 
Does the scheme decrease total expenditures (net of discount or reimbursement) 
per episode of hospitalisation among its members' 
0 What are the determinants of membership in the scheme, and is wealth one of 
them'? 
Scheme utilisation data are similarly used to address Objecti,. "e I to 3. Using these 
data, scheme impact is assessed primanly in terms of protection from the costs of 
inpatient care-, however, a variety of other questions (related to access to care and 
equity) are also addressed: 
* To what extent do the schemes provided financial protection (froni hospital 
expenditures) among those who use them? 
Relative to the overall frequency of hospital isation, how likely are members to 
make use of the schemes"' 
0 Are there differences in the degree of financial protection, or the rate of 
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utilisation, by social or demographic vanables (like age. gender or place of 
residence)? 
The qualitative interviews are used to address Objectives I through 5. including the 
impact of the schemes (both economic and social), and the factors (again, both =I 
economic and social) that underlie their impact. The more specific questions 
addressed are: 
Why do people participate in the schemes? What are their expectations. ) 
* What has been the experience among those who have used the schemes' 
A more detailed and specific set of questions (described below) vvere used to explore 
these issues. 
There are no standardised or accepted tools for detecting or measuring social 
consequences or social capital. The exploratory and open-ended nature of 
qualitative modes of inquiry make them more appropriate than quantitative methods 
for investigating these phenomena. No quantitative measures of social 
consequences or social capital were included in the household survey. 
The Principal Investigator (MKR) took pnmary responsibility for all aspects of the 
study, and was present in the field for the full duration of data collection and data 
entry. One Senior Research Assistant (RA) was employed for the full duration of 
the fieldwork. Trained and supervised by the PI, the Senior RA did much of the 
qualitative work (interviewing, translating and transcribing) with the assistance of a 
Junior RA. Together, the PI and Senior RA hired and trained seven interviewers for 
the household survey, and supervised their work during the three months of sur-vey 
administration. With direct supervision from the PI, Junior RAs were responsible 
for random sampling for the household survey. and entr-y of data from the household 
survey and from insurance claims and hospital bills into computers. 
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ure4.2: Objectives, methods and results chapters 
Household smr%eý Schemc utilisation data 
ohjectiýc I 
Objective 2 
ObjectiN c3 
Ohiective 4 
Objective 5 
Chapter 5- TF 
Chapter 8- SY WA 
Cbspier 6- TF 
ChAPter 9 -SfWA 
F ocus--. roup 
di%cu%%ions and in- 
depth inter-. icw-. 
Cross-sectional household survey 
This study was designed with the primary objective of assessing the impact of the 
two schemes in terms of. (I) population reach, particularly inclusion of the poor, (2) 
hospital Litilisation during the one-year period preceding the sur"'ev. and (3) annual 
cost ofhospitalisations, conditional on reporting, one or more hospitalisations. 
Tile survey instrument was designed based on other health care utilisation and 
expcnditure sun, evs. from India and elsewhere (Gumber and Kulkami 2000: Duggal 
and Amin 1981): Mills lQ89). The first round of qualitative work (in-depth 
interviews and focus-group discussions) fed into the questionnaire by helping to 
refine questions around: (1 ) patterns of treatment seeking; (2) different means of 
coping, with the costs of health care: (3) use of traditional Indian systems of 
nicdicine, and (4) strengths and weaknesses of TF and SEWA-IIS. 
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information was collected on household income and consumption expenditures. It 
was decided that collecting such data would be too time-consuming. and the validit'v 
of such data (income in particular) is generally, low: 
Setf reported measures of total income are unlikeýv to be reliable. because, 
quite apart from an understandable reluctance to reveal such inlormation 
to a stranger, the myriad transactions undertaken kv such selfemplqved 
people make it unlikely that respondents know this datum tMorris. et al. 
2000). 
Rather, detailed information was collected on household assets, quality of the place 
of residence, and ownership of building and land other than the place of residence. 
These were used to construct an economic status index (ESI) which was used as a 
proxy for wealth in the analyses. Appendix I provides the Household Interview 
Questionnaire, Gujarati version and Appendix 2 the English version. . -\ppendix 3 
describes the ESI and evaluates its reliability. 
Seven female interviewers were hired to conduct the household survev. Most were 
educated to the level of Masters degree, and all spoke Gujarati as their first language 
(only two spoke some English). The interviewers received almost two weeks of 
training by the PI and Senior RA prior to conunencement of the survey. During this 
time, they were introduced to the study, and to basic interviewing techniques. As 
practice, interviewers first administered the questionnaire to one another in the 
classroom, and then to a small sample of women in a single village (initially in front 
of the whole group, then in pairs or under the supervision of the PI and Senior RA, 
and finally independently). Each interviewer piloted the questionnaire at a minimum 
of five households. Piloted questionnaires were checked for mistakes, and the 
interv iewers provided comments on their initial experiences with the sun ey tool. 
The survey tool was substantially revised based on the experiences during piloting. 
Furthermore, the piloted (but not the final) questionnaire was back-translated into 
English by Masters in English students at Sardar Patel University. Very 
changes needed to made to the questionnaire on the basis of the back-translation. 
This was a cross-sectional cohort study. respondents were Inter% jewed at oniv one 
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point in time, and the number of TF. SEWA-IIS and non-insured households were 
fixed in advance. The cross-sectional approach %vas selected as it is can be 
conducted dunng a relatively short penod of time and it is relatively inexpensive. It 
was felt that the major drawback of the cross-sectional approach - not being able to 
determine whether the exposure (membership in an insurance scheme) preceded or 
resulted from the outcome (access to. or expenditure on. hospital isation) - was not of 
great importance in this case. and could be addressed using qualitative 
methodologies. A cohort (rather than a case-control) design was selected as it was 
assumed that the outcome of interest (hospital isation and use of the insurance 
schemes) would be relatively common in the stud,,,, population (further discussed 
below). 
At the design stage, households were stratified based on type of village: (1) villages 
where TF was operating alone, (11) villages where SEWA-IIS was operating alone, 11ý1 tv 
and (111) "joint" villages where SEWA-IIS and TF were both working. Based on . L- C" 
these three cohorts and three strata. there were seven different types of household 
(Table 4.6). 
Tab Ic4.6: 
Cohoris 
TF Households 
SEWA-lis 
Households 
Non-Insured 
Households 
Seven tý-pcs of households included in the suncy 
Strata 1: TF Villa, -, es Strata 2: SEWA-IIS Strata Villages Villages 
Type INA Type 5 
NA Týpe 33 Type 6 
Týpe 2 Fype 4 Type 7 
Joint 
The p6mary objective was to make compansons between individuals in households 
belonging to TF (Type I and Type 5) and individuals in non-member households in 
the same villages (Ty"pe 2 and Type 7) and between insured women in SEWA 
households (Type 3 and Type 6) and non-insured women ofthe same age range (18 
to _58 years) in non-insured 
households in the same villages (Type 4 and Type 7). 
For each scheme, the sample size was calculated based on the assumed impact of 
enrolment in an insurance scherne on the prevalence of substituting (o% cr a one %ear 
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period) for expenditures on food. agricultural development Lind education in order to 
pay for medical care. The following values were entered into the Epi InIO 6 sample 
size calculator: 95% confidence level; 80% power, 200, 'o prevalence of self-reported 
substitution amongst non-insured households, and 100,0 prevalence of self-reported 
substitution amongst insured households. Based on these figures. a sample size of 
438 households was recommended (219 enrolled and 219 non-enrolled). Howe" er. 
given the potential inaccuracy of the underlying assumptions, and the possibilitY that 
as many as 10% of households would be unwilling/ unable to participate, it was 
decided that 500 households would be interviewed for each of SENVA and TF (250 
enrolled and 250 non-enrolled). 
Two-stage, random cluster sampling was used. Cluster sampling, "the process of 
taking a random sample of natural groupings", is particularly useftil "'When the 
population is widely dispersed and it is impractical or costly to list and sample from 
all of its elements"', which certainly applied in this study (Hulley, et al. 1988, p. 24). 
Ten villages were selected for each of the three strata. Villages were selected 
randomly (using random-number tables); the probability of selection was equal for 
all villages regardless of size. The secondary sampling units were households. 
Within each village, insured were randomly selected from lists compiled by the two 
insurance schemes and non-insured were randomly selected from census or voting 
lists, again using random-number tables. In each of the TF and SEWA-IIS 'ý`Illages, 
14 insured households and 14 non-insured households %%, -ere sampled (20 ý,, Illages x 
28 households = 560 households). In the "joint villages", 14 TF households. 14 
SEWA households, and 28 non-insured households ý, vere sampled (10 ý, -illages x -56 
households = 560 households). Thus. the total sample size was 1.120. 
The household questionnaire was administered between 14 February 2000 and 6 
May 2000. Interviewers were divided into two teams of three. The remaining 
interviewer directed the activities of one team, and checked all of their 
questionnaires as they were returned. while the Senior RA supen-ised the work of 
.1 the other team. The PI checked all questionnaires, usually within -4 
hours after their 
completion. One hundred households were randomly sampled to be interviewed a 
second time to check the reliability of the survey instrument. The re-inten-iews were 
usually conducted within 24 hours of the first intervie, %&-. and were always conducted 
by a different interviewer. 
Data were double-entered into a Microsoft Access Database. Analysis was 
conducted using Stata. Special statistical tools (the -svy function" in Stata) have 
been used to correct for clustering and stratification. This means that all measures of 
central tendency, association and variance have been weighted-'adjusted to account 
for the different probability of a household being selected in each of the primary 
sampling units. The inflation factors (shown in Appendix 4) were used for 
weighting in the statistical analyses. These weights indicate the relative number of 
households in the entire study population (i. e. all villages in Kheda District where 
either the TF scheme, the SEWA-IIS scheme or both were functioning) represented 
by each household that was actually sampled. Appendix 4 lists the surveyed 
villages, along with the inflation factors used. 
Logistic and log-linear regression models were used (detailed descriptions are 
provided in Chapters 5 and 8). The survey estimators are based on maximum 
likelihood estimation. Adjusted Wald tests are presented for all models-, this is 
equivalent to the F-test of the significance of the regression. A p-value of 5% or less 
was used as criterion for significant association. The Ramsey RESET test for 
omitted variable bias and functional form is presented for all regressions; a p-value 
of 5% or less indicates bias or inefficiency. 
Review of scheme utilisation data 
The qpes of scheme utilisation data available for TF and SBVA were quite 
difTerent. For TF's hospital referral scheme. bills submitted to TF by the Shri 
Krishna Hospital were available for the fiscal years 1996/977 to 1999 00 (each fiscal 
year is from I st April through 31st March). These bills were used to assess the 
scheme in terms of- (1) protection of beneficianes from hospital costs and (2) 
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frequency of use of the referral services. The data available from claims were as 
follows: the number of bills submitted per annum; gender and taluka of residence for 
each person hospitalised; whether the patient was admitted to the Nutlitional 
Resource Centre (NRC) or the "adult wards"; total cost of the hospitalisation (no 
cost break-down was provided); whether a discount was provided. and if so. in what 
amount. All data from bills had already been entered into a computer (Dbase) b,. 
staff from TF. 
For SEWA, claims submitted to the Medical Insurance Fund between July 1". 1994 1 
through June 30'h, 2000 were available. Using these data, the scheme was assessed 
in terms of. (1) protection of claimants from the costs of hospitalisation, (2) lag time 
between discharge from hospital and reimbursement, (3) frequency of use of the 
insurance scheme; and (4) annual household income of claimants compared to 
income in the general population. The data available from claims were as follows: 
self-reported, annual household income; total costs of hospitalisation (for which bills 
were available); date of discharge from hospital, date on which receipts and 
certificates were submitted, date of the insurance panel's decision; whether the 
claimant was reimbursed, and if so, when and in what amount. Claims were entered 
into a Microsoft Access database by two Junior PAs (single data entry only). 
In Chapters 6 and 9, additional information is provided about the calculations that 
were performed, and external sources of data that were used in the analyses. 
Focus-group discussions and in-depth interviews 
In-depth interviews and focus-group discussions were used to address Objectives I 
through 5. Firstly, focus-group discussions with beneficiaries and in-depth 
interviews with health care providers and scheme administrators were conducted 
(10/99 through 12., 99). Later, in-depth interviews with beneficianies. health care 
providers, scheme administrators, and an external donor were performed (0700 to 
09/00). Earlier and later interviews addressed the same topics. guidelines for the 
interviews can be found in Appendix 5. 
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AJI sampling was purposive. In the first phase, six FGDs (3 per scheme) and six in- 
depth interviews (one administrator, one provider, and one government 
representative per scheme) were planned. In the second phase 54 to 56 in-depth 
interviews were planned, comprised of two or three providers and twentý-five 
enrolled members, per scheme. 
"'Maximum variation" was the strategy in sampling for the focus-group discussions. 
as the purpose was to document diverse variations and identify important conunon 
patterns (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 28). An attempt was made to assemble 
groups that were fairly diverse in terms of age, place of residence, gender and socio- 
economic status. Villages were first identified where both TF and SEWA-IIS had 
members, and then one village near Anand (-v%, here the district headquarters of both 
schemes are located, along with the densest cluster of hospitals in the district) and 
one village distant from Anand were selected. Focus-groups were either entirely 
female (five) or entirely male (two) - males and females were not interviewed 
together, as it was felt that females were unlikely to voice their opinions with men 
from the same community present. A roughly equal number of People from insured 
and non-insured households were invited to the focus-group discussions. Three of 
the femal. e focus-groups included insured from only one of the schemes, and two 
included insured from both schemes. Both of the male focus-groups included 
insured from both schemes (or for the SEWA scheme, the husbands of the insured). 
TF village health workers and SEWA village leaders identified the insured members 
(generally living within the village, rather than on more distant farins) and the non- 
insured were typically neighbours of the insured. Participants were not reimbursed 
for their time, but were provided with tea and snacks. 
Interviews with scheme administrators and health care providers were conducted 
during both phases of qualitative work. The strate,,, y in sampling was -'stratified 
purposeful": people from different subgroups were selected (for example, village- 
level scheme represent ati ves, their supen-isors. district-level administrators, etc. ) so 
Uo 
as to facilitate comparisons (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 28). For both TF and 
SEWA-IIS, an attempt was made to include administrators at the top of the 
administrative hierarchy (e. g. founders, chairmen) through to the bottom (e. g. village 
level representatives). For SEWA, providers were selected from amongst the 
physicians (allopathic and traditional) whose names appeared on members' 
insurance claims, and for TF from amongst village-level health care workers and 
doctors at TF sub-centres. 
Government representatives at the district level (the District Medical Officer) and at 
the central level (the Joint Minister of Health) were approached for interview. Only 
one external donor was interviewed, associated with the SEWA scheme. 
fn the second phase of the qualitative work, in-depth inter-viewees were selected 
from amongst the respondents to the quantitative household survey. An attempt was 
made to include roughly equal numbers of TF members, SEWA insured and non- 
insured respondents. Within these three groups, respondents whose households had 
experienced at least one hospitalisation within the last year were over-sampled. 
Furthermore, among TF and SEWA-IIS respondents who had expenenced a 
hospital isation, some respondents who had used the CBHl scheme and some who 
had not were included. 
The focus groups were generally attended by the PI, chaired by one research 
assistant (RA) and recorded (with video tape, audio tape, and notes) by a second PA. 
All interviews were conducted by one RA and recorded (audio tape and notes) b"'- a 
second RA. Interviews were recorded with the permission of participants. The full 
interviews - most of them conducted in Gujarati - were translated into English. 
transcribed (hand-written) and then typed in Microsoft Word. 
The data from the interv iews, 'discuss ions were coded by the Principal Investiggator 
using N-Vivo software. The unit of analysis was defined as a sentence or multi- 
sentence chunk- and assigned the single most appropriate code. All coding was 
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performed following, rather than in parallel with, the data collection. Coding and 
analysis of the data was performed using a -grounded" approach %k-herein codes %vere 
generated to represent the main themes found in the data (Miles and Huberman 
1994). In the discussion the results are related to the more analytical objectives that 
underlie the research. 
Investigating social consequences and contextual factors 
During both phases of the qualitative research, inteniewers collected information 
from participants around the rather abstract concepts of social consequences of 
health insurance, and social capital as a determinant of the success of CBH1- There 
are no standardised or accepted tools for detecting or measuring social consequences 
or social capital. For the purposes of this study, these abstract concepts were broken 
down into more concrete components, and these components were used as the basis 
of discussions with scheme participants. 
To the knowledge of this author, no empirical work in a developing country has 
looked into the social implications of a health insurance scheme. Empirical work in 
developed countries appears to be limited to research into the impact of health 
insurance on the Labor market (for example, see Monthlý- Labor Review 1998 and 
Sapolsky 198 1). The literature reviewed (see Chapter 3) suggested that the 
following potential consequences should be investigated: 
* Conflict in families, and between patient and provider, around medical decision- 
maldng, 
9 Community involvement in medical decision-making-, 
o The status of allopathic and traditional systems of medicine: 
Access to medical care among the elderly and other disadvantaged soci Zý 1 10- 
economic groups (and conflict between socio-economic groups related to access 
to health care); 
Impact of health insurance on the Labor market: 
Satisfaction or well-being related to the ability to 'give gifts'. 
The nature and prevalence of risky behaviour. 
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Past attempts to measure social capital have also broken it down into its component 
parts, and tried to measure such things as trust. civic co-operation and participation 
in civic organisations (Knack and Keefer 1997). Difficulties arise in measuring 
these inherently ambiguous factors. Further, combining the measures from these 
various domains (so as to derive a social capital index) may not be valid: it is held 
by some that social capital may be greater that the sum of its component parts. 
Examples of attempts to detect or measure social capital include the following: 
" Putnam (1993a) used a composite index of newspaper readership, the density of 
sports and cultural associations, turnout in referenda, and the incidence of 
preference voting; 
" Knack and Keefer (1997) included as separate variables: self-reported trust in 
others, acceptability of various corrupt behaviours (e. g. cheating on taxes if you 
have the chance), and participation in a variety of types of organisations, 
" Castle (personal communication) in her study of women in Mall explored advice 
networks, and sources of practical, economic and emotional support-, 
" Lochner, et al. (1999) described tools for collecting data on four (substantially 
overlapping) domains: collective efficacy (i. e. trust, norms of reciprocity and 
likelihood of intervening when the "neighbourhood" is in some way threatened), 
psychological sense of community, neighbouring and neighbourhood cohesion 
(social connections that are either personal or at the neighbourhood le'vel), and 
community competence (problem solving ability of a community that arises 
through collective effort). 
In this study. an attempt was made to collect information around the following 
components of social capital. %vhich Nvere felt to be particularly relevant to health 
insurance: 
" social consciousness or solidarity, loyalty to society, 
" traditions of collaboration and co-operation; 
" the exchange of information, 
" social proximity and trust: 
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e strength of norms and sanctions. 
While these categories are neither mutually exclusive. nor all-inclusive. they 
provided a sufficiently simple framework to guide the data collection. 
CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING QUALITY OF CASE-STUDY RESEARCH 
Qualitative and quantitative studies, despite being very different In terms of methods 
of data collection, analysis and presentation, can be assessed using similar standards 
of quality: 
As in quantitative research, the basic strategv to ensure rigour. and thus 
quality, in qualitative research is systematic, self conscious research 
design, data collection, interpretation, and communication (MaYs and Pope 
2000). 
Advocates of the "antirealist position" argue that there are multiple perspectives of 
the world that are created and constructed in the research process. As such, 
qualitative research represents a distinctive paradigm and it should not be judged by 
conventional measures of validity, general izabi I ity, and reliability (Mays and Pope 
1000). Others believe that there is an underlying reality that can be studied, and that 
qualitative research should attempt to represent that reality: 
Our view is that qualitative studies take place in a real social world, and 
can have real consequences in people's lives; that there is a reasonable 
view of "what happened" in any particular situation (including what was 
believed, interpreted, etc. ); and that we who render accounts of it can do so 
well or poorýy, and should not consider our work unjudgable (Miles and 
Huberman, p. 277). 
According to this position, it is possible to assess qualitatl%-e and quantitative 
research using the same criteria. 
In this study, the evaluation framework described in Table 4.7 was used to assess 
both the quantitative and qualitative components. The five domains are defined as 
follows (Miles and Huberman, p. 277-80): 
I/ Objectivity/Confirmability. Do the conclusions depend on the subjects and 
conditions of the inquiry rather than on the inquirer" 
21 Reliability/Dependabilitv'Auditabilit-v". Was the process of the study 
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consistent, reasonably stable over time and across research methods"' Have things 
been done with reasonable care9 
3/ Internal Validity/ Credibility! Authenticity.. Do the findings provide an 
authentic portrait of the phenomenon under observation"' 
4/ External Val idity/Trans ferab i lity/ Fi ttingness. How far can the conclusions 
be generalised? 
5/ Utilisation/Application/Action Orientation: Does the study have the 
potential to lead to more intelligent action? 
13 -5 
Table 4.7: Criteria for assessing, quality in quantitati%e and qualitati%e 
research 
Broad domains Quantitative Qualitative 
Objectivity Conformability Wa.,, there an,, [-',, e of re tl c\ i% i r. -a nitt,, tc, f difference in the -soliciting, attending sýstemaucally to the 
recording or interpreting of context of knowledge construcition, 
information from study especially to the effect of the 
participants (i. e. was there researcher. at cverý step of the 
interviewer bias)" research process (Nialtenud. p. 4,93). 
o Nre the . study's general methods 
and procedures described explicitly 
and in detail? 
o Has the researcher been explicit 
and as self-aware as possible about 
personal assumptions. values and 
biases, affectl%e states') 
o Were competing llýpotheses or 
n. % al conclusions reallv considered') 
Rcilability/Dependabili'ty/ Do ficld-ý%orkcr-s ha%e 0 Same as for quantitati % e. Auditability comparable data collection 
protocols" 
o Were data quality checks 
made') 
o Were any forms of peer or 
colleague revieýk in place'. ) 
Internal Valldity, /Credibility, In quantitati,, e research, this Does the account ring true, make n 
Authenticity relates the role of chance, bias sense, seem convincing or 
and confounding (Hennekens plausible') 
1987). o Did triangulation among 
o Was sampling random and complementary methods and data 
was the sample size sufficient sources produce generally 
tyl I. - ven the hypothesis" converging conclusions'? C, 
\k , ere subjects accurately 9 Was negative evidence sought 
classified with respect to their fo r'! 
exposure and outcome status'. ) * Have rival explanations been 
9 Were efforts made to actively considered'? 
minimise recall bias'. ) * Were the conclusions considered 
Were rates of non- to be accurate by original 
participation minimized" informants'. ) 
4, Were confounding vanables 
taken into consideration and 
controlled for') 
Fxternal Validity How much is know about the 9 . \re tile 
findings congruent \, %-ith, 
1'ransferabilit-v Fittingness characteristics of the sampled ý: k)nnected to, or confirmatorN' of 
population'. ' Pri,, r theory'? 
* To what extent does the 1, the transferable theory from the 
ss ampled population resemble rudy made e\pllclt'. ' 
some wider population of 
interest" 
Utilization. Application Action 9 Are tile findings useful'. ' Do 0 ýarne as t- or quantitati%e. 
they raise consciousness, 
develop insighL guide action, 
direct fxflicy. etc. *. ' 
Source: Lix)sely adapted from Miles and Huben-nan. 1). -' , 
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SECTION 2: TRIBMA'ANDAS FOUNDATIONS'S HOSPIT. ki- 
REFERRAL SCHEME 
1,17 
CHAPTER 5: IMPACT ON HOSPITAL UTILISATION AND EXPENDITURE: 
R. ESULTS OF A HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
SUMMARY 
This chapter assesses the impact of Tribhuvandas Foundation's referral scheme to 
Shri Krishna Hospital, in terms of inclusion of the poor, hospital utilisation and 
expenditure. Individuals in member and non-member households 'were compared 
using the survey data (2000). Wealth, proxied by quintiles of the assets index (the 
ESI), was not significantly associated with membership in TF, although there was a 
trend towards higher levels of membership among wealthier quintiles. Of 77 
hospital i sations among TF members over one year, only 7 were taken at private-non- 
profit hospitals, including Shri Krishna Hospital. TF membership was associated 
with significantly lower probability of having been hospitalised. TF membership 
was not associated with hospital expenditures, net of discount. Failure of TFs 
hospital referral scheme to impact on hospital utilisation and expenditure was most 
likely due to very low rates of utilisation of the referral scheme. Low rates of 
utilisation may have been due to several factors: lack of information among 
beneficiaries about the referral services; inaccessibility of the hospital (for example, 
because it is too far or too expensive); preference among members for other 
inpatient services, or TF may have discouraged use of Shri Krishna Hospital by its 
members, given the mounting financial imbalances. 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the 
referral scheme, thus addressing Objectives I 
collected from households in Kheda Distr 
questionnaire. Impact is assessed in terms 
particularly inclusion of the poor (addresses 
C1. economic impact" of TF's hospital 
to 3. The data for this analysis were 
ict using the interview-administered 
of. (1) population reach of the TF, 
Objective 
-3): (2) 
hospital utilisation 
") annual : ost of during the one-year period preceding the survey (Objective 1): and (I 
hospital isations, conditional on reporting one or more hospitali sat ions (Objective 
I 'It '8 
The underlying hypotheses are that TF's hospital referral scheme will 
I/ Exclude the poor and include members of higher socio-economic status. Many 
of TF's activities, including enrolment in the membership scheme. are conducted 
through village Dairy Cooperative Societies. Thus, households that are not able to 
afford at least one cow or buffalo may never leam about TF and its activities, or may 
fail to enrol. 
2/ TF members are generally entitled to a 50% discount in case of hospitalisation at 
Shri Krishna Hospital. Due to the removal to some component of the financial 
barrier to hospitalisation, TF members are expected to have a higher frequency of 
hospitalisation than controls. 
3/ Decrease the total annual hospital costs per person hospitalised. This assumes 
that among TF members, some hospitalisations will have been taken at Shri Krishna 
Hospital, and some will actually have received discount at the time of discharge 
from Shri Krishna. 
METHODOLOGY 
Data collection and analysis 
A cross-sectional cohort study design was selected, respondents were interviewed at 
only one point in time, and the number of TF and non-member households (the two 
"cohorts") were fixed in advance. Two-stage, random cluster sampling was used. 
The primary sampling units (PSUs) were villages. Twenty villages were selected 
randomly (using random-number tables), the probability of selection was equal for 
all villages regardless of size. The secondary sampling units were households. 
Within each village, insured were randomly selected from lists compiled by TF and 
non-members were randomly selected from census or voting lists. In ten villages, 14 
TF households and 14 non-member households were sampled, and in ten villages 14 
TF households and 28 non-member households were sampled (20 villages x 14 TF 
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households = 280 TF households, 10 villages x 14 controls - 10 villages x 
controls = 420 controls, therefore 700 households are included in this analysis). ' 
See Chapter 4 for a description of data entry, cleaning and analysis. 
Models 
(1) What was the population reach of TF? 
The model for looking at socio-demographic determinants of membership is a logit 
model, written as follows: 
In(p/(l -p» = Xß + F- (Equation 1) 
where p is the probability of being a member of TF and X represents a set of 
independent variables that are hypothesised to affect membership in community 
based schemes. 
(2) Did TF's hospital referral scheme impact on hospital utillsation over the last 
one year? 
The model is again a logit model. It estimates the probability of an individual being 
hospitalised during the one-year period preceding the interview, and can be written 
as follows: 
ln(pi(1 -p» = Xß (Equation 2) 
where p is the probability of hospitalisation and X represents a set of independent 
variables that are hypothesised to affect individual pattems of hospital utilisation. 
' The latter villages, in which there were txice as many control household-s (28) as TF hou-seholds 
(14) were the ten joint villages. In these villages. 14 TF households-, 14 SEWA-IIS households 
(which are not included in this analysis) and 28 non-Insured "control" households %%ere intervie%% ed. 
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Did TF's hospital referral scheme impact on net annual hospital costs per 
person hospitalised? 
The model is a log-linear model that estimates the net costs incurred for all 
hospital isations (over one year), conditioned on positive hospital isation. Costs were 
net of reimbursement by insurance schemes, including TF's. The model can be 
written: 
InY = XP +E (Equation 3) 
where Y is the net annual hospital costs per person and one or more hospitalisation 
over one year, and X represents a set of independent variables that are hypothesised 
to affect individual patterns of hospital expenditure. 
Equations 2 and 3 are equivalent to the "'two-part" (utilisation and expenditure) 
model developed as part of the Rand Health Insurance Experiment (Duan, et al. 
1982, Manning, et al. 1987), and used more recently by Yip and Berman 1001) in 
their study of the impact of Egypt's School Health Insurance Programme. 
Independent variables 
Table 5.1 describes the independent variables included in the analyses. Included 
were a number of household-level demand side factors. For models 2 and 3. 
individuals were classified as belonging to TF-member or non-member households. 
Independent of insurance, wealth was hypothesised to be positively associated with 
rates of hospitalisation and with net costs of hospitalisation. As a proxy for 'xealth. 
the economic status index (ESI) was constructed based on household assets. 
allowing the weights of these assets to be determined by the statistical procedure of 
principal components (see Appendix 3). The other household-level variables 
controlled for were religion. caste and number of people living in the household. 
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A number of indiv idual- level, demand side %anables were controlled for. -Ml 
models controlled for age, literacy, marital status, and primar-, ' occupation and 
number of acute illnesses reported during the last 30 days (as a proxy for general 
level of health). All of these variables were anticipated to influence demand for 
health care (need, access and ability to pay) and choice of provider. and for this 
reason were included as potential confounders. 
In model 3 only, characteristics of the hospitalisation xere controlled for. Use of 
private- for-profit and private-non-profit hospitals (generally perceived to be of 
higher quality) was hypothesised to be associated with higher net costs of 
hospitalisation than use of government facilities. Individuals who reported longer 
episodes of hospitalisation were expected to have experienced higher net costs. 
Finally, cause of hospitalisation was included as it was anticipated that women 
hospitalised for pregnancy, delivery and family planning would generally have 
experienced an uncomplicated hospitalisation without major surgical procedures. 
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Table 5.1: Independent variables included in the regression anakses 
Vanables Model 
Charavtpristic. N ofthe h"u. %ehold 
TF =I if household paid TF membership fee for the current year. 0 if not 
ES1 I to ES15 = quintiles of economic status index 
(these vanables are exhaustive, ESIl is left out of the models) 
HINDU =I if Hindu religion, 0 if Muslim or Chnstian 
BK\VDCASTE =I if scheduled caste, scheduled tnbe and other 
'backward castes', 0 if castes that have not been identified by government 
as 'backward' (Bhakshipanch, Brahmin, Patel. Shah. etc. ) 
HHSIZEI =I if I to 2 people in HH 
HHSIZE2 =I if 3 to 4 people in HH 
HHSIZE3 =I if 5 to 9 people in HH 
HHSIZE4 =I if >=10 people in FLH 
(these vanables are exhaustive, HHSIZEI is left out of the model, ) 
Characteri . wics of the individual 
FEMGEND =I if female, 0 if male 
AC&I =I ifO to4 years ofage 
AGE2 =I if 5 to 9 year-, of age 
AGE3 =I if 10 to 19 years of age 
AGE4 =I if 20 to 29 years of age 
AGE5 =I if 30 to 39 years of age 
AGE6 =I if 40 to 49 years of age 
AGE7 =I if 50 to 59 years of age 
AGE8 =I if ----60 years of age 
(these vanables are exhaustive, AGE1 is left out of the models) 
LITEP-ATE I if person can read and wnte a simple letter, 0 it'not 
MARRIED I it' married, 0 if never mamed, widower, divorced, 
separated, or other 
FARMER =I if pnimary occupation is farmer (including dairy farmer) 
DAILYWAGE =I if unskilled worker being paid daily %% age (agncultural 
or factory worker) 
DOMESTIC =I if pnmary occupation is domestic Aork, houseýýork 
NOT-ABLT = Not able to work (e. g. elderly, child. mentally or ph\, ýIcall, 
disabled) 
OTHERWORK =I if other than fan-ner, daily%%age, dome"tic or "not 
able- 
(these vaniables are exhaustive, OTHERIXORK is left out of the models) 
NUMBACUTE = number of acute illness episodes reporied during thC last 
10 days (ranged from 0 to 3) 
Characteristics ofthe hospitalisation T PU'BLIC I if government or EMS hospital 
PRIVATE I ifpnivate for-profit hospital 
NONPROF I if pni%ate-non-profit 
(these vaniables are exhaustive. PUBLIC is left out of the models) 
SHORT =I if 0 to 3 days hospitallsed 
MEDIUM =I if 4 to 7 days hospitallsed 
LONG =I If >7 days hospitalised 
(these vaniables are exhaustive. SHORT is left out of the models) 
OBS GYN =I if cause of hospitalisation was pregnancy, delivery or 
familv vlanning, 0 if other 
The analyses in this chapter were carried out at the indi-vidual-level rather than at the 
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household- level, despite the fact that membership in TF is hý household. The 
individual- leve I of analysis was selected for several reasons. Firstly, it was easier 
and more intuitive to interpolate to the individual level from household- level 
variables than the reverse. For example, if a household was Hindu. it seemed 
reasonable to assume that everyone within the household was Hindu. In contrast. if 
half of the individuals in a household were literate, desiý_, natM_, the household 50'o 
literate (basically making the assumption that illiteracy among some impacts on 
utilisation and cost of health care to all household members) seemed less intuitive. 
Secondly, the statistical power of the study (i. e. the ability of the study to detect 
differences that do, in reality, exist) was higher for the individual-level analysis due 
to the larger number of observations. Finally, conducting the analysis at the 
individual -level made the results more comparable to the results for SEWA (Chapter 
8). The main concern around analysing the data at the individual level is that 
membership in TF may mean different things for different individuals in the 
household - i. e. access to benefits of the scheme might varv among household 
members. Aristotle coined the term "the fallacy of di%-ision" to describe the problem 
of assuming that because a group has a certain characteristic the members of that 
group also have that characteristic (Schwartz 1994). To ensure that the level of 
analysis was not impacting on the main results, all analyses were replicated at the 
household- level; the results are presented in Appendix 6. These results are 
compared with the individual- level analyses in the discussion section. 
For each of the three models, three models, three columns of results are presented: 
(i) the "full model' includes all of the vanables listed above, (11) the 'best fitting 
model' based on measures of goodness-of-fit such as Wald's test and R-squared 
values, and (iii) an ýadults only' model. The adults only model P, included becawsc. 
especially the very young. tend to be Illiterate. unmarned and unernploý-ed, resulting 
in colinearity between age and several of the other vanables 
model excludes all individuals younger than 15 years of age. 
Tile 'adults k)nl%' 
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RESULTS 
In total, 1,626 TF members (in 280 households) and 2.137 non-members (in 414 
households) were included in the analyses. The demographic data (before 
controlling for confounding) suggest that TF members were of higher socio- 
economic status than non-members (Table 5.2). TF members ranked higher on the Zg 
Economic Status Index, and were more likely to be Hindu. There was- little 
difference in mean household size (although TF members were almost rwice as 
likely to come from the largest category of household, 10 or more members). TF 
members tended to be younger, more literate, more likely to engaged in farming. and 
less likely to be engaged in unskilled work for daily %vages. 
Before controlling for socio-demographic variables, TF members were only 581o as 
likely as non-members to have been hospitalised (0.037 versus 0.063, Table 5.1). 
Among those hospitalised, the net annual hospital expenditures for TF members 
were roughly 60% those of non-members. It was reported that 7 of 77 (901, o) 
hospitalisations among TF members were taken at a pnvate-non-profit hospital 
(including Shri Krishna) compared with 9 of 135 (7? 0) hospital isations among non- 
members. 2 
2 In households where one or more hospitalisation had occurred over the pre% iou, ýear. rerondcnLs 
were asked what type of hospital was used, but the,,, \%ere not asked If the', WA lshn Krishna 
Hospital, specifically. Thus, the onk indicator on the frequency of use ot'Shn Knshna Hospital i, 
the frequency of use of pnvate-non-profit facillues. 
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'Fable 5.2: Sample characteristics 
Vanable TF 
Numhcr of'hou,, cholds 280 
Number of individuals 1,626 
Mean ESI 0.65 
Cat: Quintiles of ESI 
%in I st quintile 15.4 
% in 2nd quintile 26.5 
% in 3nd quintile 14.0 
% in 4nd quintile 23.7 
% in 5nd quintile 20.4 
Religion 
% Hindu 99.2 
% Muslim 0.8 
% Chnstian 0.0 
% ST, SC, or other "backward" 45.2 
caste 
Mean number of hh members 6.27 
Cat: Number of hh members 
/o 1-2 2.5 
%3-4 23.4 
%5-9 60.4 
>% = 10 13.7 
% Fernale 47.5 
Mean age 25.53 
Cat: Age 
0/0 0-<5 9.5 
% 5-<10 13.1 
% 10--20 21.55, 
% 20-<30 17.5 
%30---40 14.0 
% 40-<50 11.5, 
0/ 
/650-00 
8.2 
0 . o60+ 
4.6 
"o Literate 5 8.3 
"0 Mamed 5 4.9 
0o Farnii ng 22-5 
0, 'o Working for daily wages 8.9 
10 Doing domestic work 23.4 
O'o Not able to work 12.9 
Frequency of illnessperson. 10 (). 105 
daýs 
NON-NiENI 
414 
2.137 
0.23 
28.2 
16.1 
18.9 
20.3 
16.5 
91.9 
5.0 
3.0 
43.4 
6.14 
,;. 1 
19.8 
67.5 
7.6 
48.3 
29.5-5 
7.1 
10.4 
20.8 
17.5 
10.0 
14.1 
8.9 
11.3 
53.9 
53.8 
11.4 
19.1 
22.4 
15.1 
0.09, 
146 
Table 5.3: Hospital utilization, and expenditure per hospitalization. among 
TF members and non-members 
TF (rr-- 1,626) NONAfEM 
(n = 2,13 -7) 
Hospital utilisation 
Total hospi tali sations reported 77 135 
People with >0 hospitalisations, I year 72 124 
Probability of >= I hospitalisation per person 0.037 0.063 
Mean total hospital costs (per person hospitalised) 3.498 5.8 98 
Total pnvate-non-profit hospital i sations 79 
People who used only private-non-profit hospitals 7 
US $1 is approximately equal to 44 Rs. 
T-tests were performed to compare rates/expenditures of the TF with NON-MEM 
* 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** Po significance level 
Regression analyses 
Controlling for other socio-demographic vanables, only Hindu religion, younger 
age, and working as a farmer were consistently significantly associated with 
membership in TF (Table 5.4). Results were very similar f0r the "full", -best fit", 
and "adult" models. Overall, wealth, proxied by quintiles of ESI, was not 
significantly associated with membership in TF (see F-test for the combined ESI 
variables at the bottom of Table 5.4). There was a trend suouestive of higher levels "C 
ofinembership arriong all of the wealthier quintiles (2 nd through 5 th ), and individuals 
belonging to the 2 nd and 4th income quintiles were significantly more likely than 
members of the lowest income quintile to belong to the scheme. Hindus were 
roughly 10 times as likekl to join the scheme as Nluslims and Christians. In terms of 
Icai 'in ican age, each additional ,. - was associated with a small (roughlY 
20o) but si., if t 
drop in the odds of being a TF member. Farmers were roughly three times as likely Ztý 
to join the scheme as those categonsed as OTHERWORK (see Table 5.1). 
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Table 5.4: Regression results for Equation 1. the odds of being. - a 
TF 
member based on socio-demographic variables: locyit model 
Odds r3tios ft-statistics) 
Full Model Best fit Adults Only 
(n=3,71 1) (tv-3,753) (tv-2,629) 
ES12 3.162 ES12 3.130 as 3.293 as 
(2.870) 2.620) (2.210) 
ES13 1.626 a ES13 1.474 1.607 
(1.87()) 1 41'') 11 520) 
ES14 2.849 ** ES14 2.466 2.591 0* 
(2.610) , ', (. 4)) j, I ý0) 
ES15 2.842 ES15 2.5 M 2.5: 1 
(2.100) LSSO) II S-1)) 
HINDU 10.125 HINDU 9.684 12-158 
(3.020) (3.080) ',, 45o) 
BKWDCASTE 1.407 BKWDCASTE 
(1.370) 
HHSIZE2 0.747 HHSIZE2 
(-0.850) 
HHSIZE3 1.329 HHSIZE3 - - 
(0.780) - - 
FEMALE 1.036 FEMALE - - 
(0.330) - - 
AGE2 0.709 AGE (cont) 0.982 0.985 see 
(-1.120) 
AGE3 0.464 
(-1.420) 
AGE4 0.390 
(-3.690) 
AGE5 0.533 
(-1,760) 
AGE6 0.273 
(4.520) 
AGE7 0.277 
(-3.35()) 
AGE8 0.154 
(-4.570) 
LITERATE 1.199 LITERATE 
(0. '810) 
MARRIED 1.156 MARRIED 
FARMER 2.785 FARMER 3.342 so 
(". 200) (, 1,11) 
DAILYWAGF 0.643 DAILYWAGE 0.786 
(-(). S-()) -ý) 4, w) 
DOMESTIC 1.323 DOMESTIC 1377 1.824 *a 
(0.950) 2.180) 1 ". 1 ý 1)) 
NOT-ABLE 0.813 NOT-ABLE 0.883 0.748 
(-0.61)0) 
NUMBACUTE 1.498 NUMBACUTE 
(2.030) - 
Adjusted Wald Test, F 940 .. kdjusted 
Wald Test, F 10 
P-alue = 0.026 P-value = 0.001 
Percent of' predictions correct Percent of predictions corTml 
z 58.100 59.511'a 60.800 
Rarnsev Reset Test, F 0.89 Ramsey Reset Test. F 0.83 0.43 
P-Value = 0.466 P-value -- 0.495 0.73.1 
F-test for four ESI vanables F-test for four ESI vanables 
1.8 1.7 1.4 
? -value = 0.178 P-value = 
0.205 0. .1 "_ 
*I 01'a si gn iI icanc e lev el. **5O 'o si gru ficance Ielel -0**10osi gnt 
ficance lc% el 
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TF membership was associated with significantly lower probabjljtý ot'hd% Ing been 
hospitalised, while Hindu religion and being married were associated with higher 
probability of hospitalisation (Table 5.5). Again. results were significant tOr the MI. 
best fitting, and adult models. although the association between religion and TF 
membership was only of borderline significance in the adult model. TF members 
were roughly half as likely as non-members to report hospital isation. Hindus were 
between four and six times as likely as non-Hindus, and married indi,. iduals three 
times as likely as non-mariied individuals to have been hospitalised. 
After conducting the first round of analyses, it was hypothesised that benefits of the 
TF referral scheme might be captured by heads of the households, as they are 
typically the ones who have paid the membership fee, and thus are the household 
member most likely to know about the benefits of the scheme (see Chapter 7). Thus, 
the calculations for Model 2 were repeated for household heads only (presented in 
Appendix 7), with the expectation that rates of hospitalisation among TF household 
heads might be higher than among non-member household heads. Again, the results 
were opposite to those expected: household heads belonging to TF were less likely 
to have been hospitalised over one year in comparison with heads of non-TF 
households, but this trend was non-significant. 
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Ta hIc5.5: Regression results for Equation 2. tlic probabilitt of beinp,, % hospitalised within the last year: logit model 
Full Model Best fit Adults only 
(n=3,71 1) (n=3,755) (n=2,63 1) 
0.432 1F ()4.1- a** 0.584 
(-5.110) " 1ýkoi ýI f-, 
ES12 1.045 ES12 1.0-4 1.133 
(0.110) JXM (0240) 
ES13 0.659 ES13 0.597 0-564 
(-1.360) 
ES14 1.627 ES14 1.444 1.811 
(1.340) 1 14H) ýi 4'NO) 
ES15 1.926 ES15 1.27h 1.416 
(1.310) () -90 1 (0 -. 41)) 
HINDU 6.054 H END U 3.980 3. t)64 
(2.740) 2 12 0) (1 Q-1)) 
BKWDCASTE 1.192 BKW'DCASTE - 
(1.060) 
HHSIZE2 1.858 HHSIZE2 1.691 I. bb2 
(1.370) (1 I-m (I I "m 
HHSIZE3 0.789 HHSIZE, 0.794 0.743 
(- (). 5 -, ()) (_11 ý I()) I -i) o-10) 
FEMALE 0.287 FENIALE 0.918 1.116 
(-2.000) (-() . "S()) W, 4', 0) AGE2 0.853 AGE (cont) 1.006 1.005 
(-(). 100) (0S -0) (0 S W) 
AGE3 0.730 
(_0.690) 
AGE4 2.642 
1.5 IM 
AGE5 1.169 
(0.250) 
AGEO 1.218 
((). 330) 
'\ G/ jE7 1.497 - 
- 
(0.7 6 0) 
AGE8 0.738 
(-oJ'10) 
LITERATE 0-162 LITERA FE 
(-1.640) - 
. MARRIED 
2.733 MARRIED 2.982 4-0 3.283 
(4.470) (2. X-0) (2.02M 
FARMER 1.261 FARMER 
(0.140) 
DAILYWAGE 0.528 DA IL YWA GE 
(-1,140) 
DOMESTIC 4.460 DOMESTIC 
(1.380) 
NOT-ABLE 1.779 NOT-ABLE 
(1,150) - 
NUMBACUTE 1.429 NL, MBACUTE 1.1-8 
( I. o. "M m -ým I (I 
Adjusted Wald Te-st. F 46 \djusted Wald F e!, i. F- 203 33 
P-value = 0.116 P-value ý 0.000 0.000 
Pacent of predictions COfT#-'Ct 
95.200 
Rainsey Resct TL--; t, F 0.85 
P-Value = 0.488 
Pacent of prckficuon,; correct 
94.90o 
Ramsey Reset Test. F 1.11 
P-%, aluc m 0.204 
0 IM-16 significance level. 0* Po significancc loel. *** I 'o significance lc%el 
Q-1.80, 
2.25 
0.121 
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Only characteristics of the hospital isation. namely t,, pe of hospital and duration of 
hospitalisation, were consistently significantly associated with annual hospital 
expenditures per person hospitalised (Table 5.6). Individuals hospitalised in private 
facilities spent more than five times what was spent by those using public facilities. ' 
Those who were hospitalised for eight or more days spent between 2.7 (adult m(Ael) 
and 3.7 (best fitting model) more than those hospitalised three or fewer days. There 
was a trend towards higher hospital expenditures arrion- Hindus. although this was 
only of borderline significance in the adult model. TF membership ývas not 
associated with hospital expenditures in any of the models. nor were quintiles of the 
Economic Status Index. 
3 In the log-linear model, the coefficient ý for a con6nuous independent vanable gives, the relative 
change in the mean value of Y for a unit change In X. In order to obtain the relati%c change in mean 
Y for a dummy variable. one must take the antilog (to base e) of the estimated dumm" Coefficicri and 
subtract it from I (Gujarad 1995, p. 525). 
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Table 5.6: Regression results for Equation 3. a, g. annual cost of hospital care: lo-lincar m4)del C0CffiCWnt5 (t-StZtiStiC3) 
Full M odc I Best lit 4dnb o@Jy (n- 160) 1 n= 160) w 134) 030t) 1 0.081) 4). 01' 
H 520) 10 4- (-d) I, Iý ES12 -0.177 ES 121 0.040 -0-532 (4). 400) (0 1'0ý 1.1 5 10 ý ES13 0.619 ES13 0.751 4)-144 
1300) 1.740) t-1 "m ES14 0.630 ES 14 0.977 *0 0. "9 
(1.330) 12211)) 11 ")) 
ES15 -0.392 ES15 -0.032 -0-538 0 (-0 850) (-00.4111 1- 1 4(x)) 
IIINDI: 2.949 H INDU 3.010 3.032 0 
(2.500) 
BKWDCASTE -0.277 BKWDCASTE 
(-1-330) 
IIHSIZE2 -0.159 HHSIZE-1 (continuous in adult rmidi 
IIHSIZE3 -0.842 HHSIZE3 
FEMALE -0.361 ITMALF 
(-0,7 i ()) 
AGE2 -0.332 AGE (continuous) 0.015 0.013 
(-0.270) it 09o) 
AGE3 0.502 
(0,710) 
AGE4 -0.103 
(-0 ý 130 AGI'_5 -0.112 
0.130) 
AG F6 0.282 
(0.380) 
A(jE7 0.479 
(0.5oo) 
AGF9 1.488 *0 
(2.300) - 
1-11 ERA IF -0.321 LITERATE -0.161 -0.2w) 
(- 1.3 W) (-1 ()4()) -I o(m)) 
MARRIED 0.821 ** MARRIED 0.592 0.415 
(2.240) H iom 11 ()(-)4)) 
FARMER -0.375 FARMER -40.429 -0.024 
(_0. k)Y)) 1-[ 010) (4) 01A) 
DAILYWAGE 0370 DAILYWAGL 0.185 0.137 
(0.80o) (0 3S'O) (0380) 
i)()m ric -0.81o DOMESTIC -1.009 -0.663 
(_J. Qý()) (-2 2im 1.1 W%'I) 
NOT-ABLE -0.102 NOT-ABLE -0.009 
0.250 
(_0 1-0) (4) 0_10) 10 4oo) 
N1 IM BACL rTF -0.042 Nt'MBACt- rF - 
(41oo) 
PR IVA FE 1.825 PRIVArE 1.897 1.812 
(7.050) r) 421) 1 
1 NONPROF -1.810 NONPROF -1.781 -2.113 
(_0 L)-, ()) 1_0 Q101 
MI 'I DI UM 0.693 0. MEDILN1 0.703 0.411- 
(2.1 (0) 12-11", 0 421)1 
LONG 1.512 *9* 1 ONG 1.54- ... 132. 
(4 7W) 14 -, ()) 
4 )t* II 
0B IS, GYN 0-186 OBS, GYN 
OSW) 
Adjumcd Waki -rest, F 0.610 kdjustcd Waid Test, F 2,073 225. Da 
P-vaiuc = 0.7 94 1) -,. a lue - 
0.001 0.004 
R-squatvd = 60.93'. K- iquared = 
57,7X0 . 62.300 
Ramsev Reset Test, F 2.08 Ramsey Reset Test. F 1.51 1.16 
P-valu'. 0.143 P-value - 0.251 0 -3 le-4 
* 10% significance level. ** 5% significance le%cl. *0* 1% significance level 
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DiscussioN, 
Summary of findings 
Wealth, proxied by quintiles of the assets index (the ESI), was not significantly 
associated with membership in TF, although there was a trend towards higher levels 
of membership among wealthier quintiles. Of 77/ hospitalisations amon- TF 
members over one year, only 7 were taken at private-non-profit hos-pitals. including 
Shri Krishna Hospital. TF membership was associated v. -Ith slgnificantlýý lo%%-cr 
probability of having been hospitalised. TF membership %vas not associated with 
hospital expenditures, net of discount. 
Critique of methodology 
One possible limitation of this sub-study was the questionable validity and accuracy 
of the Economic Status Index (ESI) as a proxy for household wealth. similar 
index developed for Indian survey data (Filmer and Pntchett 2001) was closely 
correlated with State Domestic Product (SDP) and poverty rates data. Using data 
from Indonesia, Pakistan and Nepal, they also showed their asset index to be 
consistent with consumption expenditures. Comparison of the index used in this 
sub-study with the interviewers' assessments of wealth and with daily household 
expenditures on food suggested strong correlation (see Appendix 3). However, the 
fact that the ESI did not correlate positively with frequency of hospitalisation nor 
positively with net annual expenditures per hospitalised individual calls into 
question the validity of this proxy. (Although in the household-level calculations. 
Appendix 6, Table A6.6, the ESI did positively correlate with net annual hospital 
expenditures among households ývith one or more hospitalisation. ) If the ESI was 
not a valid and accurate proxy of wealth. this might explain the lack of association 
between the ESI and membership in TF. Failure to adequately control for wealth 
might also have resulted in the significant association bet, ýveen TF membership and 
low rates of hospital utilisation. However, if TF members W-ere Nvealthier than 
controls, one would expect failure to control for wealth to result in a positive bias, in 
fi-equency of hospitalisation among members. not a negative one. 
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This sub-study was relatively small in sample size. The sub-studý : on--sistend" 
found higher rates of TF membership among higher quintiles of ESI. however this 
association was not statistically significant. Had the sub-study been larger, this 
association might have been significant. A larger sample size also would ha% e been 
required to capture increased hospital utilisation or decreased hospital spending 
resulting from membership in the scheme. Only 90'o of TF member hospital i sations 
were taken at a private-non-profit hospital (and it is possible that not all of these 
were taken at Shri Krishna Hospital). 
It is possible, although unlikely, that observation bias impacted on the sub-stud-Y 
results. Interviewer bias may have occurred if investigators elicited or interpreted 
information differently among the insured versus the non-insured. It was impossible 
to blind interviewers to the membership status households. The inten-iewers did 
come to make generalisations about households, for example, that TF households 
tended to be relatively wealthy. Thus, there may have been some bias in how they 
were recording household asset information. It is also possible that the interviewers 
(most of whom were social workers who seemed to hav'e an affinity for the poorer 
households) probed more carefully into health care seeking and spending among 
poorer households. Subjects may also have reported events in a non-comparable 
manner (recall bias). For example, TF members may have more accuratelý' recalled 
the number of household hospitalisations. or remembered how much had been spent 
on hospitalisation, as they may have been sensitised to the subject by the 
infonnation, education and communication fi7orn TF. However, this seems unlikely, 
especially given the low levels of awareness about the TF scheme among TF 
members (described in Chapter 7). 
The level at which the analyses were conducted, individual- versus household-le%el, 
had little impact on the sub-study results. At both levels, the results for Models I 
and 3 were the same: that ESI was not sigiuficantly associated with membership in 
TF (although there was a trend towards higher probability of membership among 
higher quintiles of ESI) and membership in TF was not sigmificantly associated %%-Ith 
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hospital expenditures. However, for Nlodel 2. results -vaned , 11,, htl% b% le,. el of 
analysis - at the individual level, TF membership was significantly associated with 
decreased probability of hospital isation, %k-hile at the household- level this association 
was of borderline significance only. Possible reasons for this difference are 
threefold. Firstly, (and most likely) the smaller number of obser-%ations at the 
household-level decreased the power of the sub-study to detect a difference. 
Secondly, it may be that one of the two models ývas mis-specified (i. e. failed to 
control adequately for confounding variables). This seems less unlikely given that 
every attempt was made to include the same variables at both levels - reflected in 
the fact that the odds ratios were remarkably similar. Thirdly, it may be that certain 
of the aggregate variables measured a different construct than its name-sake at the 
individual level. At issue is whether certain variables - for example, insurance at the 
household level - can be assumed to be divided equally among all household 
members. Or conversely, whether certain individual level-vanables can be assumed 
to impact on the entire household. For example, can it be assumed that sex ratio at 
the household level (majority male or majority female) impacts on health care 
utilisation and expenditure of all members of the household'? The fact that the odds 
ratios and coefficients were similar across the two levels of analysis suggest that 
such problems with construct validity were fairly minimal. 
Certain of the survey questions Yielded more reliable responses than others (see 
Appendix 8 for analysis of re-interviews). Questions regarding characteristics of the 
family (e. g. religion) or specific individuals (e. g. marital status) generally elicited 
the same response in both interviews. Questions regarding household assets (e. g. 
type of material used to make walls of the home, whether or not household owned a 
refrigerator) were less likely to yield reliable results. This may have hampered the 
validity of the ESI. Questions about the type of hospital used and the cost of' 
hospitalisation were answered with surprising reliability. while the duration of 
hospitalisation was provided with less reliabilitv. 
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Discussion and interpretation of findings 
While not statistically significant. there -, %, as a trend towards higher rates of TF 
membership among wealthier ES1 quilritiles. This has been the case %% A many other 
CBHI schemes. In fact, this trend was expected as TF membership. while not 
exclusive to members of local dairy co-operatives, %vas certainly more accc"sible to 
this group. The TF village health worker (V'HW) normally enrolled families at the 
office of the village dairy co-operative at the time of the annual bonus distribution. 
Members of the dairy co-operative tend not to be very poor. as they must at least be 
sufficiently wealthy to purchase and keep at least one cow or butTalo. Those who 
were not part of the dairy co-operative were welcome to join TF. but in some 
villages they never came to know about the scheme. It is highly unlikelý that the 
membership fee, only Rs. 10 per annum. deterred anyone from Joining the scheme. 
The association between TF membership and lwver rates of hospital utilisation 
(significant in the individual- level analysis, of borderline significance in the 
household-level analysis, and non-significant in the indi,, 'idual-leN-el analysis 
restricted to household heads) suggests that TF members had lesser need for 
hospitalisation, or lesser ability to access hospital care. A lesser need for hospital 
care is certainly possible. It may be, for instance. that the village-level pre%-enti%'e 
and curative services provided by TF decreased the need for higher-level care among 
TF members. However, TF's village-level sen, ices, provided through the VHW, 
were available at the same cost to members and non-members (although non- 
members may have been less aware of these serN-ices). Furthermore, the household 
survey revealed that TF members were no more likely to seek allopathic outpatient 
care (including VHWs, nurses, practitioners) than were non-members (data not 
presented here). It is more likely that TF members differed from non-members in 
ways that impacted positively on health, and that were not controlled for in the 
analysis. As already discussed, the ESI may not have fully controlled for the effect 
of wealth. Other reasons that members may have been healthier than rion-merribers 
include better nutrition (readier access to milk) or more exercise. AltematiVely (but 
unlikely), TF members may have faced barriers to accessing inpatient care. This 
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may be the case, for example, if TF members lived t'arther. on a%era, -, e. from 
hospitals; the survey did not collect information on distance from home to the 
nearest hospital facility, and thus could not control for this. 
Almost all other studies of CBHl schemes have found that insurance that covers the 
costs of hospitalisation increases hospital utilisation and decreases expenditures 
(Table 3.1). This may reflect a publication bias. wherein the most successful 
schemes are the most likely to have been studied and reported on. Failure of TF's 
hospital referral scheme to impact on hospital utilisation and expenditure was most 
likely due to very low rates of utilisation of the referral scheme. Low rates of 
utilisation may have been due to several factors, either alone or in combination. 
Members may have lacked information about the referral services, they may have 
found the services difficult to access (for example, because they are too far or too 
expensive), or they may have chosen alternative inpatient ser, %, ices (for example, 
because quality was perceived to be higher in the private-for-profit sector, or 
because Shri Krishna Hospital was percei, ý, ed to be of low qualitv). Alternatively, 
TF may have discouraged (or failed to encourage) use of Shri Krishna Hospital by 
its members, given the mounting financial imbalances. At least during the last five 
years of the referral scheme, the discounts pro-6ded to TF patients at Shn Krishna 
Hospital exceeded the Rs. 500,000 donated each year by Kaira Can to offset the 
costs of caring for TF members. The results of the qualitati%-e sub-study (Chapter 7) 
suggest that lack of information amon the beneficiary population relyarding the 9 
referral benefits and problems with how Shri Krishna Hospital was perceived - e. g. 
a place where people go to die, a hospital where doctors in training get their practice 
- were particularly important factors. 
The findings of this chapter do leave one wondering whether there %vere any benefits 
to members of TFs hospital referral scheme. The fact that the scheme %vas 
discontinued late in 1999, and replaced by a new insurance scheme (,, ee Appendix Q) 
adds weight to this pessimistic view. Certainly. this household surveý did not 
capture any "significant" benefits relating to the hospital referral scheme among the 
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surveyed population. However, it remains a possibility that the ý, Aeme %%as 
beneficial to the (perhaps relatively small) population of people who have actudllý 
made use of Shri Krishna Hospital. This possibilit-y is explored in the follo%%in- tý 
chapter (Chapter 6). TF may also have had benefits to its target population through 
its preventive and primary health care services, ho%%ever. this stud"- make, -, no 
attempt to assess these activities. 
Conclusions and policy implications 
There was a trend, although not significant. towards higher wealth among members 
of TF. TF was intended by those who initiated it, and by the current management. to 
target the poorest households in target villages. The scheme appears to have been 
somewhat unsuccessful in this regard. In order to increase co%-erage of the very 
poor, and thus facilitate cross- subs id isation within the scheme (and also to ensure 
that external subsidies reach the poorest in target communities), TF's hospital 
referral scheme would need to increase its outreach activities, providing more 
information and education to poor households, including those that do not deposit 
milk at the local dairies. 
This sub-study helps to highlight knowledge gaps that can be addressed with further 
research. Several questions were not included in the household questionnaire that, 
in retrospect, should have been included. Most importantly, rather than collecting 
rather broad information around source of hospitalisation (one option was "private- 
non-profit hospital, including Shri Krishna Hospital"), the survey should have asked 
people specifically if they were hospitallsed at Shri Krishna and whether they 
received any discount as a result of member-ship in TF. It would have been useful to 
have had even more information about the relative health of the TF and non-niember 
populations. The lower frequency of hospitalisation among TF members may 
ha% e 
resulted from their being healthier, on average, than controls: as such. 
it %vould haN 0 
been useful to have information on the prevalence of chronic 
disease. but this was 
not available from the questionnaire. In order to validate the 
ESI. additional 
information could have been collected on household consumption expenditures 
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(Morris, et al. 2000). More generally, future research should look into the factor, 
that help or hinder members of a CBHI scheme in using the scheme*-ý sen-ices- 
jig 
CHAPTER 6: EVIDENCE FRO. Nl 8,463 BILLS SUBMITTED BY SHRI 
KRiSHNA HoSPITAL, 1996-2000 
SUMMARY 
This sub-study assesses Tribhuvandas Foundation's referral services based on bills 
submitted by Shri Krishna Hospital. The scheme is assessed in terms of (1) 
frequency of use of the referral services, overall and by gender. a,,.;, e and place ut, 
residence and (2) protection of beneficianes from hospital costs. All 8.463 claims 
submitted over four fiscal years, 1996/97 to 1999 2000 were analysed. 
Frequency of use of the referral scheme (2.7 admissions per 1,000 member,, - per 
year) was very low, roughly 6% of the estimated frequency of hospitalisation. Rates 
of use were no higher among women and children, the primary target groups. The 
highest rates of utilisation occurred in talukas closest to the referral hospital. In 10% 
of cases (N = 881), no discount was provided. Of the hospital isations on which 
some discount was given, the mean rate of discount was 54.900 (N = 7,582, median 
= 48%). The discount provided to TF members reduced the percentage of 
hospital isations for which costs would have been catastrophic (-100o of annual 
household income) from 11 -25% to 5-11 %. 
Consistent with results of the household sun-ev (Chapter 5), this analysis found that 
rates of scheme utilisation were low relative to overall rates of hospital isation. This 
analysis provides evidence that distance acted as a banier to utilisation of Shri 
Krishna Hospital, and that any mechanisms that might have been put in place to 
facilitate scheme utilisation by women and children have been ineffective. The 
discount (theoretically 50% of total direct costs) appears to have provided financial 
protection to some members who used the scheme. Protection, particularly among 
those who experienced the most expensive hospital isations. was enhanced by the 
lack of any cap on benefits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the last chapter, analysis of household survey data rc,, ealed that the rate of 
utilisation of private-non-profit hospitals, including Shri Krishna Hospital, %-as very 
low among TF members. The scheme was found not to have had a significant 
impact on total annual hospital expenditures per TF member hospitalised. compared 
with hospitalised controls. However, the household survey did not allow for an 
evaluation of the financial protection conferred by the scheme amoný_, those who 
have actually used Shri Krishna Hospital. The number of hospital isations in private- 
non-profit facilities among TF members was very low (only seven o,. er one year) 
and it was not possible to distinguish between Shri Krishna Hospital and other 
private-non-profit facilities. 
This chapter assesses the impact of TF's hospital referral scheme based on an 
analysis of all bills submitted by Shri Krishna Hospital for the fiscal years 1996 97 
through 1999/2000. Analysis of this much larger sample of individuals who have 
used Shri Krishna Hospital permits a more powerful evaluation of the financial 
benefits provided under the scheme. The scheme is assessed in terms of (1) 
frequency of use of the referral services, overall and by gender, age and place of 
residence (thesis Objectives I and 3) and (2) protection of beneficiaries from 
hospital costs (thesis Objective 2). It was hypothesised that the frequency of 
hospitalisation at Shri Krishna Hospital would be high in comparison to the average 
rate of hospitalisation among an age- and gender-matched population. Furthermore, 
that utilisation of Shri Krishna would be particularly high among women and 
children, given that they were cited as the target populations of TF. Secondly, it was 
hypothesised that the scheme would significantly reduce the percentage of 
hospital isations for which the direct costs %vere catastrophic. Folloýý ing the example t4 
of Pradhan and Prescott (2000), costs were defined as catastrophic %vhen the', 
consumed greatcr than I 00/, o of annual household income. 
The first section of this chapter describes the methods used in anaksing the bills 
submitted by Shri Krishna Hospital and the second section presents results of the 
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analysis. The final section discusses the results and their pollc% Implications. 
METHODOLOGY 
This analysis is based on the bills submitted to Tnbhu%-andas Foundation by the Shn 
Krishna Hospital for the fiscal years 1996/97 to 1999,00 (each fiscal year is from Ist 
April through 31st March). The bills were entered into, and analý,; cd using. Stata. 
The data available from claims were as follows: the number of bills submitted per 
annum; gender and taluka of residence for each person hospitalised: whether the 
patient was admitted to the Nutritional Resource Centre (NRC) or the ""adult wards" 
1; total cost of the hospitalisation (no cost break-down was provided). whether a 
discount was provided, and if so, in what amount. 
Additionally, the following data sources were used in the analysis: 
I/ TF's annual reports were the source of number of member households per 
year. 
2/ In order to estimate the total size of TF's member population, the mean 
household size of 5.3 persons from the household survey (Chapter 5) was assumed. 
3/ The overall frequency of hospitalisation among this population was derived 
from the thesis household survey (Chapter 5) as well as other household surve-y-s. 
done in Gujarat (Gumber & Kulkarni 2000: Sundar 1995). - 
4/ Mean annual income of TF households was assumed to be in the range of Rs. 
22,054 and 36,757. The wide range reflects uncertainty in the precise value, given 
that income of TF households had to be imputed from data which were available for 
SEWA households (Chapter 9). The ESI, computed for TF and SEWA households 
based on data collected in a household survey (Chapters 5 and 8). was assumed to be 
perfectly correlated with annual income in rupees. The estimated mean income was 
All children younger than 10 to 15 years of age (the thrediold was some%hat flemble) \, %cre 
admitted to the NRC. This is the only indicator available as to the age of the TF membm %%ho were 
hospitalised. 
2 Given that the thesis household survey was relatively small. and hospitalisation was a rclati\cly rarc 
event. data on the frequency of hospitalisation were drawn from other studies to ensure the %alidity of 
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calculated by multiplying the mean ESI for TF households on a scale -, rounded 
at zero) by the mean income known for SEWA claimants from utilisation records 
(Chapter 9, Rs. 25,984) and dividing by the mean ESI for SEA"A hous h ds (2 e ol 
on the same scale as the TF ESI). To reflect the uncertainty in this estimate. it %%-as 
multiplied by 0.75 for the low-end estimate and by. 1.2-5 for the high-end estimate. 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflators for India from the International Monetarv 
Fund (2000) were used in these calculations. Deflators were not available 1*or 
calendar years 1999 and 2000 and were estimated by extrapolating from the data for 
the preceding ten years (1988 to 99), assuming a linear increase. Deflators that 
correspond to TF's financial year were estimated by taking the weighted average of 
the deflators for the two calendar years included (for example. the GDP deflator for 
1996/97 is 0.75 x the deflator for 1996 + 0.25 x the deflator for 1997). N., lonetary 
amounts for the year 1999/00 are also expressed in USS using the exchange rate at 
the end of calendar year 1999, Rs. 43.49 to one US$ (2000). 
REsULTS 
A total of 8,463 hospitalisations were billed during the four year period. The 
records for fiscal year 1999/00 were incomplete as not all of the bills had been 
submittedtoTF. The mean duration of hospital stay was just over eight days. 
Frequency of use of the referral scheme 
The frequency of use of Shri Krishna Hospital by TF members was low - and 
decreasing yearly - over the four-year period examined. On average. TF members 
used Shri Krishna Hospital for 2.7 
3 hospital 1 sat Ions per IMO members per year 
(1996 to 2000). and this had dropped from 4.2 per 1.000 members in 1996,97, to 1.4 
per 1,000 members in 19991-1000 (Table 6.1). This was a function of decrcasing, 
absolute numbers hospitalised and increasing total numbers of TF member-, The 0 
the results of this sub-study. 
' Frequency of hospitalisatiorv 1.000iyear = Total number of hospital 1, ations per year (houschoý, 
i, 
enrolled in the TF scheme during that year*5.3 individuals per household) 
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overall frequency of use of Shn Krishna Ho, ýpital by TF members was extremely 
low compared to the expected rate of hospitalisation in this population (Figure 6.1). 
The mean frequency of use of Shn Knshna Hospital (2.71 1.000 members) was only 
6.3% of the mean rate of hospitalisation found in the thesis household survey 
(Chapter 5) and represented as little as 33.0% (Sundar 199-5. urban Gujarat) of 
hospitalisations found in other studies in (7jujarat state. 
Table 6.1: Frequency of hospitalisation, bý year 
Year Claims 'Member- Frequency 
years (clairns. ý 1,000) 
96/97 2,913 .4 
97/98 2,225 73 0.2 87 3.0 
98/99 1,071 809,469 2.6 
99100 1,254 Sý1,24 _5 1.4 Total 8,463 3,113,909 2.7 
Assuming that the age and (gender composition of' the member populatioll 
exactly the same as that found in the household sur-vey (Chapter 5), the referral 
scheme appears to have failed to target women and children. Table 6.2 presents 
low- and Iiiili-end estimates of' the frequency of' utilisation by children and adults. ' 
Utilisation by males (adults and children combined) was 2.8 per 1,000 population 
per year, compared with 2.6 among females. Utilisation among children was in the 
ranty ,e of 
2.1 to -. 
1 per 1,000 population per year compared with 2.6 to 3.0 among 
adults. Among children, frequency of utilisation was higher for boys (2.5 to 3-6 per 
1,000 population per year) than girls (1.7 to 2.4). 
Low-end esfiniates for children assume the denominator to include children less- than 15 )Vam- of 
age, Mille the high-end csbmates assume the denominator to include children less than 10 yvam of 
age. Low-end estimates for adults assume the denominator to include adults older than 
10 years of 
age, and h1oh-end estimates assume the denominator to include adults older than 15 vzws of age. 
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Figure 6.1: Use of Shri Krishna Hospital by TF members . -ersus frequency of hospitalisation in Gujarat (various sources) with 95% confidence inten-als 
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Rates of utilisation were highest in talukas closest to Shri Krishna Hospital (Figure 
6.2). 5 The rate was highest for Anand (where Shri Krishna Hospital is situated) 
where there have been roughly 3_5 admissions per TF village over the four-year 
period. Rates were also high for the nearby talukas of Petlad (24 admissions per 
village per year) Borsad (22) and Khambhat (21). The rates ý% ere lowest tor the 
5 The average number of admissions per TF % 111age over four years were calculated, b,. taluka Thc 
denominator, i. e. the number of TF villages per taluka. is for the 1998,00 fiscal ycar. It %%as xsumcd 
that the number of TF villages in each of the talukas was stafic over the four-year perindL which 1, 
certainly not true. TF records show that the total number of TF % illages- increased only from AI in 
1996/ 97 to 644 1n 1999/00. It would ha ve been better to use number of houschol d, ,rTF mern ý c-. as 
the denominator. but these data were not available. 
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talukas that are farthest from Anand. Balasinor and KapadNxanj. both with 
admissions per TF village, and Nfahemda, ý%-ad with 5 admissions per TF villaj,; e. It is 
possible that the far-away TF villages have, on average. fewer TF member- 
households (which would account, at least in part, for the differences in ut'llsatIon); 
unfortunately, data on this were not available. 
Table 6.2: 
fremiencN, 
ITAR"M3 17 CluaIV3 
Children 
Lovs-end estimate (assumes that AWC admissions are < 15years-old) 
Claims 1,372 794 
Population 558,305 460,136 
Frequent Y 2.5 1. - 
fligh-end estimate (assu mes that, 'v'RC admissions are < 10 Year. ý-old) 
Clainis 1.372 -, 7S4 
Population 382,313 321,605 
FrequencY 3.6 2.4 
Adults 
Low-end estimate (assumes that adult admis. sions are 10- vears-old) 
Claims 3,27-1 3,033 
Population 1,252,097 1,157,895 
F1-CtjU(-'II(T 2.6 2.6 
11ýL: h-end estimate (assumes that adult adm issions are 15+ vears-old) 
Claims 3,273 3,033 
Population 1,076,105 1,019,363 
FrcqucricY 3.0 3.0 
Total 
Clainis 4,645 33.8 17 
Population 1,634,363) 1.4 79,546 
FrequencY 1.8 - 
2.6 
2,15 kh 
1.018,441 
-N I 
2.1 St, 
703.915 
3.1 
6,306 
2.409.904 
0,306 
2,095,468 
3.0 
8,463 
3,113.909 
166 
Figure 6.2: The frequency of utilisation of Shri Krishna Hospital (admissions 
per village over four years) by taluka of residence 
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Protection from costs of hospitalisation 
On average, TF members were provided with discounts for a high percentage ofthe 
total (direct) costs of hospitalisation (Table 6.33). In 100, o of cases (N = 881). no 
discount was provided. The median cost of "discounted" hospital isations was Rs. 
1,172) (25 US$, N=7,582, mean = Rs. 1.820) and the median amount discounted 
was Rs. 540 (12 US$, N=7,582, mean = Rs. 877). Of the hospital isations on which 
some discount was received, 25% (1,911) were provided for free and the mean rate 
of discount among the remainder was 339.7% (N = 5,6772. median 360o), the mean 
rate for all discounted claims was 54.9% (N' = 7,582, median = 4800). 
Table 6.3: Cost of hospitalisation and amount reimbursed 
Nifean 95'ý'O CI Median N 
Average total cost of all hospital isations (R-s) 1,736 1,694 1.779 1.096 8,4h3 
Total cost of all discounted hospi tali sations (R-s) 
As % of annual f-11-1 income - LOW 
As % of annual HIl income - HIGH 
% for whom total cost is catastrophic - LOW (I 
% for whom total cost is catastrophic - HIGH i -') 
Amount deducted 
As % of total hospital costs 
1.820 1,775 1,865 1,172 7,582 
- 8.46" 0 
11.4 - 
25.430o - 
877 852 903 540 7,5 82 
54.8"0' /0 54.15' o 55.580o 48.00'o 7,58" 
Amount borne by claimants, after deduction (R, ý) Q43 Plo 
As ', /o of annual HH income - LOW 2.47o 
As % of annual HH income - HIGH - 
"o for %% hom total cost (after deduction) is catastrophic 
I, mv (1) 4.8' )"o 
fOr ý% hom total cost (after deduction) is catastrophic 
IlI(; II (2) 11.330o 
I= Uses estimated high-end mean income of R-s. 36.757 
2= Uses estimated low-end median income of Rs. 22.054 
976 461 7.582 
4.430o 
TF's hospital referral scheme lessened the financial burden of hospital costs to its 
members, however. even after discount. the costs borne by some of the members 
were catastrophic. The mean cost of hospital isation (4.8 to 8.5? o of mean annual 
household income) was considerably higher than the mean cost borne by members 
after discount (2.5 to 4.40o ofincome. Table 6-3). For II to 25% of hospital isations. 
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the total costs would have been catastrophic to the patient (and hisher household), 
while costs bome by the patient after discount were catastrophic in 5 to I I`o. 
The protection conferred by TF's hospital referral scheme was greatest in absolute 
terms amongst those members who experienced the most expen-,, i% c hospitalisatiO111%. 
As illustrated in Figure 6.3, the mean rate of discount varied relati%elý little acro-ý,; 
quintiles of total hospital costs. from 66', ý among the least expensive hospitalisations 
to 44% among the most expensive hospitalisations. 
Figure 6.3: Mean out-of-pocket expenditure and discount by quintiles of total 
cost of hospitalisation 
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DISCUSSION 
Summary of findings 
Frequency of use of the referral scheme (3.2 admissions per 1,000 members per 
year) was very low, roughly 6% of the estimated frequency of hospital isation. Raw,; 
of use were no higher among women and children, the pnmary target groups. Rates 
of utilisation varied markedly from one taluka (sub-district) to another, m"Ith the 
highest rates occurring in talukas closest to the referral hospital. In I O'o of cases (, 'N 
= 88 1), no discount was provided. Of the hospitallsations on which some discount 
was given, the mean rate of discount was 54.91, r, o (N = 7,582, median =7 -4S'0)- The 
mean rate of discount varied relatively little across quintiles of total hospital costs, 
from 66% among the least expensive hospitalisations to 441o among the most 
expensive hospitalisations. The discount provided to TF members reduced the 
percentage of hospital isations for which costs would have been catastrophic from 
11-25% to 5-11 %. 
Critique of methodology 
Three problems with the data may have impacted on the estimates of frequency of 
utilisation of TF's hospital referral scheme. Firstly, bills for some hospitalisations 
may have been lost (unlikely) or may not ha,,, -e been processed and submitted by Shn 
Krishna Hospital at the time this analysis was conducted. This would have resulted 
in underestimates of the frequency of scheme utilisation. This likely was a problem, 
particularly for the last fiscal year (1999/'_1000), however, removal of that year from 
the analysis had very minimal impact on the overall frequency of utilisation. 
Secondly, numbers of households covered by TF in each year were provided by. and 
generated by TF. The calculation used by TF likely overestimates the si/e of the 
covered population. 6 Inaccuracy in these figures might have led to underestimation 
of referral scheme utilisation. Thirdly, calculations of the age-specific frequencý of 
scheme utilisation are likely to be somewhat inaccurate. This is because the hospital 
6TF calculates its membership by assuming that half of the total fee-ý collected are frorn howchold, 
paying Rs. 10, and half are collected from households paying Rs. 5. as many houschol, ", 3rr . 1110%%Cti 
membership in TF at some reduced rate. 
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bills provided no information on the age of patients. While tho. se patients who %%ere 
admitted to the Nutritional Resource Centre were generally Iess than 10 or 15 
years-old". this was probably quite a flexible threshold, with some older patients 
being admitted to the NRC, and some children being admitted to the adult wards. 
The data in the bills submitted by Shri Krishna Hospital were likely to be quite 
reliable. It must be remembered, however, that the costs reported on these bills were 
only for goods and services provided by Shri Krishna Hospital. for example, 
doctors' fees, bed fees, some medications and food. However, the total cost of 
hospitalisation (including indirect costs) could have been much higher, the bills did 
not include information on the costs of transportation, bribes and gifts paid to health 
care providers, and transportation and food provided to visiting family and friends. 
If all of these costs were accounted for, the percentage of hospital 1sations that were 
catastrophic (both before and after discounting) could have been much higher. 
Also a problem in the analysis of financial protection conferred by TF's hospital 
referral scheme was the lack of member-specific data on household wealth/income. 
A single range of income values was assumed for all households. If, however, 
household income varied considerably from one member to another (almost 
certainly, it did), and if household income was correlated with hospital spending, 
then this sub-study may have overestimated the frequency of catastrophic hospital 
costs. It is unlikely that costs at this charitable hospital were strongly correlated 
with income (given that members could not choose more or less expensive rooms, 
doctors, therapies, etc. ) but were more likely to be determined by seventy of illness, 
types of tests and procedures performed, and duration of hospital isation. On the 
other hand, it is possible that TF members who used Shri Krishna Hospital were 
relatively poor compared with all TF members -a possibility given that this is a .0 
charitable hospital, perceived by many to be a hospital for the poor - in which case 
the sub-study may have under-estimated the frequency of catastrophic hospital costs. 
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Discussion and interpretation of findings 
Consistent with results of the household survey (Chapter 5). analysis of scheme 
utilisation data found that rates of scheme utilisation Nvere lo%v relati,, e to o%erall 
rates of hospital isation. Low rates of utilisation may have been due to several 
factors, either alone or in combination. Members may- haýe lacked information 
about the referral services, they may have found the services difficult to acce, ý"- (for 
example, because they were too far or too expensive). or they maý-. for a variety of 
reasons, have chosen alternative inpatient services (for example, because qualltv was 
perceived to be higher in the private- for-pro fit sector). Alterriatively, TF may have 
discouraged (or failed to encourage) use of Shri Krishna Hospital by its members, 
given the mounting financial imbalances. The finding in this sub-study that rates of 
utilisation among TF members correlated inversely with distance lived from Shri 
Krishna Hospital suggests that distance was an important determinant of utilisation. 
The results of the qualitative sub-study (Chapter 7) suggest that lack of information 
among the beneficiary population regarding the referral benefits and problems with 
how Shri Krishna Hospital was perceived (e. g. a place where people go to die, a 
hospital where doctors in training get their practice) were also important factors. 
Despite TFs aim to address the health needs of women and children, scheme 
utilisation was no higher among these sub-populations. This is not surprising (Oven 
that there were no aspects of the scheme's design to ensure preferential access to 
women and children. 
TF's hospital referral scheme provided some financial protection to members: 
among those who received a discount, the mean cost of hospital isation. expressed as 
a percentage of mean annual household income. was considerably lower after the 
discount had been applied (2.5 to 4.40o after discount %ersus 4.8 to 8. ýOo before). 
However, even after discounting. costs borne by claimants were undoubtedlý a 
threat to the financial wellbeing of some households, roughly five to ele-, en percc-. t 
geater than 10% of annual of claimants were still faced with costs equivalent to L 
household income. While some members (and their families) may ha\e paid the 
1 '' 
uncovered balance out of their savings, many undoubtedlý had to borrow. sell 
capital, work more or forego spending. Impressi-ve is the impact that TF's hospital 
referral scheme had on the burden of the most expensive hospital isations: for the 
most expensive quintile of hospital i sations. the average discount provided was 44'o. 
The lack of any cap or ceiling on benefits provided under the scheme could prove 
catastrophic to a CBHI scheme - i. e. a few very expensive hospital isations could put 
the scheme out of business. The TF scheme, was, for a time, able to provide un- 
capped benefits while at the same time remaining financiall-", sustainable due to 
funds from external sources. Most CBHI schemes receive funds from some external 
source (Bennett, et al. 1998). However, TF is unique in that the costs of the referral 
scheme were entirely subsidised, in part by a donation from Kaira Can (Rs. 500,000 
per year) and in part by debt incurred by Shri Krishna Hospital. 
This sub-study was not able to demonstrate any equity benefits the scheme may have 
had. Because there was no pooling of the Rs. 10 membership fee paid (this was 
used to cover the preventive and primary care services) there could be no cross- 
subsidisation from wealthier to poorer households. However, the scheme may- still 
have had a positive impact on equity if it transferred the external subsidy (from 
Khera Can) to poor households. Given that larger discounts were to be provided to 
poorer patients, it is possible that scheme utilisation was higher among poorer 
members, and that poorer members received a greater degree of protection under the 
scheme. However, data on household wealth income were unavailable to test this. 
Conclusions and policy recommendations 
The strength of the scheme (in terms of overall health svstern -, oal,, ) %%-, is that 
it 
provided some protection against the catastrophic costs of hospital isation. 
particularly among those who experienced the most costly hospital 1 sat ions. Perhaps 
the greatest weakness was the relatively low rate of utilisation of the ý,: hcme 
by 
those who were members. The referral scheme is no longer operational. having, 
hccn 
replaced b,.,. the new Sardar Patel Insurance Scheme (Appendix Q). 
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The new scheme appears to address several of the problems of the old. Member's 
can receive inpatient benefits at any of eight pnvate-non-prot-it hospitals throughout 
the district, which should address the problems. under the old scheme. of geographic 
inaccessibility and low perceived qualivy of care. Inpatient care is to be provided to 
the patient free of cost, thus further removing financial barriers that '11ay have 
prevented members from using the old scheme. Implementation of the nex scheme 
was to be accompanied by a strong information, education and communication 
campaign (including printed circulars, regional meeting's and training of the VHWs) 
which may help to increase awareness of the scheme's benefits among its, members. 
This sub-study suggests that if the new scheme aims to target women and children, 
specific mechanisms will have to be put in place to ensure that theý- are more likely 
(than men, adults) to use the scheme. 
Scheme design and management seem to be of utmost importance in determining 
impact. A scheme that does not put a capiceiling on deductions confers benefits 
even to those who undergo the most expensive hospital isations. This may, however, 
not be financially sustainable for a scheme that does not receive large external 
subsidies. A system for monitoring the scheme is vital. so as to keep track of rates, 
causes, and costs of hospital isation, and barriers that prevent utilisation of the 
scheme by those who are insured. When a single referral hospital is used, 
geographic inaccessibility and perceptions of low quality may interfýre %ýith 
utilisation. If certain sub-populations are to receive preferential treatment under a 
scheme (for example, women. children. the poor) then formal procedures must be 
put in place to ensure that they are effectively targeted. 
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CHAPTER 7: PERCEPTIONS OF,. X-ND EXPERIENCE %% Mi, TRIBUNANDA-S 
FOUNDATION'S HOSPITAL REFERRAL SCHEME 
SUMMARY 
This chapter aims to investigate what participants in TFs hospital referral scheme 
saw it as providing, and what they percev,. -ed as accounting for its -'succe"s" or lack 
of it. 
In-depth interviews and focus-group discussions were conducted with scheme 
participants - beneficiaries, health care providers, administrators and the external 
donor. Transcripts were coded using, a grounded approach \vherein codes were 
generated to represent the main themes found in the data. Transcnpts for 
interviews were available for analysis. 
Beneficiaries (particularly females) were often unaware of their membership in the 
scheme. Those who were aware closely associated TF with the local dairy co- 
operatives, and were most familiar with TF's activities in providing free or reduced- 
cost medicines through local VHWs. The hospital referral scheme was seen as a 
vital component of TF by some beneficiaries, but as a "charity"' or "social service" 
rather than a "health insurance" scheme. TF members who had used the hospital 
referral scheme reported receiving sizeable discounts. They had few complaints 
about the hospital referral scheme, most commonly related to the remote location of 
Shri Krishna Hospital or the quality or reputation of the hospital. Administrators 
acknowledged that the scheme had encountered difficulties as a result of 
unsustainable financing, and secondary to this, it had become increasingly difficult 
for TF members to request. and prove their eligibility, for discount at the hospital. 
This research revealed that what initially seemed to be a CBHI . -, cheme %%a., in fact 
not functioning as insurance at all. This is likely to be the casc with at lea-,:, t some 
other schemes described in the published literature as CBHl. As %%ell. this sub-study 
illustrates some of the difficulties that can anse from relying heavily en exterriAl 
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sources of funding. Not only can this restrict the extent to "hich , -s,: hcme can grow 
and change, but it may also impact on beneficianes' knowledge of ownership of. 
and participation in, a scheme. 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate what participants in TF saw it as pro% iding. 
and what they perceived as accounting for its "success" or lack of it. It is intended 
to address thesis Objectives 4 and 5, and to provide supplementary information 
relevant to thesis Objectives I to 3. The first section details the study methodologý-- 
The second describes the results and the final section summanses the results, 
critiques the methodology, and discusses and interprets the findings. 
METHODOLOGY 
In total, three FGDs (with TF members and non-members) and 30 or 31 in-depth 
interviews were planned. The in-depth inter-vie'ý%-s were to include: twenty-five 
enrolled members, three or four health care providers, one administrator and one 
government representative. Transcripts for 27 interviexs were available for 
analysis: six focus-group discussions, and in-depth interviews with fourleen TF 
members (recent-past or current), three health care providers and four scheme 
administrators. Appendix 10 provides a brief description of each interview subject. 
Fewer beneficiary in-depth inten-iews were conducted than planned (14 versus 25), 
but a higher number of FGDs (6 versus 3) and in-depth interviews with 
administrators (4 versus 1). Interviews with government representatives could not 
be included in this analysis. District-level representatives (including the District 
Medical Officer) refused to be interviewed as they. claimed to kno\v absolutely 
nothing about insurance, or TF. A Joint Secretary of Health (Goverment of India) 
was interviewed, but the resulting information could not be used in this sub-study as 
the respondent did not allow the interview to be recorded. 
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REsULTS 
The main areas the beneficiaries discussed included: recent illnesses in the 
household, types of health care sought, costs of health care, and mechanisms for 
coping with health care expenditures. Health care providers. scheme administrators 
and the external donor discussed their personal experiences and opinions around thc 
hospital referral scheme. Five main themes emerged from Lhe data: 
" Financial determinants of health care seeking: 
" Methods of coping with medical (especially hospital) expenditures. 
Understanding and knowledge of insurance in general; 
" Reasons for participating in TF: perceptions as to v. -hat TF and the hospital 
referral scheme were providing; 
" Experiences of those who used the hospital referral scheme 
Findings in respect to the three former themes have been placed in Appendix II 
since they are of less relevance to the focus here on the scheme. 
Reasons for joining TF 
This section opens by describing members' knowledge of TF (and their membership 
in it) and some of the factors that appear to be most important in deternlining 
whether or not people joined TF. It then explores the benefits ofTF and the hospital 
referral scheme as perceived by participants. Results are presented under the 
following sub-headings: 
" Members often unaware of TF; 
" TF perceived to be for members of the local dairy co-operatives. 
" Expectations among beneficiaries and administrators; 
o "No, this cannot be considered health insurance". 
Members often unaware of TF 
Beneficiaries (i. e. members of TF households) were often unaware of their 
membership in the scheme. There emerged a number ot'possible explanations as- to 
why this was the case. In some Nillages; the membership fee was taken automatlcallý 
by the dairy secretary with only minimal (or no) discussion %% A heneficianes. In 
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the following passage, male members of TF discuss their lack of awareness, 
Respondent 1: How can it-(-, get the bene/it (oj- the TFscheme) if it C', do not know anything. " 
Respondent 2: At the time of bonus the -v sa -v 
that 
- vour ien rzipccs are deducted. So we also say okay, let them deduct. And at that time itt, the 
receipt. 
Interviewer: Don't any ofyou ask "why are you deducting ten rupees 
Respondent 2. - No, no. 
Respondent 1: Yes they ask. And in return we get the reccipt as an am; wer 
of our question. 
Respondent 3. - Till today veryfew have knowledge about this scheme. Onýv 
those who are educated have knowledge about this scheme. They ask about 
these ten rupees. People like me ask, "why this ten rupees is deducted" " 
So they say 'fior Foundation So I came to know that it is to receive 
benefits of Foundation. 
(FGD-MIX 3) 
In the following passage a TF village health worker acknowledged that the secretary 
for the local dairy co-operative would automatically deduct the TF membership fee 
of Rs. 10: 
Our secretary is vety good. Without taking aqvone Ps permi . ssion he just 
cuts the ten rupees before giving the annual bonus to mernbers fof the dairy 
co-operative). 
(PR 0 V- TF 2) 
Female members generally had even less information about the benefits of TF than 
did males. In some cases, this may have occurred as the membership was purchased 
by a male family member, as was the case for Respondent I in the following FGD: 
Intenieiver to Respondent k Is. your ten rupees deducted (IrOm the annual 
bonus) 
Respondent 2: She doesn't know-. 
Interviewer: You do not know-. DoYou deposit milk.. " 
Respondent ]: Yes. 
Respondent 2: So they received bonus. So it is deducted at that tirne. 
Respondent 3: Her husband or her son goes to collect the bonus so theY 
knoiv. 
(FGD-. VfLk'l, ) 
Perceived association with local dairv co-operatives 
People closely associated the TF scheme with the local daiin. : o-operatives. Nfaný 
members believed that membership was restricted to those who belong to the dairy 
co-operative (i. e. those who regularly deposit milk): 
I-Is 
Respondent 1: OnIv those who deposit milk- at the dairv ra *v 
toh#-, 7F 
membershipfee). Thosevi-ho don't deposit... 'Khy itould the. 1, pqv. 
Respondent 2: Earlier I vs-as not depo, s iting fmilk at the dally). Novi it t 
have bought a buffalo. SonovvIv%Jllpqv. Othervvist, I is-as not pqvini- 
(FGD- TF 1) 
There were numerous cases ý, vhere past members of TF had discontinued their 
membership (sometimes temporarily) because they were not depositing milk: 
Respondent: Next year when vve get bonus, we vi ill pqv (the TF 
membershipfee) again. 
Interviewer: But, you haven'tpaid thisyear. Didn't ' vou pqv 
th ISYcar 
Respondent: No, we did not have milk at that time. We did not pqý,. 
(BEN- TF 3) 
This perceived association between TF and the dairy co-operatives was so strong 
that some members felt that the work done by TF should be carefully targeted to 
those who deposit milk. For example, one member believed that current problems 
with the hospital referral scheme (i. e. discontinuation of the guaranteed discount) 
resulted from "abuse" of the scheme by members of "upper economic groups 'I who 
do not deposit milk: 
Re, spondent 1: And now TF has stopped providing Mcm, scn, i'Ces 
(discounts at Shri Krishna Hospital). And the onýv reason - 
for this is the 
abuse (ýv members). Here ive have our TF social Worker (VIII0. So she 
gives the card to everyone! And because qfthis, the milk-larmers who wert-, 
depositing the milk were not able to take the benefit while other people 
were taking the benefits - poor people were ltýft out and people jrom tipper 
economic groups were taking thc bentfit. This was happening... These 
henefits are given by TF. but this shotild be used hY farmers rather than 
them... 
(FGD-. NfIX3) 
Expectations of TF 
TF beneficiaries who were aware of the services provided by the organisation 
generally cited free or reduced-cost medicines as the pnmarý benefit: 
Respondent: Ten nipces we pqv,. 
Interviewer: Doyou ixt any advantage.,; against it. " 
Respondent: Sister (TF worker) comes here from Balaunor. (JI'Ves 
medicines. That is. they take one or nvo n4pecs. For sonic illnics. wy the. i 
take two rupees. 
Intenwiver: Do 
, you get any other 
benelit 
Respondent: Nothing else. 
I -t 
(BEN- TF 4) 
So you see, we can get medicines ij vve have conjunc: ivi '. tlýý 
medicines if we have cough. Isn't it. " So vve canget the. sc medicines. 
(FGD- TF 1) 
Few mentioned the inpatient services at the TF sub-centers, and ret'erral sen-ices to 
Shri Krishna Hospital. Among those who had not actuall% made use of the hospital 
referral scheme, knowledge of the scheme was vague: 
Interviewer: They are deducting monei-from the dain, directiv. So, do loll 
get any benefit against it? Do you know') 
Respondent: If we want to go, then when we pqv ten rupees, theygiv-c its a 
card (red membership card). With the help of the card, we can go. We have 
heard that they take us to Karamsad medical (Shri Krishna Hospital). Tile 
,v get us admitted and the expense is reduced. That's what vAe have ht'ard. 
(BEN- TF 2) 
Several believed the discount to be fixed at fiftý- percent: 
Respondent 1: Pay ten rupees and theY can become memhcrs. 
Respondent 2: If the hospital expense i. s worth one thousand nipees, theY 
givefive hundred andfivc hundredwe give. 
Respondent 3: Five hundred worth of benqfit. 
(FGD- TF 2) 
Respondent: They take ten rupees cts familv membership. I am also 
member. And during the whole , v, (-, ar 
if an , ything 
happens to anY Jýmily 
member then they (TF) provide the treatment M Shri Krishna medical 
hospital. And if the person hay taken a certificatc. from dairý- co-operative 
(i. e. the TF membership paper) then thev can get some fijiv- percent 
discount. 
(FGD-AfI. V 4) 
Among scheme administrators at all levels, primary and preventi% e health care 
services, targeted towards poorer women and children, were the objectiVes most 
often cited for the organisation. In fact, this reflects the objecti%, e specified by, Shn 
Tribhuvandas Patel when he provided the "seed money" to start TF: 
Rcspondent: He received this check. HL-. in a public rnectin.,,,. lit., tpCfiýl- 
announced that this will be ust, d to take care ofthe licalth (Ind 
children in the district. 
(. 4 DMIX- TF 1) 
According to the first managing director of TF ( 1980-97). the hospital referral 
scheme started (in the early 1980's) because the director of' the (then new) Shn 
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Krishna Hospital offered to provide free care to TF patients: 
And then he and (name of current 
should start taking patients to them. 
Shri Krishna Chairperson) sald we 
So. I said, "willyou give -lood. 
"' "Y cS 
free food. " "And clothes for the days they are there. " " And, uni. "Your 
patients will be treatedfree. 
(A DMIN- TF 2) 
She expressed that Shri Krishna Hospital's interest in the referral scherne -stemmed 
from its need for patients so that its medical school would recei% e accreditation: 
I remember seven or eight instances when I was cither called h*i- th t-, 
medical director there or he would come to m, v office... And they would 
literally beg of me to call up patients and send them somehow andfill tip 
their beds because the medical inspection was coming. To be recognised (1. ý 
a medical college. 
(A DMIN- TF 2) 
Lower-level administrators and village health workers consistently described the 
referral services as a major goaUbenefit of membership in TF: 
Interviewer: Oka , thosewho have not paid the membershipfees... y TF VHW. - For such people, uh, if they need emergency treatment it-e make 
them members - two minutes. Any time they come I make them a cardfir 
ten rupees. 
Interviewer: I see. 
VHW. - In this, they give them fijýV percent subsi4v. Shri Krishna Hospital 
gives them 50% subsi4v andfor that we issue the card. And thosc who do 
not go with a card have to payfiillfees. 
(PRO V- TF 1) 
Administrators thought that the referral scheme was often seen as a major benefit of 
the TF scheme by beneficiaries, but described the scheme as having ansen with little 
planning or thought regarding financial sustainability: 
Respondent: We recognise that an -v prima? y 
health care programme must 
have some link to a referral hospital... But it (the referral hospital) vi as 
never intended to be the focal point qj'the programme, which is where it 
went wrong. Now when that ten rupees was paid, theY percei ved it av "the 
minute I have paid this I have access to that hospital 
(A D. WIN- TF 1) 
"No. this cannot be considered health insurance" 
Beneficiaries and administrators alike did not consider TFs hospital referral s-cheme 
to be "'health insurance", but describe it as -charity" or ""social sen'ICC. Some 
beneficiaries stated that it was not an insurance scheme as membership fees %% ere not 
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retumed to those who did not make use of the inpatient services: ' 
Interviewer: Okay. So, can we call this t TF's referral scheme) insurance. ' 
Respondent: This is just social service. In this scheme. ive have the hope 
that even if we don't have enough money at home. we will be provided 141 th 
treatment at Shri Krishna Hospital. But if we don't use the hospital. will 
we get those ten rupees back? We won't. 
(FGD- TF 2) 
Interviewer: I am asking, can we call it insurance' 
Several respondents: No it cannot be called insurance. 
Respondent: It is collected every year. And once it is paid it is gone. 
don't get anythingfrom the scheme unless we use the hospital. 
(FGD-MIX 4) 
Other beneficiaries felt that the premium was too low for this to be considered 
insurance: 
And if we want to call it insurance then the amount (qfpremium) it-ill also 
rise. Ten rupees is not enough. It should be at leastfifiý, rupees or one 
hundred rupees. 
(FGD-MIX 4) 
Scheme administrators readily acknowledged that the hospital referral scheme did 
not function like insurance. One commented that it could not be considered 
insurance as it was not self-sustaining, relying instead on external sources of 
funding: 
Respondent: I don't think in the real sense , vou can call It 
Onsurance). 
because it doesn't coverfidýv the cost of the organisation. We have to 
break even, you know-, using other sources (such as Kaira Can) from that 
extra and develop possibilities. 
(A DMIN- TF 3) 
A village health worker explained that TF members did not purchase membership 
with an eye towards ""secunng" their health: 
Th e*1, , 
lCel it is for chariýv and sen-Ice for chariýv. They do not have an 
understanding that this ten nipees is for securing them ftom afilturc health 
problem. 
(PRO V- TF 1) 
Several administrators said that TF v. -as unlike an insurance scheme in that 
membership was often purchased only after someone in the household fell seriously 
I As presented in Appendix 11. insurance is commonly %-Icwed as a type of sa%ings mechanism. 
wherein prrnilums paid are returned after a pre-defined period of time, if the e%ent that is in%ured 
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ill: 
No, we cannot call it health insurance because all patient. s do not pqy 
membership in advance. "enever patients fall sick thtýy maY pcq the 
membershipfee... Right, in this way we ask them to ptq the premi . um first 
and give them discount. 
(A DMIN- TF 4) 
Experience among those who have used TF's hospital referral scheme 
Several sub-themes emerged from discussions with beneficiaries of their experiences 
with TF and its hospital referral scheme: 
" TF's primary care, outpatient services; 
" Degree of financial protection from hospital expenditures; 
" Strengths and weaknesses of the referral scheme, as perceived by members-, 
" Strengths and weaknesses of the referral scheme, as perceived by administrators. 
TF's prima[y care, outpatient services 
The accessibility and quality of TFs outpatient preventive and primary care 
activities seemed to vary considerably from one village to another (largely 
dependent on the VHW). Many beneficiaries discussed having recei-ved reduced- 
cost medications from the VHW. In one FGD, men discussed the benefit received 
by tuberculosis (T. B. ) patients through the scheme: 
Respondent: ffthere is a TB. patient, his medicines cost twenty thousand 
rupees in the private sector. And also it cannot cure T. B. one-hundred 
percent. nereas if aqv TB. patient joins this (TF), if he had paid 
membershipfees, then he is provided treatment sitting in his home. And he 
is given tablets of very good quallýy... Many patients are cured rom T B. fi 
(FGD-MIX 3) 
People acknowledged that through the TF VHW, not only had they received drugs of 
good quality at reduced cost, but they %vere also able to access the drugs locally 
rather than having to travel to the nearest drug-shop or dispensary: 
Respondent: It is much better ij'we can get medicine within the village 
rather than goingfor the same outside the village, when anYthing happens 
to us. Isn't it" I hewe to come to take medicine tivice In a month. And vhe 
(the TF VHW) gives whenever ive go. Even ýf she is cookin,,, /; )()(I she is ill 
apinst does not occur. 
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do it later and give me the medicinesfirst. 
(FGD- TF 1) 
One scheme administrator had received similar feedback from TF members: 
Interviewer: Is this scheme successful. " 
Respondent: Yes, they say that, "Sister, earlier there ivere no di. ýpensari . es 
in our village. We could not get medicines at primary Ievel: 'Ke had to ivalk 
up tofive kilometresfor medicine. Instead of that ive get medicine, wting at 
home. From this we all have benefited a lot. We cannot get ti-catment at 
such low rates at any other place. 
(A DMIN- TF 4) 
The main complaint that TF members had regarding outpatient services was that it 
was unfair that they had to make a co-payment: 
Respondent: There is no benefit in that (TFschcmc). 
Respondent's husband: In fact, if ive go to take medicine sometirne, they 
will take two rupees. They will ask "Have You brought tivo rupecs 
(BEN- TF 10) 
Degree of financial protection from hospital expenditures 
TF members who had used the Shri Krishna Hospital generally reported having 
received a sizeable discount, typically of fifty percent or more. Several people 
reported purchasing a card specifically to access the referral services only after 
someone in the household had fallen ill. In the following interview, the respondent 
reports purchasing a card after her son fell ill: 
Respondent: He had become ve? -v sick. So, I took him over here (relerring, 
to the local government hospital). But, nothing happened. So, I got tile card 
made at the dairv. 
Interviewer: Hmm 
Respondent: From the la4y. Dien. after getting the card made, I went to 
the hospital at Anand. 
(BEN- TF 12) 
While the referral scheme did seem to provide sizeable discount to those who used 
it, some who received a discount still went into debt paying for the hospital isation: 
Respondent: After deducting six hundred and seveqv-five (the discount) 
we had paid some tweniý! -siv hundred rupees, tivenjý--seven hundred rupees, 
including thefarefor the matador (taxi) and all. 
Interviewer: So then, how did 
' You arrangefor 
that mone '0 Respondent: We borrowed some from mY brother-in-law. ff'c alý" 
borrowedfrom mY elder brother-in-law. 
(BEN- TF 13) 
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Respondent: In that (the cost of hospitalisation at Shri Krishna 11o. spItal) I 
got half discount. 
Interviewer: Then, what about the remaining expense. ' 
Respondent: We work at Patel'S place. We borrowfrom him and pqv the 
hospital. 
(B EN- TF 6) 
None of the respondents had been refused discount at Shri Krishna Hospital. 
Strengths and weaknesses of the referral scheme, as perceived by member-, 
While those who were hospitalised at Shri Krishna Hospital ývere generally 
impressed with the quality of service provided, there were many complaints about its 
location and the indirect costs of hosp 1 tali sation. In the folloxving FGD, respondents 
discussed the difficulties in reaching Shri Krishna in case of emergency: 
Respondent 1: It takes one hour, thirty minutes (from our village to Shri 
Krishna Hospital). 
Interviewer. - But at the time Qf emergencýv. Suppose someone meets with 
an accident, so can we can we reach sofiar? 
Respondent 2: Then we have to take some private vehicle - then onýv ive 
can reach. 
(FGD- TF 1) 
Some who were hospitalised at Shri Krishna Hospital were provided with free 
transportation from a TF sub-centre. Others, however, complained about the cost of 
transportation. Some also complained about the costs incurred by friends or family 
who travelled to Shri Krishna to visit, or care for, a patient: 
Inten, iewer. - You took the boy to Karamsad. Didyou spend anything over 
there? 
Respondent: There was an expense of travelling to and fro. We had to 
spend on the fare. We had to go two, three times, so. We used to go and 
come everydqy to pick up lunch. We had given charitv (i. e. paid the TF 
membershipfee). So, theY did not take the hospital charges. 
(BEN- TF 7) 
Other recipients of the discount at Shri Krishna Hospital reported having to pav f*()i- 
medicines prescribed from outside the hospital: 
Respondent: Aere ive had a bill qftiveqv--five hundred nipees. out qj 
which vve paid tivelve hundred rupees. Isn't that a bent-lit. " And the 
expenses of medicines are separate. of course that ive had to pqv. If We 
ivent to a private hospitalwe would have to pqv the wholt, amount. 
(FGD- TF 2) 
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As aforementioned, there were relatively few complaints about the qualit).. - of',: are it 
Shn Krishna Hospital. These included complaints that the hospital was too large 
and difficult to navigate - particularly for the illiterate - and that the doctors were 
young and inexperienced: 
Respondent /: If you want to reduce expenditure by taking trtcatint'llt I'll 
such a hospital, then you have to take some pain. 
Respondent 2. - And doctors give their responsibility to nur,; es orstudent. s. 
In Medical (Shri Krishna Hospital) the doctors arestill learning, 
Respondent 2: Doctors are student doctors. Afterjbur attempts they can 
insert the needle. 
Respondent 3: If we suggest to a normal patient to get hospitallsed in 
Medical (Shri Krishna) Hospital, then the ve, ývfirst thing he will say is that 
"Medical means to meet death 
Respondent 2. - To go to die! 
(FGD-MIX 3) 
As referred to in this passage, Shri Krishna Hospital has, among some, gained the 
reputation of being a place where people go to die. As well, some respondents 
mentioned that Shri Krishna Hospital has the reputation of being a "poor man's 
hospital". 
Strengths and weaknesses of the referral scheme, as perceived bv administrators 
All of TF's central administrators acknowledged that the scheme has encountered 
difficulties as a result of unsustainable financing. Firstly. they generally agreed that 
the membership fee should never have been fixed at ten rupees: 
That is it-here it went wrong. "en the ' v-, 
they take the membership of ten 
rupees per year, per family, which is nothing. AOthing. AO first of all, 
when theYf4ed it as ten rupees perfami4,, I think that was thefirst mistake. 
(A DMIN- TF 1) 
Secondly, administrators gave the impression that TF members have grown 
accustomed to substantial subsidies against the costs of hospitalisation at Shn 
Krishna Hospital: 
9,, p have so many chairmen and secretaries (of'local dain' co-oPtT(Itives) 
coming and battling away, saying that "we expectJree treatMCnt, whY arc, 
we paying ten rupees". Aey just, it is embedded, it is in their headý. that 
this ten rupees isforfree treatment. And we cant explain to Mem that ten 
rupees doesn't cover anything. 
(ADMIN- TF 1) 
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... you 
know everything is not given free in the hospital. ... 
So theY are 
trying to mobilise some donations and fiinds (possibkv rejerring to 
fees) for the referral care. .... 
Vow people have been used to at, tv . ? I(, 
treatment at a substantial subsidy. Suddeniv changing this K, ould be a little 
bit difficult. 
(A DMIN- TF 3) 
Finally, they expressed difficulties encountered by the scheme as a result of relying 
heavily upon a single, fixed, external source of funding: 
And they (Khera Can) got some income tax rebate in that. I'm sure. 
Because they used to askfor letters (presumabiv., like a recel . pt). So their 
interest was that. And I askedfor more money a couple of tirnes so that the 
number of cases offreeship would increase. And the interest was not there. 
But every year we used to remind them and we got the check (for the 
amount of Rs. 500,000). 
(A DMIN- TF 2) 
As a result of mounting financial imbalances, TF's administrators said that it had 
become increasingly difficult for TF members to request, and prove their eligibility, 
for discount at Shri Krishna Hospital: 
Respondent: ... whenever a 
TF patient comes there (to Shri Krishna 
Hospital), we make that person stand on his head to justýfy wh , ý, 
he should 
be given free treatment. And we say, "How many animals have you got. " 
How much land have you got? And based on that you've got to pcq 
somcthing. " As a result, the patient is becoming exhausted hY the whole 
process. 
(A DMI., -V- TF 1) 
They described how the discount provided to members was. just pnor to the 
scheme's demise, determined based on the member's ""economic condition" 
No. not fijýy percent. Initially... the discount it-as up to fijýv percent, but 
then there was a reduction in the discount given depending on the junds 
received (from Kaira Can). It depends upon the economic condition: ifthe 
patient is very poor then he gets fidl discount (free treatment) and 11 the 
patient can pay we make him pqy a little more, and explain to him that 
"' vou do not need it "... In this way I explain him and make him pcq monev. 
(. 4 DMIN- TF 4) 
The current director of TF (ADMIN'-TF 3) cited as its strenghs: accountability 
among VHWs, a participatory approach, and a willingness to change. The director 
suggested that by havingvillage dairy societies employ and supen-ise a local woman 
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to work as VHW, they had increased the accountability of' the VHW -to tier own 
people 11. In terms of community participation, administrators attempted to -Involve 
the dairy cooperatives more and more... in the running of' the programme" and to 
increase their sense of ownership. Finally, the director felt that continuous 
upgrading of the scheme, its goals and objectives, as well as the skills of its 
functionaries, was important to success: 
... ifyou think that u have tackled one problem sufficiently then i-ou inav YO have to move over - to change the purpose. 
(A DMIN- TF 3) 
DISCUSSION 
Summary of findings 
Beneficiaries (particularly females) were often unaware of their membership in the 
scheme. In some cases, this can be attributed to the fact that membership fees were 
automatically deducted from the annual dairy co-operative bonus, and in others to 
the purchase of the membership by male household members. People closely 
associated the TF scheme with the local dairy co-op erat iv es. often believing that 
membership in TF was restricted to those who deposit milk at the dairy. 
Beneficiaries generally lacked knowledge about the benefits of TF, but those who 
were able to cite benefits generally discussed free or reduced-cost medicines. 
Similarly, TF employees emphasised the organisation's primary and preventive care 
goals. Among beneficiaries, knowledge of the hospital referral scheme was quite 
limited, and those who were generally thought it involved a fifty percent discount at 
Shri Krishna Hospital. Lower-level administrators and village health workers 
described the hospital referral scheme as a major benefit of TF. while central 
administrators described the scheme as having arisen largely out of the need to 
increase bed occupancy rates at Shri Krishna Hospital. It is perceived by 
beneficiaries not as "health insurance", but as "charity" or "social service" insofar as 
the membership fee is very low (relative to benefits), can be purchased even after 
one falls seriously ill, and it is not returned if unused (as is often the case with Indian 
insurance schemes). Administrators agreed that it could not be considered a health 
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insurance scheme, due to its reliance on external funding. the tailure of members to 
link (conceptually) membership with better health, and the fact that household-s were 
permitted to join even after someone had fallen sick. 
Consistent with participants' (both beneficiaries and administrators) goals. TF 
seemed to increase access to low-cost, high-quality. medicines among its members. 
TF members who used Shri Krishna Hospital reported recerý-ing sizeable discounts. 
Nonetheless, some who received a discount still went into debt paying for the 
hospital isation. Beneficiaries' had few complaints about the hospital referral 
scheme, most commonly related to the remote location of Shri Krishna Hospital or 
the quality or reputation of the hospital. Administrators acknowledged that the 
scheme has encountered difficulties as a result of unsustainable financing, and 
secondary to this, it became increasingly difficult for TF members to request, and 
prove their eligibility, for discount at the hospital. The current director of TF cited 
as its strengths: accountability among VHWs, a participator-y, approach, and a 
willingness to change. 
Critique of methodology 
Initially, guidelines for the interviews (Appendix 5) were based on inaccurate 
assumptions. At the commencement of the study, the PI was under the mistaken 
impression that: 
" Members of TF would be aware of TF and their membership in it: 
" The TF hospital referral scheme would be functioning like, and would be viewed 
by its members as, a health insurance scheme. 
More often than not, people kne,. v very little about TF. Those who were familiar 
with the scheme, whether as beneficiaries or administrators, denied that the scheme 
provided insurance. For this reason, as the study progressed, the interviews 
increasingly focused on very concrete events (such as specific hospital isations. 
means used to pay for hospital care, and problems with care at Shri Krishna 
Hospital, etc. ). However, during the course of the study. the inteniews probably 
should have been changed even more to optimise the yield of the interviews. If 
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interviews had been analysed in parallel \ý ith data collection. later inten ie"-s could 
better have been tailored to the knowledge and experience of respondents. For 
example, less time would likely have been spent discussing respondents* knowledge 
(or lack thereof) of insurance and risk protection, and more time spent discussing 
people's expectations of TF and the benefits that TF is perceived to have provided. 
Much of what beneficiaries had to say about TF was related to the organisation IS 
primary health care activities at the village level. Some of Nvhat respondents said in 
this regard was presented above. These interviews were not, however, designed to 
assess the impact or quality of TF's primary health care services, as these are 
available to TF members and non-members alike. and therefore were not considered 
part of the "health insurance scheme". As such, findings related to TF's primary 
care activities must be regarded as incidental and interpreted with some caution. 
Under the category of "providers" two village health workers and one field-worker 
were interviewed. While providers of TF's primary health care activities, they did 
not provide care under the hospital referral scheme. In fact, they would rightly be 
considered "administrators" in that one of their duties included selling"recording 
membership in the TF scheme. It was an error not to include any providers (doctors 
or nurses) at Shri Krishna Hospital who were not also part of TF's administration. 
The current managing director of TF, ADMIN-TF 31, was also a doctor at Shri 
Krishna Hospital at the time of these interviews. 
Both the focus-group discussions and the in-depth interviews were semi- structured, 
i. e. the interviewers were working from a schedule of open-ended questions, and 
were somewhat directive in terms keeping discussion focussed around these topics. 
It is possible that this interviewing approach interfered with the emenrence of some 
topics, such as the social consequences and determinants of CBHI. For exampic. if 
respondents were discussing things that were considered to be -off topic" by the 
interviewer, then the interviewer Nvould often pose new questions to gyct them back 
on "topic". The link between health insurance and some of the potential 
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consequences, for example, conflict in families around medical decision-makin-g. 
may not have been entirely clear to the interviewers (at least durins" the inter% 
It is possible that such subtle associations might better have been inN, esti, -, ated usin Z9 
a less structured, more exploratory, approach to interviemang. Altemativel. y. 
additional training could have been provided to the inten-lewcrs to help them better 
recognise potentially relevant themes. 
Discussion and interpretation of findings 
Participants in TF (primarily members and administrators) had similar Views on 
what the organisation should be providing overall, but their goals for the hospital 
referral scheme were discordant. Beneficiaries and providers alike viewed TF's 
primary care services, provided through VHWs, as the major benefit to its 
membership. TF members generally lacked awareness regarding the hospital 
referral scheme, but those who were familiar with it felt that it should be providing 
financial protection to member households (regardless of wealth). Interviews with 
scheme administrators revealed that the scheme "was never intended to be the focal 
point" of TF. In fact, the scheme was established with the primary goals of 
providing free care to needy TF patients and increasing bed occupancy rates 
(specifically for the purpose of accreditation) at Shri Krishna Hospital. Given these 
goals, along with the hospital's relatively small size, the relatively large number of 
TF members (approaching 900,000), and the limited (and fixed) financing available 
for the referral scheme, it is not surprising, that TF and its functionaries were doing 
little to increase awareness of the scheme or scheme utilisation. Expectations for the 
scheme were highest among VHWs, who were probably not aware of the reasons for 
which it was started, nor of the scheme's financial problems. 
Participants' experiences with, and observations about, the scheme also ý aned 
considerably. Members of TF who had used the scheme had some complaints, but 
were generally quite happy with the quality of care and the discount provided 
through TF. Scheme administrators (at least at the central level) felt that the scheme 
was working poorly. They thought that members' expectations were unrea-sonabl% 
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high given the low membership fee paid. They felt that the process of distributing 
benefits (based on means testing) was becoming increasingly difficult for patients. 
And they acknowledged that funding of the scheme ývas unsustainable. due to the 
fixed nature of both the membership fee and the annual donation from Khera Can. 
This difference in views regarding the functioning of the scheme is not surprising. 
Members who had used Shri Krishna Hospital had little grounds to complain. given 
that they had received care at subsidised cost in return for an insignificant premium. 
Administrators, on the other hand, were burdened with worries about increasing 
financial imbalances, and some pressure (not documented in this sub-study) from 
administrators at Shri Krishna Hospital to help cover the inpatient costs of TF 
members. 
In hindsight, having learned how TFs hospital referral scheme operates, and how it 
was viewed by participants (beneficiaries and administrators alike), it seems almost 
inappropriate to have included it in a study intended to look at community-based 
health insurance schemes. Initially it appeared that TF was in fact functioning as 
health insurance. The TF scheme had been described in the published literature as 
an insurance (or "prepayment") scheme, first and foremost by Dave ( 1993) and later 
by Bennett, et al. (1998) and Larnbo (1996). It was selected for this study based on 
the understanding that it involved prepayment (the Rs. 10 "membership fee") in 
return for coverage of 50% of the direct costs of hospitallsation. It was not until this 
research was well under way that the many design features that make this unlike an 
insurance scheme came to light. Firstly, the membership fee was extremely low 
(and was often halved or waived completely) and was never intended to cover, or 
even offset, the hospitalisation costs of members. Secondly, people could not count 
on receiving benefit at the time of hospitalisation, this was dependent upon an 
assessment of the member's wealth. Thirdly. it was not managed like a health 
insurance scheme. For example, people were allowed. and encouraged, to purchase 
a membership even after they had fallen sick. The membership fees %vere never 
really pooled, so in effect there was no risk-pooling or cross-subsidisation. 
However, as pointed out by Bennett (Personal Communication 2001) many CBHI 
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schemes are of this nature, "i. e. not quite what you thought they were once you have 
examined them closely... ". It is likely that many of the CBHI schemes described in 
the published literature would in fact have some characteristics that do not comply 
with health insurance as it is strictly defined by economists. 
This was, however, a unique opportunity to study a community- based financing 
scheme just as it was becoming clear to participants that it was unsustainable. At the 
time of the study, administrators had accepted that resources from the external donor 
were no longer (nor for years had been) sufficient to cover members' hospital 
expenses, and they appeared frustrated at not being able to increase the user fees 
paid by members. They were beginning to phase the hospital referral scheme out (as 
a first step, by restricting benefits to "poor" TF members) and to plan a new 
"insurance scheme" for the future (see Appendix 9). Most TF members familiar 
with the hospital referral scheme had not yet been informed about restrictions to the 
benefits package. 
Probably the most valuable and generalisable lesson that can be learned from this 
study relates to relying heavily on external sources of funding. For TF, funding 
received from Kaira Can was problematic not because it was unreliable (an amount 
of Rs. 500,000 per annum was consistently paid) but because it was fixed, whereas 
TF's membership was rapidly growing as were the costs per person hospitalised. 
The heavy reliance on external resources likely impacted on non-financial aspects of 
the scheme as well. For example, members of TF were often unaware of the scheme 
and its activities and seemed to have little sense of ownership of the scheme (rather 
they thought of it as linked to the dairy co-operative). If TF members had been 
required to cover a greater portion (or all) of the costs of the scheme, they might 
have taken a greater interest in the scheme, and demanded more (information. 
education, services) in return for their contnbution. 
Given the hospital referral scheme's financial situation at the time of this study. it is 
very difficult to comment on other strengths or weaknesses of the scheme. For 
193 
example, one might criticise the scheme for: allowing people to purchase 
membership even after they had fallen ill: lack of communication with. or aNvareness 
among, its membership; and its affiliation with onlY one hospital in the district. In 
the context of an otherwise wel I -functioning insurance scheme. these factors could 
certainly have been problematic. In the case of TF, these may instead have been part 
of a conscious effort (on the part of administrators) to provide only for those in 
greatest need, to keep rates of hospital utilisation down. and thus to keep the scheme 
functioning for as long as possible. 
Despite TF's aim of addressing the health problems of women and children, women 
appeared to be less informed of TF and its benefits than were men. This seems to 
have resulted from the selling of membership through the (predominantly male) 
dairy co-operatives, primarily to male household heads. Furthermore, there were no 
formal mechanisms to involve female members (VHWs aside) in planning or 
managing the scheme. TF might be able to improve communication with women by 
selling memberships directly to women, either by going door-to-door or by 
establishing links with local women's groups (for example, child-care co-operatives 
or cr6ches, or informal savings or credit groups). Alternatively, TF could try 
increasing awareness among females who already belong to TF by increasing the 
frequency of door-to-door visits or group presentations by local VHWs. 
Social capital appears to have been of little importance in the functioning of TF's 
referral scheme. Traditions of collaboration and co-operation likely underlie the 
success of the dairy cooperative movement. However, "altruistic feelings between 
members of a neighbourhood or social class" (Besley 1995, p. 2165) and traditions 
of collective action do not seem to have increased participation in TF. Rather, 
households joined TF either because: (1) they had been told about the scheme, and 
membership was so inexpensive that they found it difficult to say no. (2) they were 
aware of the preventive and primary care services provided TF, and believed they 
were buying access to these, or (-3) membership had been made mandatory by their 
local dairy society. Higher levels of social consciousness or solidantN- had not 
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prevented adverse selection under the scheme. It seems likely that lack of' 
community participation (or sense of ownership) in the scheme, rather than lack of' 
social capital, resulted in adverse selection; people ma,. have been purchasing .1 
membership only after falling ill because they viewed the scherne as an external 
social service rather than a community-based endeavour. 
Although not explicitly mentioned by any of the respondents. lack of trust between 
the beneficiaries and health care provider, Shn Krishna Hospital, appeared to play an 
important role in the functioning of the scheme. Those who viewed Shri Krishna 
Hospital as a place where people went to die, or to be practised on by student 
doctors, may have been less likely to make use of the facility. Trust between 
members of the target population and the "Insurer", Tribhuvandas Foundation (and 
its employees) also seemed to be somewhat important, it seems to be in those 
villages where the VHW is most active (and as a result, trusted by villagers) that 
people were most familiar with, and had more experience in using, Shri Krishna 
Hospital. 
Conclusions and policy recommendations 
This chapter highlights issues of importance to researchers, policy makers and 
community-based health insurance (or financing) scheme managers. Firstly, the =g 
participants in a scheme may have different goals for, and perceptions of, its 
functioning. Secondly, this research revealed that what initially seemed to be a 
CBHI scheme was in fact not functioning as insurance at all. This is likely to be the 
case with at least some other schemes described in the published literature as CBHI. 
This finding is a reminder that one must be very cautious in generallsing the lessons- 
learned from one scheme to another, as aspects of scheme design can be remarkably 
different. Thirdly, this study illustrates some of the difficulties that can arise from 
rel ing heavily on external sources of funding. Not only can this restrict tile extent Yi C, 
to which a scheme can grow and change. but it may also impact on berieticiaries' 
knowledge of, ownership of, and participation in. a scheme. It is difficult to draw 
other generalisable conclusions from this study given the TF hospital retCrral 
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scheme's unique design, and the fact that it was being, phased out toward the end of 
this study. However, this sub-study does draw attention to some aspects of design 
and management that are likely to determine a scheme's impact, including affillation 
with a single (versus multiple) providers and efforts to keep members informed and 
educated about the scheme and its benefits. 
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SECTION 3: THE SELF E. MPLOYED NVON11-A'S 
ASSOCIATION'S MEDICAL INSURANCE FUND 
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CHAPTER8: IMPACT ON HOSPITAL UTILISATION' A-ND EXPENDITURE: 
RESULTS OF A HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
SUMMARY 
This chapter assesses the impact of the Self Employed Women's Association's 
(SEWA's) Medical Insurance Fund, Gujarat, in terms of inclusion of the poor, 
hospital utilisation and expenditure. Age-matched insured and non-insured women 
were compared using survey data (2000). Wealth xas not a determinant of 
membership in the Fund; i. e. the poor were not excluded. Of 28 hospital isations 
among Fund members over one year. only five were reimbursed. Nlembership in 
SEWA was not significantly associated with increased frequency of hospital isation, 
but there was a significant association with lower costs of hospital isation. net of 
reimbursement. Unlike many other CBHI schemes, the Fund has overcome barriers 
that exclude the poorest. This is due in part to nesting of the Fund within a larger 
development organisation. Utilisation of the Fund, and thus impact on hospital 
utilisation and expenditure, was minimal. This may relate to a lack of awareness of 
benefits among Fund members, or costs and difficulties associated with submitting 
an insurance claim. 
INTRODUCTION 
SEWA's Integrated Insurance Scheme has been providing life, asset and health 
(under the Medical Insurance Fund) insurance to members of SEWA. Union since 
1992 (see Chapter 4). Only women between the ages of IS and 58 years are eligible 
tojoin the IIS. Inordertojoin, theycan eitherpayan annual premium of Rs. 72.5 - 
Rs. 30 of which is earmarked for the Fund - or make a fixed deposit of Rs. -100. 
Under the Fund, they are eligible for reimbursement for hospital expenditures to a 
maximum of Rs. 1,200 yearly. Members are able to use hospital facilities of their 
choice, public, private- for-pro fit, or private-non-profit. In 1999-2000 (when this 
study was carried out). SEWA IIS had 23.214 members, out of almost 150,000 
SEWA Union members in Gujarat. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to assess the "economic impact" of the Fund. The 
data for this analysis were collected from households in Kheda District using an 
interview-administered questionnaire. Impact is assessed in terms of: (1) population 
reach of the Fund, particularly inclusion of the poor (addresses Thesis Objective 3). 
(2) hospital utilisation during the one-year period preceding the survey (Objective 
1); and (3) annual cost of hospital i sations, conditional on reporting one or more 
hospital isations (Objective 2). 
It is hypothesised that the Fund will: 
I/ Include the very poor. SEWA Union organises poor women working in the 
informal-sector, and seems to target quite effectively. By restricting membership in 
the IIS to members of SEWA trade union, the IIS is likely to include women who 
are, on average, poorer than the general population. 
2/ Increase the frequency of hospitalisation among the insured, by removing some 
component (i. e. maximum of Rs. 1,200) of the financial barrier to seeking inpatient 
care. Note that impact on utilisation is likely to be lessened by the fact that women 
must first pay out-of-pocket - which often means borrowing money, selling 
valuables, performing extra work, etc. - before seeking reimbursement from SEWA. 
3/ Decrease the total annual hospital costs per person hospitallsed. This assumes 
that: among insured women, some hospital isations will be caused by conditions that 
are covered by the Fund; women will actually seek reimbursement ý%-hen they have 
been hospitalised for a covered condition; and the Fund will reimburse women for 
some portion of the claims that are submitted. 
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METHODOLOGY 
Data collection and analysis 
A cross-sectional cohort study design was chosen. Respondents were inter%-1ewed at 
only one point in time, and the number of SEWA and non-insured households (the 
two "cohorts") were fixed in advance. Two-stage, random cluster sampling was 
used. The primary sampling units (PSUs) were villages. Twenty %-Illages were 
selected randomly (using random-number tables), the probability of selection %vas 
equal for all villages regardless of size. The secondary sampling units were 
households. Within each village, insured were randomly selected from lists 
compiled by SEWA and non-insured were randomly selected from census or %-oting 
lists. In ten villages, 14 SEWA households and 14 non-insured households were 
sampled, and in ten villages 14 SEWA households and 28 non-insured households 
were sampled (20 villages x 14 SEWA households 280 SEWA households; 10 
villages x 14 controls + 10 villages x 28 controls 420 controls, therefore 700 
households are included in this analysis). ' 
See Chapter 4 for a description of data entry, cleaning and analysis. The analyses in 
this chapter are restricted to women of ages 18 to 58 years, as only they are eliSible 
for participation in the SEWA's Medical Insurance Fund. 
Models 
(1) What was the population reach of the Fund? 
The model for looking at socio-demographic determinants of membership is a logit 
model, written as follows: 
ln(pi'(1 -p)) = Xp +E (Equation 
1) 
' The latter villages. in which there were twice as many control howscholds (28) as SEWA houscholds 
(14) were the ten joint villages. 1n these villages. 14 SEWMIS houscholds. 14 TF househoU, 
(which arc not included in this analysis) and 2S non-insured "control- househokIN %% ere intervin%ed. 
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where p is the probability of being a member in the Fund. (ziven female 2ender and 
age 18 to 58 years, and X represents a set of independent variables that ar%, 
hypothesised to affect membership in community based schemes. 
(2) Did the Fund impact on hospital utilisation over the last one year" 
The model is a logit model. It estimates the probability of an individual being, 
hospitallsed during the one-year period preceding the interview. It can be written as 
follows: 
In(p/(l -p» = Xß +E (Equation 2) 
where p is the probability of hospital isation, given female gender and age 18 to 58 
years, and X represents a set of independent variables that are hypothesised to affect 
individual patterns of hospital utilisation. 
(3) Did the Fund impact on net annual hospital costs per person hospitallsed') 
The model is a log-linear model that estimates the net costs incurred for all 
hospital isations (over one year), conditional on positive hospital isation. Costs were 
net of reimbursement by insurance schemes, including the Fund. The model can be 
written: 
InY = Xp +E (Equation 3) 
where Y is the net annual hospital costs per person. given female gender. age 18 to Zý 1: 1 
58 years, and one or more hospitalisation over one ,, -ear, and X represents a set of 
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independent variables that are hypothesised to affect individual patterns of hospital 
expenditure. 2 
Equations 2 and 3 are equivalent to the "two-part" (utilisation and expenditure) 
model developed as part of the Rand Health Insurance Experiment (Duan. et al. 
1982, Manning, et al. 1987), and used more recently by Yip and Berman (2001) in 
their study of the impact of Egypt's School Health Insurance Programme. 
Independent variables 
Table 8.1 describes the independent variables included in the analyses. A number of 
household- level, demand side factors were included. Independent of insurance, 
wealth was hypothesised to be positively associated with rates of hospitalisation and 
with net costs of hospitalisation. As a proxy for wealth, the economic status indeX 
(ESI) was constructed based on household assets, allowing the weights of these 
assets to be determined by the statistical procedure of principal components (Filmer 
and Pritchett 2001). The other household- level -,. -anables controlled for %ý'Cre 
religion, caste and number of people living in the household. 
A number of individual-level, demand side variables were controlled for. Age, 
literacy, marital status, and primary occupation were controlled for in all models. 
For models I and 3, individuals were classified as SEWA insured, non-insured but 
liýang in a household with at least one other insured person, and non-insured and not 
living with someone insured by SEWA. It was not uncommon for some adult 
women in a household to join the scheme while others abstained. It was 
hypothesised that uninsured women lV, 'ing in the same households may also ha'%-e 
had increased rates of utilisation, due to the information and education provided by 
SEWA, and due to the positive wealth effect of ha,. -ing insured people in the 
household. In model 1. the number of acute illness episodes reported dunn, g the last 
2 In the log-linear model, the coefficient 0 for a con6nuous independent vanable gi%c, the relawe 
change in the mean value of Y for a unit change in X. In order to obtain the relati%e : hange in mc3n 
Y for a dummy variable, one must take the antilog (to base 0 of the estimated durnmy coefficient and 
subtract it from I (Gujarati 1995. p. K-5). 
202 
30 days was controlled for as a proxy for general level of health (unfortunatelv. data 
were not available as to whether or not individuals had chronic disease(s)). It was 
hypothesised that those in poorer health were more likely to join the Fund. 
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Table 8.1: Independent variables included in the regression anak ws 
Vanables Model 
12 
Ch a racteris tics of the household 
FMI to ES15 ý quintile,, of economic status index, this is an 
approximation of household wealth based on assets, ESII being the 
poorest and ESI 5 the wealthiest 
(these vanabies are exhausti ve. ES II is left out of the models) 
HINDU =I if Hindu religion, 0 if Muslim or Chnstian 
BK\VDCASTE =I if scheduled caste, scheduled tn'be and offier 
'backward castes', 0 if castes that have not been identified bv go%ernment 
as 'backward' (Bhak. shipanch, 
-Brahmin. 
Patel. Shah. etc. ) 
HHSIZE I=I if I to 2 people in HH 
HFISIZE2 =I if 3 to 4 people in HH 
HHSIZE3 =I if 5 to 9 people in HH 
FIHSIZE4 =I if >=10 people in HH 
(thc,, c % ariahles are exhaustive, HFISIZE I is left out of the models) 
Characteristics of the individual 
N'()N-INS -I if not insured by SEWA and not living with someone who 
is insured by SEWA 
SF-WA4NS =I if covered by the IIS 
SEWA-FAM =I if non-insured but living in tile same household as 
someone insured by SEWA 
(these vaniables are exhaustive, NON-INS is left out of the models) 
A61- II if 18 or 29 years of age V/ 
AGE2 I if 30 to 39 years of age 
AGE3 I If >40 years of age 
(these vaniables are exhaustive, AGEI-Is left out of the models) 
LITFRATE I il'person can read and %Arite a ; imple - 
letter. 0 if not V/ V/ V/ 
MARRIED I if mamed, 0 if never mamed, \ý, idower, di%orced, V V/ 
separated, or other 
DAILYWA, GE =I if unskilled worker being paid dail) wage (agricultural 12 V 
or factory worker) 
DONIFSTIC -- I if pnimary occupation is domestic work, llouseý%ork 
OTHERWORK ýI if other than unskilled daily wages or domestic work 
(these vanables are exhaustive. OTHERWORK is left out of the models) 
NTAIBACUTE = number of acute illness episodes reported cluning tile last 
30 days (ranged fTom 0 to 3), intended to control for general level of' 
health. Included as a proxy, based on the hy"Pothesis that those who are 
more sickly will have expenenced illness episodes within the last month. 
This variable was included only in model I as it \kas collinear with 
SFWA-INS. the independent %ahable of interest in Models 2_and 33. 
Characteristics of the hospitalisation 
P[1: BLA(* -I It'goverriment or FS1, lio, ýpital 
PRIVATE ýI if pnvate for-profit hospital 
NONPROF ýI ifpn\ate-non-profit hospital 
(these vaniables are exhaustive. PUBLIC is left out of the models) 
SIIOR F-I if 0 to 3 daý, s hospitalised V 
NIFIDIUM =I if 4 to 7 days hospitalised 
LONG -I if -7 davs hospitalised 
(these %anables are exhaustive. SHORT I% left out of the models) 
OBS, GYN =I if cause of hospitalisation was pregnancý. delivery or 
family planning, 0 if other 
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Model 3 only controls for characteristics of the hospital isation. Use of pnvate-for- 
profit and private-non-profit hospitals (generally perceived to be of' higher qualitY) 
was hypothesised to be associated with higher total of hospitalisation than use of 
government facilities. Women who reported longer episodes of hospitalisation were 
expected to have experienced higher total costs. Finallý-, it was anticipated that 
women hospitalised for pregnancy, delivery and family planning would glenerallý- 
have experienced an uncomplicated hospital isation. without major surgical 
procedures, and for this reason would have lower total costs. 
REsULTS 
In total 242 SEWA households and 381 control households were included in the 
analyses (some households were dropped from the analyses due to 
misclassification). In the 242 SEWA households, there were 270 members and 125 
women 18 to 58 years of age who were non-members. In the 38 1 control 
households, there were 607 women 18 to 58 years of age. 
The demographic data (before controlling for any potential confounders) suggest 
that the SEWA-insured were of lower socio-economic status than the non-insured in 
control households (Table 8.2). They ranked lower on the ESI. They were almost 
twice as likely as the non-insured to be of a "backward caste" and tended to be from 
35.0 years), less likely to be smaller households. They were older (mean 40.1 versus ) 
literate, more likely to report primary occupation as unskilled labour for daily wages, 
and almost 60% more likely to have reported illness within the last _30 days (a proxy 
for frequency of chronic disease). 
In the SEWA households interv ie wed. more than two thirds of women IS to _58 
years of age were enrolled in the Fund (Table 8.2). The SEWA-Insured. in 
comparison to the non-insured liNing with SEWA members. %vere older (mean 40.1 
versus 26.3 years), less likely to be literate. more than twice as likely to reporl that 
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pnmary occupation was unskilled labour for daily wages. and more than four times 
as likely to have reported illness within the last 30 davs. 
Table 8.2: Sample characteristics 
Variable SEWA-INS SEWA-FAINI NON- LN S 
Number of hou-seholds 242 38 1 
Number of individuals 270 12 5 607 
Mean ESI 0.29 0.84 
Cat: QuIntiles of ES1 
% In I st quintile 13.1 15., S 
% in 2nd quintile 23.9 13.8 
% in 3nd quintile 30.1 22.0 
% in 4nd quintile 13.8 18.9 
% in 5nd quintile 19.1 2 
Religion 
% Hindu 80.7 
01/0 Muslim 7.4 1 S. 5 
"/ý Chnstian 12.0 2.1 
% ST, SC, or other "backward" caste 54.0 29.4 
Mean number of hh members 5.8 
Cat: Number of hh members 
10 1-2 6.1 
3.5 
%3-4 30.4 20.8 
%5-9 53.0 --; 2.6 
-ý00 =10 I (). 5 23.1 
Mean age 
Cat: Age 
00 10-<20 
ý, 20-<30 
,,, o 30-<40 
'0 
0' 
% 40,,! - 
On Literate 
0, ,m . Nla 'ed 
0. Working for daily "ages 
O, o Doing domestic work 
Frequency of illness persom30 days 
40.1 26.3 3 5.0 
0.1 12.1 6.3 
1 ý;. q 61.4 34.0 
29.7 18.2 21.2 
54.3 8.3 38.4 
4 1. -5 
5 1.6 
7 9.3 4. -,,; 
-9.8 
2 5. () 11.4 lo. 9 
56.7 70.2 -T I.; 
0.194 0.04 77 0.123 
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Among the SEWA-Insured who expenenced hospital isations dunng the one-year 
recall penod, the frequency of reimbursement by SENV. ýL . %, as low. There were 28 
hospital isations among Fund members, and onýv 5 of these hospitalisations (18%) 
were reimbursed by SEWA. For the five members who were reimbursed. the costs 
before reimbursement were Rs. 4.4-31 and after reimbursement Rs. 3,434 
Ta bIe8.3: Hospital utilization and expenditure per hospitalization by 
coverage 
SEWA-r, sS SEIA*A-F. -k%t NO N- LN'S 
(rr--270) (n=125) (m-607) 
Hospital utilisation 
Total hospital isations reported 
Women with >0 hospital isations, I year 
Probability of hospitalisation 
Hospital costs 
Total hospitalisations reimbursed 
Women with >0 reimbursement 
Mean total hospital costs, I year 
28 12 -; 6 
26 12 51 
0.095.1 N* S 0.10 
-; 
NS 0.063 
00 
00 
2,425 N' S 3, --; 32 N* S 4,977 
I US$ is approximately equal to 44 Rs. 
T-tests were performed to compare rates. expenditures of the SEWA-I'N'S ýk Ith NON-INS, and the SEA'A-FAM 
with NON-INS. 
* 10% (borderline) significance level. ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level 
Before controllin2 for socio-demouraphic vanables, SEWA-insured were 1.5 times 1: 1 C" 
more likely than non-insured wornen in control households to have been hospitalised 
(0.095 versus 0.063, Table 8.33). A-mong those hospitallsed, the net annual hospital 
costs for the SENA-Insured were less than half those of the non-insured women in 
control households. (Clearly, this difference cannot be attnbuted to the Fund, given 
that even among the very few people reimbursed. the mean reimbursement 
amounted to less than one-quarter. ) 
Regression analyses 
Controlling for other socio-demographi': %driables, onk Ader 111d 
frequencNr. of illness episodes within the last month %vere significantly associated 
with membership in the Fund (Table 8.4). Results were the same for the -full" and 
"best fit" models. Wealth. proxied by quintiles of ESI. was not significantly 
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associated with membership in the Fund; there %%-as a trend suggestive of higher 
levels of membership amongst the 2d and P income quintiles (compared with the 
1', or poorest, quintile), but this did not reach significance at the 9500 le'. 'el. Women 
of ages 30 years and above were 3.4 times as likely to join the Fund as those of 18 to 
20 years (full model). Each additional illness reported within the last month (acute 
illnesses as well as exacerbations of chronic disease) was associated with a -00o (full 
model) to 80% (best fit) increase in the probability of joining the Fund. 
Neither membership in the Fund, nor any of the socio-demographic vaniables tested. 
were significantly associated with the probability of havin_g, been hospitallsed (Table 
8.5). Again, results were similar for the full and best fitting models. There was a 
trend suggestive of higher rates of hospitalisation among Fund members (and even 
women living in the same households as Fund members) but this association was not 
significant. There were also trends towards lower frequency of hospitalisation 
among higher ESI quintiles, and lower frequency of hospitalisation with increasing 
age, but again these were not significant at the 95% level. 
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Table 8.4: Regression results for Equation 1. the odds of being, SENNA-IN. '., 
based on socio-demographic variables: logit model (n---98')') 9 Odds ratios Odds ratios 
(t-statistics) (t-statisfics) 
Full Model K-st Fit 
ES12 1.906 ES12 1.837 
(2.060) 1 ý'ý i I) 
ES13 1.922 ES13 1.7193 
(1.290) JO(W) 
ES14 0.961 ES14 0.988 
(-0.150) ( _0 0 M) 
ES15 1.300 ES15 1.287 
(0.700) (0.650) 
HINDU 0.720 HINDU 
(-0.550) - 
BKWDCASTE 2.450 BKWDCASTE 2.563 
(2.000) (1.910) 
HHSIZE2 0.821 HHSIZE (cont) 0.940 
(-0.320) -1 2-1() 
HHSIZE1 0.631 
(-1.120) 
HHSIZE4 0.454 
(- 1.100) 
AGE2 3.356 AGE (cont) 1.040 000 
(4.840) (6 220) 
AGE3 3.423 
(4.910) 
LITERATE 1.166 LITERATE 1.166 
(0.410) (0.470) 
MARRIED 0.970 MARRIED 
(-0.160) - 
DAILYWAGE 0.672 DAILYWAGE 0.888 
(-1.7-10) (-04-0) 
DOMESTIC 0.601 DOMESTIC 0.6 75 
(-1.040) 1-1.390) 
NUMBACUTE 1.695 NUMBACUTE 1.799 
('1.00) ( ". 040) 
Adjusted Wald Test, F 5 -5 
91, 
P-value = 0.003 0.000 
Percent of predictions correct 
'/2.8*, o 72.90, 
Ramsey RESET Test, F 0.29 Ramsey RESET T,. -st. F 0. SI 
P-value = 0.833 P-value = 0.681 
* 10*o (borderline) significance lc-. -cl. ** 5*o sig nificance le-vel. *** V)o significance lc%cl 
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Table 8.5: Regression results for Equation -7. hospitalised within the la st year: logit model (n----987) 
Odd-s ratios Odds ratios 
(t-statistics) (t-statistics) 
Full Model Be%t Fit 
S 1, W, 1. \ý 2.042 1.668 
(1_0) 
SEWA-FAM 1.639 1.999 
(1.000) (1.640) 
ES12 0.564 0.5 22 
(- 1.37 0) (-1.540) 
ES13 0.801 0.762 
(-0.460) (-0.540) 
ES14 0.798 0.690 
(-0.540) (-(). 890) 
ES15 0.275 0.2 53 
(-1.960) (-1.940) 
fI fNDU 1.578 1.638 
(1.100) (1.100) 
BKWDCASTE 0.785 
(-0.700) - 
IIYISIZE2 2.328 1.729 
(1.0-10) (I. -1 0 0) 
IIIISIZE3 1.687 2.307 
(0.680) (1.010) 
HHSIZE4 0.846 1.233 
(-0.190) (0.240) 
AGE2 0.450 
(-1.270) 
AGE3 0.386 
(_1.990) - 
L. ITF Rýkl` F 0.5 85 0.766 
(_ 1.100) (-0.6-10) 
NIARRIED 1.5 22 1.4 53 
(0. -ý 0) 
DA 11. YWA GF 0.733 0.719 
(-0.4-0) 
DONIESTIC 1.2 '_5 4 1.499 
(0. "00) (0.6, )0) 
Adjusted Wald Test, F 36 21 
P-value = 0.027 0.002 
Percent of predictions correct = 91.6' o 9I. V o 
Ramsey RESET Test, F 0.38 0.61 
P-value = 0.769 0.617 
100, o (borderline) significance leýel. ** 50o ; Ignificance le%el, 
*** II, o significance level 
the probability of being, 
Results of the model of annual hospital costs per person hospitalised %, wied 
somewhat with changes in the vanables included and the removal of outliers (Table 
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8.6). In some models. hospital expenditures were significantly lower arnon, -, tile 
SEWA insured (Models 3B, 3C and 3D). Interestingly. this findi i vvaý not Z. 7 I ing 
sensitive to removal from the model of the fi-ve cases of hospitalisation that -v6-ere 
reimbursed; in model 3D, being insured by SEWA was associated with a decrease in 
hospital expenditures of 54% -0.789) even though the five reimbursed 
hospital isations were removed from the calculations. Consistent in the various 
iterations of Model 3 were the findings that hospital expenditures: Nanied directlý- 
(and significantly) with quintiles of ESL were significantly higher for private versus 
public hospitalisations; and were significantly lower for pregnancy, deliveD. or 
family planning than for other causes. The Ramsey RESET test. significant for all 
iterations of Model 3, suggests that none of the specifications are robust. This is 
most likely due to the small number of observations, which range from 70 to 8 1, 
depending on the variables included. Thus, the significant associations found in this 
model can be treated as artefact. 
DISCUSSION 
Summary of findings 
Wealth was not found to be a determinant of membership in the Fund; i. e. the poor 
were not excluded. However, women of older age and higher frequency of illness 
(within the 30 days preceding interviews) were more likely to join the scheme. Of 
28 hospitalisations among Fund members over one year, only five were reimbursed. 
Membership in SEWA was not significantly associated with increased frequency of 
hospital isation, and due to data limitations, no conclusions can be made about the 
association with costs of hospitalisation, net of reimbursement. 
Critique of methodology 
Perhaps the greatest limitation of this study was its small sample size. The Study 
shows trends towards higher rates of utilisation, and lower spending per episode of 
hospital isation, among SEWA members (significant in some models). Had the study 
been larger, these associations may have been statistically significant (or in the case 
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of spending, consistently statistically significant). Insufficient sample size irose in 
part because there were fewer Fund members in "Insured" households than had been 
expected, and because of the problem of misclassification of houscholds, i. e. 
households were identified as including a Fund member when in fact theý did not. 
Such households were dropped from the analysis v. -Ithout replacement. 
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Table 8.6: Regression results for Equation 3, the avera2e total cost of 
hospitalisation per person hospitalised: log-linear model 
Odds Ratios i t-statisucs) 
3A Full 3B Best 3C Outtlem 3D Rcimbursc<l 
Model Fit renwived nmum4 
n=77 n=8 I n-- 74 n=70 
SEWA-INS -0.630 -1.744 as -0.812 
(-1.19()) (- 2.3,5 ()) I-2,14o) 
SEWA-FAM 0.560 0.289 0.000 -0.04,8 
(O. Qoo) (0.300) (0.00o) (. 0 1 )0) 
ES 121 1.6,62 1.908 me* 1.3% see 1.353 see 
(2.270) (2.930) (4. (-ý)o) (" I)w) 
ES 13 1.779 1.2-37 see 0.5 ; 1) 0.551 
(2.800) (2.900) 1 --W) II 
ES14 2.171 1.273 1. D 00 
(2.810) (3. ISO) 
. t, 41)) 
ES 15 2.443 2.356 1.2 66 1.345 00 
(2.720) 2.5X 
HINDIJ 3.630 
(3-300) 
BKWDCASTE 0.465 1.103 00 0.2'0 0.2t)8 
(1.700) 
HHSIZE2 -1.301 
(-3.44()) 
HIISIZE3 -1.610 
(-3.500) 
HHSIZE4 -0.581 
(-1.490) 
AGE2 -0.246 
(-0.570) 
AGE3 0.403 
( I. 0Q0) 
LITERATE 0.152 
(0.4-10) 
INIARRIED 2.861 0.6 59 -0.019 -0.004 
(2. o-10) (0.5 oo) (-0ý02()) (1) 0(m)) 
DAILYWAGE 0.885 0.412 -0.223 4). 247 
(0.050) (0.410) (-0.450) (-o 5 11) 
DOMESTIC 0.793 0.674 0.325 0.345 
((). L)80) (0.8-10) (0.510) (O. i4o) 
PRIVATE 4.306 4.453 2.60) 2.601 
(10.710) 0.14o) (8ý22()) 0.3oo) 
NONPROF 3.115 3.058 1.763 1.737 
(". 080) (2. w'm) It " 
MEDIUM (4 to 7 days) 0.206 1.092 0.249 0.242 
(0.420) I. S IM (0. -40) w (), )I) I 
LONG (- 7 days) 0.716 1.433 1.445 *08 1.453 see 
14S 1 NO (. 4 fl-. it II 
OBS, GYN -1-157 006 -1.312 see -1.334 
066 
(-2.430) (4,170) (4.140) 1-I Q-41)1 
Adjustcd Wald Test. F 95 4- 8 7 
P-Value = 0.081 0. N1 0.031 
0.069 
R-squart-d z 79.320- 66.1900 
6-. 240. 6". "6* 9 
Ramsev RESET rL, %t. F 15.22 8.93 4.5.1 
4.40 
P- alue OAKH) 0.001 0.018 
0.021 
01 0", o (borderline) significanc e Ic\ el. *0 5% signi ficanx 'c\ cl, 
1 0'0 Si gm fic ancc level 
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It is difficult to say how accurately the Economic Status Inde\ (ESI) reflected 
household "wealth". A very similar index developed for Indian survey data (Filmer 
and Pritchett 2001) was closely correlated with State Domestic Product (SDP') and 
poverty rates data. Using data from Indonesia, Pakistan and Nepal, they also 
showed their asset index to be consistent with consumption expenditures. 
Comparison of the ES1 used in this sub-study the interviewers' assessments of 
wealth and with daily household expenditures on food suggested strong correlation 
(see Appendix 3). Nonetheless, it is possible that some of the "negative results" in 
this study were due to insufficiently controlling for wealth. For example. if, as 
hypothesised, SEWA membership were inversely associated with wealth, and wealth 
were directly associated with hospital spending, then failure to control fully for 
wealth could result in an observed estimate of effect that is diluted towards die null. 
Although not presented in this chapter, all of the models were run using two other 
indicators of wealth (interviewers' assessments and daily per capita food 
consumption) with no major changes in the results. 
Several questions were not included in the household questionnaire that, in 
retrospect, should have been included. For example, it is common in such analyses 
to control for state of health or the presence of chronic disease, but these data were 
not available from the questionnaire. It would have been both interesting and 
informative to know, among the SEWA-insured women who had undergone 
hospital isation, the number who had submitted claims but were still awaiting a 
response or had been unsuccessful in their claim. Finally, for purposes of 
triangulation (i. e. verifying the ESI). data could have been collected on household 
consumption expenditures. although this would certainly ha", -e been time consuming 
and expensive. 
It is possible, though unlikely. that observation bias impacted on the study results. 
Interviewer bias may have occurred if investigators elicited or interpreted 
information differently among the insured versus the non-Insured. It was impossible 
to blind interviewers to the insurance status of the household. Certainly the 
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interviewers did come to make generall I isations about households. for example. that 
SEWA households tended to be very poor. Thus. there may have been some bias in 
how they were recording household asset information. It is also possible that the 
interviewers probed more carefully into health care seeking and spending among 
poorer households. Study subjects may also have reported events in a non- 
comparable manner (recall bias). For example, SEWA members may have been 
more likely to recall episodes of hospital isation, or to remember how much they paid 
for hospi tali sati on, as they were sensitised to the subject by the information, 
education and communication from SEWA (or they had spent months collecting and 
processing the related paperwork). Perhaps the lower hospital expenditures reported 
by the SEWA insured is a function of more accurate recall (i. e. a lower probability 
of accidentally inflating the figures). 
As was discussed in Chapter 5, the test-retest reliability of the sun-ey questions was 
variable (see Appendix 8 for analysis of re-interviem'-s). Questions regarding 
characteristics of the family and specific individuals, and the oy e and cost of .P 
hospital isation, elicited reliable responses. Other questions, including those 
regarding household assets and the duration of hospital isation, often yielded 
responses different from the original at the time of re-interview. 
Discussion and interpretation of findings 
Unlike many other CBHI schemes, SEWA did not exclude the very poor. What 
design factors facilitated inclusion of the poor in the SEWA scheme" The fact that 
the IIS is nested within the larger development organisation (the SEWA Union) has 
undoubtedly been an important factor. Bennett, et al. ( 1998) hypothesise that, 
-communities may be more willing to participate actively in health insurance 
schemes (initiated by NGOs involved in broad community development activities) 
since they consider that their priority needs - for a stable income, for instance - are 
also being addressed" (p. 20). Other factors that likely facilitated inclusion of the 
poor include: bundling of health insurance with other services (life and asset 
insurance), an affordable premium. village-level representatives who ý%ere 
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themselves poor, self-employed women: and efforts to sene geographically isolated 
villages. 
The positive associations between older age and higher frequency of illness and 
membership in SEWA's insurance scheme suggest that adverse selection ma. v have 
been occurring. Bennett, et a]. (1998). in their review of communit-,, --based health 
insurance schemes, found that adverse selection affected schemes that cover hospital 
inpatient care, in particular. The fact that membership in the SEWA scheme was 
voluntary and individual may have enabled adverse selection. However. the waiting 
period after joining and the exclusion of pre-existing or chronic diseases were meant 
to limit adverse selection. It is likely that adverse selection was to some extent 
encouraged by scheme functionaries, insofar as poor households with limited 
expendable income may have been encouraged to insure the household member who 
was most likely to fall ill. Furthermore, the scheme does fall somewhere on the 
spectrum between health-insurer (strictly defined) and "social senice" in that the 
scheme aims to improve access to hospital care among the poor, and to protect the 
poor from the costs of hospital isation. As such, adverse selection may be viewed in 
a positive light. 
No significant association between membership in SEWA's Medical Insurance Fund 
and frequency of hospitalisation was found, although there was a non-significant 
trend towards higher rates of hospitalisation among SEWA members. Table 3.1 
(Chapter 3) summarises the results of other studies that have examined the impact of 
CBHI schemes on rates of hospital isation. Almost all other studies found that 
community-based insurance that covers the costs of hospitalisation increases 
hospital utilisation. This may reflect a publication bias, wherein the most successful 
schemes are the most likely to have been studied and reported on. If indeed these 
findings are valid, then the question anses, -why has the SEWA -scheme not resulted 
in significantly increased rates of utilisation"" The scheme's failure to impact on 
hospital utilisation is likely to be attributable to the factors that prevented \vornen 
from using the Fund (i. e. the factors that prevented women from submitting 
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insurance claims). Data from qualitative inter-views (Chapter 10) suggest that 
members of the Fund were sometimes unaware of their membership. or the benefits 
of the scheme. Furthermore, among those who did know about the scheme, rates of 
reimbursement may have been considered low (as the Fund does not cover 
transportation, bribes, etc. ), or the costs of submitting a claim (tor example. 
opportunity cost of missed work) may have been perceived to be high. 
The number of observations were insufficient to make any conclusions about 
associations between SEWA membership and costs of hospital isation. Very few 
other studies have looked at whether CBHl has actually resulted in decreased out-of- 
pocket expenditures (see Table 3.1). In a small study of four mutuals in Senegal 
(carried out in 2000), Ritting (2001) found that, "being a member reduces the 
expenditure for hospitalisation by 48% in comparison to non-members holding all 
other variables constant. " Other studies (Schneider and Diop 2001, Diop, et al. 
1995) found decreased spending (both outpatient and inpatient) per illness episode. 
Conclusions and policy implications 
Members of the Fund were similar to the general population in terms of wealth. The 
Fund's success at including the poor was probably due to its being nested within a 
development organisation, committed to serving poor, self-employed women. 
Members of the Fund were older and sicker than the general population, suggestive 
either of adverse selection or effective targeting of those who were most in need of 
inpatient care. In either case, the Fund can facilitate risk-pooling by broadening its 
membership to include younger and healthier individuals. If it is decided to try to 
deter adverse selection under the scheme. additional methods that could be used 
include: (1) making the household, or even the village, the unit of membership and 
enforcing this rule strictly, (2) stipulating that if a village is to be allowed to enter a 
scheme a certain proportion of households in the village must join, and (3) making 
the scheme compulsory (Benne". et al. 1998, p. 56). 
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Relatively few of those who were members of the Fund and were hospitalised %vere 
reimbursed through the scheme. This suggests either that women were not 
submitting claims even when they might have been eligible for reimbursement, or 
that the claims were not eligible for reimbursement (for example, if the 
hospitalisation resulted from one of the chronic conditions excluded from 
reimbursement). Given the low rate of utilisation of the Fund by those who were 
members, it is not surprising that the Fund had no discernible impact in terms of 
health care utilisation. Rates of Fund utilisation may be increased by providing 
members with information and education around their membership in the Fund, and 
its benefits, and by making the process of claims submission easier. faster and less 
expensive. 
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CHAPTER 9: EVIDENCE FROM 1,930 i-NsuR-x-NcF CLAIMS 
SUMMARY 
This chapter will assess the Self Employed Women's Association's Medical 
Insurance Fund in Gujarat based on submitted claims. The scheme is assessed in 
terms of- (1) insurance coverage according to income groups, (2) protection of 
claimants from expenditures on hospital i sation, (3) lag time between discharge from 
hospital and reimbursement; and (4) frequency of use of the insurance scheme. All 
1,930 claims submitted over six years were analysed. 
Eleven percent of claims were rejected (N = 1,927). The mean household income of 
SEWA claimants was significantly lower than the mean income of the general 
population, and the percentage of households living below the poverty line was 
similar among claimants compared with the general population. Of claims 
reimbursed (N = 1,712), 47% were fully reimbursed and the remaining 53"o at a 
mean rate of 55.6%. Reimbursement more than halved the percentage of 
catastrophic hospital isations (>10% of annual household income) and 
hospitalisations that would have resulted in impoverishment. On average, time from 
discharge to reimbursement was four months. Frequency of claims submission 
(18.0/1,000 members per year) was low, roughly 22 to 37% of the estimated 
frequency of hospitalisation. 
The findings have important implications for policy conceming CBHI schemes in 
India and elsewhere. The study shows that CBHI can effectively protect poor 
households against the uncertain risk of medical expenses, and can be implemented 
in areas where institutional capacity is too ýý-eak to organise nation-wide risk- 
pooling. CBHI can include the poor, including individuals and households below 
the poverty line. There is a trade-off between reducing financial fisk and protcaing 
against catastrophic care: an insurance package with a cap on benefits limits the 
financial risk bome by the scheme, but it also limits the extent of nsk-pooling and 
cross-subsidisation provided by the scheme. In order to facilitate the speed and case 
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of reimbursement, administration of the scheme. particularly processing of claims. 
should be located as close to claimants as possible. Fine-tuning the design of a 
scheme is an ongoing process that requires information on who is enrolled and 
excluded, rates and causes of hospital isation. expenditures on hospital 1 sation. and 
barriers that prevent enrolment in, and utilisation of. the scheme. So a system for 
monitoring and evaluating the scheme is vital. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, analysis of household survey data revealed that: wealth was 
not a determinant of membership in the Fund, frequency of reimbursement (relative 
to overall frequency of hospital isation) by the Fund was low; and the Fund had not 
had a significant impact on total annual hospital expenditures per Fund member 
hospitalised. The household survey data, however, did not allow for an evaluation 
of the financial protection conferred by the Fund on those who actually submitted 
claims to it; only five hospital i sations reimbursed by the Fund were captured in the 
sub-study. Furthermore, data from the household survey could not be used to 
distinguish between frequency of claim submission and frequency of (claim 
approval and) reimbursement. 
This chapter will assess the impact of the Self Employed Women's Association's 
(SEWA's) Medical Insurance Fund based on an analysis of all claims filed after July 
Ist, 1994. The Fund is assessed in tenns of. (1) insurance coverage according to 
income groups (addresses thesis Objective 3)-, (2) protection of claimants from 
expenditures on hospitalisation (Objective 2), (3) lag time between discharge from 
hospital and reimbursement (Objective 2), and (4) frequency of use of the Fund 
(Objectl,.,, e 1). There were four hypotheses underlying these measures of impact. 
First, that the group of women benefiting from the Fund would be poor in 
. pothesis was 
based on SEI 'A's focus comparison to the general population. This hy A 
on organising "poor, self-employed women workers... the unprotected Labor force 
of our country" (SEWA 1999). Second, that a well-performing scheme would 
significantly reduce the percentage of hospital isations for which the expenditures 
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were catastrophic and the percentage of hospital isations that caused annual 
household income to fall below the poverty line. Following the example of Pradhan 
and Prescott (2000) expenditures were defined as catastrophic when they consumed 
greater than 10% of annual household income. ' Third, it was hypothesised that 
reimbursement would be provided in 30 days or less, a goal set b,, - SENVA (2001. 
Appendix B). The fourth hypothesis was that the frequency of claims submission 
would be almost as high as, or higher than, the average rate of hospitalisation among 
an age- and gender-matched, non-insured population. Underlying this hypothesis 
was the assumption that the majority of hospital isations would be eligible for 
reimbursement, that the insured would submit claims for all eligible hospitalisations, 
and that insurance could, by removing financial barriers to inpatient-care, result in 
higher rates of hospitalisation among the insured. 
The first section of the chapter describes the methods used in analysing the 
insurance claims database and the second section presents results of the analysis. 
The final section discusses the results and their policy implications. 
METHODS 
Claims were entered into a Microsoft Access database. The data available from 
claims were as follows: self-reported, annual household income; total expenditures 
on hospitalisation (for which bills were available); date of discharge from hospital, 
date on which receipts and certificates were submitted, date of the insurance panel"s 
decision: whether the claimant was reimbursed, and if so, when and in what amount. 
Additionally, the following data sources were used in the analyses: 
I The World Health Organization estimates that -families that ýpend 50*o or more of their non- food expenditure 
on health are likely to be impoverished as a result" (WHO 2000, p. 36). The Engels ratios (the share of : oocl in 
total expenditures) for Gujarat (1987-88 data) were 61% for rural households (ranging from 69% among the 
poorest quartile to 51)"o among the richest) and 60`6 for urban households (72'16 for the poorest quartilc and J5% 
for the richest) (Mt-vnakshi and Ray 1999). Thus. non-food expenditure accounted for 28 to 31% of total 
expenditures among the poorest quartile of households. Fifty percent of non-food expenditure i-ý roughly 
equivalent to 14 to 106 of total expenditures. Assuming that self-reported income (reported in mý studý ) is 
equal to sclf-reported expenditure- then the cutoff for "catastrophic** used by the A HO is comparablc- although 
slightly higher (more conservative), than my cutoff of 10*9 of annual household income. 
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I/ The Times of India was the source of the po%-ert% line in Rs. per capita per 
month (Anonymous 2001); 
2/ SEWA's 1999 annual report was the source of numbers of insured per annum 
(SEWA 1999); 
3/ The overall frequency of hospitalisation among this population was den% ed 
from the thesis household survey (Chapter 8) as well as other household sur% eys 
done in Gujarat (Chapter 8 of this thesis: Gumber and Kulkami 2000: Sundar 
1995); 1 
4/ The World Development Report 2000/2-001 (World Bank 2001 c) and the 
Gujarat State Socio - Economic Review 1999 - 2000 (Gm, -ernment of Gujarat 2000) 
were sources of gross domestic product, per capita; 
Claims were included in this analysis only if the date of admission fell between July 
I ", 1994 and June 30th, 2000, and were grouped by year according to the date on 
which the claimant was admitted to hospital. The financial year is from July I st 
through June 30th. 
Statistical analyses were carried out in Stata. In order to compare monetary amounts 
for different years (for example, data on income and hospital expenditures), values 
were standardised to 1999/00 Indian rupees. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
deflators for India from the International Monetai-y- Fund (2000) were used in these 
calculations. Deflators were not available for calendar years 1999 to 2001 and were 
estimated by extrapolating from the data for the preceding ten years (1988 to 99), 
assuming a linear increase. Deflators that correspond to SEWA's financial year 
were estimated by taking the average of the deflators for the two calendar years 
included (for example, the GDP deflator for 1994 95 is the average of the deflators 
for calendar years 1994 and 199-5). Monetary amounts for the year 1999 00 are also 
2 Given that the thesis household survey was relati-, ely small. and hospiWisation %% aN a relati% ely rare 
event, data on the frequency of hospitalisation were drawn from other studies to erLsure the %ahditý of 
the msulu, of this sub-study. 
expressed in US Dollars using the exchange rate at the end of calendar year I 
43.49 Indian Rupees to one US Dollar (INIF 2000). 
India's official measure of poverty is a head count index based on the food-energy 
I _ý ý la method. 
The poverty line is the monthly per capita expenditure in 19 `-74 all-Indi 
prices of Rs. 49 in rural areas and Rs. 57 in urban areas. with people below this 
expenditure considered poor (Datt 1998). These expenditures correspond to a total 
household expenditure estimated sufficient to provide 2,400 calories daily in rural 
areas and 2,100 calories daily in urban areas, plus some basic non-food items. The 
poverty line in 1999-2000 was an income of Rs. 254 per person per month income 
(Anonymous 2001). In order to compare self-reported household income with the 
poverty line, a mean household size of 5.4 people was assumed (from the household 
survey). A household was considered to be below poverty line if the reported yearly 
income was below Rs. 16,459 (Rs. 254 per person per month x 12 months x 5.4 
household members). 
RESULTS 
Overview 
There were 1,930 claims for admissions between July 1", 1994 and June 30 th '2000. 
Claimants had a mean age of 41.0 years (N' = 1,927, median = 40 years). The 
leading causes of hospitalisation (. N = 1,914) were accidents and injuries (140o). 
malaria (10%), acute gastro-enteritis (100o) and hysterectomy (9'o) and the mean 
duration of hospitalisation was 6.1 da s (N = 1,929, median =4 davs). Care "-as Y 
taken in private- for-pro fit (61.90o of claims). government (28.60o) and private-non- 
profit (7.50o) hospitals. 
Income of claimants 
Based on annual household income (self-reported), the claimants vvere much poorer 
than the general population. The mean annual. self-reported household income 
expressed in 1999/2000 Indian rupees was 25.984 (597 USD, N = 1.83S. 95'o 
Cl = 
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24,604 to 27,365 rupees, median = 19.812 rupees). This Is slightly lower than mean 
values of household income found by Gumber & Kulkarni (2000) of 31.182 rupees 
among 121 rural SEWA households and ).. I " -715 rupees among 2.36 urban SEWA 
households (measures of variance not available). The mean value changed relatively 
little with the removal of outlying values (Table 9.1). 'Mean income among 
claimants was significantly less than the 1999 per capita income for all India of'450 Cý 
USD (World Bank 2001c; equivalent to a household income of 88,067 rupees, one- 
sample t-statistic = -88.2, p-value = 0.000) and the 1998,99 per capita income for 
Gujarat of 18,792 rupees (Government of Gujarat 2000. equivalent to a household 
income of 93,005 1999/2000 rupees, one-sample t-statistic = -9-5.2, p-value = 
0.0()0). 3 Thirty-six percent of all claimants fell below the poverty line, 661 of 1.838 
women for whom income infori-nation was available. This just outside the high end 
of estimates of the percentage of Gujarati households that are below the poverty 
line. 4 
Table 9.1: Self- 
Annual household income (Rs) 
Remove outhers 
Two > 600,000 rupees 
Six > 200,000 rupees 
annual household income of claimants 
Mean 95% CI Median N 
25,984 24,604 27,365 1 (), 7 1,838 
25.331 24,289 26,373 19,797 1,836 
24,723 23,871 25,575 19,797 1,832 
Protection from expenditures on hospitalisation 
On average, the Fund reimbursed claimants for a high percentage of total 10 
expenditures on hospitalisation (Table 9.2). Eleven percent (2 15) of' claims were 
rejected (N = 1,927) 5. The median expenditures on reirribursed hospitalisations was 
1,387 rupees (322 LISD, N=1.7 122. mean = 2,0) rupee,, ) and the median amount 
reinibursed was 1,200 rupees (28 L'SD, N=1.712, mean = 1.016 rupees). Of the 
1 As %%ith the calculation of poverty line- in order to compare household income with puhhNlicd t, vurL-, ot pa 
capita income. we a&-, unlL-d (conservam cly) a household size of 4.5. 
4 Estimates of the pacentage of Gujarati households below the po%erty line vary from 14 ()-"o (Ciujarat 
Department of Rural Development) to 31.480o ýState Food and Civil SuppliLs Department) (Anonýmous 
2MI). 
E%tm figures used by the World Bank vary considerably: for example. the estimates for 1993-W range 
from 
22.16* 0 rural and 28.28! ',, urban (World Bank I QQ8) to -3 )5.34219 rural and 
30.06% urban (Datt INS). 
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claims reimbursed, 47% (807) were reimbursed in full and the mean rate of 
reimbursement among the remainder was 55.6"o (N = 905. median = 57.30, o). the 
mean rate for all reimbursed claims was 76.5% (N = 1,712. median 92.61/o)" 
The Medical Insurance Fund sign-ificantly lessened the financial burden of hospital 
expenditures made by claimants, however. even after reimbursement. the 
expenditures by some claimants were catastrophic. The mean expenditure on 
hospitalisation (12.2% of annual household income) was significantly higher than 
the expenditures by reimbursed claimants after reimbursement (5.8'o of income. N 
1,632, paired t-statistic = 37.9, p-value = 0.000, Table 9.2). For 3_. 6"o (_8 ot 
claims, the total expenditures on hospitalisation would have been catastrophic to the 
claimant, while expenditures by the patient after reimbursement were catastrophic in 
15.1% (246) of claims (N = 1,632, paired t-statistic = 20.5, p-value = 0.000, Table 
9.2). 
Ta 1) 1e9.2: Cost of hospitalizations and arnotint reirnbursed 
Mean 95% CI Median N 
Total cost of all hospitalizations (RN. ) 2,046 1,945 2,148 1,409 1,930 
Total cost of reimbursed hospitalizations (Rs. ) 2.037 1.930 2.143 1,387 1,712 
As '/0 of annual HH income 12.20o 11.11/'0 13.20o 7' /o 1,632 
% for whom total cost is catastrophic 35.60/, 6 33.306 37.91/6 - 1,632 
Amount reimburs-ed (R-s. ) 1.016 998 1,034 1,200 1,712 
As % of total hospital costs 76.50o 75-2 0o 0 77.9 u 0 1,712 
Amount borne by claimants, after reimbur-sem ent 1,020 922 1,119 100 1,712 
(R. s. ) 
As 0/0 of annual HH income 5.8% 4.9% 6.611, o 0.3% 1,632 
00 for whom post-reirnbur-sement cost is 15.10o 13.300 16.8' 0 - 1,632 
catastrophic 
Table 9.3 suggests that the burden of hospital expenditures was greater among 
poorer claimants, and that reimbursement by the Fund was more effective in 
5 Of the 215 claims rejected. reasons for rejection included pre-existing disease (48*0), incomplete 
dtxunw-ritation (15%) and fraudulent claim (I (r,, ). 
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preventing catastrophic hospital expenditures among the poorer quintiles. Reduction 
of catastrophic expenditures by the Fund was sigiiificantly associated with income. 
having the greatest impact among the poorest quintiles (Chi-squared statistic = 
281.3, p-value = 0.000). An indicator of dispersion (percent of the poor for whom 
expenditures were catastrophic/percentage of the non-poor in the fifth income 
quinti for whom expenditures were catastrophic), A- as higher before 
reimbursement (2.03) than after reimbursement (1.64). After reimbursement. 
claimants who used govern-ment hospitals incurred less financial burden than 
claimants who used pnvate-for-profit hospitals (post- reimbursement hospital 
expenditures of 1.4% versus 8.0% of annual household income, 3.7% versus 21.2% 
of clairris catastrophic to household finances, data not shown). 
Table 9.3: The financial burden of total hospital costs and costs borne by the 
claimant after reinibursernent (reinibursed clainiants onlv) 
Income quintiles Dispersion 
Total hosintal costs (X - 1,632) 
% of FlH income 
% for whom total cost is 
catastrophic 
1 Total 
25.5ý oI2.71/, o 8.9% 7.3% 4.8' -) 12.2,110 
72.40o 45.7o 213.6q/o 19.5' o 12.1 "o -15.60o 
2.03 
Arnount borne by claimants. after reimbursement (N = 1,632) 
O/o of lift income 11.79/6 5.9% 4.0% 3.8' o 21.8% 5.8% 
% for whom total post- 24.8ý o 16. Po 12.70 11.90 , 8.70 ý4 
reimbursement cost is catastrophic 
Change in the '. of catastrophic 47.60o 10.1)'0 7.5% 33.4"o 
care after reimbursement 
I Pearson chi'2 ý 281.3 , 
0.000 
Percent of the poor for whom total expenditure was catastrophic percent of the not-so-poor (fifth 
quintile) for whom total expenditure was catastrophic 
Even before hospital isation, 33696 of reimbursed claimants fell below the poverty line 
according to their income (59-5 of 1,632 reimbursed claimants who provided data on 
income). Hospital expenditures caused an additional 6.40o of households to fall 
below the poverty line (104 households). Reimbursement by SEWA prevented 
6 Mean rate of reimbursement = [sum (amount reimbursed per claim - total expenditure per : ý. um 
number of reimbursod claims. 
. 226 
2.8% (46) of all reimbursed claimants from falling below the poveriv line (N 
1,632, paired t-statistic = 6.9, p-value = 0.000), i. e. the Fund shmificantly reduced 
(by 52%) the percentage of hospital 1 sations that would have resulted in 
impoverishment. 
The degree of financial protection provided by the scheme was less for the most 
expensive hospital isations. As illustrated in Figure 9.1, the percentage reimbursed 
by SEWA vaned considerably by quintiles of total hospital costs, from a mean of 
100% for the least expensive quintile and 29'ý for the most expensive. With 
reimbursement, the percentage of hospital isations that were catastrophic dropped 
considerably amongst the 3 rd and 4th quintilles (from 31 to 0% and from -51 to 
90"0 
respectively), however, the impact was less impressive fOr the most expensive 
quintile of hospiltalisations (from 8PNo catastrophic before reimbursement to 69`ýO 
after reimbursement; data not shown). 
Figure 9.1: Mean amount reimbursed and not reimbursed, by quintiles of 
total hospitalisation cost 
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Lag time between discharge from hospital and reimbursement 
On average, reimbursement was provided almost four months after hospital 
discharge, and the lag time appeared to be longer for those li%-ing in rural %-ersus 
urban areas (Table 9.4). The lag time between discharge and reimbursement . %, as 
119 days (N = 1,102, median = 99). This %vas significantly longer for Kheda 
District, where most members live in rural areas (mean = 161 davs. N= )-34. niedian 
140 days) than in Ahmedabad, where most members li%, e in Ahmedabad civy 
(mean = 100 days, N= 740, median = 87 days, t-statistic = -I I '. -. p-%-alue = 0.000). 
Similarly, the lag time was significantly longer among those who work as farmers or 
agricultural labourers in comparison to those working in non-agricultural sectors (t- =1 
statistic = -7.9, p-value = 0.000, Table 9.4). 
Lag time had decreased significantly during the two most recent fiscal ý, ears to just 
over three months, and the differences by district and occupation had virtually 
disappeared (Table 9.4). The mean lag time for fiscal years 1994,95 through 
1997/98 was 159 days (N 384, median = 140) and for fiscal year's 1998/99 and 
1999/2000 was 98 days (N 718, median = 87 days, t-statistic = 14.0, p-value = 
0.000). During the most recent two years. differences in lag time by district (t- 
statistic = -0.69, p-value = 0.492) and by occupation (t-statistic = 0.11, p-value 
0.905) had decreased to the point of no longer being statistically significant. For the 
last two years, the 98 days between discharge and reimbursement can be roughly 
broken down into: 55 days from discharge to submission of the claim, 26 days from 
submission to the date of the panel's decision, and 18 days bet, ý%-een the panel's 
decision and receipt of payment by the claimant. 
Frequency of use of the Fund (as a proxy for frequency of hospitalisation) 
The frequency of claims submission was very low compared to the expected 
frequency of hospitalisation in this population, suggesting either that excluded 
conditions were responsible for a high percentage of total hospitalisations or that 
members did not submit claims even when the hospitalisation mig"ht be eligible for 
reimbursement, or both. In any case. the claims database does not provide any 
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evidence to suggest that the SEWA scheme increased hospital utilisation. The 
overall frequency of claims submission was 18.0 per 1,000 members per year (N = 
1,930, 95% CI = 17.2 to 18.8 ). 
7 Figure 9.2 compares. the freauencv of claims 
submission with the frequency of hospitalisation among females found in several 
household surveys conducted in G jarat State. ' The frequency of submission of Lij 
claims to SEWA, as a percentage of the frequency of hospitalisation found in these 
studies, ranges from 19% (Chapter 8 of this thesis, frequency = 96.4,95'o Cl = 27.9 
to 165.0) to 37% (Gumber and Kulkarni 2000: rural. frequencý -- 48.0.951o Cl = 
25.0 to 7 1.0). 
Table 9.4: L. i,,,, time (days) from discharge to reimbursement 
Mean 95% CI Median N 
Overall 119 115 124 9() 1.101 
By district 
Ahmedabad 100 96 104 S- 740 
Kheda 161 151 1-1 141) -'-'4 
By occupation 
Farmer or farm laborer 143 134 1 124 
Other 107 102 111 90 
By fiscal year 
1994 to 1998 159 150 169 140 384 
1998 to 1000 98 95 102 87 718 
Restnicting analysis to 1998-2 000 
By distnict 
Ahmedabad 97 92 101 85 i 50 
Klicda 100 107 93 146 
By occupation 
Farmer or farm laborer 98 92 101) 88 202 
Other 98 94 103 87 513 
The frequency of claims submission was fairly consistent a cross fiscal Years (Table 
the 1995,96 being 9 5) exception at only 11.0 claims per Using 1,000 members. , , . 
We %vere unable to examine frequenc\ of claims b\ distnct as there %% ere ilk) ac,: uratc re,:,, rd, t- Aic 
number of members per year by distnct. 
'The Ranson study (Chapter 8) included SEWA members. ages 18 to 58 years. in Kheda distiricL Gujarat- T-hC 
Guiriber and Kulkarni (2000) study included females of all ages living in households where at least one woman 
was a SEWA member. The Sundar (IW5) study included females of all ages in a sample of the general 
population. These studies included hospitalizations due to all causes. including chronic and other causes 
dhat 
might he ineligible for reimbursement under the SEWA scheme. 
29 
rough estimates of the number of lifetime and annual members (data gathered by the 
International Labour Office; ILO 2001) the frequency of claims submission . vas 
estimated for these two categories of membership (Table 9.5). Among lifetime 
members, the frequency of claims submission has gradually increased over the years 
to 32.7 per 1,000 members per year, while the frequency among annual members has 
gradually decreased to 5.6 per 1,000 members per year. Overall, the frequency of 
claims submission was 1.7 times higher among lifetime members. Meanwhile. the 
likelihood of re*ection (versus reimbursement) was similar for lifetime and annual 
members (12% versus 10%; data not shown). 
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Figure 9.2: Frequency of claims and hospitalizations in Gujarati N%omen 
(various sources) with 95% confidence intervals 
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Table 9.5: Frequency of clainis submission by membership type (lifetime 
and 111111ti. 11) and vear 
Nu4er of member-, Claims per 1,000 members per year 
Year Total Lifetime Annual Total Lifetime Annual 
Q4 4 )1 
95/96 12,784 6,500 6,284 11.0 6.0 16.1 
96, '97 15,846 7,500 8.346 16.2 16.3 16.2 
97()8 19.515 10,000 9.515 19.5 23.0 15.6 
98,99 26,000 10.500 15.500 19.9 36.0 9.0 
9Q/00 23,214 11,000 1 14 18.4 32. " 5.6 
Total 107.359 50,000 5 7.3 59 18.0 22.7 13. -/ 
-) -, 0 
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DiscussION 
Summary of findings 
SEWA's Medical Insurance Fund appears to have been -successful at includinu, the 
poor, the mean household income of SEWA claimants was significantly lower than 
the mean income of the general population, and the percentage of households li -ing 
below the poverty line was similar among claimants compared ývith the general 
population. The Fund undoubtedly provided some financial protection to clainiants: 
it more than halved the percentage of catastrophic hospital isations and 
hospitalisations that would have resulted in impoverishment. HoweNer. even after 
reimbursement the expenditures were undoubtedly a threat to the financial %vellbeing 
of some households; fifteen percent of claimants were still faced with expenditures 
equivalent to greater than 10% of annual household income. Reimbursement by the 
Fund was more effective in preventing catastrophic hospital expenditures among the 
poorer quintiles, and among those who experienced the least expensive 
hospital isations. Even when the Fund covered an adequate percentage of the Z' 
expenditures on hospital isation, the time between discharge and reimbursement was 
quite long, at four months over the last six years, and just over three months over the 
last two years. The frequency of claims submission was very low compared to the 
expected frequency of hospitalisation in this population. but was almost twice as 
high among lifetime versus annual members of the scheme. 
Critique of methodology 
Some of the data included in the insurance claims may not have been reliable. In 
particular, data on self-reported household income and cost of hospitalisation were 
likely inaccurate. The insured may have misreported household income if they were 
unaware of the true amount, they did not understand the question. the question was 
asked differentiv at different households. or thev were distrustful of the interv ieý, %-er. 
Costs of hospitalisation, even when evidenced by bills and receipts, were likely 
inaccurate. Firstly, the costs reported in the claims did not include the many indil-ect 
costs of hospitalisation. including: transportation. bribes and gifts supplied to health 
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care providers, and food provided to visitors. Furthermore, the bills may not ha%-e 
accurately reflected the direct costs of hospital isation; when the insured are aware 
that the maximum coverage under the Insurance Fund is Rs. 1.200. they are 
motivated to collect receipts up to, but not exceeding, this amount. Dunng the 
course of this study, one doctor commented that SEWA insured are happy if the,, 
have a receipt showing at least Rs. 1,200, regardless of the actual cost of 
hospital isation. 
Discussion, conclusions and recommendations 
The Fund's success at including the poor surely reflects SEWAs commitment to 
target the self-employed poor. It is likely due also to a flat-rate premium that is 
fairly low, currently 72.5 rupees (or 0.4% of median annual household income 
among claimants in this study). Studies of CBHI schemes in Ghana, Burundi and 
Mexico have found that cost of membership was indeed an important determinant of 
participation (Bennett, et al. 1998). By targeting the poor - and consequently, to 
some extent, excluding the wealthy - the Fund may limit the extent to which 
redistribution occurs, both from high to low-income and from the healthy to the ill. 
SEWA may also foster adverse selection by enrolling women who are at higher risk 
of ill health than the age- and sex-matched general population. Thus, the Fund faces 
a challenging trade-off. On the one hand, the Fund is committed to serving the poor, 
which translates into low premiums and a target population in which the frequency 
of illness, and thus hospital i sation, may be relatively high. On the other hand, the 
Fund is expected by administrators to remain financially viable. To date, this trade- 
off has not been very problematic for the Fund, in large part because the low rates of 
Fund utilisation (along with the small external grant from German Technical 
Cooperation) have meant consistently high rates of cost recovery. A CBHI scheme 
that wishes to target strictly the poor could improve equity and financial % iability bý 
seeking subsidies from government or donor agencies. Subsidies may. however. not 
be sufficiently reliable or sustainable. Alternatively, a socially oriented CBHI could 
seek to broaden membership to include wealthier populations, but ensure equity by 
indexing premiums to income and enabling equal (or better) access to care among 
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the poor. At least for voluntary CBHI schemes. this would require a high degree of 
social solidarity among members. 
Even after reimbursement, hospital expenditures %vere catastrophic for some 
members. Some women may have paid the uncovered balance out of their savings. 
many undoubtedly had to borrow, sell capital, work more or forego spending. 
SEWA administrators wish to maintain a ceiling on reimbursements, so as to prevent 
adverse selection and protect the scheme from large claims. Maintaining this cap on 
reimbursements may seem to be against the principles of socially oriented insurance. 
insofar as it limits the degree of risk-pooling and financial protection available to 
members. However, given that the total premiums collected under the Fund remain 
relatively small (relative to the cost of long, expensive hospital stays), and that the 
Fund is not reinsured by any higher-level insurer, the cap has been maintained in 
order to protect the Fund's financial viability. In future years, administrators plan to 
introduce new packages that would provide a higher level of coverage at a higher 
premium. For example, they have designed a package (to be offered alongside the 
existing package) that would cover hospitalisation to 9,000 rupees for an annual 
premium of 237 rupees, compared to the present ceiling of 1,200 rupees for a 
premium of 30 rupees (SEWA 2001). There is the risk that the neýv package is 
going to attract the economically better-off SEWA members and exclude poorer 
members; this could have negative impacts on equity if it creates two separate pools, 
thus limiting the amount of risk-pooling and cross- subsid i sati on. 
It is impossible to know whether financing of hospitalisation under the Fund was 
equitable; while the poorest claimants did seem. to benefit most in terms of 
prevention of catastrophic expenditures, it is possible that even poorer members of 
the Fund were not accessing hospital care or submitting, claims. Determining 0Z- 
whether or not the Fund was equitable requires information on the household income 
and hospital expenditures of all members. rather than claimants alone. The 
household survey (Chapter 8) captured only five episodes of reimbursement hý- 
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SEWA, and thus was not sufficiently large to explore the equity impact of the 
scheme. 
Lag-time between discharge and reimbursement was much higher than SENVA*s 
stated goal of 30 days, and was certainly too long for those women who had to 
borrow at high rates of interest to pay for their hospitalisation. Decentralisation of 
the claims process to the Anand office (for Kheda District) coincided with the drop 
in lag time since 1998. At present, more than half of the lag time (55 of 98 daý-s) 
occurs between discharge from hospital and submission of the claim to SEWA. This 
may be because of problems encountered in collecting receipts and certificates. or 
difficulties in presenting the claim to the closest SEWA office (e. g. lack of time or 
money for transportation, restrictions on where the claimant may travel 
independently, poor health). Future research should investigate why women wait so 
long before submitting their claims. Mechanisms that could be put in place to 
encourage claims submission (and also address the problem of dela%, -s in claim 
submission, include: (1) providing women with further education around benefits 
under the Fund, and the process of claim submission, (2) training village-level 
SEWA workers to accept insurance claims, so that members would not have to 
travel to offices in Anand or Ahmedabad to submit; (3) establishing a program 
wherein Members could notify SEWA at the time of admission to hospital, so that a 
SEWA representative could be present at the time of discharge to collect all of the 
appropriate paperwork-, or (4) establishing more formal links with certain hospitals 
such that the hospitals could submit receipts and certificate directly to SEWA. 
The relatively low rate of claims submission suggests that: members had low rates of 
hospitalisation (perhaps due to high anticipated costs): excluded conditions 
compnsed a high percentage of all hospitalisations; or members submitted claims for 
only a fraction of all hospital isations. The latter would not be surprising given that 
rates of reimbursement may be considered low by members (as the Fund does not 
cover transportation, bribes, etc. ). while the costs of submitting a claim (for 
example, transportation to the SEWA office. opportunity cost of missed work. b6bes 
2 
_3 
5 
paid to doctors for hospital certificates) are potentially quite high. It is not clear why 
the frequency of claims submission was higher among lifetime members. . -%,:,: ()rdin, -, 
to scheme administrators, lifetime members are more likely to be reimbursed for 
hospital isations related to chronic or pre-existing diseases, so perhaps such 
conditions account for the higher rate of claims among this group. An alternative 
hypothesis is that lifetime members are more familiar with the benefits, and overall 
processes, of the scheme and thus are more likely to submit claims. The claims 
database provides no evidence to suggest that the Fund increased the frequency of 
hospital utilisation. A study should be conducted to investigate the causes of all 
hospital isations among Fund members. If excluded conditions do indeed comprise a 
high percentage, then SEWA administrators should consider including some of these 
in the benefits package. The high rates of cost-recovery b,,, - the Fund suggest that 
there is room for reducing the number of exclusions. Operational research should 
also investigate the frequency with which, and the reasons vvhy, women are 
hospitalised for a condition covered by the Fund and yet do not submit a claim. 
Every change that administrators make to the Fund, whether an increase in breadth 
or amount of the benefits package, or interventions to improve rates and timeliness 
of insurance claim submission, will have to be weighed against impact on the Fund's 
affordability and ability to recover costs. 
This sub-study is one of the very feýv to have investigated the impact of a CBHl 
scheme on health care utilisation and the financial burden of medical expenditures. 
Its findings have important implications for policy concerning CBH1 schemes in 
India and elsewhere. In India, as in many other developing countries, expenditurcs 
on hospitalisation are frequently catastrophic to household finances. The study 
shows that CBHI can effectively protect poor households against the unceriain nsk 
of medical expenses, and can be implemented in areas "-here institutional capacity is 
too weak to organise mandatory. nation-wide risk-pooling. 
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The study identified various aspects of scheme design and management that can be 
tailored (depending on the priorities of scheme administrators) to achieve such goals 
as risk-sharing, cross-subsidisation, financial protection of households and scheme 
financial viability. First, this study suggests that CBHl can include the poor. 
including individuals and households below the poverty line. Factor,, that may 
facilitate inclusion of the poor include an affordable premium. external assistance. 
and nesting the scheme within a larger organisation that addresses other needs of the 
poor (for example, providing access to credit. education and bargaining power in the 
workplace). Second, the financial risk borne by a scheme can be limited by placing 
a cap on the benefits provided. However, this also limits the extent of risk-pot-)Iing 
and cross-subsidisation provided by the scheme. There will inevitably be cases 
where hospital expenditures far exceed this cap with dire financial consequences for 
the insured. Third, in order to relieve the financial burden of expenditures on 
households, reimbursement under a scheme should be fast and facile. This requires 
that administration of the scheme, particularly processing of claims, be located as 
close to claimants as possible. Fourth, fine-tuning the design of a scheme requires 
information on who is enrolled and excluded, rates and causes of hospital isation, 
expenditures on hospital i sation, and barriers that prevent enrolment in the scheme 
and utilisation of the scheme by those who are insured. So a systern for monitoring 
and evaluating the scheme is vital. 
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CHAPTER 10: EXPLORING THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES -tND 
DETER. NIINA. NTS OF CBHl: PERCEPTIONS OF SENNA's MEDICAL 
INSUR. x. NCE FuTND AMONG PARTICIPANTS 
SUMMARY 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate xhat participants in SEWA's Medical 
Insurance Fund see the Fund as providing, and what they percei% e as accounting for 
its success or lack of it. 
In-depth interviews and focus-group discussions were conducted with Fund 
participants - beneficiaries, health care providers, administrators and the extenial 
donor. Transcripts were coded using a grounded approach \k, herein codes were 
generated to represent the main themes found in the data. 
Transcripts for 28 interviews were available for analysis. Some women enrolled in 
the Integrated Insurance Scheme (IIS) were unaware of the scheme and their 
membership in it. The decision to join the scheme was often made by, or in 
collaboration with, other household members. Beneficiaries who were aware of the 
Fund described its benefits strictly in terms of reimbursement for hospital 
expenditures. For the most part, members who received reimbursement from the 
Fund seemed satisfied with the amount received. )vlany of the women who had 
submitted claims to SEWA experienced difficulties in compiling the necessary 
receipts and certificates. 
The data did not support the hypothesis that the Fund had social consequences. 
Rather, they suggest that financial protection is the pnmary goal among participants. 
The interviews provided some evidence to suggest that "affiliation" with other 
members and sense of community were instrumental in increasing membership in 
the IIS. This study highlights some of the difficulties encountered b-,, - CBHI 
schemes. For example, the baseline understanding of insurance and solidantv mav 
be absent or limited. The insurer may have to invest a great deal of time, money and 
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energy to educate participants in the scheme around the concept of insurance and 
health insurance. 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate what participants in SEWA*s Medical 
Insurance Fund see the Fund as providing, and what they perceive as accounting, for 
its "success") or lack of it. The first section provides detail on the methodology. 
beyond what was provided in Chapter 4. The second describes the results and the 
final section summarises the results, critiques the methodology, and discusses and 
interprets the findings. 
METHODOLOGY 
Among SEWA participants, three FGDs (with SEWA members and non-members) 
and 30 or 31 in-depth interviews were planned. The in-depth interviews were to 
include: twenty-five enrolled members, three or four health care providers, one 
administrator and one government representative. Transcripts for 28 interviews 
were available for analysis: five focus-group discussions, and in-depth interviews 
with thirteen SEWA members (past or current), four health care providers, five 
scheme administrators and one representative of the external donor. Appendix 10 
provides a brief description of each interview subject. These interviews included 
fewer SEWA members than planned (13 versus 25), but a larger sample of 
administrators (5 rather than 1). Interviews with government representatives could 
not be included in this analysis. District-level representatives (including the District 
Medical Officer) refused to be interviewed as they claimed to know absolutely 
nothing about insurance, or SEWA. A Joint Secretary of Health (Government of 
India) was interviewed, but the resulting information could not be used in this sub- 
study as the respondent did not allow the interview to be recorded. 
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RESULTS 
Reasons for participating in the US 
This section opens by describing members' knowledge of the IIS (and their 
membership in it) and some of the factors that appear to be most important in 
determining whether or not women will join the IIS. It then explores the benefits of 
the IIS and the Fund as perceived by participants. Results are presented under the 
following sub-headings: 
" Awareness among members of the IIS; 
" Decision to join often made by male household members: 
" Ability to pay an important determinant of membership; 
What the IIS should provide; 
What the Medical Insurance Fund should provide. 
Awareness among members of the IIS 
Some SEWA insured women were unaware of the IIS or their membership in it. In 
most cases, this lack of awareness seemed to occur as other household members 
(often male) had purchased the insurance: 
Interviewer: How much monev were you paying there? "en the sisters 
used to come 'I 
Respondent: I don't know, he (my husband) had paid. It was sevenlý, or 
eighty that were paid. Ask him. 
(BEN-SE WA 11) 
Interviewer: Are 
, you a member 
in any organisation 
Respondent: No, sister. 
Respondent's son: Yes, , ves. Respondent: Iam? Ididn'tknow. 
Respondent's son: MahilaSwasth. ya. Insurance organ isati on. 
Interviewer: Are you a member' 
Respondent: Member? The share that we have taken, isn't it" I clon't 
understand all this, that we have taken share. 
Respondent's son: It's insurance, insurance. 
Intenlewer: In that, how much moncy do - Vou pqv. 
',, ' 
Respondent: How much do we pqy? (Asking her son. ) 
Respondent's son: Seventy rupees. 
(BEN-SEKA 12) 
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One administrator acknowledged that lack of awareness %vas a problem. and 
attributed it to the failure of household members to communicate information to one 
another: 
Respondent: Many times it happens that the women does not know thatshe 
has taken the insurance. Many times it happens if the daughter-in-law ha'; 
taken the insurance, the mother-in-law is not avvare of it. 
(ADMIN-SEWA 3) 
Decision to join often made by male household members 
Even when the respondents were aware of their membership in the IIS, the decision 
to join was made by, or in collaboration with, male household members. One 
respondent stated that the decision to join the IIS was deferred to her son: 
Respondent 1: We will ask our sons. Ivýv husband has gone out, so I it-ill 
ask them. If my sons say "okay mother you can pay ", onýv then can I paY. 
Then we will pay, okay. 
Respondent 3: This sister will collect the insurance. (Pointing towards- the 
village SEWA leader. ) 
Respondent ]: Okay we will tell her. After talking to evc? -vone in our 
family, we will tell... But we will go home and talk to oursons. As they 
move outside (the village), the ,v 
knoll, everything, while itv do not go 
an , vwhere. 
Till toda ,vI 
haven't even seen Dakor (a nearbY town)... Solve 
will go home and ask our sons, because we are not so expert . enced. 
(FGD-SEWA) 
One village leader explained that enrolling a woman in the scheme xas made easier 
if the woman and her husband agreed to the membership: 
Respondent: But I give them the paper. so tit times what happens is that 
women come to me with a lot of enthusiasm but their husbands then re/iise 
to let them join. So if she joins after theY have come to an agreement, then 
it becomes easy. If both of them agree to it there are no problems. 
(ADMIN-SEWA 4) 
Abilily to pay an important determinant of membership 
Finding enough money to pay the premium Nvas clearly an issue for some women. 
One respondent who was a member at the time of the household survey, had chosen 
not to renew her membership in the [IS: 
Interviciver: Have. vOu paid this time. " 
SEW4 ivorker: This time I had told her to pay insurance but she 
didn 't. 
Respondent: I havent paid. If ithout moncy how can I pqv,. " IlInc,, ýc"; are 
got ng on. 
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SEWA worker: When there is no money for illness, how can theýv pqv 
insurance. 
Respondent: That's what- If we are not sick, we can pqv... But as there 
is illness, so- So, and how can we pqyfor insurance and then henýfit also. 
(BEN-SEWA 5) 
Male respondents suggested that the premium be collected during the harvest, as 
money was more likely to be available at that time. 
Respondent 1: We want to take insurance but we do not have mone. v- 
From where can I bring so much amount of moneY" 
Respondent 2: So what you should do is that you should pqv it in tobacco 
season. It is also a kind ofsaving. 
Respondent3: You could pay as per the season. Othervvise, you cannot get 
this amount. 
Respondent 4. - Otherwise we cannot save two hundred, threc hundred 
rupees. 
Respondent I. - During the agricultural season vve can have enough "10? )L, _I, to payfor it. 
(FGD-MIX 4) 
A representative of the external donor confirmed that the ability to pay for insurance 
is a "precondition" for schemes like the IIS: 
Respondent: That when people are organised already and have a good 
saving and credit system in place, earn a certain amount of money -I mean 
those were also these preconditions so that they can pqv the prernium - that 
then one can start with this kind of insurance packages. 
(DONOR-SEWA 1) 
What the HS should 2rovide 
When asked about the HS, beneficiaries who were aware of the IIS tended first to 
mention the life insurance component. Respondents seemed to view life insurance 
as something they were doing for others, particularly their children, rather than for 
themselves: 
Interviewer: With what hope are - vou pqving" Respondent: They say that, "w, hen you won't be there, your childrell Will 
get. " ... At least the children will 
be happy after us. We %-ill work hard till 
the end. That way they have convinced us to pqv. That, "ýI'you are not 
there, then it will be usefulforyour children. 
(BEN-SEWA 8) 
This view was shared by a village-level representative of SEWA: 
Respondent: Insurance is, to us insurance means that in later stage of life, 
even if we do not have an 'y thing 
but we have taken insurance. then our 
children can do something with the insurance pqvment... (Ei-en when vi-e 
242 
are still alive) He can say to money-lender that. "m 
' i- mother andpithcr have taken insurance, so I can return you back when I receive the insurance benefit ". So our children can have that much relief. " (ADMflV-SEWA 5) 
A higher-level administrator felt that the IIS should provide benefit in the fonn of 
46 social security", directly to its members (with no mention of benefits to members, 
children or husbands): 
But all along in my mind I always saw them (the members) as iivorker. ý, as 
producers, as entrepreneurs, as labourers, I mean as an economic 
component... So this informal sector, who is also contributing to the 
economy, should also in their own right, should have acces,, ý to ýocial 
security, as any other, otherformal sector vvorkers have. So I alvvqv. ý saw 
this as part of their, as part of their labour rights. 
(ADMIN-SEWA 2) 
As well, this respondent discussed the holistic nature of the IIS, addressing not only 
death, but illness and loss of assets: 
"en they could not repay loans ... then ive had to go in depih into the 
problems, of their lives, of their livelihoods.... So illness - so there it-as 
always constant illness in thefamily. You know somebo4v or the other Vvas 
always sick. So cost of the medicine then. Then their house was also, I 
mean the slums were also so - only kuttcha - and their slunis being also not 
only homes but also workplaces for their production, storage... Andthere 
was mortal4v, was also there. 
(ADMIN-SEWA 2) 
What the Medical Insurance Fund should provide 
Beneficiaries who were aware of the Fund described its benefits in financial terms. 
In the following interviews, women expressed the belief that the Medical Insurance 
Fund covers half of hospital costs: 
Interviewer: So, what benefit do , vOu getfrom 
that" 
Respondent: "at benefit will we get" If someone is not well, then thLy 
give halfmoney. 
(BEN-SEWA 9) 
Respondent: Look if ive want to take insurance then Vve havL, to pqv 90 
rupees if it is for both man and woman and ij'vve want to take insurance 
onlyfor ourselves, then vou have to pqv seventy rupees. In that. if voll /ýll 
ill and you are hospitalised then the ,v giveyou 
haýfoj'the expenditure. But 
you have to show bills or that and then onývyou can get back montýv. fi 
(FGD-MLYI) 
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Respondent: I have paid five hundred and fiJiy rupees... If Ke fijII sick. 
they give us half the money. 
(FGD-MIX 2) 
Husbands of SEWA members (in a focus-group) discussed the importance of timely 
reimbursement, agreeing that payment should be made within days of 
hospital isation, as loans would have to be taken in the interim: 
Respondent: 
... even if we 
have taken a health insurance rolic. v, Joir that 
time (prior to reimbursement) anyhow, we must make some arrangement ' 
jor 
the money... So after we submit the bill they should give us mont, ' I. within 2-4 or 5 da . Because we also have to borrow it from someone. So Ive Ys 
should get it (reimbursement) in time. 
(FGD-MIX 4) 
Administrators of the Fund did not describe the benefits of the scheme in ten-ns of 
the amount of money reimbursed. Rather, they discussed: who should be covered 
under the Fund, how and when the reimbursement should be provided, and non- 
financial benefits of the scheme. Several administrators said that an attempt should 
be made to cover all SEWA (trade union) members under the IIS. One suggested 
that increasing coverage was a means to combat high levels of illness among the 
covered population (i. e. adverse selection): 
Respondent: Important thing is, we must have more members and more 
premium. Or more members so that the percentage of illness will he 
comparatively less, so, the loss of a claim, we, what vtv are giving, can he 
adjusted against the premium of more people. 
(ADMIN-SEWA 1) 
Administrators talked about the importance of processing the claims quickly and 
easily, so that women receive their money soon after hospitalisation. 
Respondent: Our main objective is to provide money immediateky to the 
women... We want to make it much easier so that they can get money siaing 
in their home. This I am very much willing to do. 
(ADAIIN-SEW. 4 3) 
As well it was suggested that SEWA should be somewhat lenient in the proces-sing 
of claims as the scheme is a "social service": 
Respondent: And, purpose of the insurance scheme should be, it cannot he 
rigid. Of course, integrilýv of the insured should be there. But at the same 
time we should not be so rigid in neglecting the claim, or not giving the 
claim. We should understand that this is the social sen, ice, social 
obligatoty scheme. So, we should he liberal in that. 
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(ADMIN-SEWA 1) 
Scheme administrators saw the scheme as a tool for increasing women .s awareness 
of their own health, and for educating women around health care: 
Respondent: Through our insurance scheme women gains an awareness ol 
her own health, that "I must take care of myselfthen only I can take care of 
my house ". "If I am not health , ý, 
then how vvill I take care of mýy house or 
my children or do myjob? " So they themselves get aware about this. 
(A DMIN-SEWA 3) 
Respondent: The purpose of this scheme is, our members should knovi it-ho 
are the quacks (the untrained and unlicensed doctors). And to vvhom the ' ly should go. And what is thefact. And what is the proper treatment. So thl .s 
is the one type of the health education also... Suppose one member does 
not get the claim, or we say to her okay because of this problem (h. ecau. ý#-, 
she has taken health carefrom a quack) you are not getting the claim... So, 
that will be one, this is also one type of the health education also. 
(ADMIN-SEWA 1) 
Experience among those who have used the Fund: perceived impact 
Several sub-themes emerged from discussions with beneficiaries of their experiences 
with the Medical Insurance Fund: 
" Degree of financial protection from hospital expenditures; 
" Problems in compiling claims; 
" Choice of provider and quality and cost of care, 
" Awareness of insurance; 
" Other comments on the strengths and weaknesses of the IIS and Fund. 
Degree of financial protection from hosl2ital ex]2enditures 
Opinions about the degree of financial protection provided by the Fund vanied. For 
the most part, members who received reimbursement seemed satisfied with the 
amount received, although they did acknowledge that there were costs beyond the 
direct costs that could be included in the claim. In the followinil, case, the 
respondent voices her satisfaction with the reimbursement, despite having received 
only a small percentage of the total cost of hospital isation: 
Intenlem-er: Then, what benefit didyou get. fior pq)-ing that moncy (i. e. the 
IIS Premium) *' 
Respon(lent: Got bent., fit. I received twelve hundred nipees... I received it 
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when the operation was done ... 
I had completed all the paren and gii-en to 
them. At the (SEWA) office. So they gave mone - vfrom the office. 
Then, 
even the ladyfrom the insurance (from the SEIV4 office) had come here. 
She wrote down everything and then, after six months I got the mone ' V... 
the 
expense was ten thousand. Out of that I received twelve hundred ... #'it it -as ten thousand, I got at least twelve hundred rupees. For this we must take 
insurance. "en I was sick, at least I could get the maintenance cost pr 
running the household -from the twelve hundred I got. For this reason we 
takeinsurance. 
(BEN-SEWA 3) 
There were, of course, cases where women were unhappy with the amount of moneY 
reimbursed. In the following case, the beneficiary expected to receive 
reimbursement to fifty percent of the cost of hospitalisation (a common 
misperception) and was disappointed to receive 1,200 rupees, the maximum amount 
provided by the Fund: 
Respondent: And even during the operation we thought that if the 
expenditure is six thousand, then we get three thousand rupees. We thought 
this way, but we got only twelve hundred rupees. 
(BEN-SEWA 3) 
In several cases, despite having SEWA insurance, women had to borrow money in 
order to cover the costs of hospitalisation: 
Interviewer: From that you got nine hundred and fiftv (reimbursed bY 
SEWA). And the remainder, how didyou arrange? 
Respondent: By borrowing it only. By borrowing it. Aty nephews vt,, ork as 
masons and do all that. So they give. My brother-in-law's sons. We 
borrowfrom them. And when we get moneyfrom work, we give it back. 
(BEN-SEWA 8) 
Women talked about the burden of costs that could not be included in a claim to 
SEWA. For example, one beneficiary of the scheme talked about the high costs of 
transportation for family members who came to visit her in hospital. 
Problems in compiling- claims 
Many of the women who had submitted claims to SEWA experienced difficulties in 
compiling the necessary receipts and certificates. As well, they reported waiting 
three or more months between submission of a claim and reimbursement. The 
difficulty in compiling claims - doctors' certificates, hospital receipts. and pertinent 
laboratory reports - seems to result from (1) a lack of information among the insured 
regarding what documentation is required and (2) attempts by doctors to makc 
246 
things difficult and/or extract money. In the foliowing interview. one of' the state- 
level Fund co-ordinators attributes delays in submitting claims to the mernbers 
themselves: 
Respondent: 
... 
nereas with our women, man 'v 
times when thtýv go to 
hospital theyforget their bills there or thev ma -v not 
have requestcd. We 
also demand those documents and keep those documcnt. ý. So man ' I? 
tinles it 
happens that beneficiaries claim after a long period - after 6 month. or 
after 12 month. And then we know that the claim cannot he 11assed. So 
now what we should tell them 
(ADMIN-SEWA 3) 
Women talked about the difficulties involved in getting receipts and certificates 
C.. 
- 
from the medical doctors: 
Respondent: Yes, some doctors do not give the certificate. The ,, 
fi, cl that 
they are not required to give anýything. At times the 
, i, 
do not cl-c'n givc the 
bills. So women come and tell us about it - that doctors do not give them 
the bills. So I go and talk to the doctors. Otherwise. fijý, percent of 
doctors do not give the bills. 
Interviewer: Is it? 
Respondent: We had a meeting with some doctors and had explained to 
them our entire scheme. But there are certain doctors who still don't 
understand. 
(ADMIN-SEWA 4) 
Interviewer: "en you take iavurance, at that time sisters must he telling 
that ifyou have this disease and - vou 
are hospitalised- 
Respondent I. - They told my, "Give its the pqperý (document required by 
SEWA), then you will get reimbursement. - 
Respondent 2: But how can ive produce the papers, ive can't get them. 
Interviewer: "en we go to the hospital. do vve take the rcceipt. sý and till 
that immediatekil or- 
Respondent 3: Th e, v give the receipts. But it-hen ive go to take the 
certificate, they don't give it immediatclv... If we give monev', the. 01sil"n it. 
Th*, '11 sign if we give fifýv to hundred rupees... For m*v daughter's 
certificate - she was admitted at Kanubhai 'S for three da , vs -I 
had to pqv 
himfioqy rupeesfor the certyicate. After that he gave the certificate. 
(FGD-SEWA) 
In some cases the delays or difficulties arose onl. y after the claims were submitted to 
SEWA, but very few seemed bothered by such delays: 
Interviewer: So you had submitted the papers. Then, ancr how rnuch time 
didyou receive the rnoney" 
Respondent: We got it ajier six months. We did not get it immediateýi'- 
(BEN-SEWA 10) 
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Choice of 12rovider and guality and cost of care 
Respondents denied that they had changed their choice of health care provider (for 
example, private versus public) as a result of having health insurance: 
Interviewer: Sister you? What do you feel? Do you feel that qfler taking 
insurance you are able to get treatment in a better lvcq, or i. s there no 
difference? 
Respondent 1: Same, before taking insurance and after taking, both it ere 
same. 
Interviewer: Don't you feel that as you have taken insurance ' you it-ill get the money back, so because of that you go for a better treatment for 
yourser 
Respondent 1: No sister, it is not so. 
(FGD-SEWA) 
Perhaps the only indication that the scheme had impacted on health care providers 
was a doctor who claimed that doctors who were aware of the SEWA scheme, 
knowing that it targets poorer women, might provide health care at reduced cost. 
Respondent: Indirectly means, the doctors to whom these patients go, W( , 
help them as much as we can. Cost wise, we try to reduce it and provide 
them with the required papers for availing the benýfit ftorn the 
organisation. 
(PROV-SEWA 4) 
Awareness of insurance 
Scheme administrators stated that levels of awareness of insurance and health 
insurance increased as a result of the scheme. One stated that increasing 
membership in the IIS in recent years resulted from women having experienced 
benefits, and then sharing their experiences Nvith others: 
Interviewer: But what is the reason behind the increase in membership? 
As you said, there is an increase in membership jbr so many years, and it 
has now come up to 1000 members? 
Respondent: Isn't it same reason, madam. ) Like at present theY have taken 
insurance from which they received benefit. So another person will also 
sa , "ff 
I will take it then I vvill also get benefit in future. " So this way, by Y 
sharing the e. yperienceswith each other, new it-omen beconit, our members. 
We takefive rupees and make them a member (of SEIVI union). And then 
furtherwe make them such member (of the insurancescheme). 
(. 4DMLV-SEW. 4 5) 
A state-level co-ordinator made the claim that increasing levels of awareness 
have 
contributed to changes that have been made in the insurance scheme (for example, 
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the increased ceiling, and coverage of gynaecologic diseases): 
Respondent: But when I see through mY seven years ol I experience then. 
yes, women are more alert... We could make so man 'v change. N in 
the 
scheme only because now they are ve? ýv alert. And so Ke can add new' 
things to our insurance scheme... Man 
- ý' are aivare and the 'v come 
h'I. 
themselves to pay the premium as and when they come to know that the 
insurance they have taken last year is soon to expire. 
(ADMIN-SEWA 3) 
Other comments on the strenglhs and weaknesses of the Fund 
In a number of cases, respondents had lost their trust in the insurance scheme - 
usually due to problems of poor communication - and as a result. had discontinued 
their membership: 
Respondent: Here, the whole neighbourhood had taken frorn (the SEIVA 
worker). But, she comes only once a year to take the insurance, She never 
gives any benefit to anyone. If anyone is sick, she doesn't come to check. 
She did not give any benefit to anyone. So, everyone stopped paving. 
Otherwise, everyone used to pay. 
(BEN-SEWA 2) 
Similarly, the following respondent felt that more regular communication from the 
IIS to its members was required: 
Respondent: ... the organisation should 
be such that they come and ask its. 
Every month or fifteen days they make a visit and thev should ask the 
members, "do you have any problem? "... ffthey can't come, it is okaY. 
But, if they write a letter, "ýo you have an ,v 
difficultv to the members. "If 
you have any difficulty, tell us so that vt-e can come. Or else, if you need, 
they can come. If the organisation does something like that, then there is no 
harm injoining it. But, if they don't even look at us, then hatred arises. 
(BEN-SEWA 4) 
One respondent had at one time submitted a health insurance claim to a local SEWA 
representative, but her claim had been lost: 
Respondent: ... As m, v papers were 
lost, I lost hope. We had to incur fibur 
orfive thousand in the hospital. Sister had said that, -" you will get half 
bentfit", but what benefit did I get. " Did I get" The papers are lost 
somewhere. Youjust think. J17i ,v should 
ive paýv one hundredfijtY nipecs " 
Why should we work hard to pay the mone ,0 
Plepay the insurance. firStof 
all and don't even give food to our children. If'we get some benifit then 
only we willpqy, otherwise why will ive pay. " 
(BEN-SEWA 7) 
A few respondents complained about the failure of the IIS to cover household 
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members other than adult females. In the follo%ý ing case. the husband of i current 
member had refused her future enrolment if the scheme were not changed to : ()%-er 
other family members. 
Interviewer: Do you feel that any changes should be made. " 
Respondent: He (my husband) is refusing to pqy. He sa , J's, 
"Onk. 
, voll are getting, so why should we pay? We don't want to pay. - But, I say t1lat %to 
are not able to save any money at home. So, we should pqv. 
Interviewer: Is your husband refusing? 
Respondent: He is refusing. But, this time I paid. He Lý refusing to pqi- 
nextyear. Becauseofthat. Hesays, "Only. vou are getting. Nobo4velsels 
getting the benefit. So why should we pay? 
Interviewer: So, who else should get? 
Respondent: He says, "At least children can gct. If I don'tgct, it is ok-aY. 
Childrenjall sick often. So, if the-v get, it is good. - 
(BEN-SEWA 10) 
Administrators and the external donor (perhaps not surprisingly) generalk- felt that . C" 
the IIS was functioning well, and attributed its success to a variety of different 
factors. The doctor responsible for reviewing claims at SEWA attributed the success 
of the scheme in part to good management: 
Respondent: That is, because of the whole team-vvork. In the scilse that 
our health worker, our co-ordinator, all these people, the ' i- 
have prepared 
the claims in such a wa 'v 
that my work is vety smooth. I have to look after 
only medical aspect. And even for that, now, the ' i, are also accustomed. they are, they also know everything (including the medical aspects) in 
details. So, that in that way I think that our scheme is ninning very well... 
(ADMIN-SEWA 1) 
Another state-level employee of SEWA felt that the scheme was a success in part 
due to strong leadership: 
Respondent: Jaihreeben Vyas and Miraiben Chatterjee, there is a maj'or 
contribution of these two, because of whom vve could do so much. 
Othervvise we could not have even thought of decentralisation. And also 
could not have thought of managing our own health insurancescheme. lt 
was ontv, because Afiraiben wtis there, so ive could think over it. Btvaust' 
she has done her doctorate in this. So, she. lelt that when we it cre 
in collaboration with the UIIC (United India Insurance Company) Vioint'll 
were not getting much benýfit. And ive could also see that it is true. 
(ADMIN-SEW. 4 3) 
A representative of the external donor felt that the IIS had been successful (in terms- 
of attracting new members) in part because of strong affiliation and the '; ense of 
community among SENVA members - that SEWA members seemed to be juniping, 
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on the insurance band-wagon: 
Respondent: 
... I mean SEWA is also alwa , vs sa - i-ing 
that, - ii ell, look at the 
numbers, we can constantly raise the numbers of insured people. and thi's 
also shows the success. "I think this is on one hand this is certain4i- true. 
On the other hand I believe this also verv much related to the strong 
affiliation of being a SEWA member and belonging to thiýý SE If .4 
community, and having access to the sen, ices. And if thcrc i*, ý a new 
service, and they can afford it, they also theyjustjump on it. Becawe it 
SEWA. 
(DONOR-SEWA 1) 
DISCUSSION 
Summary of findings 
Some women currently enrolled in the IIS were unaware of the scheme and their 
membership in it. Even among members who were aware of the IIS, the decision to 
join the scheme was often made by, or in collaboration with, other (often male) 
household members. Cost of membership and the availability of money were 
important in determining whether women would join. Beneficiaries who were aware 
of the IIS, seemed to perceive the life insurance as the major benefit, while a top- 
level scheme administrator described the holistic nature of the scheme, addressing 
various problems in members "lives" and "livelihoods". Finally, beneficiaries who 
were aware of the Fund described its benefits in financial terms, while 
administrators discussed who should be covered under the Fund, how and when the 
reimbursement should be provided, and non-financial benefits of the scheme. 
For the most part, members who received reimbursement from the Fund seemed 
satisfied with the amount received. although they did ackno%ýIedgye that there were 
expenditures beyond the direct expenditures that could be included in the claim. 
Many of the women who had submitted claims to SEWA experienced difficultie, in 
compiling the necessary receipts and certificates. This was due to attempts býý 
doctors to make the process difficult andor to extract moneý. and a lack of 
information among the insured regarding the required documentation. In a number 
of cases, respondents had lost their trust in the insurance scheme - usually due to 
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problems of poor communication - and as a result. had discontinued their 
membership. Administrators and the external donor (perhaps not surprisingly) 
generally felt that the IIS was functioning well, and attributed its success to good 
management, strong leadership, and the strong sense of affiliation among SEWA 
members. 
Critique of methodology 
Initially, guidelines for the interviews (Appendix 5) were based on inaccurate 
assumptions. At the commencement of the study, the researcher was under the 
mistaken impression that: 
9 Members of the IIS would be aware of the 11S, their membership in it, and would 
therefore be familiar with the concept of insurance, 
0 Members would be able to discuss the relatively abstract concept "What factors 
account for the scheme's success, or lack of it"" 
In fact, these relatively abstract concepts were difficult for people to discuss, even 
those who were intimately associated with the two CBHI schemes (for example, 
administrators). For this reason, as the study progressed, the inteniews increasingly 
focused on very concrete events (such as specific hospitalisations, failure to pay an 
insurance premium, delay in receiving reimbursement by a scheme, etc. ) However, 
during the course of the study, the interview schedule was probabl-y not changed as 
much as it should have been in order to optimise the yield of the intervle%vs. If 
interviews had been analysed in parallel with data collection, later interviews could 
better have been tailored to the knowledge and experience of respondents. For 
example, less time would likely have been spent discussing respondents' knowledge 
(or lack thereof) regarding SEWA's Fund, and more spent discussin.,; the concept of 
insurance and risk protection. 
As already mentioned in the qualitative sub-study for TF's hospital referral scheme 
(Chapter 7) a more exploratory (i. e. less structured) approach to intervieiving might 
have been more appropriate. particularly for investigating the "'social perspective". 
-Pc, 
Discussion and interpretation of findings 
Following the literature review, it was hypothesised that participants would have in 
mind many goals for the Fund in addition to such traditional goals as coverage of the 
poor and financial protection of households. However, almost none of the 
participants mentioned potential "social consequences" of' health insurance. The 
data do not suggest that the Fund had impacted on the locus of medical decision- 
making, the status of the allopathic medical profession, access to medical care. 
mechanisms of gift-giving or the nature and prevalence of risky behaviour. Rather. 
the data suggest that financial protection was the primary goal among all 
participants. The fact that social consequences did not come out in the interviews 
may reflect: 
I/ Truth. Perhaps the Fund did not have - nor was it expected to have - much 
impact outside the realm of the economic measures of health insurance. 
2/ Failure of the interviewers to question adequately around topics that were 
somewhat abstract and potentially sensitive (e. g. female participation in medical 
decision making). 
3/ Lack of awareness among beneficiaries of social consequences that the Fund 
had indeed had - i. e. perhaps qualitative modes of inquiry were not sufficiently 
-sensitive". This raises the question whether other methodologies could have been 
used instead. 
In the case of SEWA's Medical Insurance Fund. the first (i. e. that the scheme did not 
have social consequences) is likely to be of greatest importance. To almost all 
participants, insurance and health insurance were relatively new concepts, and 
people did not seem to have thought of impact outside of what they have been told 
by their local SEWA leaders. And although financial support for hospitalisation was 
often provided through informal networks (see Appendix 11). respondents did not 
suggest that there were any similarities between these networks and the formal 
insurance scheme under investigation. Even among those who were members of the 
Fund, levels of knowledge and awareness about the SEWA scheme. and about 
health insurance more generally. were low. Perhaps as wornen are provided %vith 
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more information about the scheme. and as utilisation increases. participants wIII 
develop a greater awareness of potential or actual non-financial benefits of the Fund. 
Certain aspects of scheme design and management were likelv to have been 
important in determining the scheme's impact. Firstly, while SEWA was able to 
attract many members through its membership campaigns. the level of awareness - 
both around membership in the scheme, and the benefits available - was low among 
some members. This may have limited the ability of women to make use of their 
membership. Secondly, while the scheme targeted females, it was clear from the 
interviews that decision-making around membership in the scheme was often done 
by the whole family, or by males in the household. While the scheme was clearly 
oriented towards women, failure to interact with female household members may 
have resulted in the exclusion of some women from the Fund. Thirdly. in order to 
keep members satisfied with the scheme, it is important to make the claims process 
fast and relatively easy. It seems that compiling doctors' certificates and receipts 
was the most difficult part of the claims process. Such difficulties resulted in 
women spending more time, energy and money in compiling their claims, and may 
have deterred some women from submitting claims. 
It seems likely that the nesting of the IIS within a larger development organisation 
was beneficial for the Scheme in several ways. Compared to non-members with 
similar income, members of the SEWA trade union may have had better access to 
credit, savings accounts, etc., and as such they may ha-v-e had greater demand for 
insurance - perhaps both increased need because they were sufficiently stable to 
make plans for the future, and increased ability to pay because they had more 
disposable income,, 'credit. On the supply side, it is likely that the physical and 
managerial infrastructure used by other branches of SE%VA (for example, SEWA 
Bank and SEWA Academy) contributed to the IIS's (and thus the Fund%s) success, 
reflected in the following statement: 
... In realim it should always 
be remembered that it wa. 5 through it, ý 
bargaining power and credibili&ý- that SEKA was able to obtain certaill 
advantages at the political and institutional level. Simllar4v. it it-as able : (1 
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draw on the infrastructure, networks and management s' vstems that it had 
created to conduct its other activities OLO 2001, p. 80). 
The other services provided by SEWA may also have served to develop a sense of 
trust and dedication in SEWA and its management among members. Indeed, some 
respondents suggested that trust among beneficiaries in the SEWA was important to 
success of the IIS. 
The interviews provided some evidence to suggest that "affiliation" with other 
members and sense of community were instrumental in increasing membership in 
the IIS. However, there was no evidence that higher levels of social consciousness 
or solidarity served to decrease adverse selection, free-riding or fraud. There are 
two potential reasons as to why SEWA members would not see it as "wrong" that 
the young and healthy abstain from insurance while the old and infirm join. Firstly, 
women seemed to join the insurance scheme for their own benefit and for the benefit 
of their household. Their desire to secure household finances, by insuring those who 
were most likely to fall ill, may have outweighed their desire to help balance the risk 
pool, particularly if doing so meant spending a significant amount of money to 
insure someone who was young and healthy. Secondly, it was not evident that 
SEWA insured had an awareness of risk-pooling (or the healthy subsidising the 
health care costs of the less healthy). 
This study found beneficiaries to possess little information about the Fund and its 
benefits. This may reflect: 
I/ Failure of SEWA to provide women with adequate education at the time of 
enrolment; 
2/ Members having been so overwhelmed with information about the IIS (for 
example, life insurance) that they forgot the bits about the Fund. combined with a 
failure by SEWA to periodically re-educate worrien around the scheme, 
3/ An inability of members to understand the complexities of insurance. 
The former explanation seems to be the most likely. It may be that the emphasis at 
SEWA (as is reflected in the "administrator" intervie%vs) %%-as to increase enrolment 
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under the IIS, with less thought,, concern to more -distal" outcomes (such as 
increased hospital utilisation, and improved health status). Getting a woman into the 
scheme may have been seen as an end in itself, with less concern as to whether or 
not she actually made use of the membership. Future investigation at the village 
level could look into the relative emphasis that SEWA leaders (the village-le%-el 
representatives) put on enrolment versus education. SEWA leaders do not receive 
any kind of financial incentive for increasing IIS enrolment in their area, but theý 
undoubtedly receive praise and recognition within the organisation for bringing in 
new members. Perhaps incentive mechanisms (financial anctor other) could be put 
in place for SEWA leaders to improve knowledge about the Fund among their target 
population (perhaps measurable by looking at rates of submitted medical insurance 
claims per member). 
It was disheartening, but not so surprising, to hear many of the beneficiaries tell of 
the problems faced in obtaining medical certificates from their doctors. This 
appeared to be a common phenomenon, and could in part explain low rates of claims 
submission and the very significant delays between discharge from hospital and 
submission of the insurance claim (on average, 55 days, see Chapter 9). One would 
like to think (perhaps unrealistically) that providing doctors with information about 
the Fund, and its target population (largely poor and illiterate) would prevent such 
behaviour. As well, improving education among beneficiaries might increase the 
frequency with which they request the necessary paperwork prior to discharge from 
hospital. However, given the context - user fees, both formal and informal (i. e. 
bribes) are charged by public and pn,.,, ate providers alike, often for doing nothing 
more than spending a few minutes writing a prescription - it will likely be 
impossible to get all providers to discontinue this rent-seeking behaviour. The 
solution may lie in SEWA restricting its benefits to a limited number of providers 
who could submit bills directly to the Fund's insurance panel. This. of course. 
would have implications for geographic access and consumer choice. 
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Conclusions and policy implications 
This study highlights some of the difficulties encountered bv CBHI schemes. 
Firstly, the baseline understanding of insurance and solidarity may be absent or 
limited. The insurer may have to invest a great deal of time. money and ener ,, to 9. 
educate participants in the scheme (target population, health care providers, and 
scheme employees) around the concept of insurance and health insurance. 
Furthermore, it is not enough to provide education at the outset - it appears that 
education and communication about the scheme and its benefits should be regularly 
repeated. Secondly, this research suggests that it is difficult to target insurance 
towards certain individuals within households. This is because the individuals who 
are most likely to be targeted for reasons of equity or on the basis of medical need 
(women, elderly, children, chronically ill) may not be in a position to make 
decisions, either about their membership in such a scheme, or around sceking 
medical care. Thirdly, lack of formal ties, or direct communication, between the 
insurer and health care providers can hinder the impact of CBHI schemes. 
Mechanisms may have to be put in place to ensure that providers working in 
collaboration with a CBHI scheme have an interest in caring for members and will 
not hinder the processing of their claims. Fourthly, in order to keep members 
satisfied with a scheme, the process for claiming benefits should be fast, easy and 
inexpensive. Fifthly, nesting a CBHl scheme within a parent organIsatIon may 
create an enabling context for CBHI, by improving the economic condition of its 
members, providing managerial infrastructure and support, and helping to establish a 
sense of trust in the insurer. Finallv, a sense of community among the target 
population, and possibly some history of collaborating in other ventures (such as 
savings or credit schemes) may be a determinant of success in terms of increasing 
scheme membership. 
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SECTION 4: DISCUSSION, ('ONCLUSIONAND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS 
CHAPTER 11: DiscussioN OF FINDINGS 
INTRODII"CTION 
This chapter discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the methods used, 
summanses the findings of the two case studies, and compares Findings bem-een the 
case studies. 
The thesis set out to explore the impact of CBHl schemes. and the factors 
contributing to success or lack thereof. A broad literature review in Chapter 3 gave 
nse to a framework which illustrated the dual nature of outcomes - economic and 
social - and the many factors that potentially contribute to the success (or failure) of 
CBHI. The framework, presented again below as Figure 11.1, was used as the 
theoretical framework for the case studies. 
Figure IIA: Objectives and contextual determinants of success for CBIII 
schemes 
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The two schemes were quite different in terms of scheme desip and management. 
and the broader context in which they functioned (e. g. TF linked to the dair%l co- 
operative, and SEWA to a union for the self-employed). Table 4.4 highlighted die 
main differences between the two schemes. On the one hand, the differences 
between the two schemes make it possible to explore the influence of context in 
greater detail than if only one case (one combination of factors) had been studied. 
On the other hand, the ability to address context, and its impact upon scheme 
processes and outcomes, is limited because there are only two schemes, and many of 
the potentially important contextual variables are the same for the vwo schemes. 
This chapter considers some of the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology of 
the study, and then surnmarises the findings of the two case studies. Findings 
highlighted by a comparison between the case studies are then discussed. 
METHODOLOGICAL AND DATA ISSUES 
In India, as in other developing countries, CBHI schemes are relatively rare, and it is 
unusual to find more than one scheme operating in a single geographic area. The 
case-study approach was chosen for this study both because of the limited number of 
schemes available for study, and the very complex nature of the schemes - in 
particular, the complex associations between context, scheme design and 
management, and outcomes. At the outset, it was seen as beneficial that the case- 
study approach allowed starting with specific research questions (the deductive 
approach) as well as with broader questions that could be refined in the course of 
fieldwork (the inductive approach). Furthermore, by allowing the use of different 
methods (both qualitative and quantitative) it was thought that the case-studý 
approach would produce findings that were more comprehensive and valid than it' 
only a single method had been employed. 
As described below, the choice of the case-study approach was larlyehr justificd in 
terms of the comprehensiveness and qualivy of the data. This section Cir,, t 
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briefly summanse the methodological issues alreadý raised in the results chapters 
(Chapters 5 through 10), and will then discuss broader methodological issues. 
Methodological issues: household survey 
The household survey had several major strengths. In general. the survey data 
probably provide an accurate snapshot of households across the district. This results 
from: the wide scope of the survey (households in thirty villages): the random 
selection of both villages and households: extremely low rates of non-participation, 
and the reliability of responses provided to key questions (see Appendix 11). 
Furthermore, the household survey produced findings that were immediately useful 
to the scheme administrators, particularly around the ven- low rates of scheme 
utilisation relative to overall rates of hospital isation. 
The two greatest problems with the household survey ývere small sample size and 
the reliance on assets (in the form of the Economic Status Index) as a proxy for 
household wealth. 
Small sample size may have resulted in false negatB, -e findings, particularly with 
respect to the (low frequency) outcomes "probability of hospitalisation over one 
year" and "'net annual hospital costs per person hospitalised". This small sample 
size resulted from a variety of factors. Firstly, the outcome variable that was used in 
calculating sample size, "prevalence of substituting for expenditures on food, 
agricultural development and education (at any time over one year) in order to paý 
for medical care", could not be analysed. Respondents were not able to answer the 
relevant question, which was removed from the final version of the questionnaire. 
Two of the outcome events ultimately anal,,. -sed (frequency of hospi tall sation. and 
costs per person hospitalised) were actually much rarer than -prevalence of 
substituting... "' (hypothesised to occur among 20% of non-insured households and 
10% of insured households). with a resulting drop in the power of the models to 
detect a difference. Secondly, the mis-classification of households resulted in many 
households being dropped from the analysis. This was particularly problematic for 
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SEWA; many households were identified by SEWA as including a Fund member. 
when in fact they did not. 
The concern with the assets index (ESI) is that it may not accurately reflect the 
wealth of households, or more specifically, wealth insofar as it is facilitates or 
hinders health care seeking. Worryingly, questions regarding household assets 
elicited relatively (in comparison to other questions in the survey) non-reliable 
results. A similar index has performed well in other settings, correlating with 
consumption expenditures (Filmer and Pritchett 2001). And in the sur-vey, the ESI 
was strongly correlated with interviewers' assessments of wealth and with dally 
household expenditures on food. In retrospect, it would have bee useful to collect 
more detailed information on household expenditures, total expenditures could have 
been used as a proxy for wealth or at least could have been used in validating the 
ESI. Consumption expenditures per adult is the preferred measure of living 
standards used in the World Bank's Living Standard Nleasurement Study (LSMS) 
surveys. Many researchers are looking into proxy measures (other than the ESI) that 
can be administered more quickly and inexpensively (Grosh and Baker 1995: 
Montgomery, et al. 1999, Morris, et al. 2000). 
Methodological issues: scheme utilisation data 
The strength of the scheme utilisation data was that it revealed much about the 
financial protection conferred on members of the two schemes. Such information 
could not be obtained from the household sur%! e,,,, due to the IoNv rates of 
hospitalisation and scheme utilisation. 
One problem with the data was lack of, or potentially inaccurate, information on 
household income. Bills submitted by Shri Krishna Hospital to TF included no 
information regarding the members' income, while all insurance claims submitted to 
SEWA included the claimant's self-reported, annual household income. For both 
TF and for SEWA, impact was assessed in terms of -percentage of hospitalisat ions 
that would have been catastrophic" (i. e. would have consumed oreater than 10% of' 1=ý 
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mean annual household income). companng figures pre- and post -re im bursem ent. 
For TF, the same income range was assumed for all households (based on data from 
SEWA and the household survey), while for SEWA. the actual incomes reported by 
claimants were used. The calculations for TF may bias the impact of the scheme, it 
is feasible that this bias could be in either direction. For example. if household 
income was correlated with hospital spending at Shri Krishna Hospital. then the 
frequency of catastrophic costs would be lower than estimated. Conversely. if TF 
members who use Shri Krishna Hospital are relatively poor compared with all TF 
members then the frequency of catastrophic costs would be higher than estimated 
(and the impact of the scheme, potentially greater). For SE'A"A, it is unclear how 
accurate the income data were. The insured may have misreported household 
income either intentionally, or because they were unsure of the true amount. For 
both schemes, the estimates based on income must be interpreted with caution, and 
direct comparisons between the schemes based on these estimates will not be made, 
given potential bias in the TF data. 
A second problem was the absence of information on indirect costs of 
hospitalisation. For both schemes, data were available on the direct costs of 
hospitalisation (for example, doctors' fees, bed fees, some medications and food) but 
not the indirect costs (e. g. transportation, bribes and gifts paid to health care 
providers, food for visiting friends/family) which in this setting can be substantial. 
By using low estimates of "total expenditure". the calculations have thus 
overestimated the impact of the two schemes in terms of reducing the expenditure 
burden and reducing the frequency of catastrophic expenditures. 
Methodological issues: qualitative interviews 
Qualitative interviews were employed to collect data relevant to all of the study 
objectives. The interview data had several strengths. Firstly, the relatIvely large 
number of interviews conducted meant that I was able to confirm findings across 
individuals and different villages. While not a random sample. hearing that some 
views and experiences were consistent across the fairly large number of people 
did 
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increase my confidence in the internal validity of the data. Secondly. trian I gulation 
by source of data was possible because people who had different roles in the 
schemes were interviewed (i. e. beneficiaries. providers and administrators). For 
example, the fact that both beneficiaries and administrators of the TF's hospital 
referral scheme thought of it as a charity rather than insurance added to the 
credibility of this finding. Finally, the interviews proved useful insofar as they could 
be used to confirm, and seek the reasons underlying, some of the quantitatiVe 
findings. The interviews, for example, provided information useful in developing 
hypotheses around the very low rates of utilisation of the two schemes. Data from 
the interviews were also used to explore the fact that many of the SEWA claims 
were for hysterectomy care (see Ranson and John 200 1. Appendix 12). 
There were several weaknesses in the methods used in collecting and analysing the 
qualitative data: problems with the interview schedules based on incorrect ex ante 
assumptions; lack of discussion around social consequences/determinants, and 
uncertainty as to whether this reflected "'truth" versus-false negative". 
Going into the interviews, the researcher had unrealistic expectations as to what 
discussants (particularly beneficiaries) would be interested in, and able to discuss. 
More specifically, in every interview, respondents were probed for their knowledge 
and views around "Insurance" and ""health insurance". It was common, however, for 
respondents (i) not to know of a specific insurance scheme (i. e. not to know anything 
about TF or SEWA or not to perceive these schemes as insurance) and (11) not to 
have an understanding of insurance (or an understanding in which they had 
sufficient confidence to voice). While it was evident during data collection that 
respondents had little knowledge regarding insurance, it was not until all interviews 
were completed and analysis was well under way that the scope of the problem 
became clear. If interviews had been analysed in parallel Aith data collection, later 
interviews could better have been tailored to the knowledge and experience of 
respondents. For example, less time would likely have been spent discussing 
respondents' knowledge (or lack thereof) of insurance and risk protection. and more 
264 
time spent discussing people's expectations of, and experience with, TF and SEWA. 
One of the main findings of the qualitative interviews was that the social perspectiVe 
appeared to be of minor importance with respect to the consequences, and factors 
underlying, these two schemes. However, these negative findinos mav not reflect 
truth i. e. they may be false-negative findings. False negatives occur when the 
method of inquiry (in this case, qualitative interviews) is not adequately sensitive in 
terms of detecting the phenomena in question. Perhaps beneficiaries simply lack an 
awareness of social consequences and/or social capital, even where they do exist. 
Or possibly the interviewers failed to question adequately around topics that are 
somewhat abstract and potentially sensitive (e. g. female participation in medical 
decision making or trust among SEWA members). In fact, there probably was some 
element of both "true negative" and 'Talse negative". On the one hand, many 
respondents were entirely unaware of their respective schemes, and relatively few 
respondents had actually used the schemes themselves, so it was not surprising that 
people had not been affected by the schemes. On the other hand, it is possible that 
the semi-structured approach to interviewing interfered with the emergence of some 
topics, such as the social consequences and determinants of CBHI. It is possible that 
such subtle associations might better have been investigated using a less structured, 
more exploratory, approach to interviewing. 
Broader methodological issues 
This section discusses how the case-study methodology proved to be well suited to 
the study objectives and setting, and briefly discusses the general isabi lity of the 
results. 
Firstly, the case-study methodology made it possible to go into some depth in 
investigating the scheme outcomes. design, context, and the complex inter- 
relationships between these. A previous study of "pre-payment" schemes in India 
had looked at both TF and SEWA, but focusing on aspects of design and 
management (as descnbed by scheme administrators) (Dave 199-3). Dave's study 
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did not capture many of the intricacies of the schemes. for example. the fact that TF 
members were permitted to purchase membership after falling ill. Having ample 
time to devote to these two schemes was important in that it allowed the researcher 
to pursue (in the final qualitative inten-ie, -vs) the reasons as to why scheme 
utilisation rates were low. 
Secondly, by using a variety of different methods, it was possible to take the 
findings made using one method and confirm them using a second i. e. to triangulate 
using different methods. For example, together the household survey and scheme 
utilisation data provided strong evidence for low rates of utilisation of both schemes. 
Similarly, both the scheme utilisation data and the interview data suggested that 
among those who used the schemes, rates of reimbursement were high in 
comparison to direct hospital expenditures. Triangulation across methods added 
greatly to the internal validity or credibility of the study. 
Thirdly, the inductive nature of the case-study approach - the fact that it was 
possible to pursue some new questions as they arose - contributed directly to the 
internal validity and to the usefulness of the study's findings. The internal validity 
of the study was enhanced because it was possible to look into (using qualitative 
methods) factors underlying some of the quantitative findings. For example, some 
of the potential reasons underlying low rates of utilisation of both schemes were 
explored, as was the long Ia. -; time between hospitalisation and reimbursement under 
SEWA's Fund. The utility of the study was increased because findings of particular 
interest to scheme administrators could be pursued. For example, based on the 
finding that almost 10% of all claims submitted under the SEWA scheme were for 
hysterectomy care, finiher qualitative research around the quality of hysterectomy 
care available to SEWA's members was carried out (see Ranson and John 2001, 
Appendix 12). 
Because only two schemes were examined, the degree of vanation in terms of 
design, management and context observed was necessarily limited. Sonle of the 
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findings are thus quite limited in terms oftheir generalisabilit-,. It is, i'or example. 
difficult to make generalisations regarding low levels of awareness (regarding the 
hospital referral scheme) among TF members, or restriction of benefits under the TF 
scheme to a single hospital, given the relatively unique and unsustainable condition 
of its finances at the time of the study. Other findings of the study support prior 
understanding or theories around CBHI. and thus can be generallsed. with some 
caution., to other settings. For example, the donor funding so heavily relied upon by 
TF's hospital referral scheme ultimately proved inadequate as TF scheme 
membership and costs per hospitalisation rose. At SENVA. the cap on insurance 
benefits limited the impact that reimbursement had in terms of preventing =1 
indebtedness (or "catastrophic expenditures") particularly among those who 
experienced the most expensive hospital isations. Finally, some of the findings that 
were not specific to either of the schemes, and that were consistent with previous 
empirical studies, can more easily be generalised. For example, in line with the 
work of other investigators, credit (borrowing) was found to be a very common 
source of protecting households against financial shocks. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This section summarises the main findings for TF (drawing together findings from 
Chapters 5 to 7) and then SEWA (Chapters 8 to 10). As these findings have already 
been discussed in preceding chapters, discussion is limited here to instances where 
findings from different chapters (and thus methods) are inconsistent with one 
another. Findings are presented here according to (and generally in the same order 
as) the categones and sub-categories laid out in the theoretical framework of the 
research methodology (Table 3.4): (i) impact, (ii) context, and (iii) scheme desion 
and management. 
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Tribhuvandas Foundation's hospital referral scheme 
Findiny-s related to the scheme's impact 
Access to health care - Rates of utilisation of the hospital referral scheme were verý. 
low in comparison to overall rates of hospital isation. In the household sur" ey (Ch. 
5) less than 10% of TF-member hospital isations (only 7 of 77) were taken at a 
private-non-profit hospital (including Shri Krishna). Analysis of the utilisation 
database revealed that the frequency of use of Shri Krisha Hospital by TF members 
(3.2/1,000 members/year, 1996 to 2000) was only 3.5% to 7.400 of the mean rate of 
hospitalisation found in other studies in Gujarat state (Ch. 6). Rates of scheme 
utilisation were lowest for residents of talukas farthest from Shn Krishna Hospital 
(Ch. 6). There was no evidence that membership in TF resulted in increased access 
to inpatient care. Rather, the household survey (Ch. 5) revealed significantly lower 
rates of hospitalisation among TF members (roughly halo in comparison to controls. 
Protection from the costs of health care - In general, membership in TF was not 
associated with reduced annual hospital expenditures (net of discount) per person 
hospitalised, perhaps reflecting very low rates of scheme utilisation (Ch. 5). Among 
TF members who used Shri Krishna Hospital, some discount was provided to 90% 
and the median rate of discount was 48% (mean 551.0 (Ch. 6). The mean rate of 
reimbursement varied relatively little from the least expensiýe hospital isat ions (660o 
among the least expensive quintile) to the most expensive (44% among most 
expensive). Even after discount, a small percentage (some 5 to I P, O) of 
hospital isations taken at Shri Krishna Hospital were likely to have been catastrophic 
to members (i. e. expenditures >10% of mean household income). Consistent ý%ith 
the quantitative findings, inten-iews revealed that TF members who had used the 
Shri Krishna P-enerally received a sizeable discount, typically of fifty percent or 
more. Some who received a discount reported voing into debt (borrowing orselling 
assets) to pay for the hospitalisation (Ch. 7). 
Equitv of acvess - The study revealed nothing about tile relative cost of. or access to. 
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hospital services by socio-economic group under the TF scheme. Several findings 
suggest that the scheme had not effectively targeted the groups identified as 
6"neediest" by scheme administrators, i. e. the poor, women and children. There was 
a non-significant trend towards higher levels of wealth among members of the TF 
scheme, compared to non-members (Ch. 5). Rates of utillsation of Slui Krishna 
Hospital were as high among men as women, and among adults as children (Ch. 6). 
Financial sustainability - Late in 1999, the hospital referral scheme was completelý 
discontinued due to refusal by Shri Krishna Hospital to incur further debt in caring 
for TF inpatients. 
Consumer satisfaction - Among members, there were no complaints about the 
process of seeking discounts from TF, but administrators reported that this process 
had become increasingly difficult for members as a result of linking the amount of 
discount inversely to wealth (Ch. 7). 
Social areas of impact - No direct evidence (see discussion below). 
Findines related to context 
Social context - No direct evidence (see discussion below). 
Findings related to scheme design and management 
Premium - All participants thought the premium to be low, and this was one of the 
reasons cited by beneficiaries as to why the hospital referral scheme could not be 
considered as insurance (Ch. 7). 
Premium collection - Many interviexx respondents reported that the premium was 
taken automatically by the dairy secretary with only minimal (or no) discussion with 
beneficiaries (Ch. 7). When membership was voluntary, it -was most often the male 
household head who had paid it. 
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Access to, and quality of, benefits - Those who were hospitalised at Shri Krishna 
Hospital were generally impressed with the qualltý' of service provided. although 
there were many complaints about its location and the indirect costs of 
hospitalisation (Ch. 7). The quality of health care services were perceived by some 
to be low (e. g. too large and impersonal, too many student doctors and nurse-s). 
Mechanisnu to prevent (or encoLirage) adverse selection - Several people reported 
purchasing a card specifically to access the referral services onlv at-ter someone in 
the household had fallen ill. Administrators acknowledged that this was allowed, 
and in some cases, encouraged (Ch. 7). 
Links with other organisations -TF was perceived by beneficiaries to be linked to 
the local dairy co-operatives, and many TF members thought that membership in TF 
was restricted to those who deposit milk at the local dairy co-operatives (Ch. 7). 
The household survey (Ch. 5) confirmed that farmers (including dairy farmers) were 
significantly more likely to have joined the scheme than those of various other 
occupational categories. 
Financial managenient - All of TF's central administrators acknowledged that the 
scheme had encountered difficulties as a result of unsustainable financing. On the 
one hand, there was the expectation among some members of free hospital isation. 
while on the other hand, membership fees were very low (and fixed) with the 
majority of scheme costs covered by external funding which was also fixed (Ch. 7). 
Community involvement - The current director of the scheme suggested that one of 
the strengths of the TF scheme was that the dairy cooperatives were involved in the 
running of the scheme (Ch. 7). It vvas not clear whether. or to what extent. the 
broader community (i. e. those outside dairy co-operative administration) had been 
engaged. 
Under4ying objectives - Administrators of TF cited as the main objective of the 
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broader organisation the provision of preý-entvve and pnmar, v health care ser'ýIces- 
targeted towards poorer women and children. The hospital referral scheme arose out 
of the perceived need for affordable inpatient care. and the desire of administmtors 
at Shri Krishna Hospital to increase utilisation of the facility. Members of TF were 
often unaware of the hospital referral scheme, but those who were cited discounted 
hospital costs as the primary benefit (Ch. 7). 
Information, education and communication - Members of TF were often una'ware of 
their membership in the scheme. Lack of awareness appeared to be more common 
among women (Ch 7). 
SEWA's Medical Insurance Fund 
finding, i related to the scheme's impac 
Access to health care - Rates of utilisation of the Fund were low in relation to 
overall rates of hospital i sation. Among Fund members in the household survey, 
there were 28 hospitalisations, and onli, -5 of these hospital isations (1890) were 
reimbursed by SEWA (Ch. 8). Similarly, analysis of all claims submitted to SEWA 
revealed that the rate of claims submission (181,000 Fund membersývear) accounted 
for only a fraction (roughly 22% to 37%) of all hospitalisations among claimants 
(Ch. 9). Overall, the frequency of claims submission was 1.7 times higher among 
those with lifetime versus annual membership in the scheme. There was no 
significant association between membership in the Fund and frequency of 
hospitalisation (Ch. 8). 
Protection from the costs of health care - In the household survey, there was 
insufficient data to draw conclusions about the association between membership in 
the Fund and hospital expenditures per annum (Ch. 8). In the analysis of the claims 
database, of all claims submitted to SEWA, I Po were rejected. Among claims that 
were reimbursed, the median level of reimbursement was 93", o (and the mean 7) 7'o) 
(Ch. 9). There was considerable variation in level of reimbursement by total 
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hospital expenditure: the least expensive quintile of hospitalisations was reimbursed 
to 100% while the most expensive was reimbursed to only 291o. Reimbursement 
more than halved the frequency with which hospitalisations would have been 
catastrophic (i. e. would have accounted for >10% of annual household income) from 
36% to 15%. Protection from catastrophic costs was greatest among the poorest 
households, for example, among the poorest quintile of claimants, reimbursement 
decreased the frequency with which hospitalisations would have been catastrophic 
from 72% to 25%. In the two most recent years, lag time between hospital discharge 
and reimbursement was just over three months. 
Consistent with the quantitative findings, qualitative inten-iews revealed that 
members who received reimbursement were generally satisfied with the amount 
received, although they did acknowledge that there were costs beyond the direct 
costs that could be included in the claim. In several cases, despite hak'ing SEWA 
insurance, women had to borrow money in order to cover the costs of hospitalisation 
(Ch. 10). 
Equity of access - Older age and higher frequency of illness episodes within the last 
month were significantly associated %vith membership in the Fund (Ch. 8). Wealth 
was not significantly associated with membership in the Fund (Ch. 8). Data on self- 
reported annual household income provided by claimants suggest that levels of 
poverty among SEWA claimants are comparable to the general population of 
Gujarat (Ch. 9). Although there have been improvements over the two most recent 
fiscal ears, claimants living in rural areas and claimants working in the agriculture y 
sector waited significantly longer for reimbursement (Ch. 9). 
Consumer satisfaction - Many of the women who had submitted claims to SEWA 
experienced difficulties in compiling the necessary receipts and certificates. As' 
well, they reported waiting three or more months between submission of a claim and 
reimbursement (Ch. 10). However, they generally did not attribute the delays to a 
problem with SEWA, but rather to the doctors who were required to provide receipts 
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and certificates. 
Quality of health care - Respondents denied that they had changed their choice of 
health care provider (for example, private versus public) as a result of ha% ing health Cý 
insurance (Ch. 10). 
Social areas of impact - No direct evidence (see discussion below) 
Findinzs related to context 
Social context -A representative of the external donor felt that the IIS had been 
successful (in terms of attracting new members) in part because of strong affiliation 
and the sense of community among SEWA members (Ch. 10). 
Findings related to scheme design or manavemen 
Premium - The membership fee is sufficiently high as to act as a deterrent (for 
some) to joining the scheme (Ch. 10). Male respondents suggested that the premium 
be collected during the harvest, as money was more likely to be available at that 
time. 
Premium collection - At least in some cases, household members (often male) other 
than the insured woman, had purchased the insurance, and this seemed to be 
associated with lower levels of knowledge among those who had not paid for 
themselves (Ch. 10). 
Claims process - The difficulty in compiling claims - doctors' certificates, hospital 
receipts, and pertinent laboratory reports - seems to result from (I)a lack of 
information among the insured regarding what documentation is required and (2) 
attempts by doctors to make things difficult ancU-'or extract money. 
Trust and links with other organisations - Members' trust in SEWA Uruon (and the 
various smaller organisations that fall under it) was thought to influence their 
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decision to join the IIS. In a numbeýr of cases, respondents had lost their trust in the 
insurance scheme - usually due to problems of poor communication - and as a 
result, had discontinued their membership (Ch. 10). 
Decentralisation - Until recently (the last two years) the lag time between discharge 
from hospital and reimbursement was longer among claimants living, in rural areas 
(and claimants who reported working primarily in the agriculture sector) (, Ch. 9). 
Coinciding with "decentralisation" of the claims process (the opening of the Anand 
claims office) lag time decreased significantly, and the differences by district and 
occupation virtually disappeared. 
Managementlleadership - Administrators of the SEWA scheme attributed the 
success of the Fund in part to good management and strong leadership (Ch. 10). 
Underlying objectives - Beneficiaries (who were aware of the Fund) felt that its 
primary objective should be to cover (very specifically, half of) hospital costs. 
Scheme administrators expressed various goals for the Fund, including: high levels 
of coverage of all SEWA members, fast and facile processing of claims, and 
increased awareness among members of their own health and issues of quality of 
healthcare (Ch. 10). 
In/brmation, education and comnizinication - Some SEWA insured women were 
unaware of the IIS or their membership in it (Ch. 10). 
Exclusion of otherfamiýv members - Fexv respondents complained about the failure 
of the US to cover household members other than adult females (Ch. 10). 
DiscussION OF KEY OVERALL FINDINGS FROM THE CASE STUDIES 
This section compares findings from the two case-studies, and discusses these 
findings in the context of previous research on CBHI. The section is diN-ided 
according to the indicators of scheme impact for which this study provided data: 
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- scheme utilisation and access to hospitalisation (thesis Objective I 
- protection from the costs of hospital care (Objective 2): 
- coverage by the scheme and targeting of the poor. and equity of access to benefits 
(Objective 3); 
social consequences (Objective 4), 
sustainability, financial and managerial. 
Each sub-section opens with a comparison of the findings for the t,. %-o schemes. 
followed by discussion that draws links between the impact findings, and underlving 
aspects of scheme context, design and management (thus addressing Objective 5). 
Scheme utilisation and access to hospitalisation 
Relative to overall rates of hospital isation, rates of utilisation both of TF's hospital 
referral scheme and SEWA's Fund were very low. Given this, it was perhaps not 
surprising that neither of the schemes had resulted in increased access to 
hospitalisation among members relative to controls. 
There are reasons to expect that once enrolled in an insurance scheme that covers 
some portion of hospital costs, one would make use of it. Qualitative findings 
(presented in Appendix 11) suggest that the costs of seeking health care in this rural 
district were high relative to income. Perceived cost of health care and the 
availability of money in the household were important determinants of whether, 
where (what type) and how much health care was sought. Bennett, et al. (1998, p. 
19) suggest that user-fees (including at government facilities) fiAmay be essential if 
the potential role of insurance is to be recognised or broad popular demand for 
insurance created. "' 
Almost all other studies have found that community-based insurance that covm the 
costs of hospitalisation increases hospital utilisation (see Chapter 3, Table 3-I). This 
may reflect a publication bias, wherein the most successful schemes are the most 
likely to have been studied and reported on. Under-utilisation appears not to have 
been an issue for other CBHl schemes, in fact Bennett. et al. (1998, p. 45) states. 
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""problems with over-utilisation of sen, ices and cost escalation appear to ha% e been a 
problem in Type I (covering high-cost. low-frequency events) schemes especialk . 
Both TF and SEWA fall into this category of "'Type F schemes. 
Given that user-fees in this setting were widespread and high. "-hy did members of 
these schemes fail to use them? Low rates of utilisation may have been due to 
several factors, either alone or in combination. The factors most likely responsible 
for low rates of utilisation were similar for the two schemes: lack of awareness of 
the scheme and its benefits among members; perceived problems with the process of 
making a claim, or the amount reimbursed'discounted under the scheme; and 
perceived problems with access to and'Or quality of health care under the scherne 
(unique to TF). Under the TF scheme, any or all of the above factors may have been 
exacerbated by the fact that the schemes finances were collapsing, resulting in the 
discontinuation of the scheme late in 1999, and that improved access to 
hospitalisation was not a central objective of the scheme. 
Members of both of the schemes lacked knowledoe about their respective scheme, 
its benefits, and/or their membership in it. This appeared to be the most important 
reason for low levels of utilisation of both schemes. In the case of TF it was clear 
that this occurred in some cases because the secretary at the local dairy co-operative 
had automatically - with varying degrees of discussion or notification - deducted the 
Rs. 10 membership fee from the annual bonus before passing the balance on to 
recipients. Lack of awareness among females resulted in some cases from men 
purchasing the membership without informing female household members. Perhaps CD 
more surprising, given that individuals rather that households were covered, was that 
members of the IIS were also lacking information. In some cases. this ý%'as because 
other members of the household had purchased the insurance - sometimes another 
female resident of the household, perhaps an IIS member herself. but sometimes a 
male member of the household. Bennett. et al. ( 1998, p. 26) concluded that 
""examination of the histories of long-standing schemes shows that maintaining a 
given level of coverage (and presumably also utilisation) requires... a sustained 
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information and sales policy. " 
Lack of information among members might anse in a variety of ways. Firstl. %-. it 
may be that the CBHI scheme fails to provide members xith clear information and 
education at the time of enrolment (or it is shared with one household member. vvho 
fails to pass it on). Alternatively, this information may be imparied to members, but 
they fail to understand it. Thirdly, it is possible that the information is- sharedý and 
understood, but it is forgotten with time. This is especially likely to be true if 
members are not periodically reminded and re-educated about the scheme. For TF 
and SEWA, it is likely that all three factors came into play. There seemed to be an 
emphasis within both schemes on increasing overall membership, with less 
thought/concem to more "distal" outcomes, such as increased hospital utilisation, 
and improved health status (although this study does not provide evidence to 
substantiate this claim). This is perhaps because coverage was a traditional indicator 
of the schemes' success, and more specifically had been used as a measure of the 
success of village-level representatives. Thus, it may be that there was little or no 
incentive for the scheme representatives who were actually selling the 
membership/policy to spend time explaining the procedures and benefits. 
Members may fail to use the schemes if they anticipate that the value of 
reimbursement/discount will be low, or that the process of seeking reimbursement 
will be difficult, time-consuming or costly. Members of TF's referral scheme 
complained neither about the process of seeking discount, nor about the amount theý 
expected to be reimbursed or (among those who had used the scheme) had been 
reimbursed. Administrators explained that the process of seeking a discount grew 
more difficult for members in 1999 as they were subjected to a needs as-sessment. 
but such difficulties were not reflected in beneficiary interviews. Arriong SENk .A 
beneficiaries, the situation was quite different. Those who were familiar %% ith the 
Fund, including those who actually used it. had few complaints about the le%els of 
reimbursement. They were aware, however. that direct and indirect costs ot a 
hospitalisation could easily exceed Rs. 1,200. Furthermore, many who submitted 
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claims to the IIS faced unforeseen problems and costs in doin. -, so. 
Compihlniz 
doctors' certificates and receipts %vas the most difficult pan of the claims proce"o - 
on average, it took women 55 days (from hospital discharge) to submit their claims 
to SEWA. In interviews, claimants reported attempts by doctors to make the process 
difficult and/or to extract money. It may also be that claimants, encountered 
difficulties in presenting the claim to the closest SEWA office (e. g. lack oftime or 
money for transportation, restrictions on where the claimant could travel 
it is poss' o %% re independently, poor health). Thus, II ible that members of the IIS wh -e 
eligible for reimbursement may have failed to submit a claim as they anticipated the 
level of reimbursement would be lo,. k- or the process of reimbursement would 
excessively consume their time, energy and resources. 
One of the key reasons that the schemes did not impact on hospital utilisation may 
be that outpatient and primary health care - the funding and promotion ofwhich are 
often a major catalyst to change - were not adequately covered under the schemes. 
It should be recalled (from Chapter 4) that some primary care is provided by the 
parent organisations of both schemes: however, in both cases this primary care is 
limited in scope (accessibility and variety of sen, ices provided). It is generally held 
that a rational referral network (at least in non-emergencv cases) involve,, a patient 
presenting first to an outpatient provider, with only more serious cases referred on to 
inpatient providers or specialists. Perhaps removing the financial bamers; to 
inpatient care has little impact when no protection is provided against the costs of 
the gate-keeper, although this seems implausible. Rather, it may be that lack of 
knowledge and awareness around health-related issues (and the benefits of 
hospital isation) pose a greater (or as great a) barrier to hospital utIllsatIon than 
do 
costs of care. Education and communication generated through increased access to 
preventive and primary care may- be a necessary precursor to increased 
hosi)ltal 
insurance scheme that also covers outpati utilisation. Finally, it may be that an 
cam would have greater impact on hospital utilisation because members %%ould - as- 
a result of the high frequency of events requiring outpatient care - 
be niore familiar 
with, and more likely to remember, the benefits covered under the scheme. 
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It may also have been the case that members of SENVA's IIS did not submit claims 
as they were hospitalised due to one of the conditions excluded from benefit (e. g. 
chronic tuberculosis, certain cancers, diabetes. hýpertension). Howc%er. given the 
low levels of awareness among members, most would be unaware that there %vere 
excluded conditions, far less what these conditions were. Consistent with this. fe%% 
interview respondents complained (or seemed to know) about excluded conditions. 
Furthermore, the doctor who reviewed claims for the scheme reported bending the 
rules to provide reimbursement despite an excluded condition being the cause of 
hospitalisation (particularly with longer-term members) as the scheme was a -social 
service". Women who did not submit a claim because they had been hospitallsed for 
an excluded condition probably accounted for a small fraction of those who failed to 
submit a claim. 
Members of TF may not have used Shri Krishna Hospital because of concerns about 
distance, indirect costs (including the cost of transportation), and/or quality of care. 
Indeed, all of these were cited by members as reasons for not using the facility. 
Consistent with the hypothesis that distance acts as a barrier to utilisation, this study 
found that rates of utilisation of Shri Krishna Hospital (among TF members) 
correlated inversely with distance between their taluka (sub-district) of residence and 
the hospital. There was ample evidence from the qualitati-, ý-e interviews that lack of 
trust (versus perceptions of poor quality) was also an issue. Those who ,, iewed Shri 
Krishna Hospital as a place where people go to die, or to be practised on by student 
doctors, may have been less likely to make use of the facility. The TF hospital 
referral scheme had much in common with "hospital-owned" schemes in that all 
inpatient care was provided at a single facility. Bennett, et al. ( 1998, p. 58) found 
some hospital-owned schemes to be unresponsive to consumers: 
However, several oj'the health insurance schemes reviewt., d. partlcularýV 
facility-based schemes. effectiveýv ignored the demand issue (i. L,. whedier 
demand exists among non-formal sector workers and rural populationO 
during the design period, simply assuming that the product would be 
bought once available. 
Perhaps this lack of responsiveness stems from the %-er-.. - limited supply of health 
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insurance schemes in most developing countries (i. e. lack of competition). 
There is evidence, then, for a variety of factors that may ha,. e limited utilisation of 
TF's hospital referral scheme: lack of knowledge about the services and perceived 
problems with distance, indirect costs, and/or quality of health care. But A-h,, were 
the low rates of scheme utilisation tolerated by TF administrators" In large part. this 
was probably due to problems of financial viabilivv. To increase utilisation would 
almost certainly have meant pushing the scheme (or rather Shri Krishna Hospital) 
further into indebtedness. As is discussed below, failure of scheme administrators to 
make significant changes to the scheme so as to increase rates of utilisation also calls 
into question whether, and to what extent, increasing access to hospitalisation was 
actually one of their objectives. According to TFs first managing director, the 
scheme arose to provide inpatient care for the very poorest of TF's beneficiaries (i. e. 
those who could not afford hospitalisation elsewhere) and to increase Shri Krishna 
Hospital's patient-load so as to facilitate its accreditation. Beyond that, 
administrators of the scheme did not aspire to increase access to, or relieve the 
financial burden of hospital i sation. This appears to have occurred with other 
hospital-owned schemes (Bennett, et al. 1998, p. 13): 
Some jaciliýy-based schemes it-ere primariýy driven bY the need to raise 
revenue, for example. Others sought to combine revenue-raising with 
improved utilisation of services. Thus hospital-based schemes may have 
paid little attention to meeting a population's needfor services at different 
levels... 
Protection from the costs of hospital care 
Among those who actually used the two schemes. the mean amounts 
reimbursed/discounted were large relative to direct costs of hospitalisation. Both 
schemes were likely to have reduced indebtedness and impoverishment among those 
who used the schemes. Some, however, still went into debt despite rccelving 
reimbursement/discount. Compared to SENVA, TF conferred greater 
financial 
protection on those who experienced the most expensive hospital isations. 
As aforementioned, these findings must be interpreted somewhat cautiously. 
For 
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example. while median levels of reimbursement under the SEWA scheme appear 
higher (93% for SEWA versus 48% for TF), the estimate for SEWA maý be 
erroneously high as claimants may not have been motivated to submit receipts in 
excess of Rs. 1,200. Both for TF and for SEWA. the denominator (total direct 
hospital costs before reimbursement'discount) is exclusi%e of indirect costs of 
hospitalisation. The indirect costs, particularly those for transportation and 
medicines (purchased outside the hospital) may have been high, and alone may have 
been burdensome to some individuals. 
The discount provided by TF has three apparent advantages over reimbursement 
under SEWA's IIS. Firstly, the discount provided by TF was generally indexed to 
the direct costs of the hospitalisation. For most of the scheme"s history it was 
approximately 50% of direct costs, but varied according to income in the final year 
of the scheme. Secondly, the TF discount was taken off the hospital bill before the 
patient paid anything out-of-pocket. Thirdly, members of the TF scheme were 
excluded from benefits based on wealth, as opposed to nature of illness. AS 
discussed in the following three paragraphs, the fact that under SEW'A's IIS there 
was a cap on reimbursement, reimbursement was provided only after the member 
had paid for hospitalisation, and certain conditions were excluded from coverage, 
limited the financial protection conferred by the scheme. 
The cap on reimbursements by SEWA's IIS (currently Rs. 1,200) may seem to be 
"against the principles of socially oriented insurance"' insofar as it limits the degree 
of financial protection available to members (minimising the impact on the financial 
burden of those who experience the most expensive hospitalisations) and the degree 
of redistribution of resources that occurs under the scheme. However, ui-v-en that the 
total premiums collected under the Fund remain relatively small (relative to the cost 
of long, expensive hospital stays), and that the Fund is not reinsured by am highcr- 
level insurer, the cap has been maintained in order to protect the Fund's financial 
1 Comment made by an anonymous re%, ie%%er from the Bulletin ql- the lVorld Health Ov, -, jni: ario,, in 
written communication of 8.12101. 
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viability. Given that cost-recovery by the Fund has consistentl-v been higher than 
100% (see Chapter 4), administrators could consider increasing the cap on 
reimbursement, or increasing the amount provided for hospital i-sations that are 
particularly expensive. 
The lag time between discharge from hospital and reimbursement by SEWA's IIS 
(on average, just over three months) means that members are required to pa., v the 
total costs of hospitalisation out-of-pocket at the time of discharge. This was much 
higher than SEWA's stated goal of 30 days. Despite the hope of future 
reimbursement, many of these women undoubtedly had to borrow, sell capital. work 
more or forego spending in order to pay for hospital isation. Bennett, et al. (1998, p. 
35) reported that "evidence from elsewhere in India suggests that in such 
circumstances (i. e. when the patient must first pay out-of-pocket). demand may be 
considerably reduced because of the necessity of finding cash to make the initial 
payments. "' In recent years, more than half of the lag time (55 to 98 days) before 
reimbursement by the IIS occurred between discharge from hospital and submission 
of the claim. This may be due to problems encountered in collecting receipts and 
certificates, or difficulties in presenting the claim to the nearest IIS claims office. 
The study provided no evidence that the exclusion of certain medical conditions (e. g. 
chronic tuberculosis, certain cancers, diabetes, hypertension) had a significant 
impact on financial protection (or utilisation, or equity of access). Only I1 "0 of 
claims submitted to SEWA were rejected for any reason (and only half of these 
because of "chronic or pre-existing disease"). And, as already discussed. it is 
unlikely that women failed to submit a claim because they had been hospitallsed for 
an "excluded condition" and so anticipated that they would not be reimbursed. In 
schemes where exclusions are more strictly adhered to, they may impact adverscly 
on outcomes such as financial protection, utilisation and equity: 
Admittedly, setting certain exclusions (or caps) niay be essential . 
1or 
schemes that cover the catastrophic costs of care, in order to prevent 
adi, erse selection. How-ever, these exclusions are likell- to aj L rL 
vulnerable groups, such as the elderli- andpeople withAIDS. 
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Bennett, et aL (1998, p. 4 7) 
Coverage and targeting of the poor 
Both TF and SEWA included among their objectives the targeting of their services 
to the poor. There was a trend towards higher levels of wealth among TF's 
members, relative to the general population. Members of SENVA's Fund appeared 
not to differ from the general population in terms of wealth. 
In comparison to other CBHI schemes in India and elsewhere, TF and SENVA 
managed to enrol an impressive number of people in their "Insurance" schemes. At 
last count, TF had 166,650 member households (assuming -5.3 persons per 
household, this is almost 900,000 members; it is not clear what percentage of the 
population in TF's 644 villages this represents). Membership in SEWAs Fund was 
23,214 women (1999/2000) while total SEWA membership was approximatel. y 
147,618. Thus, some 16% of SEWA members are currently enrolled in the Fund. 
CBHI schemes in other settings have largely failed to include the poor. According 
to the published literature, this failure can usually be attributed either to a failure to 
"target"" the poor (i. e. as one of the objectives of the scheme) and'or an unaffordable 
premium. Of the 82 CBHI schemes reviewed by Bennett, et al. (1998, p. vii), -very 
few reached the poorest households. " In fact, many of the schemes were targeted at 
the "rural middle class", SEWA was listed as one of only four that actually targeted 
"the poor" (p. 23). An unaffordable premium appears to have been particularly 
problematic in other settings. Bennett, et al. (1998) found that most schemes relied 
on flat-rate premiums, and that for several schemes unaffordable premiums were a 
major deterrent to participation. Dave (1993, p. 314-5) cited a number of 
mechanisms that have enabled poorer individuals and households to participate in 
"prepayment" insurance" schemes in India (although she provided no evidence of 
their effectiveness): 
Sewagram and the SSSS have membershipftes related to ability to p(I. I.... 
Membership contributions are graded according to these cawgori . cs... .4t 
Sewagram, contributions mqv he made in sorghum. at K4H. 4 in riLT. and at 
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Goalpara either in rice or through community Labor... Schemes tha., 
request members to pciy a co-payment, most1v towards drugs. all -vail't, rces 
either totally or partiallyfor those members judged unable t() pay. 
In the case of TF, it is highly unlikely that the membership fee. only R. s. 10 per 
household per annum, deterred anyone from joining the scheme. Women reporled 
that the premium for SEWA's IIS (Rs. 72.5 per individual per year) could pose an 
obstacle to joining the scheme, and yet SEWA was more successful at including the 
poor. For these two schemes, there appear to be a variety of other factors (which 
differ by socio-economic group and) which determined whether or not people joined 
the schemes. 
Membership in TF's hospital referral scheme was largely driven by a household's 
participation in the local dairy co-operatives. Households seemed to join TF either 
because: they had been told about the scheme, and membership was so inexpenso-e 
that they found it difficult to say no, or membership was made mandatory by their 
local dairy society. This explains both TF's abilitv to attract such a large 
membership, and the fact that the poor were excluded to some degree. Membership 
in SEWA's IIS, and its inclusion of the poor. is somewhat harder to explain. In pan, 
membership was driven by participation in the larger SEWA organisation, and its 
many development-oriented activities. But the fact that members of the IIS were 
older and sicker than the general population (and probabýi- the larger population of 
SEWA Union members) suggests that there might have been more to SEWA 
membership than just "jumping on the bandwagon" (as was expressed by one of the 
interview respondents, DONOR 0. 
TF's strong ties to the local dairy co-operatives (including overlap in their 
management and administration) undoubtedly deterred some poor households from 
joining. In order to belong to the dairy co-operative. a household had to be 
sufficiently wealthy to purchase and keep a milch animal (a butTalo or Cow), the 
costs of which would have been prohibitive to the poorest in a village. While those 
who did not belong to the local dairýy co-operative were xelcome to join TF. they 
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may never have come to know about the scheme. or thev mav have faced other 
barriers to joining. Consistent with this theorý'. this research found that people 
(members and non-members alike) closely associated the TF scheme with the local 
dairy co-operatives, often believing that membership in TF was restricted to those 
who deposited milk at the dairy. In the household survey it was found that farmeri 
(including dairy farmers) were significantly more likely to ha,. e joined TF than were 
non-farmers. 
There was some evidence from the qualitative intervie, -A-s that membership in TF ý%-as 
determined by state of health, i. e. that households joined TF after someone had 
fallen seriously ill and it was clear that they were going to require inpatient care. 
Given the very low rate at which TF members were hospitalised at Shri Krishna 
Hospital, it is not surprising that this adverse selection did not impact on the socio- 
demographic profile of TF's membership. 
The various services offered by the CBHI scheme - or its "parent *1 or -sister" 
organisation - may facilitate participation among the poor. The many de% elopment- 
oriented services offered by SEWA likely facilitated inclusion of the poor in the IIS. 
For example, (although no evidence is available from this study) members of the 
SEWA trade union may have had better access to credit and savings accounts, and as 
such they may have had greater demand for insurance. perhaps both increased need 
because they were sufficiently secure to make plans for the future, and increased 
ability to pay because they had more disposable income credit. CBHl schemes 
elsewhere have also benefited from ownership by an NGO involved 
in broad 
.PI community development activities. Bennett, et al. (1998, p. 
20- 1) hV othesised that: 
communities ma ,y 
be more willing to participate activelv, in health 
insurance schemes (created b. i- NGOs involved in development activitic, s) 
since thev consider that their priority nceds - Jor a ýtahle inc ome, lor 
instance - are also being addressed- 
ýf a health insurance s(herne 1'. ý 
linked to the communiýv development project vvith it-hich theY art, alrea4i- 
involved, man. v households mail I/Cel 
the. 11 should support the scherne 
membership drive. 
Thus, broader development activities may change the "context" in many "-a%-s that 
.., 8; 
facilitate participation, particularly by the poor. including: empowerim-, the 
disenfranchised to take decisions around membership and health care utilisation: 
increasing the perceived need for health care; creating a sense of dedication to the 
insurance provider; and improving the economic conditions such that the premium is 
affordable. 
Social capital may have been a determinant of membership in SENVA's IIS. but it 
was unlikely to have determined membership in TF. As alreadY mentioned, 
households joined TF either because they were automatically (mandatonly) enrolled 
or because membership was very inexpensive (and they saw it as "charity" or "social 
service"). There seemed to be little sense of solidarity', or of working together 
towards some common good, among TF members. At SEW. -V on the other hand. a 
sense of "affiliation" and "community", perhaps borne out of previous expenence 
with collective action, was cited as a determinant of membership in the IIS. 
Respondents did not report any sense of solidarity (i. e. a willingness and acceptance 
that there would be transfers from the wealthier to the poorer, and from the healthier 
to the sicker, under the scheme). Interestingly, Bennett, et al. (1998, p. 11) found 
that the demand for insurance covering hospitalisation was driven more by "personal 
risk aversion" than "cohesive community": 
Personal risk aversion was more likely to form the basis ot'demand jor 
membership of Týpe I (covering high-cost, low-frequencv events, namell, 
hospitalisation) schemes than. for membership oj'Type H schemes tcoveri . ng 
low-cost, high firequency events, ýypicallv outpatient sen, i . ces or 
medicines)... Lack of a cohesive communi . ýv was thus much less ol'an issuc 
for Type I schemes than for Type II schemes. Moreover, bentficiaries of 
Type I schemes tended to be distributed over a ivide area, relatlv, _, 
ýv 
heterogeneous and therefore less likeýv to experience strong jeclings qf 
solidaritv. 
Aside from the enabling en,,, -ironinent provided by SEWA Union. a sense of 
affiliation, and the affordability of the premium. there is evidence to sug, _gest 
that I -n 
perceived risk of illness (or death) also contributed to the decision whether or not to 
join the 11S. Compared to the general population. IIS members were significantlý 
older and more likely to have reported illness "in the last 30 days". (It may be that 
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members of the SEWA Union were also older and sicker than the general 
population, but this seems highly unlikeb,,. ) -AdN, -erse selection" has occurred xith 
other CBHl schemes. Bennett, et al. (1998) found that ad%erse selection affected 
schemes that cover hospital inpatient care, in particular. In fact, the problem of' 
adverse selection appeared to be particularly problematic for schemes covenn- 
inpatient care that allowed individual (as opposed to household) membership 
(Bennett, et al. 1998, p. 23): 
Schemes that had initially allowed individuals to enrol often rapidýV. fiact: ti 
problems of adverse selection and had to be switched to enrolment hY 
household. 
However, it may be that this "adverse selection" under SENVA's IIS should instead 
be viewed as effective targeting. For example, it is likely that adverse selection was 
to some extent encouraged by scheme functionaries, insofar as poor households %vith 
limited expendable income may have been encouraged to insure the household 
member who was most likely to fall ill. Furthermore, the scheme did fall 
somewhere on the spectrum between health-insurer (strictly-defined) and "social 
service" in that the scheme aimed to improve access to hospital care among the poor, 
and to protect the poor from the costs of hospital isation. As such, adverse selection 
may be viewed in a positive light. Given that the poor are, ceteris paribus, more 
likely than the wealthy to fall ill , inclusion of the older and sicker 
individuals in the 
IIS may also be an indication that the poor were being included (or at least were not 
being excluded). 
The extent to which the poor are included in a scheme in turn has an influence on the 
overall equity impact (not directly assessed in this study) and also on a scheme's 
financial viability. By targeting the poor - and consequently, to some extent, 
excluding the wealthy -a CBHl scheme may limit the extent to which redistnibution 
occurs, both from high to low-income (cross-subsidisation) and from the healthy to 
the ill (risk-pooling). A scheme that focuses narrowly on the poor is likely to have 
to charge low premiums, yet in the target population the frequency of illness, and 
thus hospital isation, may be relatively high. For the TF scheme, there \vas no 
pooling of resources, thus concern around including the poor was not borne out ofa 
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desire to maximise risk-shanng and cross-subsidisation. but perhaps a desire to see 
that external donations were distributed "equitabl. y- among the target population. 
Under SEWA's IIS, despite the diversity of wealth among its membership. the 
amount of redistribution was limited because of the relatively low cap on benefits 
(that does not vary with income). This also greatly limited the risk of financial loss 
by the SEWA's Medical Insurance Fund. One might argue that SEWA could 
""afford" to target the poor, or even focus on them exclusi%-elv. because of the cap on 
benefits. But it must be remembered that while allowing increased coverage of the 
poor (without great risk of financial loss) the cap hindered the overall equity impact 
of the scheme. 
Equity of access to scheme benefits 
Weak evidence from the review of SEWA claims suggested that claimants were as 
poor or poorer than the general population (and thus IIS members overall) but 
comparable data were not available for TF. There was stronger evidence for both 
schemes that distance (or geography) was a barrier to scheme utilisation. 
It is likely that those living in more rural or isolated areas are poorer. Thus, the 
finding that distance was a barrier to utilisation of (or reimbursement under) the 
schemes suggests that access to benefits under the schemes may have been 
inequitable. For SEWA's IIS, rates of utilisation by district were not available. But 
the longer delays between discharge and reimbursement among residents of Kheda 
(a predominantly rural district) relative to Ahmedabad (urban) suggest that distance 
to the nearest claims office may have hindered claims submission or provision of 
payment. This hypothesis is strengthened by the fact that the differential between 
rural and urban delays disappeared with "decentralisation" - the creation ot' an IIS 
claims office in Anand town in July, 1998. It seems likely that within districts, 
delays remained longer for those who lived further from a claims office. Low rates 
of utilisation among TF members who lived in talukas far from Shri Knshna 
Hospital may reflect lower levels of awareness among those living at a distance. or it 
may be that the cost and inconvenience of travelling to Shri Krishna Ho. spital acted 
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as a deterrent. In interviews, beneficiaries remarked that in cas-e'ý of emergen,: ý- it 
took too long to travel to this facility, and that the cost of transporting the patient, 
their family and friends to and from the hospital. could be significant. 
The finding that distance was a barrier to scheme utilisation is entirely consistent 
with the experience in other settings: 
Fairly substantial evidence suggests that utilisation increases Ia'r more 
among insured households located close to a health care j6cihn- and that 
these households are also more likely tojoin such a scheme. Since, under 
most schemes, people pay the same premium vt-herever they live. those. - distant from the facility (who might in any case belong to poorer. morc 
remote, rural communities) in effect cross-subsidise those who live close to 
the health facility. 
(Bennett, et al. 1998, p. 47) 
Rarely have other authors suggested that equity to access could be improved bý' 
establishing facilities (either the health care services or facilities for reimbursement) 
in rural or remote areas - perhaps reflecting the fact this could be labor- and 
resource-intensive, and might take years to implement. Maw, -, however, have 
suggested that the overall equity impact of schemes could be improved by making 
financial contributions more equitable, i. e. by changing the premiums paid to reflect 
rates of utilisation. Dave (1993) cites the example of the RAHA scheme in India: 
Members who are referred to any one of the three hospitals affiliated to 
RAHA pqy an entrancefee related to the distance trai, elled. The charges 
are Rs. 200 if the distance travelled is less than 25 kilometres, Rs. 150 if it 
is oi, er Rs. 25 kilometres but less than 100 kilometres, and Rs. 100 if it is 
over 100 kilometres. 
Social consequences 
Data from this study provide no evidence for the many potential social consequences 
that were described in the literature review. As previously discussed, the qualitati%C 
methods used may not have been adequately sensitive to the social consequences of 
CBHl. Alternatively, social consequences may not ha-ve been obsen-ed due to the 
nature of the schemes investigated or characteristics of the setting. 
The social consequences described in the literature review (Chapter 3) were for ffic 
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most part observed in developed countnes, and in relation either to mandator-ý, 
social insurance schemes or private- for-pro fit schemes. In developed counthes. 
health insurance is generally widely available (or mandatory), essential insofar as 
inpatient services would be unaffordable without it. and insurance schemes are hv no 
means a new phenomenon. It is not hard to imagine that health insurance could 
impact on the status of allopathic physicians (de Swaan 198-S) or impact on the 
nature of the interaction between doctor and patient, for example. in setting's where 
the bulk of health system resources flow through insurance schemes. On the one 
hand, it may be that TF's hospital referral scheme and SEWA's IIS were too small 
(in terms of coverage and resource mobilisation), too new or too infrequentl", - used to 
bring about social consequences. For example, such schemes mav bnn,, about 
changes in medical decision-making (for example, empowering insured women to 
make their own decisions) only after members become familiar with insurance 
through long-standing and repeated use. Alternatively, it may be that some aspect of 
the broader context (something about Gujarat, India, or developing countries, for 
example) prevented the schemes from having social consequences. For example, the 
fact that hospitals in India are largely uru-nonitored and unregulated means that it is 
extremely difficult for a scheme dealing with multiple providers (like SEWA's IIS) 
to evaluate the services at facilities, and direct members to one group of providers 
versus another. Thus, the health system context in India maý' prevent health 
insurance schemes from improving the status of allopathic physicians %ersus 
unqualified or traditional doctors. 
This study does highlight one potential social consequence (not covered in the 
literature review) that should be further investigated in this setting. The qualitatiVe 
sub-study revealed that informal credit (borrowed from friends, family, employers or 
money-lenders) was a common means of acquiring money to paý for hospital isation. 
Even those who received benefits under the two schemes reported using credit. 
either to pay the hospital bill while xvaiting for reimbursement (under SEWA's IIS). 
or to pay the un-covered portion of the bill or the indirect costs incurred. If CBHl 
becomes more prevalent, it seems likely that it %&, III have some impact on these 
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informal networks of financial protection. either by decreasing the frequency with 
which they are used, or changing the nature or duration of borrolwingg. 
Sustainability, financial and managerial 
During the course of this study, it became increasingly clear that sources of funding, 
and levels of cost-recovery, were important determinants of the long-term viabilit. ' 
of the schemes. Early on during the study, it was revealed by scheme administrators 
that the costs of caring for TF members at Shri Krishna Hospital were offset. riot by 
membership fees paid by TF members, but by a fixed donation made annually by an 
external donor, Kaira Can. In recent years, the discounts provided to TF members 
had far exceeded the donation by Kaira Can, so that Shri Krishna Hospital was going 
into considerable debt providing subsidised care to TF members. As this study was 
going on, scheme (and hospital) administrators had responded to these financial 
imbalances first by reducing benefits under the hospital referral scheme, attempting 
to provide discounts in inverse proportion to a member's wealth. Late in 1999, 
discounts at Shri Krishna Hospital for TF members were completely discontinued. 
(Note that these changes were not captured in the household survey or the scheme 
utilisation data, as these data largely pre-dated the changes. ) 
At SEWA, on the other hand, resources for the Medical Insurance Fund came from 
two main sources. The premiums paid by members accounted for the largest 
portion. Since the Fund's inception, the premiums have consistently exceeded the 
total amount reimbursed, at a ratio varying from 119 to 309 percent (11-0 2001, p. 0 
77). Administrative costs of the scheme are considered separately here. as it has not 
been possible to estimate the percentage of administrati% e time spent on the N'tedical 
Insurance Fund versus the life and asset insurance components. All administrative 
costs have been paid for out of interest on a grant from German Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ). These costs accounted for 10.2 to 22.9% of total IIS costs 
annually (11-0 200 1). 
The heavv reliance on external funds by TF's hospital refen-al scheme. compared to 
2QI 
the use of mixed sources at SEWA, may have been problematic t'or two reasons. 
Funding received from Kaira Can was problematic not because it was unreliable (an 
amount of Rs. 500,000 per annum was consistently paid) but because it was fixed. 
whereas TF's membership was rapidly growing as were the costs per person 
hospitalised. The external funding under SEWA's IIS ývas also relati%ely fixed 
(depending on the rate of interest), but because It comprised a small percentage of 
total revenues, this did not seem pose a problem even as membership in the IIS gre%,. - 
over time. Through its close association with SEWA Union (and SENVA Bank), the 
IIS may have been able to draw on accounting and administrative systems that were 
already in place. The reliance on external funds probably impacted on other aspects 
of the scheme's design and management. For example, if TF members had been 
required to cover a greater portion (or all) of the costs of the scheme, they might 
have taken a greater interest in the scheme, and demanded more (information, 
education, services) in return for their contribution. Similarly, if administrators of 
the hospital referral scheme had been managing money perceived to belong to 
beneficiaries, they might have been more careful to ensure that it was spent 
effectively. 
While over-reliance on donor funds poses some risks, CBHI scheme always require 
some external financial support. Bennett, et al. (1998, p. %-11) found that "all of the 
(82) schemes depended on continuing access to some form of external subsidy. Of 
the six Indian "prepaymentlinsurance" reviewed by Dave (1993) all relied on at least 
one source of funding other than the premium fee. These sources 
included user-fees, domestic or international donors, government grants and fund- 
raising activities. 
To attribute all of a scheme's financial difficulties to too heavy a reliance on a single 
source (in this case external) of funds seems too simplistic. For many years. 
administrators of TF were aware that the hospital referral scheme was 
financially 
unsustainable. and yet it was not unti demise was imminent that any major i 
changes were made. Doubtless, this reflects other aspects of context and the 
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scheme's design and management. Was this lack of change due to the Lict that the 
hospital referral scheme (or relief of medical indebtedness, or remoNal of financial 
barriers to health care seeking, etc. ) was not a major concern. objectl%-e of scheme 
administrators or beneficiaries? Was it because TF assumed that one of its "sister 
organisations" involved in the scheme (including Kaira Can. Shri Krishna Hospital. 
and the Kaira District Cooperative Milk Producers' Union Limited. parent 
organisation to the local dairy co-operatives) would eventually save it from financial 
ruin? Was it because scheme managers were insufficiently equipped (e. g. 
technically, with information, with political clout) to bnng about the necessary 
changes? Data from this study do not provide the answer. The fact that the old 
scheme has now been discarded and replaced suggests that participants did not , see 
the old scheme as worth saving, and wished to start with a clean slate. The lack of 
change to TF's hospital referral scheme over its 19-year lifespan suggests, that 
management was doing little to optimise its impact. In contrast, in the almost ten 
years since it was started, the SEWA's IIS has constantly evolved. This has been 
cited as one of its strengths: 
Some of the more succesýful schemes progressiveýv adopted a more active 
purchasing role and regularýv sought feedback on their performance. The 
SEWA scheme, in particular, made considerable efforts to adapt in order to 
meet members'needs. 
(Bennett, et al. 1998, p. 41): 
SE 4A 's efforts to streamline procedures in order to meet clients ' needs are 
an excellent example ofsuch responsiveness. 
(Bennett, et aL 1998, p. 58-9) 
Finally, one aspect of the design and management of both schemes that may have 
had a negative impact on all indicators of impact was the failure to collect andor 
make use of data. Fine-tuning the design of a scheme requires information on \, %-ho 
is enrolled and excluded, rates and causes of hospitallsation. expenditures on 
hospital isation, and barriers that prevent enrolment in the scheme and utilisation of 
the scheme by those who are insured. In fact. at the commencement of this study, 
both TF and SEWA already had much data available to them. For example. TF 
kept 
annually updated records of its members and received utilisation data 
from Shn 
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Krishna Hospital monthly in the form of bills. Similarlý. the IIS recorded a Sma! 1 
amount of information on all enrolled members, and recorded relati%'elv detailed 
information on all those who submitted claims. In neither case. though. had data 
been entered into a computer and monitored over time for indicators such as rate of 
scheme utilisation or proportion of expenditures reimbursed. In fact. this study 
marked the first time that claims data for the SEA"A scheme (previously kept as 
cover-sheet, receipts and certificate in binders) had been entered into a computer and 
analysed. Bennett, et al. (1998, p. 32) expressed the importance of data on 
utilisation to financial sustainability: 
So for Type I schemes, utilisation review, including regular revicit, ol 
medical records to identify excess provision or unusual medical practices, 
may be necessary to ensure the schemes continued. 1inancial viability. 
SUMMARY 
This section has described and discussed the impact of TF's hospital referral scheme 
and SEWA's Fund in terms of. (1) scheme utilisation and access to hospitalisation, 
Q 1) protection from the costs of hospital care; (3) inclusion of the poor and equity of 
access to scheme benefits; (4) social consequences, and (5) sustainability, financial 
and managerial. Links were described between scheme impact and underlying 
aspects of context and scheme design and management. 
Both schemes ha,,, -e had some minor successes. SEWA was successful at including 
the poor under the Fund. Both TF and SEWA reduced hospital expenditures, and 
relieved indebtedness, among those who actually used the schemes. These 
successes, however, were overwhelmed bv the verv low rates of utilisation of the 
two schemes. The factors most likely responsible for low rates of utilisation were 
similar for the two schemes, and included: lack ofawareness of the scherrie and its 
benefits among members; perceived problems with the process of making a,: Iaim, or 
the amount reimbursed, 'discounted under the scheme, and perceived problems with 
access to and; or quality of health care under the scheme (this last point is unique to 
TF). Under the TF scheme, any or all of the above factors may have been 
exacerbated by the fact that the scheme' s finances were collapsing . resulting in the 
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discontinuation of the scheme late in 1999. 
The study found that the schemes had not had important social consequences. and 
that participants expressed their goals for, and perceived the impact of, the schemes 
in terms of economic benefits. Social capital appeared to be an imporlant 
determinant of membership in the SEWA scheme. but otherwise appeared to have 
minimal influence on the functioning of the two schernes. 
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CHAPTER 12: CO. NCLUSION'S. A-ND POLICYI-NIPLICATIONS 
This chapter will demonstrate the extent to which this study's objectives have been 
met. The conclusions are presented in two parts. The first section presents 
substantive conclusions that can be made about the two schemes studied. For each 
scheme, the nature of the impact and the factors that underlie this impact are 
presented. The second section presents theoretical conclusions based on what the 
two case studies reveal about CBHI schemes more generally. These conclusions are 
of greater interest to a wider audience of policy-makers, but their nature is more 
tentative. The third section describes what the study's conclusions contribute to 
theory, and the extent to which the objectives of the thesis have been met. The 
fourth section highlights the implications of the study for policy-makers in India and 
elsewhere (addressing the thesis' final objective), and the final section suggests areas 
for future research. 
SUBSTANTIVE CONCLUSIONS ON THE TWO CASE-STUDY CBH1 SCHUMES 
Tables 12.1 and 12.2 use the categories set out in Table 3.4 to summarise the overall 
impact of TF's hospital referral scheme and SEWA Medical Insurance Fund, and the 
factors found in this study to underlie impact. 
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Rates of utilisation of both schemes were IoNk. and neithcr had increased access to 
hospitalisation among members relative to controls (althou-gh this mav reflect 
insufficient statistical power of the household survex. ). Several aspects of the TF 
hospital referral scheme's design and management may have contributed to lo"- 
rates of utilisation. Members were often unaware of the benefits to which they %%-ere 
entitled, and in some cases were entirely unaware of TF and their membership in it. 
Those who were aware of the scheme may have perceived problems with the referral 
services, namely distance to, cost and perceived quality of, ser-", -Ices at Shri Krishna 
Hospital. Similarly, low levels of awareness may have hindered utilisation of 
SEWA's Fund. Members of the IIS may have decided not to seek reimbursement 
under the Fund, anticipating that levels of reimbursement ývould be low or that there 
would be difficulties and delays in seeking and receiving reimbursement. It is 
unlikely the exclusion of certain chronic conditions from reimbursement by the Fund 
prevented members from submitting claims as most members were unaware of these 
disease illness exclusions. 
Among TF members who used Shri Krishna Hospital, and SEWA-IIS members who 
submitted claims to the Fund, average rates of discount'reimbursement (as a 
percentage of direct costs of hospitalisation) were high. TF's referral scheme, 
relative to SEWA's Fund, was especially effective in preventing indebtedness 
among those who experienced more expensive hospitalisations. Despite the 
financial benefits provided under the two schemes, there were some recipients who 
went into debt paying for hospitalisation. In the case of SEWA's Fund, some went 
into debt because of the delay between discharge and reimbursement, while others 
went into debt to cover the un-reimbursed hospital expenditures. The financial 
protection conferred by SEW. Vs Fund %vas hindered by the fixed cap on 
reimbursement (compared with discounts indexed to total direct costs of' 
hospitalisation under the TF scheme) and delays between discharge from hospital 
and reimbursement (compared with the discount being subtracted directl%- from the 
hospital bill. prior to any out-of-pocket payment). 
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There was a trend towards higher levels of %vealth among TF's members, relative to 
the general population, while members of SEWA's Fund did not differ from the 
general population in terms of wealth. Demand for membership in TF's hospital 
referral scheme was largely driven by participation in the local dairv co-operatives, 
membership in TF was either sold through the local dairy co-operatives (on a 
voluntary basis) or mandated by the co-operatives, so most members of TF were also 
members of the local dairy co-operatives. Members of the dairy co-operatives were 
likely to be wealthy in comparison to the general population as they had to be able to 
afford at least one milk-producing animal. Households may also have joined TF as 
they perceived the membership fee to cover the many other village-level services 
provided by TF - including some primary and preventive care services - or they 
believed it to be a contribution to "charity" or "social service". Demand for 
membership in SEWA's Fund was similarly related to the scheme's strong links 
with a parent organisation and services that were packaged together with the health 
insurance. The development-oriented services of SEWA Union may have created an 
enabling context for a successful insurance scheme (e. g. generating sense of 
affiliation between SEWA members, improving the economic condition such that 
the premium was affordable) and a sense of dedication to SEWA. Members also 
purchased membership in the Fund because this membership was packaged (under 
the umbrella of the IIS) with life insurance. While perceived risk of illness 
contributed to the decision whether or not to join both schemes, only SEWA Fund 
members were significantly older, and in poorer health, than non-members. 
There was some evidence to suggest that access (specifically. geographic) to benefits 
was inequitable under both schemes. Utillsation rates were lower arriong TF 
member households in talukas farther from Shri Krishna Hospital, in more rural 
areas. The cost and inconvenience of travelling to Shri Krishna Hospital were 
reported as barriers to its use. Prior to decentralisation of claims processing. delay" 
between discharge and reimbursement by SEWA's Fund were significantly longer in 
Kheda District (largely rural) than in Ahmedabad (urban). The cross-district data 
suggest that residents of rural areas faced delays in reimbursement due to longer 
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distances to the closest clahns office. 
The TF scheme was financially unsustainable, with Shri Krishna Hospital incumns-, 
debts as a result of the scheme for several years prior to the scheme's 
discontinuation late in 1999. Financing of the scheme was unsustainable both 
because funding from the extemal source was fixed (while the scheme*s 
membership and cost per hospitalisation were increasing with time) and because the 
scheme did not draw on any altemative sources of funding. SEWA's Niedical 
Insurance Fund appeared to be financially sustainable. It relied on extemal funding 
to cover administrative costs. Members' premiums. the other major source of 
funding, were consistently higher than benefits paid out by the scheme. This can be 
attributed to relatively low rates of scheme utilisation coupled with the fixed cap on 
benefits. 
Several aspects of the TF hospital referral scheme's management impacted 
negatively across all measures of impact assessed in this study. First and foremost, 
it seems that the scheme was not intended by those who designed and implemented 
it to increase rates of utilisation, or to protect all member households from the 
catastrophic costs of inpatient care. Rather, it was intended to provide freellow-cost 
hospitalisation for the very poorest TF members (particularly women and children), 
and to increase bed occupancy rates at Shri Krishna Hospital. Thus, inconsistencies 
between the scheme"s actual objectives and those outlined in Table 3.4 may underlie 
the scheme's "failure" to impact on overall rates or costs of hospitalisation. Second, 
scheme administrators had at their disposal all of the utilisation data presented in this 
thesis (Chapter 6); however, this had not been analysed for utilisation rates. or 
differences in utilisation by age, gender or place of residence. Analysis of this data 
would have revealed, for example. that the hospital referral scheme had failed to 
target women and children (a stated goal of TF) and would have allowed for 
corrective mechanisms to be put in place. Third, as presented above, levels of 
awareness among members, particularly women. about the scheme and its benefits 
were low. This suggests that insufficient communication with, and education of. 
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household members was an issue. Finall-y. over its approximately nineteen years of 
functioning, virtually no changes were made to the design of the scheme until the 
fmal year. Over this time, the membership fee remained constant, there were no 
changes to the scheme's benefits (for example, they were only ever a%-ailable at Shn 
Krishna Hospital) and there appeared to ha%-e been little chan, -, e in how the di. scount 
was applied for, processed or awarded. This lack of change seems remarkable -, i%-en 
the worsening state of the scheme's finances. 
As was the case with TF, all activities of SEWA's Fund ý%-ere hindered by the 
absence of a system for regularly analysing and reporting on data that were collected 
about the scheme. However, since its inception in 1992, small changes were 
constantly made to the scheme in response to its members' "'needs". This helps to 
explain the scheme's large membership and impressi,,, -e rates of cost-recovery. but is 
at odds with the low rates of utilisation. 
THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS 
Factors which have emerged as important determinants of the impact of the two 
CBHl schemes studied are reviewed below, and some conclusions about their 
broader relevance to CBHl schemes in developing countries drawn. Caution was 
used in making generalisations regarding scheme context, given that only two 
schemes were observed, and many aspects of context were the same for the nvo. 
Furthermore, because TF's hospital referral scheme has many peculiar 
characteristics that make it unlike most other CBHl schemes, extra care was taken in 
making generalisations based on findings about this scheme alone. 
The importance of context 
Economic context was found to have influenced the impact of both schemes. while 
social context was of greater importance to SEWA's IIS. The ability to pay was 
cited by SEWA members and their husbands as one of the factors influencing their 
decision to join the IIS. This was not the case for TF, as the premium "-as 
considered by all to be very low. Social capital (expressed in terms of sense of 
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6flaffiliation" or "community) may have encouraged enrolment in SENVA's IIS while 
it appeared not to influence membership in the TF scheme. It did not appear to have 
influenced the other measures of impact examined in this study. Members of both 
schemes reported that the costs of seeking health care were high and that the cost of 
health care was an important determinant of whether. where and how much health 
care was sought. Neither of the case-study schemes had linkages, fon-nal or 
otherwise, to government. As such, it is difficult to make any conclusions related to 
political context. 
In terms of generalisable conclusions about context, Ilic, cconomic condition ofthe 
household is likely to influence demand for membership in a CBHI scheme, 
depending on the amount of the premium. A sense of affiliation or community 
among members of a target population may enhance enrolment in a CBHI scheme. 
The extent to which social capital underlies or influences a scheme's impact 
probably varies tremendously, depending on the nature of the benifits. thesize ofthe 
enrolled population and share of the population enrolled, ownership of the scheme 
and other factors. It is thus difficult to make further generalisations around the 
importance of social capital. Where the costs of hospitalisation are high relatil, e to 
income, they may act as an important determinant of the demandfor inpatient care 
(i. e. whether, where, and how much care people choose to take). 
The importance of scheme design and management 
Premium 
Membership fee for the TF scheme was viewed by administrators and beneficiaries 
alike as being very low, yet there was a trend towards higher wealth among 
members. The premium for SEWA's IIS was reported by some to be unaffordable. 
Nonetheless, the poor joined the scheme. These finding's highlight that a hkzh 
premium can deter some firom joining a CBHI scheme, but that a very low 
(affordable) premium alone does not ensure that the Poor willjoin a scherne. 
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Packaging health insurance with other sen-ic cý 
Under both of the case study schemes, serý, ices other than -health insurance" %%ere 
available. TF members perceived the greatest benefit of the scheme to be reduced- 
cost medicines available through local VH%Vs while SEWA IIS members generally 
thought that life insurance was the greatest benefit available under the IIS. This may 
explain in part how the schemes were able to attract large mem ber-popu I at ions, 
while rates of utilisation of the health insurance component remained low. Thc. ý, -, 
findings suggest that packaging of health insurance vvith other sen'lces (, cspccialýl- 
services perceived to be important by beneficiaries) may increaýe enrolment in a 
scheme. In a scheme where health insurance is packaged with other sen-ices, 
overall membership in the scheme does not serve as an indicator of demand for 
health insurance alone. "en health insurance is pack-aged with other sen-ices. 
individuals may be less aware of the health insurance component, or consider it to 
be of lesser importance relative to the other ser-Oces. 
Fin(incial benefits: amount, ease of claiminz and timeliness 
Financial protection provided under TF's hospital referral scheme ývas enhanced 
because the discount was indexed to total direct costs of hospitalisation and the 
discount was subtracted off of the bill before the TF member made any out-of- 
pocket payment. Reimbursement under SEWA's IIS was less effective due to the 
fixed cap on reimbursement and delays between the discharge from hospital and 
reimbursement. The process of compiling a claim was sometimes difficult and 
costly. 
In terins of generalisable conclusions about scheme financial benefits, it seems that 
a fuced cap on the amount rcimbursed (or discounted) mqi, be less LIkc, tive at 
protecting CBHI membersfrom vciý, expensive hospitalisation. ý than reiinhursernent 
(or discount) that varies in direct proportion to the cost ofhospitalisation. Ple 
relative effectiveness of the two different methods c? freimbursenwnt (at protcaing 
members from the cost qf hospitalisation) will depend, oi'coursc. oil the value at 
which reimbursement is capped and the percentage to which costs arL, relmhursed. 
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Provision of reimbursement (or discount) at the time of sen-ice use proude. ý, cert. ris 
paribus, greater financial protection than reimbursement that is provided it Ith 
delay. Members of a CBHI may face many challenges in compiling their ou n 
insurance claims - the process can consume a member's energy, time and moncY. 
Distance from place of residence to the nearest claims jacillýy may jurther 
complicate the process. 
Sin-gle versus multiple health care providers 
The TF hospital referral scheme was associated with a single referral hospital. As a 
result, TF administrators had ready access to information about the nature and cost 
of services provided to its members, had some influence over the services provided 
at Shri Krishna Hospital, and could provide reimbursement directl"' to the hospital. 
The scheme was unpopular among some beneficiaries for lack of alternate providers; 
they cited variety of problems with the referral hospital including its location, cost 
and poor quality of care. SEWA members enjoyed a virtually unlimited choice of 
inpatient providers. However, scheme administrators had virtually no direct contact 
with health care providers, and could not monitor the cost or quality of services 
provided, exert influence on the providers, or pay providers directly. It appears that 
linking with a single hospital may result in low rates Qf utilisation if members 
perceive there to be problenu of geographic accessibility, cost or quality or lack oj' 
choice. "en a CBHI scheme is not associated with a single hospital. facilit. l. (or a 
limited number offacilities), it is administrativeýv difficult to monitor the cost and or 
quality of care, to exert influence on the provider (for example, to improve a higher 
quality or more cost-effective service), or to reimburse the health care provider 
directIv. 
Links with a parent oManisation 
TF's links with the local dairy co-operative helped it to recruit members. while 
development-oriented services offered by SEWA Union may have enabled women 
to join the IIS and created a sense of trust in SEWA. Both schemes undoubtedly 
made use of the staff and infrastructure of their parent organisations in their efforts 
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to recruit and retain members. Findings related to the importance qj a paren., 
organisation must be interpreted cautiouýlv, given that no control (i. e. a j-rL, e- 
standing CBHI scheme) is available in this studv. Aonethele. ýs, it appears that a 
parent organisation may help to create a context in vi-hich iL5 memhers arc more 
willing to purchase insurance (e. g. sense of community, sense of dedication to the 
insurer) or have a greater ability to pay the premium (e. g. due to income gencrati . ng 
activities or savings and credit facilities). Furthermore, a parent oryanisation ma *v 
facilitate the enrolment of new members in a CBHI scheme, or retention Q/- old 
members, by lending its staff and infrastructure to the effort. Technical skilLs and 
support (accounting, managerial) provided by the parent organisation mai- enhance 
a CBHI scheme's financial viability. 
Mechanisms for Protecting against adverse selection 
To some extent, those who initiated and administered TF's hospital referral scheme 
saw adverse selection as a goal rather than a threat to the scheme's financial 
viability, they aimed specifically to increase access to hospitalisation among TF's 
poorest and sickest members. Administrators at SEWA's IIS, on the other hand, 
aimed to protect the financial security of its members, but at the same time to run a 
largely financially self-sustaining scheme. Members of the IIS were older and 
unhealthier than the general population, perhaps owing to membership at the 
individual-level. It seems that, depending on a CBHI scheme's goals and objectives, 
the over-inclusion of the aged and the ill (disproportionate to their numbers in the 
target population) may be viewed as effective targeting rather than adverse 
selection. Enrolment of individuals rather than groups (for exampic. holl. ýOwldý or 
villages) mav result in - and nullifi, other qforts to prevent - adverst, sclection. 
Underlying obiectives Ibr the scheme 
For neither scheme were the objectives, as stated by scheme participants, fully 
consistent with the indicators of economic impact traditionally used to asscss CBHl 
schemes, namely increased access to health care. and decreased financial burden (to 
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the insured) of health care. For example, administrators of TF's hospital referral 
scheme hoped that it would provide free hospital isations for very poor and sick TF 
members, and at the same time would help fill beds at the referral hospital. 
Members of TF were largely unaware of the hospital referral scheme, but those who 
were thought that a discount (for all members regardless of income) on the cost of 
hospitalisation was the primary benefit. It appears that the different participants in 
a CBHI scheme may have different objectives 
-for 
the scheme. Participants ' 
objectives for a scheme may not be consistent with indicators traditional4i, used to 
assess CBHI schemes, such as increased access to health care and protection from 
the costs of health care. A CBHI scheme designed to address oýlectivcs other than 
increased access to health care and protection from the costs of hcalth care rnqy 
perform poorly if assessed by these standards. 
Collection, analysis and use of data 
Administrators of both schemes had available to them raw data relating to scheme 
utilisation (including name of the hospitalised member, duration of hospital isation, 
total direct cost, reimbursement/discount provided, etc. ). However, these data were 
not routinely analysed or used to make improvements to the schemes. Based on 
these observations, it appears that evidence-based decision making is not 
necessarily part of CBHI management culture. Technical assistance may be 
required by CBHI scheme administrators in order to develop impact indicators and 
draw on external sources of information. 
Ad gptabiliaý 
Over its nineteen years of functioning, virtually no changes were made to the design 
of TF's hospital referml scheme until the final year. Virtually all aspects of 
SEWA's IIS, on the other hand, had been changed since 1992 in order to respond to 
members' needs. It seems that failure oj' a scheme to change in response to 
members' needs may be associated with decreased overall impact and financial 
sustainabil4v. 
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Education and communication 
For both schemes, low levels of awareness contributed to low rates of scheme 
utilisation. Under the TF scheme, this occurred in some cases as the household had 
been enrolled (perhaps without being informed) by the local dairy cooperative 
secretary. Under both schemes, lack of awareness was in some cases related to 
failure of the household member who purchased the membership to pass information 
on to others in the household. It appears that ongoing education ()/. ' anti 
communication with, scheme members mqv be required in order to make members 
aware of a scheme and its benefits. In cases where membership is riot sold dircctýv 
to all members (e. g. it is purchased b_v another household nieniher. or bY one 
member on behal(of a household or village) levels of awareness mqv /if-, particvlarýv 
low among those who did not pqv the premium. 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORY 
According to the utility maximising model, an individual's demand for private 
health insurance will be determined by a variety of factors including the price of 
insurance, the individual's assessment of the probability of loss resulting from 
illness, and income (see Chapter 3). The findings of this study support the utility 
maximising model insofar as membership (particularly in SEWA's IIS) was 
determined by the affordability of the premium, availability of money in the 
household to pay for the premium, and the probability of falling ill (with the old and 
ill more likely to join the scheme). However, the case-study findings suggest that 
other factors are an important influence on an individual's demand for insurance. 
First, health insurance sold through CBHI schemes may be (more often than not) 
bundled with other products, for example. reduced cost primary and prcventive care 
or other types of insurance. In such a scenario it may be impossible. empirically. to 
tease out the demand for health insurance versus the demand for these other services. 
Second, demand for CBHI may be influenced by whether it is associated with a 
larger (parent) organization, and the nature of this organization's activities. For 
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example, people may be more likely to join a scheme if the activities of the parent 
organization result in a sense of affiliation among its members. and a sense of trust 
in the organization. There may be parallels here to the brand-name effect common 
in more open and competitive markets. SEWA's IIS scheme employed 
(purposefully or otherwise) various mechanisms to enhance demand that have 
ultimately resulted in a broad enrolment. The use of such mechanisms was " iewed 
by Stinson (1982) as an important determinant of the success of CBHI schemes. 
The differences between (theoretical) determinants of demand for private-for-profit 
health insurance and determinants of demand for CBHL are due in part to the fact 
that real-world health insurance schemes and markets are not as simple as the 
models on which economic theory is based. They result also from differences in the 
underlying objectives of different types of schemes. The purpose of a private-for 
profit insurer operating in an open and competitive market is to supply a product up 
until the point at which marginal revenues are equal to marginal costs of producing 
the insurance, with the objective of maximising profits. CBHI schemes, like social 
health insurance schemes, are not driven by the profit-motive. Social insurance 
schemes are generally implemented in developing countries with the primary 
objective of mobilising funds (Normand 1999; Kutzin and Barnum 1992) "to relieve 
a shortage of government budgetary resources for health care relative to an 
increasing, demand and need for care" (Kutzin 1997, p. 3). Membership is almost 
always mandatory among those working in the formal sector. In some cases they 
have met with limited success owing to small formal-sector populations relative to 
the total population, and inefficient spending of funds (Kutzin 1997, Kutzin and 
Barrium 1991). The objectives of CBHI schemes appear to be more varied, and less 
predictable, than those of either private-for-profit or social insurance schemes. This 
study suggests that the objectives that underlie a CBHI scheme may be quite 
specific. for example, to provide hospitalisation to the very poor and vulnerable. or 
increase utilisation of a specific facility. 
The problems of adverse selection and moral will hazard not necessanly be 
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considered as problematic under CBHI schemes. Adverse selection is a problem for 
the for-profit insurer because "the population that purchases the insurance will be 
skewed towards the high risks and the insurer will face net financial loss"' (Chapter 
3). Moral hazard may be problematic to the for-profit insurer. for example. xhen 
the insured increase the frequency with which they make use of inpatient care (at 
cost to the insurer) as a result of being protected against its costs. This study 
suggests that CBHl schemes may actually target, and increase access to 
hospitallsation among, those who are in greatest need of the sen-ices covered under 
the insurance. Adverse selection and moral hazard may be encouraged among 
certain groups (for example, the poor, the chronically ill) with the aim of improving 
their welfare. Thus, phenomena that are termed adverse selection and moral hazard 
in a for-profit context may, in some cases, be viewed as goals of CBHl. The extent 
to which they can be pursued as goals will depend on the availability of sufficient 
funding, both from within the scheme and from external sources. 
Evaluations of CBHI schemes should thus differentiate between two different types 
of adverse selection and moral hazard. On the one hand. adverse selection and 
moral hazard may be consistent with a scheme's objectives to increase health care 
utilisation among the poor and unhealthy. In this case, the costs of increased 
utilisation would presumably be expected, and budgeted for, by scheme 
administrators. On the other hand, adverse selection and moral hazard may result in 
utilisation of health care services over and above what is planned by CBHI scheme 
administrators. The costs of this unplanned over-consumption of services would not 
have been included in a scheme"s budget, and could endanger the scheme's financial 
viability. 
Thus, it may be inappropriate to apply the standards used to assess the impact of' 
private- for-profit insurers (or social insurance schemes) to CBHl scheme', operating 
in developing countries. At present. there is not a standard set of impact indicators 
that can be used to assess CBHl schemes. A useful step towards this goal rnl, -Iht be a 
system for classifying CBHI schemes. based not on their ownership or the tyres of 
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services covered (Bennett, et al. 1998) but rather on the underlying objectives the 
schemes are intended to achieve. For example, CBHl schemes might be categonsed 
on the basis of stated target population and/or intended impact on health care. 
Targeted populations might include: the poor. informal sector labourers. A-omen, 
members of a specific occupational group, members of a work cooperative. residents 
of a specific geographic area or those who use a certain health care facility. Stated 
goals relating to health care might include: improved quality of care, improved 
accessibility (for example, reduced distance between client and provider), increased 
utilisation (this could include increased bed-occupancy rates), or decreased out-of- 
pocket price. Further, these health care goals might relate specificall". - to outpatient 
and primary care, inpatient care, or to care provided through a specific facility. A 
CBHI scheme that aims to target the very poor with a focus on increasing access to 
health care at all levels might be evaluated based on different criteria than a scheme 
that targets the members of a work cooperative and aims to improve the quality of 
health care at a single inpatient facility. From the perspective of government (say a 
representative of the Ministry of Health), the former scheme might be considered 
successful if it results in the equitable redistribution of resources, %k-hile financial 
sustainability might be considered less important (perhaps such a scheme could be 
provided with subsidies). The latter scheme, on the other hand, might best be 
evaluated in terms of technical quality of health care, consumer satisfaction and 
financial sustainability. 
The findings of the study do not support the WHO's view that -insurance schemes 
designed to expand membership among the poor offer a path for government - with 
external funding partners - to a rapid improvement in the health of the most 
vulnerable" (WHO 2000, p. 139). For example, SEWA's IIS, despite havino 
survived for almost ten years, and despite ha%-ino, a large and increasing membership. 11 C4 - 
appears to have contributed little to broader health s,., -stem goals. I 
The literature review (Chapter 3) revealed that health insurance (particularly -, (),: ial 
health insurance schemes in Western European countries) could have many social 
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consequences. This study suggests that such social consequences have not ýet 
resulted from the case-study schemes. This may reflect contextual (including 
cultural) differences; for example, the investigation of social consequences may be 
more yielding where CBHl scheme members are more aware of the scheme and its 
benefits, and have actually had experience in using the scheme. Alternatively, as 
already discussed, this study may have asked the wrong questions, or applied the 
wrong methodology, to come to a categorical conclusion on the issue of social 
consequences. 
There are a number of reasons to believe that social capital might enhance demand 
for CBHl. Altruistic feelings between members of a group or community, traditions 
of collaboration and co-operation among its members, and greater trust in the health 
insurer may all contribute to make people more willing to enrol in an insurance 
scheme. This study joins the empirical work of Liu (200 1) in suggesting that social 
capital is, indeed, an important determinant of people's willingness to participate in 
a CBHI scheme. This study does not support the theory that social capital may 
benefit CBHl schemes in other ways, for example, by preventing adverse selection, 
moral hazard, free riding or fraud. To some extent, this may reflect the fact that the 
CBHI schemes had not aimed to prevent these things. 
Consistent with previous studies in India, this study found that government had 
played no role in the schemes. This is consistent with findings in certain other 
countries. Take for example the Bwarnanda hospital insurance scheme in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (Criel 1998b, p. 25): 
The overall environment in which the ýBvvamanda hosPital insurance) 
initiative took place was characterised ýv the vlrtualýv total absence qj- the 
state, both in terms of resource allocation and in terms qfplanning, 
regulation, control, etc. 
Bennett, et al. concluded (1998) that government has an important role to play in 
facilitating the success of schemes by developing a clear policy framework. 
facilitating scheme development. monitoring and regulating the schemes, and 
providing subsidies. As is discussed below, many factors may determine whether or 
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not govenu-nent involvement is required or beneficial. Administrators of the t-wo 
Indian CBHI schemes expressed. off-the-record. that goverrunent involvement 
(presumably district, state or central level) would be likely to do more hami than 
good, as many government officials are corrupt or self-interested. 
In agreement with other authors, this study finds that scheme design and 
management are of great importance in determining whether or not the scheme wIII 
have the desired impact. In general, aspects of design and manaLgement that are of 
importance include: mechanisms to promote enrolment in the scheme. ongoing 
provision of education and information to scheme members; collection and analysis 
of data in order to make improvements to the scheme. and the ease, accessibilitý. 
timeliness and quality of benefits available under the scheme. This study lends 
support to Bennett, et al. 's (1998, p. 61) conclusion that "Man, " of the schemes 
examined had been poorly designed and had encountered a range of problems as a 
result. " Similarly, a literature review of all Indian schemes (Chapter 3) revealed that 
most authors had attributed the success or failure of the schemes to aspects of design 
or management. 
This study lends some support to the conclusion by several other authors that outside 
financial and organisation support is vital to the success of such schemes (Bennett. et 
al. 1998; de Ferranti 1986). Both schemes studied had received support (including 
staff, infrastructure, perhaps accounting expertise) from their parent organisations. 
As well, both schemes relied to some degree on funding from external donors. 
However, the study finds that over-reliance of external funding may actually 
contribute to the downfall of a scheme. 
This study has contributed to knowledge around the '*economic consequences- " of 
CBHl, perhaps most importantly bV identifying factors related to context. design and 
management that may facilitate participation in the schemes, utilisation of the 
schemes, financial protection under the schemes. and financial sustainability. The 
study revealed little about the potential social consequences of CBHI schemes. This 
most likely resulted from scheme members' limited knowledge and utilisation of tl,, e 
case-study schemes. Different methods of qualitative data Collection might have 
been more sensitive to social consequences. Finally, this study was one of the first 
to look at the importance of social capital as a determinant of the succe. -ss of CBHl. 
The study provides insights into how social capital can facilitate success bý- dra%%. in,,, 
people into a CBHI scheme. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
This section opens with a summary of implications for those (individuals or 
organizations) who run, or who wish to design and implement, CBHl schemes in 
developing countries. It then addresses the more difficult issues pertaining to 
governments in developing countries that consider playing a role in CBH1. 
Several aspects of context are likely to influence the success of CBHl schemes, 
either in terms of enrolling 'members, or achieving health system's goals among 
those who do join. Contextual factors that may facilitate enrolment in CBFII 
include: 
"A sense of affiliation or community within the target population, 
"A degree of economic well-being such that indiý, -Iduals or households are able to 
afford the premium. 
As already discussed, an insurer may be able to create an enabling environment for 
CBHl by engaging in other development -on ented activities (e. g. micro-credit 
schemes, production-based cooperatives, income generating projects), or linking 
with another organisation, perhaps even govenunental, involved in such acti %. ities. 
This study finds that aspects of scheme design and management are particularl" 
important in determining a scheme's impact. Scheme design and management wIII 
generally be amenable to intervention, either by scheme administrators. or with 
technical an&'or financial support from govenunent or external donors. This study 
did not reveal a design template that is likel-v to achieve impact in all settings. 
However, some basic principles did emerge that might help to optimise the impact of 
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other schemes. For example: 
Packaging of health insurance with other services may bring members into a 
scheme, but care must be taken to ensure that members are educated specifiicallý 
around the health insurance component and its benefits; 
Willingness and capacity among management to make changes to the scheme 
may enhance its sustainability: 
9 Ongoing education of, and communication with, scheme members is, required to 
develop an awareness of the scheme among members. and facilitate scheme 
utilisation; 
* Nesting of a CBHI scheme within a parent organisation may enhance overall 
rates of membership under the CBHI scheme; 
*A fixed cap on the amount reimbursed (or discounted) mav be less effective at 
protecting CBHI members from very expensive hospitalisations than reimbursement 
(or discount) that varies in direct proportion to the cost of hospital isation: 
0 Provision of reimbursement (or discount) at the time of service use provides, 
ceteris paribus, greater financial protection than reimbursement that is provided with 
delay; 
* The process of claiming reimbursement under a CBHl scheme should be made 
as fast, easy and inexpensive as possible. Mechanisms may need to be put In place 
to facilitate the submission of claims among disadvantaged groups, such as the 
illiterate, those living in ruraVisolated areas, women, etc., 
o Linking with a single (or limited number of) hospital(s) may result in low rates 
of utilisation if members perceive there to be problems of geographic accessibility. 
cost or quality. However, by linking to one (or a few) pro% iders, a CBHl can 
become a strategic purchaser of health care, attempting to influence the behaviour of 
die providerýs) so as to maximise quality and efficiency while at the same time 
keeping costs under control. Conversely, a scheme that permits the use of aný one 
of many hospitals provides its members with provider options, and as -such 
it may 
achieve higher rates of membership and scheme utilisation. However. the insurer 
may have more difficulo. - in exercising any influence over the providers. or in 
monitoring the cost and the quality of care they are pmviding. 
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This study sheds little light on whether, to what extent, or ho -. =g ýX overrunent should 
play a role in community-based health insurance. The degree and nature of 
government involvement in CBHl schemes varies tremendousl. v from one countr-,. to 
another (see Ranson and Bennett 2002. Appendix 12). Government (local, state and 
national) had no direct role in either of the two case-studv schemes. Nonetheless. 
the study does reveal some of the important issues that may be faced by a 
government considering involvement in CBHl. 
Before intervening in CBHI, a government should consider why it is doing so. 
Presumably, governments would typically be turning to CBHl schemes for help in 
meeting such health system goals as better health, fair financing, and responsiveness 
(WHO 2000). Where CBHl schemes are already in existence, some effort may first 
have to be made to explore the objectives that underlie them. These objecti'vcs may 
differ among participants in a CBHl scheme. And e,,, -en Nvhere there is consensus 
among participants, the objectives for a scheme may differ from (or even run counter 
to) a government's health system goals. 
Where government does decide that CBHI can help to meet its health system goals, 
a quick-fix should not be expected. The WHO's view that CBH1 can result in "a 
rapid improvement in health of the most vulnerable" appears to be overk" optimistic 1 
(WHO 2000, p. 1) 39). In contrast, this study suggests that even where context is 
conducive to large CBHI scheme size, the desired impact may fail to materialize, or 
may do so only after many years. 
It must be decided whether CBHI represents the most efflicient means for 
government to achieve its social objectives, and whether government intervention i%; 
likely to do more benefit than harm. While CBHI may represent one path to achle%*e 
health system goals, there may be others (such as greater government financing, of 
heal th c are). As well. it should be recognised that government involvement can 
have negative consequences for CBHI schemes (Ranson and Bennett 2002). 
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Government intervention may prove harmful in settings where government is 
corrupt or se I f- interested. For example, government may see CBHI schemes as an 
easy source of income through extortion. Even well-intentioned and well-executed 
government can change the nature of a CBHI scheme. Increased government 
regulation and control may change a commuruty- financed scheme from bottom-up 
(participatory) to a top-down organisation, where decisions are made centrally and 
handed down to scheme managers. 
Finally, government must identi r, and choose between, inte -entions that may 
lessen or overcome obstacles to the success of CBHl schemes (and the achievement 
of health system's goals). Such mechanisms include: creation of an enabling 
context, stewardship, and transfer of resources, both financial and non-financial. For 
example, the most commonly used mechanism is the indirect transfer of resources 
from goverriment to the CBHl scheme, usually in the form of free or reduced-cost 
health care services at government facilities (Ranson and Bennett 2002). The 
optimal package of mechanisms will vary from one country to another, and within 
one country as it moves through different stages of development, particularly as 
health insurance coverage increases. 
REcomMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
While the findings of this study have addressed its main objectives, they have also 
highlighted gaps in the theory and knowledge regarding CBHI. Furthermore, 
because the two schemes studied here are distinct in certain of their underlying 
objectives, the context in which they function, and certain aspects of their design and 
management, some of the findings were of limited generalisability. Research in 
other settings will serve to corroborate or refute the general isability of such findings. 
In general, future research around CBHI can contribute to kno"Jedge by doing one 
or more of the following. First, similar methodologies can be used to study similar 
impacts and relationships, but in different settings. Second, similar aspects of CBHl 
(impacts, context, design and management) can be studied. but using different 
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methodologies. For example, in looking at the association between membership in a 
CBHl scheme and access to health care, or health status, more advanced 
epidemiological studies could be used, such as prospective observational or 
intervention studies. Thirdly, studies may examine different aspects of CBHl 
schemes to those examined here, for example, the impact of CBHl schemes on 
quality of health care, or the impact on access to preventive and primarý' care 
services. 
This study found that the aims and objectives that participants hoped to achieve 
through a CBHI scheme influenced its design and management, and ultimately its 
impact. Objectives such as increased access to health care, and protection of 
households from the costs of health care may be dominated by other objectiVes. 
Future research should investigate the aims and objectives of different participants in 
CBHI schemes as the schemes are being conceived and implemented. How is a 
consensus reached as to how the scheme is ultimately designed, managed and 
monitored'? To what extent do members of the target population actually have a say 
in these matters, and are there mechanisms that can be put in place to ensure that the 
community's needs are heard and met by scheme administrators? If a system for 
classifying CBHI schemes by their objectives were devised, might this facilitate 
comparisons between schemes, and generallsations from one scheme to others with 
similar objectives? 
This study found that schemes failed to increase access to hospitalisation and to 
significantly decrease household expenditures on hospitalisation among their 
members. However, the survey data were for one point in time only. Research 
should look into types of systems that can be put in place to allow ongoing. 
prospective, cost-effective collection and analysis of data. Furthermore. research 
should look into how such data can best be fed back to participants in the scheme. 
and used to optimise scheme desi, (, -Yn and management. 
18 
Various aspects of scheme impact were only touched upon in this study and desen e 
further attention. This study looked at coverage (by socio-economic ggoups) under 
the schemes and (based on limited data) at the equity of access to benefits under the 
two schemes. Future research should examine the extent to which CBHl schemes 
actually impact on equity. Are there quantifiable resource traristers from the 
wealthy from the poor, and from the healthy to the ill" "'fiat research 
methodologies and impact indicators best capture these transfers" What aspects of 
context and scheme design and management result in more equitable schemes" 
Investigation is also required into the quality of health care available through CBHI 
schemes, and interventions that can be put in place to optimise quality. 
At least in India, it is likely that a better measure of wealth is required in order to 
assess the equity impact of health insurance schemes. Ideally, such a measure could 
be administered in a short amount of time, alongside questions about health care 
utilisation and expenditure. Several proxy measures for wealth have been 
developed, but they tend to be context- spec i fic, and will require pilot testing before 
being used in the evaluation of CBHI schemes. 
Given that the potential social consequences of CBHI could not adequately be 
examined in this study - owing largely to members' lack of awareness and low 
frequency of scheme utilisation - research in other settin,, s should explore such 
consequences. As mentioned previously, social consequences may be best 
investigated using a "more loosely structured, emergent, inductively grounded 
approach to gathering data" (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 17). 
Relatively little could be concluded from this study about the importance of context, 
in part because only two schemes were examined and many aspects of context did 
not vary between them. Future in-depth, case-study research should assess the 
importance of context, by comparing across a variety of settings. Given that social 
capital was found in this study to impact on one's willingness to join a CBHl 
scheme, it deserves attention in future studies. It has been suggested that social 
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capital may be more important to (and perhaps more to measure for) Nnialler. 
community-based schemes that cover outpatient preventive and or pnmarý- care 
(Bennett, et al. 1998). As well, the role that government can play in optimising a 
CBHI scheme's impact, including its impact on broader health system's goals. 
deserves attention. 
This study, like others before it, found that aspects of scheme design and 
management were key to a scheme's impact. It may be useful for future case-stud" 
research to examine the associations between design, management and impact. to 
ensure that these findings are generalisable to other setting's. But more importantlý-, 
longitudinal studies should examine how the impact of CBHI schemes chanocs with 
the implementation of interventions aimed at improving scheme design and 
management. Further, the relative cost-effectiveness of such interventions should be 
studied. Given the findings of this study, the types of interventions that could be 
studied include: 
0 Putting in place a system for ongoing collection and analysis of data, 
9 Building the capacity of scheme administrators to monitor the quality of care 
being financed under the scheme, and to act as a strategic purchasers of health 
care for scheme members; 
* Educating members on an a regular basis around the scheme and its benefits; 
0 Educating managers (or providing techrucal assistance) regarding aspects of 
financial planning and management, for example, the use of different sources of 
funding, setting premium rates, deciding how to allocate resources-, 
Targeting scheme membership or benefits towards certain vulnerable gyroups (for 
example. women, the elderly, or the chronically ill). 
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HOUSEHOLD INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
STUDY OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING IN KHEDA & ANAND DISTRICTS 
LSHTM 
QI to Q5 should be completed before approaching the household: 
Ql. Interviewer's Name: 
Q2. Village Name: 
Q3. Household Number: 
Q4. Household Type: 
Q5. First interview 
Re-interview 
by- 'es" Prin6pil In'v 
. COMPUTER 
Identification No: 
Identification No: 
Tribhuvandas Foundation 1 7' 
SEWA (At least I insured SEWA member) 2 
Control 3 
2 
'Aiiistaht" J . ''I at 
)r 
Ideally, the respondent to this questionnaire should be the wife of the household head If the household head is currently unmarried, t4'" another adultfemale (older than 18 years of age) shý-uld be questioned If all adultfemales are awayftom the home, then you 
"hOuld excuse yourseýfand return at a later date. Only if there are no adultfemales living in the household should you intcrview and 
adult male. 
random for our ""Maste ben! I am conducting research amongst households in your village. Your household has been chosen at 
614dy- Ile Purpose of this study is to learn about patterns of health-care seeking, and health-care fmiincing 
in Kheda and Anand 
DIS21cts. I would like to ask you a number of questions about recent illness episodes amongst your household members. 
Your 
r"nses will be recorded in writing, but the answers you give will be strictly confidential. The questionnaire takes approximately 45 
't'nutCS to complete. It is hoped that the results of this research will ultimately benefit you and other members of your household. T'le findings of our research will be presented at a community meeting in this village within the next year. Your participation in this 
MdY would be greatly appreciated. 
ý Atcord of visits to household: 
I 
2 
3 
4 
06. 
Q7. 
Day Month Time Interviewed? 
JJ __ 
_u - -: - 
JJ __ 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
If 'NO', why not? 
Yes/No 
-L-j - -: - 
Yes/No 
Due of interview: I. I/ II 
Time Interview Started: -J-J: 
H Moming/Aftemoon/Evening 
361 
Address of Household: 
Name of Household Head: 
Name of Respondent: 
Q3- Gender of Respondent: 
Female I 
Male 2 
Q9. Relationship to Household Head: 
Head of household 01 Parent-in-law 07 
Spouse 02 Brother/Sister 08 
Son/Daughter 03 Brother-in- law/Sister-in- law 09 
Son-in-law/Daughter-in-law 04 Nephew/Niece 10 
Parent 05 Other Blood Relative II 
Unrelated 12 
Q10. Religion: Hindu 01 
Muslim 02 
Jain 03 
Christian 04 
Other (specify) 99 
Q11. Caste: Scheduled Caste 01 
Scheduled Tribe 02 
Other backward class 03 
Bhakshipanch 04 
Other (specify) 99 
Q 12- How many people have regularly eaten food from your kitchen over the thirty days (we will 
derine these as 
)0= household members): II 
Q13. How many, if any, family members have died widiin the last year? 
II 
'nose who have died should be included in the census list. Further, their illnesses should be recorded if thlýv have 4ý'-d within the last month, as should their hospitalizations within the lastyear. ) 
el 
362 
For each household member, please provide the following information: 
Name Q14. Q 15. Gender Q16. Age Q 17. Marital 
Relat'n Male =1 Status 
Female =2 
_LJ 
LJ I 
_J__J 
I . LJ 
I 
I. J LJ I 
I 
__J_J 
I LJ I 
II I _ LJ I IJ I J I I 
II I I I I 
II I I I I 
II I I I I 
_LJ 
I I I I 
II I I I I 
II I _ LJ 
I 
II I I I I 
II I I I I 
61strucdons: 
Q14. Relationship of the individual to the household head: F-WdOfhousehold Ol Parent 06 
spouse 02 Parent-in-law 07 
SOWDaughter 03 BrotherlSister 08 
-ýOn-in-LawlDaughter-in_jaw 04 Brother-in-lawlSister-in-law 09 
CIrandchild 05 Nephewl? Viece 10 
Q18. Person 
can read and 
write a simple 
letter? 
1-Yes, 2-No 
Q19. 
Education 
-J-J 
-U 
-u -U 
-U -U 
-U 
-U LJ 
-U 
-U 
-U -U 
LJ 
-U 
Other Blood Relative 
Unrelated 
LI 
11 
12 
Q16. Age in years at last birthday. Infants less than one year of age, write 00. Include approximareage ifrespondcm in uncertain, 
Q1 7. Marital Status: 
Married 
Q19. Education: 
Nursery School 
In to 12'h standard completed 
Passed Bachelor Level 
Q20. Primary occupation: 
Presently studying 01 
110wesvorkIDomestic 
work 02 
'Farming (including dairyfarming) 03 
60vvwntenf 
employment 04 
-W-employed (petty-business at home, 
tFnaU shop) 05 
Never Married 2 Divorced 
WidowlWidower 3 Separated 
Other 
00 Passed Master degree or above 14 
01 through 12 Passed Technical Diploma 15 
13 171iterate 99 
Trainedprofessional (e. g. doctor, 
engineer, teacher) 06 
Unskilled daily wages (e. g. agricultural or 
factory worker) 07 
Skilled daily wages (e. g. plumber, 
electrician, turner) 08 
Unskilled, monthly sala? y (e. g. maid) 
09 
UilitarylPolice 10 
Not able (e. g. elderly. child. mentallY or 
physically disabled) 11 
Beggar I., 
Unemployed (loolungfor uvrk) 13 
Skilled, monthty salary (prime 
empl(ýVrnent) 14 
Co-operative sector (e. g emplqvee of 
dairy co-operatme) 1.1 
Nothing (not looking) 16 
Don't know 99 
Q20. Prirnary 
Occupation 
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Q21. Has anyone not been completely well within the last 30 days? (Include any kind of illness suffered, as well as problems of 
Prcgnancy and childbirth, even if treatment WAS NOT sought. Also include here episodes of hospitalization withm the last 30 days, ), 
Yes/No 
Q22. Has anyone been admitted to hospital during the last year (excluding hospitalizations within the last month)? (Ifany member k'a suffered more than I illness in the last month, or more that I hospitalization in the last year, then each episode should be recorded 
separately. ) 
Yes/No 
Q23,24. Finally, indicate if any family members belong to schemes wherein regular payments (or membership fees) are paid in 
&dvance, and in return, the cost, or partial cost of medicines, surgeries or hospitalizations is covered? 
S. N. Q21. Not completely well Q22. Hospitalizations Q23. Membership in Q24. Prepayment schemes 
within last 30 days (overnight hospital stay SEWA, 5 Rs paid (not 
within 1 year) including insurance) 
I-Yes, 2-No 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 1, H, II 
5. 
-L-L -j-j 6. 
-Li -L-J, -J-ý 7. H, II 
8. 11 H 
9. 
--Lj 10. 1 -A 11. -i-j 12. 
-j-J, --L-4 -j-j 
H 
13. 11 
-Lý -Li 
II 
14. 
-LJ, -L-J, 
11 11 
15. 1 1. ", II 
-LJ, -J, 
H 
1"Structions: 
and Q22. 
47enerak Fever, chills 01 
-Veuro: Headache, dL-ziness 02 Seftsory Problems with ears, hearing, eyes, vision, skin diseases 03 
taX Cough, cold, asthma, anemia, TB, lung and throat CA 
04 
01, Abdominal pain, diarrhea, vomiting, intestinal CA 
05 
GU. - Urinary problems, kidney problems, STDs, utertne C4 06 
Ortho: Joint disease. fractures 07 
injuries: and other wounds 08 
Pregnancy, Delivery &family planning 09 
CVS. - Heartproblems, bloodpressure 10 
Other (specify) 99 
Q-74 Prepayment Schemes: 
Tribhuvandas I ESIS 
SEWA Lifetime MembershiplFUed Deposit 2 Employers Reimbursement 6 
SEWA Yearly Membership 3 Xone 11 
4 MediclaimIJan Arogya Bima Other (specify) 
9 
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Lwrucdons: Note, for each illness episode for which treatment was sought, complete the first coluran below. if more than one 
source of treatment was sought, then complete the following colurnris. 
For each episode of illness within the last 30 days, complete the following questions (Q25 to 45): 
Person ill within the last 30 days, S. N.: II 
Illness: Ij 
* Note, this information should correspond to one cell in column Q2 1. 
Q25. Was any treatment (home remedy or otherwise) taken for this episode? Yes 
No 
Don't know 
Q26. Did you take only home remedy/treatment for this illness: Yes I 
No 20 GO TO Q28 
Q27. What was the home remedy? 
How much did you spend 
LEE -Rs 
Q28. Why did you not go for treatment outside the borae? 
Thought not serious 01 
Got better soon after being sick 02 
Too far/No transportation avail 03 
Too expensive/not enough money 04 
First Treatment 
Q29. Days between onset (or -LJ 
days 
Pre'Vious treatment) and this 
Action 
Q30. Action Taken (If private doctor, do they hold degree? ) 
Instructions. - Mome remedy 
3EWA Health Worker 
rnbhuvandas Village Health Worker 
O'her MWIVillage Leader 
ClOvernment dispensary 
Prwaze dispensary 
Charuable (including TF) dispensary 
ESIS 
Q3 1. Who, decided on 
trtatnent? 
bwructions, 
ýl Penon alone ýOýehold head 
41 Pmon with help of family 
II 
Don't like going to heilers/doctors 05 
Healers/doctors not effective 06 
Knew self-treatment 07 
Other (specify) 08 
Don't know 99 
Second Treatment 
II days 
II 
Ji4l': 
: 
Third TrC2tMCnt 
II diys 
-Li 
01 
02 Traditional doctor (e. g, Ayurved, Hardved. Quack) 09 
03 Unqualiftedpractitioner 10 
04 Government hospital 11 
05 Private hospital 11 
06 Trust Hospital (incl. Shri Krishna) hospital 13 
07 ESIS Hospital 14 
08 Compounder 15 
Other (specify) 99 
Family other than the ill person 4 
1 Health care provider 5 
2 Other (specify) 8 
3 Don't know 99 
Q32. Duration of treatment -LJ 
days days days 
(days) 
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Q33. Result of treatment _j 
Lutructions: 
Got better Remained the same 
4 
Got slightly better 2 
Still under treatment 
' 
5 
9 
Got worse 3 
Don t know 
Q34. Provider Fees (incl. Rs _L_L_LJ 
Rs Rs 
Meds, tests given by provider) 
Q35. Medication costs Rs -J-J--LJ 
Rs IL Rs 
Q36. Diagnostic Tests Rs Rs 
Rs 
Q37. Return Transportation Rs _Lj-. 
Lj Rs Rs 
Q38. Other costs (PRONIEPT: Rs 
Rs IL Rz 
P 'be n es, gifts) 
Q39. Total costs (sum of Q34 _Li_LJ 
Rs Rs 
Rs 
to Q38) 
Q40. Did any prepayment _j _j 
Kherne help to cover these 
Costs? Yes=l , %o-2 ý GO TO Q42 
Q41. How much coverage was 
I IRs -iJ-LJ 
Rs 
Provided? 
Q42. Enough money available I _j 
M houselsavings? 
yes-I ý GO TO Q44 
t Now2 
Q43. How was money 
H 
Obtlined? 
Instructions. - 01 Reducedfood purchased 
11 
Sold goldlsilverjewelry 02 Reduced entertainmenAobbies 
12 
Sold cooking/kitchen utensils 03 Deductedfrom salary 
13 
Sold ricelfood cropIcash crop 04 on trust - will pay after treatment is completed Soldfarm tools 14 
Borrowedfrom moneylender 05 06 apital Used business c 
is 
Borrowedfrom bank 
07 paid in kind 
16 
Borrowedfrom employer 08 MortgagedpledgedPrOPerlYlYarm Borrowedfrom ftiendlrelative 
09 Did extra labor 
8 
Begged1received gift 10 Don't remember 
19 
Sold livestocklfowl other 99 
944. During this illness episode, the total wages lost by the ill person: _J-J-LJ 
Rs 
b iver (or care-givers): -. 
LLi RS the care- 
Rs 
Q45. During this illness episode, the t y otal wages lost g 
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Astrucdons: For each hospitalization, complete Q46 to 67. Each colurnn represents a different hospitalization. 
If one person has 
b= hospitalized more than once in the last year, then one colurnn should be completed for each 
hospitalizarlon. 
Q46- Where there any occasions within the last year when someone within the household should 
have been hospitalizcdý but was 
r'00 Which family member, what was the illness, and why were they not hospitalized? 
#1 
Q47. Person hospitalized H 
Would correspond to Q22). 
Q49. Ulness (should 
Correspond to Q22) 
Q49. Treatinent source H 
htstructions: 
1 Government hospital 01 
Private hospitaLlnursing home 02 
I rust Hospital (incl. Shri Krishna Med Ctr) 03 
ESIS Hospital 04 
Other 05 
Q50. Who decided on 
Lwructions: 
13 Person alone 
Hoinchold. head 2 
M person with help of family 3 
Q51. Season 
btaructions. 
Winter 
Summer 2 
Rain Y 3 
Don't know 9 
Q52. Duration of treatment days 
(days from admission to 
e-s-charge) 
Q57. Quality of care: Instructions: 
Excellent 
Good 2 
Okay 3 
Bad 4 
#2 
11 
II 
II 
I 
Family other than the ill person 
Health care provider 
Other (specify) 
Don't know 
I 
" days 
I 
#3 
11 
-J-J 
II 
I 
367 
4 
99 
I 
days 
I 
Q54. Result of treatment 
litstructions.. 
Got better I Remained the same 4 
Got slightly better 2 Still under treatment 
5 
Got worse 3 Don't know 
9 
Q55. Provider Fees (including Rs Rs Rs 
meds given by provider) 
Q56. Room costs P's Rs 
Rs 
Q57. Medication costs Rs Rs 
Rs 
Q58. Diagnostic Tests Rs Rs Rs 
Q59. Return Transportation Rs Rs Rs 
W. Other costs Rs Rs 
Rs 
Q61. Total costs (sum of Q55 Rs Rs 
RS 
to Q60) 
Q62. Wages lost by the person Rs 
Rs Rs 
silo was hospitalized 
Q53. Wages lost by careggivers Rs 
Rs -LLLJ 
Rs 
Q64. Did any prepayment 
Q-1eme help to cover these 
costs? Yes- 1, 
No % -2 0 GO TO Q66 
Q65. How much coverage was Rs 
Rs II IjRs 
Provided? 
Q66. Enough money available 
I 
W house/savin-s' 
*) Yes-I 0 GO TO Q68 
No-2 
Q67. How was money 
H 
Obamed? 
litUructions: 
Sold goldlsilverjewelry 01 
hased Reducedfoodpurc 
l 12 Sold cookinglkitchen utensils 02 
hobbies Reduced entertainMCnt 
13 
Sold ricelfood crop/cash crop 03 
04 
Deductedfrom salary 
On trust - willPaY aftcr trearment is COMPleted Soldfarm tools 14 
Borrowedfrom moneylender 05 
06 Paid in kind 15 Borrowedfrom bank 
Borrowedfrom employer 07 
Mortgaged1pledged propeMýYarm 16 
Borrowedfromfiiendlrelative 08 Did extra labor 
Don 't remember 
17 
19 
Begged/received gift 09 
10 Other 99 Sold livestocklfowl 
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Q68. Within the last year, has anyone in your household visited a Vaid? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
Q69. Within the last year, has anyone in your household visited an Hadvaid (traditional bone-setter)? 
Yes I 
No 2 
Don't know 9 
Q70. Within the last year, has anyone in your household visited a faith healer? 
Yes I 
No 2 
Don't know 9 
Q71. Do you know anydiing about medical or illness insurance? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
PlMe tell me what, if anything, you know about medical or illness insurance (interviewer should not prompt file 
'ýýondent). (More than one answer is possible) 
Q72. 
Q73. 
Q74. 
Q75. 
Q76. 
Q77. 
Q78. 
Q79. 
Premi= or membership is paid. 
Covers the costs of medical care (e. g. medicines, tests, fees, and hospitalizations). 
Covers wages lost during illness. 
Must cover 100% of costs. 
Heirs receive money in case of death. 
Type of savings scheme/Money (plus interest) is returned when policy matures. 
Other 
Don't know. 
kwuction: Questions Q80 to Q84 should be filled out by obsming the respondent's home and clothing 
990. What type of house is this: 
Single family home 
Joint ownership 
Rented home 
Employer owned 
Other (specify) 
_ 
Q81. Wall construction 
Mud walls I 
Concrete bricks 2 
Other (specify)_ 9 
Q82. Roof material 
Tbatched I Clay tile 4 
Corrugated metal (tin) 2 Other (specifY) 9 
Concrete 3 
F- j"ý, -_,, 
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Q83. Floor material 
Mud/cow dung floor 
Cement floor 2 
3 Tiled floor 
Q94. essed, and the way the house is Judging only from the appearance of the house, the way people are dr 
arranged, is this household: 
Poorer than average 2 About Average 
3 Better-off than average 9 Unable to say 
Instrucdons: Thefollowing questions are to be asked of the respondent. 
Q85. Do you have a ration card? Yes I 
No 2 GO TO Q87 
Q86. What color is your ration card? Pink 1 
Beige 2 
White 3 
Q87. What kind of toilet is used by members of your household? 
Open toilet 
2 Public toilet 
3 Private toilet 
9 Other 
Q88. Do you have electricity connection? 
Yes 
2 No A 
Q89. of drinking water for members of your 
household? What is the major source ce water (lake, pond) 05 River spring surf3 , , Piped into residence 01 06 other vendor Tanker truck , Piped into yard or plot 02 07 
Public tap 03 Rain-water 09 A 4 6 Well 04 other . 
How many of the following are owned by your household members? (Write 
99'f(? r any value greater than. or equal to 99 
Q90. Other dwellings besides this one acres/vigha/gundia Q91. Land for house LJ Q92. _ Goats 
Q93. Cows H Q94. 
995. 
Oxen 
Buffalo _U J J 996. _ _ Televisions 
Bicycles 
Q98, Scooters/Mopeds/Motorcycles 
Q99. 
Q100. 
Carts 
/Trucks/Tractors) -. 
LJ 
-wheeled Vehicles (Cars/JCePs Four-wheeled or Three Q101. -i-i Handpump H Q102. Refrigerator or freezer 
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Q103 Do You own agricultural land? A 
Yes 1 ý-j 
No 2 GO TO Q105 
Mortgaged 3 
Q104. Howmuchlanddoyouown? I lacres/vigha/guntha 
Q105. Usually, how many meals are eaten by the adults in your household in one day? _J 
Q106. On days when you don't fast, how much to you spend on food? 
Non-Insured Households ONLY 
Q107. Why have you or your household members notjoined a medical/illness prepayment scheme? (More than one answer is 
Possible) 
Too costly 01 
02 
72 
Husband, or other household member chose not to 
Superstition (prepayment may lead to poor health or death) 03 
Not a member of the dairy co-operative 04 
Refused by insurer 05 
High costs of health care are not a problem 06 
Prepayment schemes are not easily available 07 
Because these schemes do not cover the whole family 08 
Because we are illiterate 09 
10 Because they don't offer 100% reimbursement 
I am not aware of these schemes II 
Other (specify) 12 
Don't know 99 
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Tribhuvandas Foundation Households ONLY 
ý108- According to the records of the Tribhuvandas Foundation, your household has membership in this 
0ýý60n- Were you, personally, aware of this? Yes 1 
No 2 
I Qlog As far as you know, who can become a member of Tnbhuvandas? 
Dairy Co-operative members 
Anyone 
Other (specify) 
Don't know 
Q110. How does a household join Tnbhuvandas? 
Automatic for Dairy co-op members 1 
Pay 10 Rupees 2 
Pay some other amount of money (specify) 3 
Other (specify) 8 
Don't know 9 
QI 11. What are the benefits of being a member of Tribhuvandas? (More than one answer possible) 
Charity - the money goes to a good cause 
Free/reduced cost medicines 2 
Free/reduced cost care from the VHW 3 
Free/reduced cost outpatient doctor visits 4 
Free/reduced cost hospital care 5 
Other (specify) 8 
Don't know 9 
Ql 12. What do you feel is the most important benefit of belonging to Tribhuvandas? 
Q 113, In fact, membership in Tribhuvandas means that your family has paid 10 rupees yearly membership fee. If "Ou do not make use of the benefits of TF during a year, some other household may get the benefit of your ten ', -"Pees. How do you feel about this? 
No problem - it is a good cause I 
No problem - insignificant amount of money 2 
I should get money back 3 
Other (specify) 4 
Don't know 5 
14. How do you feel the Tnbhuvandas scheme could be improved? (more than one answer possible) 
Reduced membership fee I 
Increased membership fee 2 
Improved health care in village 3 
Improved health care at sub-centres 4 
Improved hospital care 5 
More health education 6 
People should be made aware of the scheme 7 
Other (specify) 8 
Don't know 9 
"J. 
H 
_j 
) 
I 
.. J. 
1" 
-J. 
"J. 
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SEWA Households ONLY 
Q1 IS. According to the records of SEWA, at least one member of your household belongs to the SEWA 'insurance i 1ýb=e- Were you, personally, aware of this? Yes 
No 2 
i Q1 16. As far as you know, who can purchase insurance from SEWA? 
Women only I 
Women aged 18 to 58 only 2 
Anyone 3 
Other (specify) 8 
Don't know 9 
Q1 17 How does someone become insured by SEWA? 
Pay 65 Rs or 80 Rs per year I % 
Pay fixed deposit of 500 or 700 Rs 2 
Pay some other amount of money (specify) 3 
Other (specify) 8 
Don't know 9 
Ql 18. What are the benefits of being insured by SEWA? (More than one answer possible) 
Charity - the money goes to a good cause 2 Reimbursement after death -0 
Reimburses for loss of house or working capital 3 
Covers the costs of medical care 4 _J 
Other (specify) 8 
Don't know 9 
Q1 19. What do You feel is the most important benefit of having SEWA insurance? 
Q120, In fact, to be insured by SEWA, a person must pay a certain amount per year (between 65 and 80 Rs) must or d ePosit a fixed amount of money one time only (500 or 700 Rs). If you do not make use of the benefits of SEWA du i : ng a year, some other person may get the benefit of your membership fee or deposit. flow do you feel about d: a? 
No problem - it is a good cause I 
No problem - insignificant amount of money 2 
I should get money back 3 
Other (specify) 4 
Don't know 5 
Q121. How do you feel the SEWA scheme could be improved? (more than one answer possible) 
Allow all family members to join I 
Cover all diseases 2 
Cover 100% of costs 3 
4 Allow the old women to join 
Reduce membership fees 5 
6 More health education 
Make people more aware of the scheme 7 
Other (specify) 8 J 
Don't know 9 
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LJMoming/Aftemoon/Evening Lj: Q122. Time Interview Com leted: _ __ p 
Q123. How reliable do you feel these responses are? 
All reliable I 
Mostly reliable 2 
Partially reliable 3 
Unreliable 4 
Q124. Degree of co-operation 
:1ýý, "-, -I'. ., z 
V-0 
Very good I 
Good 2 
Not so good 3 
Not good at all 4 
Q125. Did the person interviewed understand the questions? 
No difficulty 1 
Little difficulty 2 
Much difficulty 3 
Great difficulty 4 
General Comments: "0 
J 
Cb=ked by Interviewer (Signature): 
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APPENDIX 3. THE ECONOMIC STATUS INDEX (ESI) AND ITS 
RELIABILITY 
No information was collected on household income or expenditures. An economic 
status index is constructed based on household assets, allowing the weights of these 
assets to be determined by the statistical procedure of principal components (Filmer 
and Prichett 1998). Twenty-two of these asset variables are used, which can be 
grouped into three types. First, eleven discrete variables describing farm/household 
assets (goat, cow, ox, buffalo, television, bicycle, motorised two-wheeler, pull-cart, 
motorised three/four-wheeler, handpump, refrigerator). Second, eight discrete 
variables related to the place of residence (ownership of house, concrete walls, 
concrete/tile roof, cement/tiled floor, private toilet, electricity connection, water 
from public tap, water piped into yard/residence). Third, three discrete variables 
about whether the household owned buildings other than the house, owned other 
residential land; and owned agricultural land. 
Economic status index (Table AM). The mean value of the index was zcro by 
construction. The standard deviation was 1.95. Since all the asset variables took 
only the values of zero or one, the weights were easily interpreted. A move from 0 
to I changed the index by scoring factor/standard deviation. A household that 
owned a refrigerator or freezer had an asset index higher by 1.29 than one that did 
not. Obtaining drinking water from a public tap (as opposed to various private 
sources) lowered the index by 0.38. 
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Table AM: Scoring factors and summary statistics for variables entering the 
týýqT ?f the first principal component compý! 
_ V_ II I . 7, Standard-I J 0 , 
r fac 
" de " ir-' stApda d ti a] jatiýo !q, __CV 
a -0 
Own house 0.036 0.944 0.230 0.16 
Concrete walls 0.337 0.452 0.498 0.68 
Concrete/clay tile roof 0.130 0.597 0.491 0.27 
Cement/tiled floor 0.387 0.361 0.481 0.80 
Private toilet/latrine 0.383 0.214 0.410 0.93 
Electricity connection 0.282 0.667 0.471 
0.60 
Water from public tap -0.129 0.133 0.340 -0.38 
Water piped to yard/residence 0.242 0.487 0.500 
0.48 
Own other dwellings 0.079 0.172 0.378 0.21 
Own residential land -0.008 0.133 0.339 -0.02 
Own goats -0.056 0.060 0.237 -0.23 
Own cows 0.118 0.101 0.301 
0.39 
Own oxen 0.031 0.158 0.365 
0.09 
Own buffalo -0.036 0.571 0.495 . 
0.07 
Own television 0.317 0.277 0.448 0.71 
Own bicycle 0.167 0.364 0,481 0.35 
Own motorised two-wheeler 0.286 0.075 0.263 
1.09 
Own pull-cart 0.175 0.034 0.182 
0.96 
Own motorised three/four- 0.164 0.044 0.206 
0.80 
wheeler 
Own handpump 0.126 0.033 0.180 0.70 
Own reffigerator/freezer 0.324 0.068 0.251 
1.29 
Own agricultural land 0.057 0.614 0.487 
0.12 
Economic status index 0.000 1.953 
Reliability of the asset index. Table A3.2 compares the average asset ownership 
across the ESI quintiles. The index produced sharp differences across quintilcs 
for 
most assets: for example, television ownership was 2% among the poorest quintile 
and 79% among the wealthiest. The separation was cleanest 
for the variables related 
to the place of residence (for example, concrete walls, private toilet) and was 
least 
clean for certain farm assets (goats, cows, oxen, buffalo, 
handpumps) and for 
ownership of residential and agricultural land. 
376 
guintile Table A3.2: Percent of households with assets, by EST c "" -7 77 7 77 7 
PO ore st wealthiestý 
Own house M - 88% 91% 88% 95% 99% 
Concrete walls 10% 21% 62% 85% 97% 
Concrete/clay tile roof 37% 54% 56% 44% 82% 
Cement/tiled floor 0% 10% 44% 90% 97% 
Private toilet/latrine 0% 3% 9% 52% 95% 
Electricity connection 18% 63% 90% 
100% 100% 
Water from public tap 28% 8% 14% 
9% 1% 
Water piped to yard/residence 6% 43% 59% 
80% 89% 
Own other dwellings 9% 14% 19% 
25% 29% 
Own residential land* 12% 11% 16% 
12% 12% 
Own goats* 8% 4% 6% 
2% 4% 
Own cows* 6% 13% 7% 
13% 24% 
Own oxen* 11% 21% 13% 
10% 16% 
Own buffalo* 51% 60% 52% 40% 
46% 
Own television 2% 5% 20% 
51% 79% 
Own bicycle 17% 30% 38% 52% 
65% 
Own motorised two-wheeler 0% 0% 2% 
4% 37% 
Own pull-cart 0% 0% 1% 
3% 10% 
Own motorised three/four- 0% 1% 1% 
5% 11% 
wheeler 
Own handpurnp* 0% 2% 6% 3% 
8% 
Own reffigerator/freezer 0% 0% 
0% 1% 57% 
Own agricultural land* 56% 57% 
57% 49% 70% 
The robustness of the index was tested by removing the seven variables 
marked with 
an asterisk in Table A3.2 (chosen as they were not "cleanly" related 
to ESI quintile). 
Households were divided into quintiles based on the new (15 variable) 
index, and 
the old (22 variable) and new indices were compared (Table A3.3). 
No household in 
the bottom quintile of the index using all 22 variables was 
in any of the top three 
quintiles by the reduced new index. Similarly, no household 
in the top quintile of 
the index using all variables was in the bottom two quintiles 
by the reduced index. 
Comparison of the asset index with the interviewer's assessment of wealth and with 
daily expenditures on food suggests strong correlation 
(Table A3.3). 
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Table A3.3: Comparison of the full (22 variable) index with the reduced (15 
variable) index and other estimators of wealth 
-3 -Totai 
Quintiles of reduced (15 variable) index 
1 19.30 1.25 0.13 0.00 0.00 20.68 
2 0.81 17.42 1.45 0.00 0.00 19.68 
3 0.00 1.23 17.31 1.24 0.25 20.02 
4 0.00 0.00 1.12 17.66 0.92 19.71 
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.30 18.62 19.92 
Wealth, as judged by interviewer 
Poorer than average 10.17 7.23 6.43 4.03 
0.00 27.87 
About average 9.42 11.09 11.14 12.84 
10.54 55.03 
Better off than average 0.51 1.57 2.44 3.33 
9.25 17.10 
Color of ration card 
White (<I 1,000 Rs per 12.16 11.39 10.83 8.83 6.08 49.30 
annum) 
Beige (>11,000 Rs per 1.26 3.23 3.28 3.53 3.57 
14.87 
annum) 
Pink (topmost income level) 2.59 2.64 3.63 5.86 9.69 24.40 
No ration card 4.10 2.64 2.28 1.98 
0.44 11.43 
How much do you spend daily on food? (quinti les) 
1&2 10.59 12.03 8.50 8.71 3.51 43.34 
3 4.20 4.47 4.35 3.39 1.17 17.57 
4 3.69 2.15 4.48 5.86 6.02 22.20 
5 1.73 0.83 2.79 2.35 9.19 16.89 
Amount spent on food per person, per day (quintiles) 
1 5.03 5.27 4.00 3.95 1.80 20.04 
2 6.37 7.22 5.10 5.82 3.77 29-29 
3 2.00 2.40 2.68 2.43 2.25 11.76 
4 4.99 3.98 5.91 6.39 3.88 25.16 
5 1.82 0.61 2.42 1.72 8.19 14.75 
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APPENDIX 5: QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW SCHEDULES 
Interviews with beneficiaries (including focus-group discussions) 
" Has anyone in the household been hospitalised recently (within the last year)? 
" How did household cope with costs of hospitalisation? 
" Is respondent familiar with the concept of insurance? Health insurance? 
" Is anyone in household enrolled in an insurance scheme? If so, which one? Was 
reimbursement provided for any of the hospitalisations described? 
" What should a health insurance scheme provide? More specifically, for SEWA 
and TF members, what should these schemes provide? Why did they join TF or 
SEWA? 
What was their experience in using SEWA or TF (strengths and weaknesses of 
the scheme)? What factors account for the scheme's success, or lack of it? 
Will they continue to participate in the scheme, or will they drop out? Why? 
Interviews with health care providers 
What type of health care do they provide (outpatient vs. inpatient, allopathic vs. 
traditional)? From what geographical areas and socio-economic groups do thcy 
draw their clientele? What are the prices charged for some procedures that thcy 
commonly perform? 
Is interviewer familiar with the concept of insurance? Health insurance? 
Does the respondent have health insurance? 
Is it common for the respondent's patients to have insurance? 
Is respondent familiar with SEWA or TF schemes? 
What is the nature of their interaction with scheme beneficiaries and with 
scheme administrators, if any? What is their experience of the scheme, positive 
and negative? What, if any, benefits do they think the scheme provides? 
What factors account for the scheme's success, or lack of it? 
Are there things that the scheme should'be achieving/providing that it currently 
is not? 
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0 Are the insured (and more specifically, the SEWA or TF insured) treated 
differently'? Prove for differences in the quality of health care provided, whether 
there are differences in referral mechanisms, and differences in cost and billing? 
Interviews with scheme administrators 
" How is the respondent involved in administration of the scheme? For how long 
have they been working with SEWA/TF, and how have their 
roles/responsibilities changed with time? 
" Have them describe the design and management of the scheme. How do people 
join in the scheme? 
" What does insurance mean to them? 
" What is the nature of their interaction with beneficiaries and health care 
providers? 
" What is their experience of the scheme, positive and negative? 
What factors account for the scheme's success, or lack of it? 
Are there things that the scheme should be achieving/providing that it currently 
is not? 
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APPENDIX 6: HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL ANALYSES OF UTILISATION AND 
EXPENDITURE9 TF 
Table A6.1: Independent variables included in the household-level regression 
Variables Model 
2 3 
Characteristics of the household 
TF =1 if household paid TF membership fee for the current year, 0 if not 
ESII to ES15 = quintiles of economic status index, this is an 
approximation of household wealth based on assets, ESII being the 
poorest and ESI 5 the wealthiest 
LLthese variables are exhaustive, ESII is left out of the models) 
I T4T'KrnYT- I : CL]r: -A.. -I. *. -: -- A 100, 
BKWDCASTE =I if scheduled caste, scheduled tribe and other 
'backward castes', 0 if castes that have not been identified by govenunent 
as 'backward' (Bhakshipanch, Brahmin, Patel, Shah, etc. ) 
HHSIZEI =I if I to 2 people in HH 
HHSIZE2 =I if 3 to 4 people in HH 
HHSIZE3 =I if 5 to 9 people in I-111 
HHSIZE4 =I if >--10 people in HH 
(these variables are exhaustive, HHSIZE I is left out of the models) 
Characteristics of individuals (averagedfor HH) 
PropFEMALE = continuous variable (0 to 1) proportion -of household 
members that are female 
AvAGE1 =I if average age in household is 10 to <20 years .7 
AvAGE2 =1 if average age in household is 20 to <30 years 
AvAGE3 =I if average age in household is 30 to <40 years 
AvAGE4 =I if average age in household is 40+ years 
(these variables are exhaustive, %AGEI is left out of the models) 
PropLITERATE = continuous variable, proportion of household adults or 
(>--15 years) that can read and write a simple letter 
PropMARRIED = continuous variable, proportion of household adults 
(>= 15 years) that are mani ed 
PropFARMER = continuous variable, proportion of household adults V, 
(>= 15 years) engaged in fanning 
AvNUMBACUTE = average number of acute illness episodes reported 
during the last 30 days (ranged from 0 to 3), intended to control for general 
level of health. Included as a proxy, based on the hypothesis that those 
who are more sickly will have experienced illness episodes within the last 
month. 
Characteristics of the household head 
HdFEMGEND =I if female, 0 if male 
HdAGE1 =I if 0 to 4 years of age 
HdAGE2 =I if 5 to 9 years of age 
HdAGE3 =I if 10 to 19 years of age 
HdAGE4 =I if 20 to 29 years of age 
HdAGE5 =I if 30 to 39 years of age 
HdAGE6 =I if 40 to 49 years of age 
HdAGE7 =I if 50 to 59 years of age 
HdAGE8 =I if >60 years of age 
(these variables are exhaustive, HdAGEI is left out of the models) 
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HdLITERATE =I if person can read and write a simple letter, 0 if not 
HdMARRIED =I if married, 0 if never married, widower, divorced, 
separated, or other 
HdFARMER =I if primary occupation is farmer (including dairy farmer) 
HdDAILYWAGE =I if unskilled worker being paid daily wage 
(agýricultural or factory worker) 
HdDOMESTIC I if primary occupation is domestic worldhousework 
HdNOT-ABLE Not able to work (e. g. elderly, child, mentally or 
physically disabled) 
HdOTHERWORK =I if other than farmer, dailywage, domestic or 
notable (e. g. presently studying, government employment, self-employed, 
trained professional, skilled daily wages, unskilled monthly salary, 
military/police, beggar, unemployed but looking for work, unemployed but 
not looking for work, employee of co-operative sector) 
(these variables are exhaustive, OTHERWORK is left out of the models) 
HdNUMBACUTE = number of acute illness episodes reported during the 
last 30 days (ranged from 0 to 3), intended to control for general level of 
health. I include this variable as a proxy, based on the hypothesis that 
those who are more sickly will have experienced illness episodes within 
the last month. 
Characteristics of the hospitalisation 
PUBLIC =I if ALL hospitalizations government or ESIS hospital 
PRIVATE =I if ALL private for-profit hospital 
NONPROF =I if ALL private-non-profit hospital 
MDCEDHOSP =I if more than one type of hospital 
(these variables are exhaustive, PUBLIC is left out of the models) 
SHORT =I if AVG duration 0 to 3 days hospitalised 
MEDIUM =I if AVG duration 4 to 7 days hospitalised 
LONG =I if AVG duration >7 days hospitalised 
(these variables are exhaustive, SHORT is left out of the moqSýý 
OBS/GYN =I if cause of ALL hospitalizations was pregnancy, delivery 
I or family planning, 0 if other 
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Table A6.2: Sample characteristics at household level 
Number of households 280 414 
Mean ESI 0.57 0.26 
Cat: Quintiles of ESI 
" in I st quintile 16.6 26.6 
" in 2nd quintile 27.3 15.7 
" in 3nd quintile 13.7 20.1 
" in 4nd quintile 21.9 20.7 
" in 5nd quintile 20.6 16.8 
Religion 
" Hindu 99.2 90.5 
" Muslim 0.8 6.0 
" Christian 0.0 3.5 
% ST, SC, or other "backward" 42.5 41.0 
caste 
Mean number of hh members 5.34 5.04 
Cat: Number of hh members 
%1-2 6.6 14.6 
%34 32.9 27.8 
%5-9 54.0 54.4 
>% =10 6.6 3.2 
"Alean " household characteristics 
% Female 46.4 47.3 
Mean age 26.78 33.41 
Cat: Age 
% 10-<20 20.0 7.5 
% 20-<30 49.8 44.2 
% 30-<40 24.1 27.1 
%40+ 6.1 21.2 
" Adults literate 63.0 59.0 
" Adults married 79.8 72.0 
" Adults farming 33.3 16.3 
Characteristics of the household head. 
% Female 5.0 9.4 
Mean age 42.80 48.02 
Cat: Age 
% 20-<30 13.0 6.9 
% 30-<40 23.8 16.0 
% 40-<50 31.0 29.9 
% 50-<60 23.4 24.3 
%60+ 8.8 22.9 
% Literate 74.2 68.8 
% Married 91.5 88.0 
% Farming 62.9 30.8 
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Table A63: Hospital utilisation and expenditure per household by TF 
. 
Foyerage - -W I- ---- -- 7.1 1, rr-V -"', 'N6 -UEM 
IkI4) 
Hospital utilisation 
Total hospitalisations reported 77 135 
Households with >0 hospitalisations, I year 60 111 
Probability of >=I hospitallsation per household 0.177 
0.284 
Mean total hospital expenditures (per 1111 with 4,075 
6,661 
hospitalisation) 
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Table A6.4: Regression results for Equation 1, the odds of a household 
belonging to TF based on socio-demographic variables: logit model r" I aýc, S ý-, 07siius-t , : ""r" , Mean Model 
-691 
ES12 3.092 ESI2 3.146 
(2.250) (2.530) 
ES13 1.362 ES13 1.270 
(1.280) (0.730) 
ESI4 3.169 ES14 2.249 
(2.190) (1.390) 
ES15 3.068 ES15 2.833 
(2.820) (1.890) 
BINDU 7.589 HRITDU 9.157 
(2.310) (2.220) 
BKWDCASTE 1.346 BKWDCASTE 1.774 
(1.040) (2.590) 
HHSIZE2 0.603 HHSIZE2 0.874 
(-1.210) (-0.440) 
HHSIZE3 1.094 HHSIZE3 1.929 
(0.180) (1.760) 
PROPFEMALE 0.775 HdFEMALE 0.689 
(-0.380) (-0.710) 
AvAGE2 0.414 HdAGE5 0.802 
(-2.530) (-0.430) 
AvAGE3 0.287 HdAGE6 0.431 
(-3.100) (-1.950) 
AvAGE4 0.073 HdAGE7 0.329 
(-2.770) (. 2.220) 
HdAGE8 0.168 
(-3.910) 
PROPLITERATE 1.199 HdLITERATE 1.027 
(1.470) (0.070) 
PROPMARRIED 1.156 HdMARRIED 0.769 
(1.380) (-0.390) 
PROPFARMER 2.785 HdFARMER 4.769 
(3.070) (6.390) 
AVNUMBACUTE 1.498 HdNUMBACUTE 1.071 
(2.550) (0.180) 
Adjusted Wald Test F 8 Adjusted Wald Test, F 117 
P-value = 0.055 P-value = 0.009 
Percent of predictions correct 63.5% Percent of predictions correct - 64.4% 
F-test for four ESI variables 1.9 F-test for four ESI variables 2.7 
P-value = 0.162 P-value = 0.073 
10% significance level; ** 5% significance level; *** 1% significance level 
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Table A6.5: Regression results for Equation 2, the odds of one or more 
hospitalisation in the household within the last year: logit model 
og, Zt--'ý a9s FF r Mean Modc: l Head Model. 
TF 0.472 TF 0.467 
(-2.000) (-2.040) 
ES12 1.234 ESI2 1.069 
(0.320) (0.100) 
ES13 0.549 ES13 0.486 
(-1.420) (-1.460) 
ES14 1.475 ES14 1.150 
(0.630) (0.250) 
ES15 1.345 ES15 0.971 
(0.570) (-0.070) 
HINDU 3.915 HINDU 4.871 
(1.850) (2.030) 
BKWDCASTE 1.102 BKWDCASTE 1.248 
(0.450) (0.950) 
HHSIZE2 3.741 HHSIZE2 4.225 
(2.570) (3.050) 
HHSIZE3 2.269 HHSIZE3 2.477 
(1.270) (1.520) 
PROPFEMALE 1.336 HdFEMALE 0.484 
(0.230) (. 1.140) 
AvAGE2 1.725 HdAGE5 0.518 
(0.960) (-1.410) 
AvAGE3 2.833 HdAGE6 1.059 
(1.320) (0.190) 
AvAGE4 1.485 HdAGE7 0.812 
(0.560) (-0.690) 
HdAGE8 1.184 
(0.570) 
PROPLITERATE 0.546 HdLITERATE 1.182 
(-1.740) (0.470) 
PROPMARRIED 2.147 HdMARRIED 0.660 
(0.870) (-0.610) 
PROPFARMER 0.942 HdFARMER 1.059 
(-0.190) (0.170) 
AvNUMBACUTE 1.306 HdNUMBACUTE 2.409 
(0.410) (2.460) 
Adjusted Wald Test, F 166 Adjusted Wald Test, F 348 
P-value = 0.006 P-value = 0.042 
Percent of predictions correct = 74.7% Percent of predictions correct - 73.8% 
* 10% significance level; ** 5% significance level; *** 1% significance level 
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Table A6.6: Regression results for Equation 3, the net annual hospital 
expenditures per household where there was one or more hospitalisation: log- 
linear model 
Mean M 
17 77 sta 
odcl %6d Mo 
0.554 TF 0.587 
(1.460) (1.630) 
ES12 0.532 ES12 0.419 
(1.210) (0.940) 
ES13 0.772 ES13 0.494 
(1.370) (0.790) 
ES14 1.292 ES14 0.910 
(2.240) (1.600) 
ES15 1.397 ES15 1.104 
(2.020) (2.060) 
HINDU 1.144 HINDU 1.460 
(2.090) (2.450) 
BKWDCASTE 0.012 BKWDCASTE 0.118 
(0.060) (0.480) 
HHSIZE2 0.700 HHSIZE2 (continuous in adult mod) 0.492 
(2.370) (2.230) 
HHSIZE3 0.469 HHSIZE3 0.352 
(1.380) (1.240) 
PROPFEMALE 
-0.300 HdFEMALE -0.299 
(-0.340) (-0.870) 
AVAGE2 0.427 HdAGE5 -0.500 
(0.810) (-0.580) 
AvAGE3 0.021 HdAGE6 -0.439 
(0.040) (-0.660) 
AvAGE4 0.892 HdAGE7 -0.470 
(1.690) (-0.670) 
HdAGE8 -0.608 
(-1.050) 
PROPLITERATE 
-1.591 HdLITERATE -0.639 
(-2.100) (-1.450) 
PROPMARRIED -0.264 HdMARRIED 0.258 
(-0.390) (0.380) 
PROPFARMER -0.408 HdFARMER -0.516 
(-0.770) (-2.060) 
AvNUMBACUTE -1.147 HdNUMBACUTE -0.731 
(-1.500) (-3. o4o) 
PUB -0-325 PUB -0.127 
(-0.680) (. 0.210) 
PRIV 0.677 PRIV 0.7S1 
(2.830) (1.990) 
MEDIUM 1.048 MEDIUM 1.049 
(3-810) (3,710) 
LONG 1.724 LONG 1.693 
(6.000) (5.910) 
OBS/GYN -1.074 OBS/GYN -1.263 
(-4.310) (. 2.640) 
Adjusted Wald Test, F 12.060 Adjusted Wald Test, F 32 
P-value = 0.223 P-value - 0.138 
R-squared 47-16% R-squared 44.08% 
F-test for four ESI variables 1.5 F-test for four ESI variables 3.4 
P-value = 0.267 P-value - 0.037 
*I O'Yo significance level; ** 5% significance level; *** I% significance level 
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APPENDix 7: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EQUATION 29 THE 
PROBABILITY OF BEING HOSPITALISED WITHIN THE LAST YEAR9 
RESTRICTED TO HOUSEHOLD HEADS: LOGIT MODEL 
t7 MIC 7,777ý ý7 Full Model ,, ý!, *st Fit' 
(rr- 
TF 0.614 TF 0.683 
(-0.630) (-0.520) 
ES12 0.449 ESI2 0.513 
(-0.600) (-0.570) 
ESI3 0.227 ES13 0.347 
(-1.560) (1.450) 
ES14 1.008 ES14 1.298 
(0.010) (0.510) 
ES15 0.134 ES15 0.259 
(-1.580) (. 1.920) 
HINDU 62.196 HINDU 73.445 
(2.950) (3.520) 
BKWDCASTE 0.508 BKVvDCASTE 
(-1.930) 
HHSIZE2 3.220 HHSIZE2 2.840 
(3.030) (3.660) 
HHSIZE3 9.407 HHSIZE3 7.360 
(2.560) (2.310) 
FEMALE 0.036 FEMALE 0.242 
(-2.700) (-1.200) 
AGE5 1.736 AGE (cont) 0.993 
(0.460) (-0.530) 
AGE6 1.580 
(0.570) 
AGE7 1.467 
(0.980) 
AGE8 0.254 
(-1.200) 
LITERATE 1.388 LITERATE 
(0.330) - 
MARRIED 0.289 MARRIED 0.304 
(-1.070) (-1.350) 
FARMER 1.188 FARMER - 
(0.140) - 
DAILYWAGE 0.580 DAILYWAGE - 
(-0.410) - 
DOMESTIC 27.542 DOMESTIC - 
(1.420) - 
NOT-ABLE 5.085 NOT-ABLE 
(0.980) 
NUMBACUTE 0.811 NUMBACUTE 0.771 
(-0.210) (-0.290) 
Adjusted Wald Test F 37 Adjusted Wald Test F 27 
P-value = 0.128 P-value = 0.000 
Percent of predictions 94.5% Percent of predictions 94.5% 
correct = correct = 
* 10% significance level; ** 5% significance level; *** 1% significance level 
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APPENDIX 8: ANALYSIS OF HOUSEHOLD REINTERVIEWS 
The purpose of this appendix is to compare responses between first and second 
interviews among those households that were twice surveyed. 
Non-sampling errors are due to variations between a given response and the true 
answer. They result from biases introduced at any stage of the survey process - 
survey design, questionnaire development, field data collection, data processing 
analysis or reporting (Fabricant 1992). This analysis looks at the reliability of 
survey data (i. e. the recording of the same answer to the same question on two 
different occasions) as an indicator of non-sampling error. Differences from one 
interview to the next may result if, for example: the respondent was different, and 
the two respondents had different opinions about the correct answer, the respondent 
was unsure of the answer and was making a best guess; the question was asked 
differently from one occasion to the next; the same answer was given on both 
occasions, but the answer on one occasion was misunderstood, or mis-recorded. 
Thus, the results of data from households that were re-interviewed will give us some 
indication as to the reliability of the survey tool, but if it is found to be un-reliable, 
the analysis may shed little light on the underlying cause of the inconsistency. 
It is hypothesised that certain types of questions will have been answered more 
reliably than others. No hypothetical questions were asked, such as where a person 
would go for care if they were sick, or how much they would be willing to spend on 
hospitalisation. Questions about the household's religion, and the marital status of 
certain individuals, should generally have been easy to answer in an objective 
manner. However, many of the responses, such as illness of household members, 
treatments used, and amounts spent, depended on the recall of past events. Others, 
such as household membership, might be subjective, while still others, such as the 
Possession of livestock, and daily food expenditures, might elicit deliberate false 
answers. 
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Methodology 
One hundred households were randomly sampled to be interviewed a second time to 
check the reliability of the survey instrument. Only ninety-five of these households 
agreed to re-interview. The re-interviews were usually conducted within 24 hours of 
the first interview, and were always conducted by a different interviewer. 
Most variables used in the analysis of the household survey data were either binary 
or categorical (see Chapters 5 and 8). The reliability of data that were entered into 
the models as binary or categorical variables are assessed using the following 
measures (Fabricant 1992): 
Gross error rate is the proportion of responses in a given category for which a 
different response than the original one was given in the re-interview. It is 
therefore a measure of the reliability of individual responses to a given question, 
and also of the level of randomly occurring error which would be undetected by 
a gross comparison of original and re-interview data. Errors which occur 
randomly tend to weaken or mask the true relationships by introducing 
anomalies into observed results. 
Net bias is the difference between the proportion of answers to a given question 
falling into a given category in the original interview and in the re-interview. 
This estimate of error is generally smaller than that indicated by the gross error 
rate because erroneous responses will cancel out to some extent by randomly 
falling into different categories. Net bias reveals systematic errors which tend to 
distort true relationships. This rate can therefore be considered to be a measure 
of reliability of the question for the entire sample. 
Other parameters are used in the analysis of errors for continuous variables (e. g. 
annual hospital costs per person hospitalised, number of acute illnesses during the 
last 30 days): the percentage of individual responses which to not match exactly; the 
mean of the ratio of (value at re-interview-original value)/(original value); and the 
mean of the absolute value of this ratio. 
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Results 
Certain of the survey questions yielded more reliable responses than others. 
Questions regarding characteristics of the family (e. g. religion) or specific 
individuals (e. g. marital status) generally elicited the same response in both 
interviews. Questions regarding household assets (e. g. type of material used to 
make walls of the home, whether or not household owned a refrigerator) were less 
likely to yield reliable results. This may have hampered the validity of the ESI. 
Questions about the type of hospital used and the cost of hospitalisation were 
answered with surprising reliability, while the duration of hospitalisation was 
provided with less reliability. 
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Table A8.1: Response errors for select binary and cat 
How often a different interviewer 8% 
Household religion 
Religion 9% 1.05% 
Hindu 0% -1.05% 
Number of household members 
I to 2 0% -1.05% 
3 to 4 7% 0.00% 
5 to 9 9% 2.11% 
>-10 0% -1.05% 
Concrete walls 
No 17% -1.05% 
Yes 24% 1.05% 
Own motorised two-wheeler 
No I% 4.21% 
Yes 45% 4.21% 
Own reftigeratorffreezer 
No 1% -1.05% 
Yes 40% 1.05% 
Any hospitalizzations in the last year? 
Yes 7% -1.88% 
No 3% 1.88% 
Literacy 
No 10% 0.77% 
Yes 7% -0.77% 
Married 
Yes I% . 1.07% 
No 3% 1.07% 
Type of hospital 
Public 0% 0.00% 
Private 6% 0.00% 
Nonprofit 100% 0.00% 
Days hospitalised 
Short 11% 4.00% 
Medium 38% 4.00% 
Long 0% -8.00% 
rical variables 
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Table A8.2: Response errors for select continuous variables 
730, t f7xjjjj.,, "M; ra 
Mat h 
Total annual hospital costs per person hospitalised 92% -6.09% 
Number of acute illness episodes during the last 30 days. 3% 
* These calculations not possible as "original value" was often zero. 
Absolute 
'ine, "' I ". ,', an error M 
27.11% 
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APPENDIX 9: SARDAR PATEL INSURANCE SCHEME 
TF's hospital referral scheme has been (largely) discontinued, and replaced by the 
new Sardar Patel insurance scheme, which started operating on January 26b, 2001. 
This voluntary scheme is open only to members of the dairy co-operatives. In return 
for a flat-rate premium (Rs. 26 per household per annum) members are entitled to 
free hospitalisation (no user-fees) at any of eight private-non-prorit hospitals 
affiliated with the scheme. The cost of running the scheme is to be heavily 
subsidised by contributions from Amul Milk amounting to 3 paise per litre of milk 
deposited in the participating villages. It is anticipated by scheme administrators 
that several factors will contribute to much higher rates of utilisation of the new 
scheme, including: entirely free inpatient care, improved geographic access to 
hospitals, and a strong IEC campaign (including printed circulars, regional meetings, 
and training of the VHWs). 
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APPENDIX 10: LIST OF QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED 
vt ý" ýý ý, 'ý 'ý ", - ý 1ý ý' , !. 'ý' "' "ýj I, 
1ý ,''- )'Description' e. 
Focus-group di ussions 
FGD-MIX 1 13 women from one village near Anand; mixed social classes; mixed SEWA members. 
TF members and non-members 
FGD-MIX 2 7 women from one village near Anand; middle- and uppcr-social classes, mixed SEWA 
members, TF members and non-members 
FGD-MIX 3 12 men from one village near Anand, mixed social classes; mixed SEWA spouses. TF 
! ]2embers and non-members 
FGD-MIX 4 10 men from one village far from Anand, mixed social classes; mixed SEWA spouses. TF 
members and non-members 
FGD-SEWA 10 women from one village far from Anand, mixed SEWA members and non-members 
FGD-TF 1 9 women from one village far from Anand, middle- and upper-social classes, mixed TF 
members and non-members 
FGD-TF 2 14 women from one village near Anand, TF members and non-members 
Beneficiary in pth Interviews, TF 
BEN-TF I Female member of TF, son hospitalised, member not aware of TF membership. and they 
have never used Shri Krishna 
BEN-TF 2 Female member of TF, was aware of benefits of TF membership. but had never used Shri 
Krishna, her husband was insured through New India Insurance 
BEN-TF 3 Female member of TF, one family member (daughter) had made use of Shri Krishna. but 
several years before. 
BEN-TF 4 Female member of TF, two family members hospit3lised within the last year but no use 
of Shri Krishna, unaware of TF hospital benefits. 
BEN-TF 5 Female member of TF, her husband was hospitalised, they used a hospital in Ahmedabad. 
unaware of the hospital benefits of TF. 
BEN-TF 6 Female member, her son had been hospitalised at Shri Krishna (falciparum malaria) and 
they received 50% discount, but still went into debt to pay the balance 
BEN-TF 7 Female member, son (cleft palate) had used Anand sub-centre and Shri Krishna. received 
discount. As well, two daughters had taken care at private facilities. 
BEN-TF 8 Female member, had been treated at TF sub-ccntre for I week for anaernialweakricss 
(during pregnancy), entirely free of charge. 
BEN-TF 9 Female member whose husband was hospitaliscd at Shri Krishna (no, seemingly not Shn 
Krishna but the "Mission Hospital" in Anand). 
BEN-TF 10 Female member who was hospitalised. but did not use SK. Denies use of TF VJIW but 
was aware of VHW activities. 
BEN-TF 11 Female member, two hospitalisations in family, but neither used SK (both were for 
deliveries). Unaware of the hospital benefits. 
- 
BEN-TF 12 Female member, son was 'hospitalised', they used TF facility (as far as I can tell, they 
used the Anand Sub-centre rather than Shri Krishna Hospit3l). 
BEN-TF 13 Female member, daughter-in-law hospitalised at SK, they received discount due to IT 
membership. 
BEN-TF 14 Female member, used services of TF sub-centre. 
Provider in-dep h interviews, TF 
PROV-TF I Female, TF village health worker. 
PROV-TF 2 
1 
Female, TF village health worker. 
PROV-TF 3 Female, TF field-workcr 
Administrator in-depth interviews, TF 
ADMIN-TF I Male, Chairman, IRMA, and former-Chairman of TF. Female, Chairwonm. TF. Shri 
Krishna Hospital and National Dairy Development Board. 
ADMIN-TF 2 Female, first doctor and manager of TF. 
ADMIN-TF 3 Male, current honorary secretary (managing director), TF 
------ 
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ADMIN-TF 4 
_I 
Female, TF scheme administrator at Shri Krishna Hospital. 
Beneficiary in- pth interviews, SEWA 
BEN-SEWA 1 Female, past-member, has not been offered membership for past 2 years. 
BEN-SEWA 2 Female current member, not aware of her membership, two household hospitalisations in 
last year. 
BEN-SEWA 3 Female curTent member, rec'd Rs. 1,200 after hospitalisation for stomach operauorL 
mortgaged land to 2ay for hospitalisation. 
BEN-SEWA 4 Husband of current member (who was also past SEWA worker). lit had been 
- - 
hospitalised within last year. EE N-SEWA 5 Female current member. She, her husband and her son all hospitalised within the last 
year, but no reimbursement as insurance started after her hospital stay. 
BEN-SEWA 6 Female current member, unaware of membership, recently hospitalised but did no seek 
reimbursement. 
BEN-SEWA 7 Female current member, recently hospitalised, insurance claim submitted to SEWA but 
lost by SEWA worker. 
BEN-SEWA 8 Female curTent member, recently hospitalised, reimbursed Rs. 950 only 15 days after 
discharge. 
BEN-SEWA 9 Female current member. Her two daughters are also members, and both have recently 
given birth. One has rec'd maternity benefit and the other is still waiting afler 3 rnonth%. 
BEN-SEWA Female current member. Respondent has not been hospitalised recently. but she did 
10 receive reimbursement some years ago. 
BEN-SEWA Female current member, hospitalised (seen-dngly more than one year ago) but did not 
II seek reimbursement. 
BEN-SEWA Female current member, recently hospitalised, rec'd reimbursement from SEWA without 
12 any difficulties. 
BEN-SEWA Female current member, recently hospitaliscd, rec'd reimbursement. 
13 
Provider in-dep h interviews, SEWA 
PROV-SEWA Female, gynaecologist and lecturer at an ayurvcdic hospital. 
I 
PROV-SEWA Male, consulting surgeon, private hospital owner. 
2 
PROV-SEWA Male, surgeon, private hospital owner. 
31 
PROV-SEWA Male, surgeon, private hospital owner. 
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Administrator in-depth interviews, SEWA 
ADMIN- Male, doctor who checks all claims for the insurance panel. 
SEWA I 
ADMIN- Female, founder of SEWA. 
SEWA 2 
ADMIN- Female, state-level administrator, 
SEWA 3 
ADMIN- Female, SEWA village leader (representative). 
SEWA 4 
ADMIN. Female, SEWA village leader (representative). 
Donor in-de th i nterviews, SEWA 
DONOR- Female, relatively new to the donor organisation. 
SE) 
I 
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APPENDIX 11: ADDITIONAL QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
The purpose of this appendix is to present findings from in-depth intervicws and 
focus-group discussions that are not specific either to TF or SEWA. 
Transcripts for 51 interviews were available for analysis: seven focus-group 
discussions, and in-depth interviews with 27 benericiarics (TF & SEWA), seven 
health care providers, nine scheme administrators and one external donor. Appendix 
10 provides a brief description of each interview subject (basically the information 
that was available to us before starting the interviews). 
Financial determinants of health care seeking 
MY data show that the perceived cost of health care and the availability of money in 
the household were important determinants of health care seeking. Perceived cost 
and ability to pay influenced: (1) whether people sought care, (2) when they sought 
care - i. e. whether there was any delay in seeking care; (3) the type of care they 
took; and (4) whether they complicd with the prescribed treatment. 
Being poor is perceived as a barrier to seeking health care. One elderly respondent 
explained why her son was not able to take her for cataract surgery: 
If he doesn't have any income, how can he take me? 7he money he makes 
is not enough to run the house, and things are likely to get worse nowfor 
lack of rain. 
(BEN-SEWA 1) 
The costs of medicines alone may prevent the poor from seeking health care: 
Respondent 1: Now if the poor cannot have enough money for foo(4 theft 
how can they spend on medicine. In this way, seventy-five pcrccia of the 
population in the villages suffer and die. 
Respondent2: Yesha#"ofthem. They are very poor... 
Respondent 3: At present also we cannot get the medicines in govcniment 
hospital... And if the medicines cost money then... Vien I won't buy. 
(FGD-MIX4) 
For others, the cost of transportation poses a major barrier to health care seeking: 
Respondent 1: We are planning to take him to Civil (a government hospital 
in Ahmedabad)... 
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Respondent 2: We can take him only if we have sonic arrangcmcnt fi)r 
money. 
Respondent 1: Yes. If we have at least one-thousand rupees, then onýy Vve 
can take him. There won't be any other expense, but we need for the 
(busltrain) fare. 
(BEN- TF 6) 
The problems associated with paying for health care are perceived by some to be 
unique to the poor: 
Respondent 1: Yhe upper economic group has no problem. Only we poor 
people have the problem. Nen we come back home, we feel very 
depressed and tense, thinking "Now what will we do? From whcre will we 
borrow the money? To whom can we go for help? " Me keep on thinking 
about all this after we come home. And the rich have got enough money. so 
they do not have any problem, and they do not have to wor7y. 
Respondent 2: Me have to think whether to eat or spend moncy for 
medicine. 
(FGD-MLY 1) 
Women acknowledged that because men in the household control the finances. it is 
generally the men who decide whether and where the other family members go for 
health care: 
Interviewer: But suppose someone from your family, may be you or your 
children, falls ill. No takes the decision about the hospital inyourfandly? 
Respondent]: Of course, it is decided by men. It is the husband who tells 
us "you go to this particular hospital" or will say "you come with me. I 
will take you to the hospital" ... we 
do not have money with us. Wecango 
only if men give us money. 
(FGD- TF 1) 
Respondents reported delays in seeking health care for lack of money. A male 
family member of one respondent delayed in seeking treatment for a serious heart 
condition: 
In between (diagnosis and operation) he stayed at home for two days. lie 
was able to go only after making arrangementfor the money. 
(sister-in-law of BEN-SE WA 13) 
One respondent's husband delayed in seeking treatment for an oml tumour until it 
was so large and painful as to prevent him from eating: 
We did know (there was something wrong) but there was no pain. and he 
could still eat... He kept on working. fflat is the use of going to the 
hospital when there was no arrangementfor money? ... Then there came a 
point when he couldn't even eat and the tumour became larger inside. 
(BEN-SEWA 5) 
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Decisions around the type of treatment sought - allopathic versus traditional care, 
private versus public - are determined by perceived cost among other factors (e. g. 
quality, location). In the villages of Kheda District, private care is widely available, 
and is generally thought to be of higher quality than publicly provided health care: 
Respondent 1: Private facilities are good. As we are busy coming and 
going for work, we can take their treatment. Because private doctors are 
nearby... 
Respondent 2: Private Doctor's charges are very high. 
Respondent3: Only those people who have money go to private hospital. 
(FGD-AIIX 4) 
Respondents expressed a preference for private facilities, but indicated that they 
would use public health care if insufficient money were available: 
Respondent 1: We ourselves (the women in the household) decide which 
hospital we want to go to. Today if vve have five, twcnty-five rupees. we 
think of going to a big hospital (a private hospital), but if we do not have 
money. we will naturally go to the government hospital... 
Respondent 2: 111C can get treatment at a lesser cost. 
(FGD-MIX 2) 
In one focus-group discussion, men reported that they were unlikely to use seek care 
from Ayurvedic practitioners, not because of high consultation fees, but because of 
the cost of Ayurvcdic treatments: 
Inicrvicu-cr. - Does anyone go to take ircaimcntfrom them? 
Respondent 1: Poor people do not go. Because it is %. Cry experuive. for 
them. The Ayurvaid's medicines are cowtv.. 
(FGD-AfIX 4) 
For lack of money, respondents discontinued or modirted the treatments that they 
had been prescribed by health care providers. For example. one rCsPOndent with 3 
chronic dental condition reported that she was not able to take her medicines as 
prescribed: 
Since last year, the month ofAshadh, I have stoppcd all medicines. We nced 
the moneyfor other things. I have stoppcd all of thern... but I thaujqht that 
when we get some money from work. I '/Igo. 
(BEN-SEWA 11) 
Another suffered recurrence of her illness after failing to follow the prescribed 
treatment: 
She (my daughter) was cured in the government hospitaL But we 
u-cre 
401 
supposed to buy those two bottles (of medicine), but we couldn't buy as we 
did not have money at that time... Her grandfather said that now she is 
feeling well so there is no need to buy the bottles ... so again she came down 
withfever. 
(FGD- TF 1) 
One female respondent expressed that lack of money could prevent her from 
purchasing prescribed medications and following up with referrals: 
They (government doctors) prescribe medicines from outside the hospitat.. 
Only if we have money do we buy, otherwise we take whatever medicines 
the doctor can give usforfree. If we don'tfeel better, then the doctor gives 
us a note and asks us to go further, to Nadiad or Anand (larger towns 
nearby). If we have money we go further. If we have money we go. and if 
we don't have we stay here itself 
(FGD-SEWA) 
Methods of coping with medical expenditures 
Various methods were used for coping with the cost of medical care. NIcans of 
coping with medical expenditures included: borrowing from employers. family. 
fiiends and money-lenders; mortgaging land or other possessions; selling valuables 
(particularly women's ornaments); foregoing expenditure on food, work. education 
or entertairunent; using money saved by the household; doing extra work- for wages; 
and using the public hospitals as the provider of last resort. Women in one focus- 
group discussion listed some of the ways in which they raised money for medical 
care: 
Respondent 1: We would mortgage our land Even if it is hay*an acre, for 
medicines, we have to mortgage it. If we don't have land. we would even 
sell our gold ornaments. We have to incur the expensesl 
Respondent 2: We may cut down on our entertainment and hobbies. but we 
can't leave aside the sickperson. 
(FGD-MIX2) 
Borrowing was by far the most commonly reported means of paying for health cam. 
Respondents reported bon-owing from family and friends, employers and (vcry 
rarely) money-lenders. Whether interest was charged on the loan, and the amount of 
interest, seemed to depend on the nature of the relationship between the two parties 
and the size of the loan: 
Interviewer: You spent nine thousand rupees. How didyou arrangefor it? 
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Respondent: We borrowedfrom someone like you (a wealthy villager). And 
gave back little at a time. 
Interviewer: Did they take interest? 
Respondent: No, they did not take interest. We had good relations, so they 
did not take. 
(BEN-TF 10) 
One respondent had borrowed to cover expenditures incurred in having her grandson 
hospitalised: 
Interviewer., So did you have money in your house (to pay for the 
hospitalisation)? 
Respondent: From here and there only (we acquired the money)... Yes, 
there is some neighbourfrom whom we got the money. Me have to do like 
that and pay only... The interest was five percent. Actually, it is usually 
seven percent. But because they were known to us... 7hey took less. 
(BEN-SEWA 2) 
Respondents also borrowed from their wealthier employers, and then paid back the 
loan out of their wages: 
Respondent: ... we go 
for work, and if we ask for five hundred or one 
thousand rupees, then Patel (the employer) gives us the money. JFc work 
throughout the year, so he settles the account every twelve months. 7hen, 
whatever we have borrowed is deducted, and the remaining is given to us. 
Interviewer: And, do you have to pay interest? 
Respondent: Patel says that, "We don't take interest. " But, (for those who 
have borrowed) they pay a lower wage per day so it is almost the same as 
interest. 
(BEN- TF 6) 
In the following focus-group discussion, one respondent acknowledged that it was 
not always easy, particularly for the old and inf inn, to borrow money. 
Respondent 1: Now someone like this uncle (motioning towards on older 
participant). Now this uncle is not in a position to do any kJnd of labour 
work. If this uncle comes to me and asks mefor money then I will have to 
think, "how will he repay my money? " ... Any person can see that 
he is not 
in a position to repay a loan, so people may not give him money. So 6(such 
a person is ill, then he may suffer and die. 
(FGD-MM 4) 
Beneficiaries reported acquiring money from several different sources to pay for a 
single episode of health care. The following respondent had used money from 
various sources to pay for her daughter-in-law's hospitalisation for childbirth: 
Respondent: How to do? My sons go to cut the wood, so we were able to 
collect their wages. We borrowed some money. And we got sonic motley by 
selling buffalo's milk In that way we have arranged the money. 
(BEN-SEWA 9) 
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Health insurance was rarely spontaneously mentioned by respondents as a means of 
coping with medical expenditures. 
Understanding and knowledge of insurance 95 
Many respondents were unfamiliar with the concept of insurance. Among those 
who were familiar, many viewed insurance as a type of savings mechanism, wherein 
benefits would be provided at a time of need (for example, at the time of 
hospitalisation, or on the death of a family member) but any unused investment 
would be returned when the policy had "matured". One male respondent derincd 
insurance as follows: 
If we have taken insurance then we have to pay a certain amount of 
money... If our cattle die, for example, then we can get the moneyfor that. 
If we meet with any accident we can get the money. Other wise, we can get 
our money back when the policy matures. 
(FGD-TF 1) 
One female respondent described the interest-eaming capacity of her insurance: 
Respondent 1: Yes, we ha , 
ve joined an insurance scheme. 1; c pay fifty 
rupees (every month). Ifyou pay one thousand today, then after ten years 
with interest it doubles. 
Respondent 2: Such money is useful. You won't lose it. 
(FGD-MIX2) 
Some respondents thought that savings and credit mechanisms were also forms of 
insurance: 
Interviewer. - So what do you think, what does insurance mean? 
Respondent P Insurance means the saving, which can be useful infuture. 
Respondent 2: If we have saved money in small amounts right from tile 
beginning, it may come to one thousand or two thousand rupees, 771en it 
becomes useful in thefuture. We can also get a loan if we want to. We can 
use that savingfor anything we want to. 
Respondent 3: If we want, we can also take a loan. If we were not saving 
up small amounts, we would never be able to save up such a big amount. It 
can be useful when someone is ill. 
(FGD-MIX 1) 
When discussing insurance, respondents most often cited life insurance as an 
example: 
Respondent: In thefuture, if we meet with an accident, or we die a natural 
death, then my successors can at least live their lives peacefully. Suppose I 
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have taken insurance of fifty thousand rupees. Now double accident 
insurance means when I die because of an accident, at that time my 
children can get one lakh (one hundred thousand) rupees. So myJamily 
can live a happy life after me. 
(FGD-MIX4) 
Interviewer: Has anyone heard about insurance? 
Respondent: Insurance is the one that we get when someone dies. If there 
is a death, they add into it (the amount paid as premium) and give back to 
us. 
(FGD- TF 2) 
Very few cited health insurance as an example of insurance, or were able to describe 
existing schemes. 
Insurance, in general, is thought of as being too expensive, something that is 
available only to the wealthy. One woman said: 
Didn't I tell you that it (insurance) is a relief But ifwe do not have moncy 
to pay, how can it be a reliej.? 
(FGD-MIX2) 
Male participants in a focus-group felt that paying a regular prcmiurn was difficult, 
given fluctuations in agricultural incomes: 
Respondent: For this insurance, at present I may say that "you give me 
insurance ofone lakh (one hundred thousand) rupees. " So then I will have 
to pay two thousand five hundred rupees premium. Suppose today our 
paddy crop grows well, I may be able to pay two thousandfive hundred 
rupees. And next time if it does not grow, we may not be able to pay. So 
then our investment goes to waste. 
(FGD-MIX 4) 
Beneficiaries and doctors alike are distrustful of insurance schemes and agents. The 
following respondent did not wish to join an insurance scheme, having heard of 
others who had lost money to insurance and savings "societies": 
Respondent: Many have lost their money after paying to become a 
member. Many societies have closed after taking people's moncy. 
Interviewer: So you have not paid anywhere. 
Respondent: No, nowhere. I have not paid anywhere and I ant not going to 
pay. 
(BEN-SEWA 3) 
Men in one focus-group discussion spoke of their negative expcricnces with 
livestock insurance: 
405 
Respondent 1: Now suppose the buffalo dies. Aen the insurance company 
will say that because of neglect it died So for this reason we may not get 
moneyfrom the insurer. 
Respondent 2: 77iey do not get reimbursement from the insurer. 97th 
buffaloes, this is theproblem. 
Respondent 1: If it is a human being then we can know his identity. So we 
can get reimbursement from life insurance. Klereas with buffalo it is 
difficult to identify a specific animal. They may have written black colour 
on the insuranceforms, but there are many black buffaloes. So many times 
people do not get the insurance. Now people have got fed up - we have 
stopped the insurance here in our dairy co-operative. 
(FGD-MLY4) 
One doctor described some of the ways in which insurance agents might try to 
deceive the insurer for personal financial gain: 
Respondent: Suppose onefellow in our area develops peripheral vascular 
disease. So I will operate on this type of person to prevent gangrene. 
Gradually, thatfellow will recover. So, during the period of recovery, that 
person may be contacted by an insurance agent in his village. 7he agent 
may contact thatfellow, and the agent will start insurance. 7hen the agent 
will come to me saying, "Doctor, can you show this operation on a later 
date than it actually occurred? "I don't like this kind of thing. 
(PROV-SETVA 3) 
Summary of findings 
Perceived cost of health care (including indirect costs, like cost of transportation) 
and the availability of money in the household were important determinants of 
health care seeking. Being poor was perceived as a barrier to seeking health care. In 
some households, males decided whether and where women in the household sought 
health care, due in part to the fact that males were in control of household finances. 
Decisions around type of treatment sought were determined by perceived cost and 
levels of economic wealth. Respondents reported cases in which lack of money had 
resulted in delays in health care seeking, and failure to comply with treatments that 
had been prescribed by health care providers. 
Many different methods were used for coping with the cost of medical care. 
including mortgaging land or other possessions, selling valuables. and foregoing 
expenditure on food, work, education or entertainment. Borrowing was by far the 
most commonly reported means of paying for health care, although it was common 
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to acquire money from several different sources to pay for a single episode of health 
care. 
Many respondents were unfamiliar with the concept of insurance. Among those 
who were familiar, insurance was often viewed as a type of savings mechanism, 
wherein premiums paid should be returned if the insurance went unuscd. 
Respondents were most familiar with life insurance. Insurance was generally 
perceived to be unaffordable to the poor. Past experience had made beneficiaries 
and doctors alike distrustful of insurance schemes and agents. 
Discussion and interpretation of findings 
The fact that respondents expect to receive money back when an insurance policy 
expires is not surprising. Formal money-back insurance plans are common in India. 
For example, India's governmental Life Insurance Company (LIC) sells as one of its 
most popular products the "Endowment Plan" - "Under this plan sum assured is 
payable on the date of maturity or on death of the life assured, if earlice, (Life 
Insurance Corporation of India 2001). Such policies provide the full bencrit of the 
policy if the policyholder outlives the term. If the policyholder dies before the term, 
the benefit passes on to their nominee or legal heirs. 
It was not surprising to learn that borrowing is a common source of money for 
financing health care. Many studies have shown that houscholds in India smooth 
consumption by using formal credit markets, and also by borrowing from family. 
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Quality'of hysterectomy care in rural Gu arat: the role of 
community-based health insurance 
M KENT RANSOM AND KR JOHN2 
'Health Policy Unit, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK and zDepartment of Community Health, Christian Medical College, Vellore, India 
Community-based health insurance (CBHI) may be a mechanism for improving the quality of health care 
available to people outside the formal sector in developing countries. The purpose of this paper is: (1) to 
identify problems associated with the quality of hysterectomy care accessed by members of SEW& an Indian 
CBHI scheme; and (2) to discuss mechanisms that might be put in place by SEWA, and CBHI schemes more 
generally, to optimize quality of health care. Data on the structure and process of hysterectomy care were 
collected primarily through review of 63 insurance claims and semi-structured Interviews with 12 providers, 
Quality of hysterectomy care accessed by SEWAs members varies tremendously. from potentially clanger- 
Ous to excellent. Seemingly dangerous aspects of structure include: operating theatres without separate 
hand-washing facilities or proper lighting; and the absence of qualified nursing staff, Dangerous aspects of 
process include: performing hysterectomy on demand; removing both ovaries without consulting or notify- 
ing the patient; and failing to send the excised organs for histopathology, even when symptoms and signs 
are suggestive of disease. Women pay substantial amounts of money even for care of poor, and potentially 
dangerous, quality. I 
In order to improve the quality of hospital care accessed by its rnýmbers, a CBHI scheme can: (1) gather data 
on the costs and complications for each provider, and investigate cases where these are excessive; (2) use 
incentives to encourage providers to make efficient and equitable resource allocation decisions. (3) selem 
and contract with, providers who provide a high standard of care or who agree to certain conditions. and (4) 
inform and advise doctors and the insured about the costs and benefits of different interventions. In tho case 
Of SEWA, it is most feasible to identify a limited number of hospitals providing better-quality care and con- 
tract directly with them. 
Introduction 
Dvt! r the last 20 years there has been growing interest in health insurance for the informal sector in developing 
countries. Corninunity-based health insurance (CBHI) 
schemes (also referred to as micro-insurance and mutual health insurance) involve prepayment for some component 
Of health care and pooling of revenues such that there are 
cross-subsidies from low-risk to high-risk individuals. CBHI 
schemes can vary tremendously in terms of their design, 
Management and the nature of the 'communities' covered (see Bennett et al. 1998 for a review of 82 schemes). POlIcyrnakers generally see CBHI as a means of improving 
access to effective health care, and preventing indebtedness 
Ind Impoverishment as a result of trying to access such 
Care. 
A CBHI scheme also has the potential fd shape the quality' 
Of care accessed by its members. For example, Bennett et al., (1998, p. 38) found that 'more successful schemes' did take 
On a more strategic purchasing role, including 'selective con- 
U'acting with providers and use of essential drug lists, to heli 
ensure quality of care'. CBHI might prove helpful in 
addressing poor quality and inefficiency In India's health 
care systefn. Health care in India is largely privately finance(I 
(75% of all health expenditures are private) and priV3telV 
provided (80% of allopathic doctors and 57% of hospitals 
are in the private sector) with minimal government rrguý 
lation (Bhat 1999). This system pays providers more for 
doing more, whether or not there is any evidence more is 
beneficial to the patient. Because there is regulation of 
neither the quality nor the price of medical care, the sy%tern 
may pay more for poor quality, 
The purpose of this paper is twofold: first. based on a small 
preliminary study. to identify problems a&uxlated wuh th, 
quality of hysterectomy care accessed by members of an 
Indian CBHI scheme, the Self-Employed Women's Amwx-j 
ation's (SEWNs) Medical Insurance Fund Since i9, j-, 
SEWA has operated a voluntary Medical Insurance Fund f4c 
its members. Secondly, the study will discuss mechanisnu t hi 
might be put in place by SEWA, and communfrvýhased insw 
3nce schemes more generally. to optimize qualitY of healt 
-are. 
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Hysterectomy was chosen as a tracer of quality for two main 
reasons. First, hysterectomy is the single most common cause 
of hospitalization for which SEWA members submit claims. 2 Secondly, the technical quality of hysterectomy care is highly important given the potential benefits and risks of this pro- 
cedure. Benefits of hysterectomy may include prolongation of life, for example, when it used to rid the body of cancer of the 
cervix or uterus. Quality of life may be enhanced if hysterec- 
tOmy is used to cure irregular or painful menstruation, or to 
provide relief from a prolapsed uterus. However, the risks of 
this major surgery include intra- or post-operative death and 
non-fatal complications, such as urinary tract infection, inci- 
sional hernia, sepsis, intestinal obstruction, coronary artery 
disease, depression and other psychiatric problems (Sand- 
berg et al. 1985). 
The first section of the paper provides a brief description of 
SEWNs Medical Insurance Fund. The following section 
describes the methods and results of the study on quality of 
hysterectomy care. The final section discusses mechanisms 
that may be employed by SEWA and other CBHI schemes to 
increase the quality of health care services. 
SEWNS medical insurance fund 
SEWA is a union for women working outside the formal 
sector, with 68% of its 215 000 members residing In Gujarat. SEWNs Integrated Social Security Scheme was initiated in 
1992. This scheme provides life insurance, medical insurance 
and asset insurance (against the loss of house or working 
Capital in case of flood, fire or communal riots). In order to 
Join the Medical Insurance Fund, women must be between 18 
and 58 years of age. Those who pay the yearly Social Security Scheme membership fee of 72.5 rupees (30 rupees of which is 
earmarked for medical insurance) are covered to a maximum 
of 1200 rupees yearly in case of hospitalization. Women also have the option of becoming Lifetime Members of the Social Security Scheme by paying 700 rupees. Special benefits to 
which only the Lifetime Members are entitled include: 
maternity benefit of 300 rupees with the birth of each child; 
reimbursement for cataract surgery up to 1200 rupees; 
reimbursement for a hearing aid up to 1200 rupees; and 
reimbursement for dentures up to 600 rupees. Exempted 
from coverage are certain chronic diseases (for example. 
chronic tuberculosis, certain cancers, diabetes, hypertension, 
piles) and disease caused by addiction. 
The choice of provider is left entirely to the discretion of the 
SEWA member. They are eligible for reimbursement 
whether they use private for-profit, private non-profit (i. e. 
trust or charitable) or public facilities. At the time of dis- 
charge from hospital, the SEWA member is required to pay 
the full bill out-of-pocket. The insured must then submit to 
SEWA the following documents within a 3-month period: a 
doctor's certificate stating the reason for hospitalization and 
the dates of admission and discharge; doctors' prescriptions 
and bills for medicines purchased: and reports of laboratory 
tests done during the hospital stay. After submission of these 
documents, the member is usually visited by a SEWA 
employee who verifies the authenticity of the claim. All docu- 
mentation is reviewed by a consultant physician (to assess for 
fraudulent claims or cases of chronic disease. but no( the 
quality or appropriateness of the services provided). and a 
final decision on the claim is then made by an insurance panel 
Finally, the SEWA member is notified of the p. inel's dectsion 
and, when applicable. is paid by cheque, Of approx. 1mately 
1930 claims submitted in Gujarat between 1994 and 20(Xi, 
89% were approved for reimbursement. 
Tbroughout the ten districts of Gujarat where It operates, the 
Medical Insurance Fund had approximately 23 214 members 
(47% lifetime, 53% annual) in 1999-2000, Statewide. covrrý 
age by the Medical Insurance Fund was 16% (23 214 insured 
among 147 600 SEWA members), It is vM difficult to 
estimate the costs of administering the Medical Insurance 
Fund; many of the administrative functions are shared with 
the life and asset Insurance components as well as with other 
activities of SEWA. A recent study by the International 
Labour Organization found that basic administration costs 
accounted for 9.3-19.7% of SEWA: s Integrated Social 
Security Scheme expenses annually (Michaela Balke, 11-0. 
personal communication) . 
Quality of hysterectomy care accessed by SEWA 
members 
Study methodology 
This study was carried out in August 2000. It focused on prx)- 
viders who had performed hysterectomies on the 63 SEVVA 
members in Kheda District who had submitted claims from 
July 1994 to August 2000. QuaRty was assessed based on 
Donebedian's 'structure. process, outcome' approach 
(Donabedian 1980). Structurerefers to the availability of inputs 
or Infrastructure necessary to provide good quality care, The 
key aspects of structure examined were the availability of 
staff and equipment. Process refers to the procedures of 
delivering care, in particular the correctness of the diagnosis 
and choice and process of delivering a therapeutic regime 
Here we assessed the appropriateness of performing hys- 
terectomy (and oophorectomy). patterns of pre.. intra- and 
post-operative care, and the processes of informat ion sharing 
and decision-making, Outcome. which is the achievement of 
the expected improvement In health status. cotild not be 
assessed In this study. Data on the cost of hysterectomy care 
was also collected. 
Relevant Information was first obtained directly from the 
insurance claims, including: age of claimants. cost of hospit 41 
ization, type of provider (public. private non-profit of private 
for-profit) and providers' contact details In order to comparr 
monetary amounts for different years (for example, data on 
income and cost of treatment), values have been standardurtl 
to 1999/2000 Indian rupees. Gross Domestic Procluct (GDP1 
deflators for India (IMF 1999- 513) were used in thrw 
calculations. 
The number of hysterectomies performed by each proOder in 
the database was tallied. The authors. with the help of mm 
research assistants experienced in qualitatIve research and 
fluent in Gujarati (the local language), sought to Osit all 
providers who had operated on three or more SEWA 
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; adents. Three methods of data collection were used: (1) 
Y=]J-Structured interview; (2) a visit to operating theatre and 
*'Zrd. and (3) where available, a review of at least one in- 
; atlent medical record. The semi-structured interview was 
ýnlgnecll to collect information in the following domains: 
provider characteristics (regarding staff and operating facili- 
zes). pattern of care provided to hysterectomy patients 
during the pre-operative, operative and post-operative 
periods; the process of information sharing and decision- 
=aking: and fees charged. All interviews were conducted in 
the providers' facilities. Data collected during visits to the 
a2rds and operating theatres was limited to presence of. 
jaub room, dome light, operating table, Boyle's apparatus, 3 
autoclave and air conditioning. In-patient records were 
reviewed to validate the course of pre-operative, operative 
3nd post-operative care as described by the provider. 
A single focus group discussion was held arnong ten SEWA 
members in order to explore their perceptions of the hys- 
terectornY procedure and hospital care available in Kheda Diswct. 
Results 
General 
The average age of the 63 hysterectomy claimants was 35.32 
YeJT$ (median 35; age distribution shown in Figure 1). The 
average duration of hospitalization was 9.1 days (median 8 
(! 3YS). Four of the claims were for care at a public hospital, six 
CIjains were for care at three different private non-profit hos- 
Pitals. and the remaining 53 claims were for care at 27 differ- 
ent Private for-profit hospitals (Table 1) - 
Twelve of the 31 providers were interviewed (see Table 1), 
representing 39 of the total 63 SEWA members operated on 
(62%). No provider refused to be interviewed. Of the eight 
providers who had performed three or more of the surgeries, 
Wven were interviewed. 
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Figure 1. Age distribution of women who have submitted claims for hysterectomy (July 1994 to August ZM) 
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Of the 12 doctors interviewed, nine worked In private for. 
profit hospitals, two in private non-profit (inission) hospitals 
and one in the public hospital. Seven of the providem were 
diploma or degree holders in gynaccology, while the remain 
Ing four (all of them in private for-profit fzidlities) were 
general surgeons. 
Structure: staffand equipment 
The number of beds in each private for-profit hospital ranged 
from 10 to 60, whereas the number of beds in private non- 
profit hospitals and the public hospital ranged from 75 to 150 
The bed to staff ratio (including full-time phy%irians. nurse%. 
administrative, cleaning and other support staff) ranged from 
1.3 to 4.3 at private for-profit facHities. 09 to II at private 
non-profits. and 3.6 at the public hospital. Neither the private 
for-profit hospitals nor the public hospital employed qualified 
nurses (that is, nurses with any formal training) but used 
nurses' who had received on-the-job training Bo(h of the 
private non-profit facilities had approximately one qualified 
nurse for every four in-patient beds. 
The operating theatres at private non-profit hospitals and 
the government hospital all had at least one scrub rrx)m, 
dome light, Boyle's apparatus and air-conditioner, This 
equipment was also possessed by three of the private for. 
profit hospitals. Operating theatres in five of the priv3te for. 
profit hospitals were without scrub room. four without dome 
lights (simple fluorescent tube lights or floor lamps were 
used), four without Boyle's apparatuses. and two without 
air-conditioning. No single operating theatre. was larking in 
all four amenities. 
Process: hysterectomy (and oophorectonty) performed only 
when medically indicated? 
The general surgeons admitted that they would perform 
surgery in the absence of signs or symptoms of disexw- on 
request by the patient (as discussed below. It is coininon ror 
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Table 1. For each provider, the number of hysterectomy claimants, their average age and Income, duration of hospitalization. cost of hospitalization, and amount reimbursed 
Provider (aInterviewed) No. of Average age Duration Total cost (1999/2000 rupees) Reimbursed 
claimants (yrs) (days) Average Min Max (199912000 rupees) 
Public 
la 4 42 11 2 196 706 3932 1045 
Private non-profit 
2 3 35 8 5545 1276 
3a 2 37 8 6 188 1321 
41 1 38 5 1449 1321 
Overall, private non-profit 6 36 8 5077 1449 8135 1298 
Private for-profit 
5a 8 32 8 3 118 1286 
66 6 38 9 5914 1 294 
7a 4 39 8 7619 1 317 
8s 3 34 8 4097 1 312 
ga 3 33 10 5597 1 312 
l0a 3 31 11 3491 1 316 
11 2 35 11 5033 1 254 
12 2 44 10 2888 1 200 
13a 2 32 8 6427 1 266 
14 2 33 9 6274 1 355 
15, 2 34 7 6087 1 321 
16 1 25 8 5503 1 3ZI 
17 1 30 7 6746 1 200 
18 1 35 10 5658 1 212 
19 1 45 10 6 2Z9 1 510 
20 1 35 13 12 172 1 307 
21 1 40 2 1437 1 307 
22 1 35 11 8621 1 307 
23 1 37 7 6053 1 307 
24a 1 40 9 3877 1 212 
25 1 38 41 3852 1 321 
26 1 29 10 6752 1 307 
27 1 22 6 3411 1 307 
28 1 35 8 5331 1 212 
29 1 35 10 4 131 1 212 
30 1 45 10 8040 1 212 
31 1 28 6 4685 1 307 
Overall, private for-profit 53 35 9 5215 1437 12172 1292 
Overall 63 35 9 5010 706 12 172 1277 
women to request hysterectomy for non-medical reasons). 
The gynaecologists generally acknowledged that it was an 
unhealthy practice to remove the uterus unnecessarily; 
however, most performed the surgery 'on demand', as patients 
denied surgery (and instead offered medical treatment) 
would simply present to another hospital requesting the oper- 
ation. Only the gynaecologists in the two private non-profit 
hospitals reported denying surgeries to those who did not 
seem to have underlying disease. 
Three of the five general surgeons routinely removed both 
ovaries, while one removed a single ovary in every case ('the 
left ovary is left), and another removed ovaries only in 
women older than 35 years. The gynaecologists reported per- 
forming bilateral oophorectomy in 10-30% of all cases, and 
rarely before the age of 40 or 45 years. 
Process: pre-, intra- and post-operauve care 
Table 2 summarizes the information gathered on patterns 
of pre-, intra- and post-operative care from two of the 
hysterectomy providers. These were selected to Illustrate 
worst- and best-case practices. 
All providers claimed to perform history, physical and vaginal 
examination when the patient first presented. Ultrasound was 
available in five of the nine private for-profit hospitals as well 
as the two private non-profit hospitals Approximately half of 
providers reported occasionally performing cervicai smear, 
generally when cervical erosions were seen an vaginal 
examination. None of the doctors reported routinely per. 
forming diagnostic dilatation and curettage (some cited high 
cost as the reason, others the refusal of patients to undergo a 
trial of conservative, or medical. management for their 
complaint). 
All of the general surgeons stated that tiley would admit ami 
operate on the same day. The g)=ecologists generally 
reported admitting 24 or 48 hours prior to the procedum so 
as to conduct pre-operative tests and to prepare the patient 
for surgery. At all providers, blood tests and urine microscopy 
were routinely performed. Only when patients were willing to 
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Table 2. Worst-case (private general surgeon) and best-case (trust hospital gynaecologist) protocols 
Activity Worst-case protocol 
Pre-admission appointment None. Patient admitted to hospital 
when she first presented 
Diagnostic dilatation and Never. 
(D &Q 
Trial of medical therapy Never. 
Counselling None, as patients were usually 
'pre-decided'. 
On admission Blood and urine tests only 
Transfusion Very seldom, as 'very little blood lost 
during this procedure'. 
Type of surgery Abdominal hysterectomy. 
Duration 35 to 40 minutes. 
Oophorectomy Always as 'most were hypertrophied or 
cystic, and they would otherwise have 
problems in the future'. 
Appendectomy Always. 
Scrubbed staff assisting in One non-registered nurse. 
surgery 
Specimens sent for Never. 
histopathology 
Post-surgical lab tests None. 
Post-surgical medications IV antibiotics given at the time of 
operation, but outside of the OR. 
Pain killer. 
Days between surgery and Five. 
discharge 
Lnstructions on discharge Patients were advised to return to 
routine work irTunediately as they 
get enough rest here (in hospital)'. 
HRT Never, 'Post-menopausal symptoms 
(like hot flushed and loss of 
sex-drive) are a Western 
phenomenon'. 
Complications after Patients were assured that no 
discharge complication would arise. 
Follow-up Follow-up after 4 days. History and 
physical examination was 
performed. No further follow-up. 
Best-case protocol 
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Mways. History and physical examination including vaginal exam, 
Depending on circumstances. ultrasound and cervical smear 
may have been performed. 
If older than 30 years. or woman had completed child-bearing, 
and no gross abnormality, then D&C performed, 
If no pathology on exa rnination/investigat Ions. then medical 
therapy (hormones or antibiotics) was generally tried 
Counselling was provided to women who were requesting 
hysterectomy but had no pathology an investigation, 
Ultimately, many still opted for hysterectomy. 
Admitted 48 hours prior to surgery Blood. urine, kidney function, 
blood sugar, HIV. HBSAg, BTCT checked in all cases. In some 
cases X-ray, ECC and echocardlogram. 
One matched pint of blood was kept at the ready for each patient. 
If haernoglobin was less than 8, then the patient was transfused 
prior to surgery (20% of all cases) 
Usually abdominal hysterectomy. however vaginal hysterectomy 
for prolapsed uterus. 
1.5 hours. 
If age less than 40 and pathology of ovary. then one was removrd 
If age over 40 then bilateral oophorectomy. 
Never. 
One medical intern and one registered nurse 
Always. 
Haernoglobin and urinalysis. 
IV antibiotics for I to 2 days. followed by 5 to 7 days of oral 
antibiotic. Pain killer, ranitidine, antacid and iron also given, 
Generally seven (may be five or six) 
Labourers were instructed to rest for 3 months (sweeping can be 
done after I month) Upper Income women were Instructod 
to rest for 1.5 months, High protein diet was advised 
Abstinence from sexual activity for 15 months. 
Women of higher income groups generally accepted this, whereas 
middle and lower income groups declink*d because of I he cost 
5% post-oophorectomy opted for HIRT. 
Patients were advised how to detect wound infection anit were 
counselled on 'menopausal* symptoms (hot fluthes, dry skin, 
vaginal dryness. etc. ). 
Physical examination at I week (with vaginal examination), 
I month and 6 months. 
Pay extra were tests such as X-ray, HIV/HBSAg or ECG per- 
formed. Generally, providers would not operate unless 
haemoglobin was at least 8 or 8.5. However, chart review 
revealed surgeries being performed with haemoglobin as low 
as 6.4 [in this case, the general surgeon stated that haemo- 
globin was not so important given that 'little blood was lost 
during this (hysterectomy) procedure'] HIVtesting was per 
formed routinely only at the two private non. pmfit hospitaI3 
The number of hysterectomies performed Per 0110'rating 
doctor per year ranged from 35 to 180 (both of these were 
gynaecologists in private for-profit hospitals) The general 
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surgeons performed abdominal hysterectomies only. The 
gynaecologists performed abdominal hysterectomies, except 
in the case of prolapsed uterus, where vaginal hysterectomies 
were performed. The reported duration of surgery varied from 30 minutes to 2.5 hours. AD of the providers reported having at least one sterile (or 'scrubbed') assistant available 
during the surgery, in addition to a ('non-scrubbed') qoor 
assistant. 
None Of the doctors reported routinely sending the excised 
uterus (or ovaries) for histopathology, even when the patient 
presented with signs or symptoms suggestive of disease. The 
doctors stated that patients were not willing to pay the 150 to 
400 rupees charged for histopathology examination. 
Post-operatively, a minority of the doctors routinely gave oral 
iron, calcium and/or gastro-protective agents (to protect the 
stomach from the analgesic medications). A single follow-up 
appointment was generally scheduled for 4 to 10 days after 
discharge. 
Process information sbaring and decision Making 
All of the doctors commented that a certain percentage of 
Patients requested hysterectomy even In the absence of signs 
01 symptoms of gynaecologic disease. Similarly, they reported 
that women who had signs or symptoms of disease were often 
unwilling to undergo a trial of conservative (i. e. medical) 
management. It is not clear the extent to which doctors tried 
to discourage (or encourage) unnecessary hysterectomies, or 
warned patients about the potential complications. 
A complex variety of social, culturaL economic and medical factors seemed to underlie the willingness to undergo hys- 
terectomy. As reported in the focus group discussion, it was 
the tradition in some households that during menstruation, a 
woman was not permitted to enter temples, to cook for her family, and more rarely, to enter the house. For example, 
women stated: 
". 
-- we don't do household work for three days 
(while 
menstruating). " 
"No. No cooking. We get it (food for our family) prepared 
by someone else. " 
"We don't touch anywhere in the house during those days. 
Three days. " 
'We can't go to the temple for four days. We don't even 
touch anybody in the house. " 
Women felt that avoidance of such problems may in some 
cases justify hysterectomy, but agreed that the decision 
whether to go for hysterectomy was ultimately made by the 
doctor: 
"The doctor gives advice that, 'You will have to get it (the 
uterus) removed, then you won't have any problems 
again. ' So we have to do it. " 
The women acknowledged that doctors (particularly private 
for-profit) had an interest in performing unnecessary 
hysterectomies: 
"There are doctors who do it for money only .. Yes. It is there in many places. At many places they do the oper- 
ation for money. Nobody gives true advice. If we go to 
the government hospital, then we get good advice. But 
not In the private hospital. " 
None of the doctors consult the patient about oophorectomy 
pre-operatively, and often they do not Inform her post-oper- 
atively that the ovaries have been removed. The argument 
given bydoctors In favour of 'blanket oopherectomy'was that 
this helps the woman by preventing future ovarian disease. 
These same doctors downplayed the potentially harmful con- 
sequences of early removal of the ovaries. Hormone replace- 
ment therapy was never prescribed by the general surgeons, 
and only rarely by the gynaecologists. Reasons cited for not 
prescribing HRT include: high cost to the patient. limited 
patient compliance. and 'Indian women never have com- 
plaints related to this'. 
Only one of the five general surgeons routinely provided a 
discharge summary, compared with six of the seven gynae- 
cologists. The Instructions provided to the patient at the time 
of discharge varied considerably. Most. though not all, of the 
doctors advised the patient to refrain from heavy lifting (fnr 
anywhere between 2 weeks and 3 months). Very few of the 
doctors advised the patient around sexual intercourse Git 
least one doctor told patients to abstain for 3 months). 
cost 
Among the 63 surgeries for which claims were submitted to 
SEWA, the average official cost (based on receipts for bed 
fees, doctors' fees, medicines and lab fees) was 5010 rupees 
(median 5292 rupees), and average reimbursement 1277 
rupees (median 1307 rupees). Data suggest that the cost of 
hospitalization in public facHities was less than in private 
facilities, and that there was little difference between private 
for-profit and private non-profit (see Table 1) 
Providers reported that the cost of surgery and hospitaliza- 
tion (inclusive of medicines and tests) was generally tailored 
to the socioeconomic status of patlenu. For the poorest 
patients, the cost varied from 3210 rupees at the government 
hospital (this includes drugs purchased outside the hospital 
and bribes or 'unofficial gifts'of 500 rupees) to 6000 rupees at 
one private non-profit hospital. For the wealthiest patients 
the cost was as high as 15 000 rupees; this higher cost was 
accounted for primarily by extra laboratory tests and 'special 
room' charges (special rooms are typically private with air 
conditioning and attached bathroom). 
On average, the fees were highest among gynaecologists at 
private non-profit hospitals (5500 rupees), rollowed by gynae- 
cologists; at private for-profit hospitals (5100 rupees). and 
were lowest among the general surgeons at private for-profit 
hospitals (4300 rupees). 
Discussion: what, if anything, can be done? 
Weaknesses of the current study Include its small size, and the 
focus on structure and process indicators of quality as 
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Opposed to outcomes, for example, the frequency of medical 
COmPlications following hysterectomy While structure (staff 
Zad equipment) could be assessed fairly objectively, data on 
Process were collected through provider in-depth interviews, 
ar-d hence may be prone to bias. More objective, but time and 
resource intensive, measures of process might involve direct 
Observations (for example, of the hysterectomy surgery itself, 
Or pre-operative visits) or more thorough review of medical 
records (not available for most of the facilities studied). 
TMS study suggests that the quality of hysterectomy care 
among SEWAs members varies tremendously, from poten- tially dangerous to excellent. This variation is present in both 
structure and process indicators of quality. Seemingly danger- 
Ous aspects of structure include operating theatres without 
separate hand-washing facilities or proper overhead lighting, 
and the absence, in the majority of facilities, of qualified 
nursing staff. Dangerous aspects of process include: perform- 
. 
ing hysterectomy on demand without diagnostic work-up; 
rernoving both ovaries without consulting (pre-operatively) 
or notifying (post-operatively) the patient; and failing to send 
the excised uterus (and ovaries) for histopathology, even 
when symptoms and signs suggest an underlying disease. These dangerous practices seem (with the exception of 
oophorectomy) geared towards increasing the number of 
Procedures Performed and keeping costs to the provider down. in general, it can be concluded that the standard of care is higher among the gynaecologists than among general sur- 
geons. Given the small size of this study, it is impossible to 
Make conclusions regarding the relative quality of care pro- 
vided by public versus private facilities. The cost of a hys- 
terectomy was higher when provided by a gynaecologist 
verzus a general surgeon, suggesting that there may be, in this 
setting, an association between higher price and better 
quality. Many women are, however, paying substantial 
amounts of money for care of poor, and potentially danger- 
ous, quality. 
There are problems both on the patient and providers sides, for which it may be difficult to improve quality of hysterec- 
tOMY care in Kheda District. For patients, decisions around 
whether, when and where to have a hysterectomy, are diffi- 
Cult given the imperfect information available to consumers, In general, 'the consumer (of health care) is unlikely to have 
good information about her own health, what treatments are 
available, what the effectiveness of treatments is likely to be 
and what the cost of treatments will be' (Mooney 1992, p. 87). This lack of information is exacerbated in rural Gujarat, 
where the literacy rate of women (older than 6 years of age) is Only 49% (Government of Gujarat 1996) and where decision-making is complicated by the domestic, religious and 
economic implications of hysterectomy. Ideally, the con- 
stimer should be able to rely on her physician to make a well- Wormed decision that is in the consumer's best interest. However, Providers may not know what is the most efficient 
rate or quality at which hysterectomy surgeries should be per- formed. For example, a study by McPherson et al. (1982) found a more than two-fold variation in age-standardized hYsterectomy rates between hospital service areas in each of New England, Norway and England. Furthermore, It may be 
difficult for a doctor to make a decision in the patient's best 
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interest when there are financial incentives to do otherwise, 
For example, a doctor who is paid out-of-pocket by patients 
for each hysterectomy performed may be inclined to encour- 
age women to have hysterectomies even in the absence of 
indications. 
For more than 8 years, the SEWA Medical Insurance Fund 
has been running in Kheda District. Having acknowledged 
that it is difficult to establish what is the ideal rate and quality 
of hysterectomy care, why has SEWA failed to at least protect 
its members from the dangerous practices described above? 
Several factors seem to be responsible for this: 
(1) SEWA has not attempted to monitor the frequency or 
quality of care provided to its members. 
(2) SEWA does not actually act as an intermediary (financial 
or otherwise) between the purchaser and provider. and 
thus has had no influence on provider behaviour. 
(3) Levels of reimbursement under the SEWA scheme are 
low relative to the cost of hospitalization. and are not 
conditional on the hospitalization being necessary or or 
an acceptable level of quality. Thus. the scheme appears 
to have done little to direct consumer behaviour. 
What things might a CBHI scheme do to optimize the 
quality and efficiency of the care it finances? I'he com. 
munity-based insurer must be a strategic purchaser of health 
care (i. e. must serve as the financial intermediary), attempt. 
ing to influence the behaviour of both providers and con- 
sumers so as to maxirrdze quality and efficiency while at the 
same time keeping costs under control (Enthoven 1994. 
WHO 2000). 
First, the insurer must establish guidelines as to what consti- 
tutes efficient care, and gather data on outcomes and resource 
use for each provider (physician profiling). For example. 'a 
good Insurance-based information system would be able to 
compare referral rates by different doctors and Investigate 
those cases where excessive referrals seem to have been 
made' (Bennett et al. 1998. pý 96). Similarly, an information 
system should allow comparison of costs and outcomes for a 
certain intervention across different providers, Cases where 
costs or complications are excessive could then be investi- 
gated. For SEWA, as for other CBHI schemes, it would be 
relatively easy to collect and compare data on costs 
However, it would not be feasible for SEWA to collect 
provider-specific information on outcomes. given that myTiad 
different providers are used under the scheme, and the bene. 
ficlary population would be difficult to contact in follow-up as 
they live in villages over a very wide area. It might be feasible 
and useful for SEWA to monitor structure and process 
aspects of care by more thoroughly reviewing receipts that 
are being submitted, and perhaps by requiring doctors to 
submit a copy of the In-patient record. 
Secondly, 'insurers should take a very active role In establish- 
ing institutional mechanisms that encourage providers of 
health services to make efficient and equitable resource allo- 
cation decisions' (Kutzin and Barnum 1992, p. 68) Perhaps 
most important here Is determining the method by which 
doctors, and other health care providers. will be remunerated 
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for their services. Mooney (1992, p. 135) states, '. .. while we know we can influence what doctors do by changing the finan- 
cial and non-financial incentives they face, there is (1) too 
little recognition of this as a policy tool in health care; (2) too 
little information about just what the impact of different 
incentive and remuneration systems is on doctors' behaviour, 
and (3) too little thought given to trying to decide what 
societies want their doctors to do anyway! '. Different 
methods of payments present providers with different incen- 
tives and each of the methods has its strengths and weak- 
nesses. For example, a doctor who is paid by salary to provide 
hysterectomy care might try to limit the number of patients 
he sees, as well as the time spent with each patient. A doctor 
paid by fee for service has the incentive to perform as many 
surgeries as possible, and if there is no constraint in the pur- 
chaser's ability to pay, to use the best available 
, 
surgical tech- 
nology, drugs, accommodation, etc. Payment mechanisms can 
be combined (for example, a doctor can be paid by salary that 
is topped-up with a fee for each service provided), they can 
vary from one disease or intervention to another, and they 
may need periodically to be adjusted based on experience. 
SEWA, if it is to have any significant impact on quality of care, 
Will need to become an intermediary between patients and 
providers. However, if SEWA is to use any method of 
Payment other than fee-for-service (for example, capitation, 
fixed budget or case payment) then it will almost certainly have to restrict the number of health care providers (dis- 
cussed further below) in order to be administratively feasible. 
Thirdly, the insurer should contract with providers who will 
be responsible for caring for the insured. Limiting the number 
of providers may allow the insurer to take advantage of 
economies of scale and physician experience, and may facili- 
tate the gathering of data (say on rates and quality of pro- 
cedures). Perhaps the biggest problem with limiting the 
number of providers is that it may hinder geographic access 
among the insured, particularly those who live farthest from 
the facilities. At the extreme, the community-based insurer 
may provide the health care services itself (known as the 
dfrectpattern of insurance). Or, in countries like India, where 
there is a large and active private sector, the insurer might 
merge, or contract, with a single existing provider. Under the 
indirect system of insurance, the third-party insurer reim- 
burses a separate health care provider for its services. The 
insurer should contract selectively with providers who are 
observed (retrospectively) to provide a high standard of care 
or those who (prospectively) agree to certain conditions. 
Conditions might include following standard treatment pro- 
tocols, a rational referral process, and/or drug formularies. 
Even under such a scheme, ongoing monitoring of volume 
and quality of services would have to be conducted. Given 
that many hospitals already operate in Kheda District and 
Gujarat, it would not make sense for SEWA to establish its 
own system for delivering hospital care. However, SEWA 
could contract with a limited number of hospitals. Most fea- 
sibly, SEWA could identify providers of better-quality care 
through small-scale research like this study of hysterectomy 
care. Having limited the number of providers, SEWA could 
then monitor process and outcome indicators, and renew con- 
tracts periodically (annually or biennially) based on satis- 
factory performance. The process of identifying, contracting 
with, and monitoring a group of providers would require that 
SEWA build up (or hire on a temporary basis) individuals 
with expertise in medical outcomesand contracting 
Fourthly, the insurer can inform and advise both doctors and 
the insured about the costs and benefits of different inter- 
ventions. For example, SEWA can educate its own members 
around the indications for, and complications of. hystere-c- 
tomy. This would be a useful adjunct to some of the afore- 
mentioned purchasing strategies. Alone, however, It is 
probably unrealistic to expect this largely illiterate group of 
women to absorb and act on technical Information, Under 
the current SEWA scheme, the fact that patients anti pro- 
viders are dispersed geographically also makes education 
difficult. 
As an initial step towards monitoring and improving quality 
of care, SEWA recently established a monitoring and evalu. 
ation ceH, and there are plans to establish a research cell. 
Activities to date have focused on entering the insurance 
claims into a computer database. Activities of the research 
cell may include: more carefully reviewing incoming claims, 
receipts, and where available, in-patient records: more sys. 
tematically monitoring outcomes. including consumer satis. 
faction with hospital care and medical complications resulting 
from hospitalization; and identifying hospitals that provide 
high quality care (at least one per district) The research cell, 
which will consist of at least two full-time researchers (one of 
them most likely a medical doctor), will be partly funded by 
external donors. At present, It is not clear what the ; idminis- 
trative costs of this research cell will be, or whether its cost 
can ultimately be incorporated into members' premiums. The 
complexity and cost of monitoring quality of care and medical 
outcomes are likely to be high, given that subscribers to 
SEWWs Integrated Social Security Scheme are fairly widely 
scattered among ten districts. In other situations. where the 
CBHI scheme Is based on a smaller geographic area (for 
example, a village- or district-based scheme) more intensive 
interventions might be feasible, 
Conclusions 
A well-designed and managed community-based health 
insurance scheme should serve to improve the qualitv ()f 
health care available to people outside the formal sectt; _)r 
in 
developing countries. This study of hysterectomy care pro. 
vided to a group of insured women in rural Gujarat found 
that: (1) the quality of care can vary from excellent to danger. 
ous; (2) women spend a substantial amount of inonev on hvs 
terectomy care of poor quality and (3) for i variety of 
reasons, SEWA's Medical Insuýance Fund has hod minimal 
impact on quality of care. In order to improve the qualitv of 
care available to its members, SEWA must take on a strategic 
role in purchasing health care. Most feasibly, this would 
involve Identifying a limited number of hospitals providing 
better-quality care and contracting directly with them Fuiure 
research should: (1) help community -hasýd insurers io estall- 
lish the most cost-effective rate and means of delivering 
different interventions: and (2) determine the mechanisms 
(for example, different modes of provider reimbursement, 
drug formularies, practice guidelines, patient and provider 
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education) most cost-effective in ensuring that providers 
deliver care of acceptable quality and cost. 
Endnotes 
1 We use the term quality as defined by Donabedian (1991, p. 61): 'Quality shall mean a judgement about the goodness of both 
technical care and the management of the interpersonal exchanges between client and practitioner. ' 2A separate study by one of the co-authors (MKR) found that 
More than 15% of claims (63 of 417) submitted in Kheda District from July 1994 to August 2000 were for hysterectomies. 3 This is a machine that allows the continuous flow of gases 
while the patient is anaesthetized. Pressurized gases are supplied by 
cylinders or pipelines to the anaesthetic machine, which controls the flow of gases before passing them through a vaporizer and delivering 
the resulting mixture to the patient via the breathing circuit. 
References 
Bennett S, Creese A, Monasch R. 1998. Health insurance schemesior 
People outside formal sector employment Geneva: World 
Health Organization, Division of Analysis, Research and 
Assessment. 
Bhat R. 1999. Characteristics of private medical practice in India: a 
Provider perspective. Health Policy and Planning 14: 26-37. 
Donabedian A. 1980. The definitton ofquallty and approaches to its 
assessment. Ann Arbor, MI: Health Administration Press. 
Donabedian A. 1991. Reflection on the effectiveness of quality 
assurance. In: Palmer RH, Donabedian A, Povar GJ (eds). 
Striving for quality in health care. - an inquiry into policy and 
Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 59-128. 
Enthoven AC. 1994. On the ideal market structure for third-party 
Purchasing of health care. Social Science and Medicine 39: 
1413-24. 
Government 
of Gujarat. 1996. Health Review, Gujarat, 1995-96. 
Gandhinagar, Gujarat: Government of Gujarat. 
DAF- 1999. Internatfonal Financial Statistics Yearbook. Washington, 
DC: International Monetary Fund. 
403 
Kutzin J, Barnum H, 1992. Institutional features of health insurance, 
programs and their effects on developing country health 
systems. International Journal of Health Planning jnd. N4jnVr- 
ment 7: 51-72. 
McPherson K Wennberg JE. Hovind OB. Clifford P 1982. Small- 
area variations in the use of common surgical procedures: an 
international comparison of New England. England, and 
Norway. New England Journal ofMedidne 307: 1310-4. 
Mooney G. 1992. Key issues in health economics London Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. 
Sandberg SI, Barnes BA, Weinstein MC, Braun P 1985, Elective hys. 
terectomy: benefits. risks and costs. &kd1cal Care 23: 1067-85, 
WHO. 2000. The World Health Report 2000., Health sYsterns: improv. 
ingperformance. Geneva: World Health Organization 
Acknowledge ments 
The authors wish to thank members of the Self-Employed Women's 
Association for their support and Professor Anne Mills. Dr Arnie 
Cullimore and Ms Mirai Chattetjee for stimulating rrview com- 
ments. Thanks to Ms Swati Vyas and Ms Dimple Save for their 
research assistance. This research was supported by the Briti%h 
Department for International Development (DFID) 
Biographies 
M Kent Ranson, MD (McMaster University). MP14 (Harvard Uni. 
verstty), is a PhD candidate in the Health Policy Unit. London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. 
KR John, MBBS, MD (Community Medicine). Diploma in Public 
Health, is Professor and Health Economist in the Department of 
Community Health. CMC, Vellore, India. (Address: Department of 
Community Health, Christian Medical College. Vellore. Tamil 
Nadu, India. Email: kr-johnfhotynail. com) 
Correspondence M Kent Ranson, Health Policy Unit. London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. Keppel Street. London 
WC1E 7HT, UK. Email: k. ransonglslitm. ac uk 
417 
CORMSPONDENCE 
Women in hospital and 
academic medicine 
Sir-Your July 14 editorial' draws 
attention to the difficulties that 
women face in medicine. The system 
has to change to ensure that women 
stay in meoicine and can choose 
particular specialties without 
reservation. 
Senior colleagues could encourage 
women to stay. Training should be 
more flexible and job-share schemes 
should be introduced. ' Setting up 
childcare facilities such as nurseries, 
holiday play-schemes, and nannies, 
would provide an environment that 
would ensure peace of mind for 
women with young families. I 
wholeheartedly agree that women in 
hospital medicine should be more 
equally represented on academic 
boards, grant-awarding bodies, and 
appointment committees. 
A survey of preregistration house 
officers showed that women are not 
choosing careers in surgery largely 
because of the attitudes of and poor 
Support from their senior colleagues. 
Rayner and Firth-Cozens' concluded 
that the situation could be remedied 
by Personal coaching, team leader- 
ship, or the acquisition of new 
communication skills. 
'Me royal colleges need to take a 
more active role to ensure that female 
doctors stay in their chosen specialties 
and to provide support for flexible 
training. That these women do not 
side-step into non-career grade posts 
for the sake of their families, or after 
being dissuaded to stay in career posts 
by senior colleagues is important. As 
the system changes, women should be 
able to combine caring for a family 
with a thriving career. 
Beryl A De Souza 
107 Cheyne walk, Grange Park, London 
N21 1DD, UK 
Anon. Keeping women in hospit2l 
and academic medicine. Lancer. 2001; 
3SS: 83. 
De Souza BA- A step by step guide to 
flexible training. WIST 200 1; 20: 3. 
Rayner C, Firth-Cozens J. Women 
and surgery: gains and losses. Ann R 
Coll Surg Engi 200 1; 83 (suppl): 
228-30 
Sir-When I started medical school, 
the feeling of being on a mission 
prevailed. Caring for patients seemed 
the highest and most satisfying goal in 
my life. I was ambitious, I worked 
long hours, and being a woman did 
not feel a restriction at all. My career 
was well planned, and there was no 
doubt in my or anybody else's mind 
that I would achieve my goals. 
8 years later, the feeling of being on 
a mission persists. However, I made 
career choices before experiencing 
what that mission requires. I agree 
with you, that a career in medicine is 
very demanding, but caring for a 
family is just as exacting. The ultimate 
challenge is to succeed in combining a 
career and a family while remaining 
happy. However, I see too many 
women and men become frustrated 
while trying to achieve this 
combination and, unfortunately, I see 
few examples of real success. 
I have decided that I cannot achieve 
within the present medical system 
having a top medical career, 
successfully managing a family, and 
being happy. Many colleagues, both 
women and men, recognise the 
difficulty, however, they all hope they 
will be that one success. 
The reason why I chose a career 
outside clinical medicine is one of 
practicality. Factors in my decision 
were the inefficient 5 or 6 years of 
training that could be reduced to 3 or 
4 years; the absence of part-time 
positions, the scarcity of childcare 
facilities that provide care for more 
than 8 hours a day, and a partner 
working under the same conditions. 
Thus, the medical world loses another 
potential specialist at a time of a 
serious shortage. I might reconsider 
my choice if changes occur, 
but I 
doubt this will happen during my 
working life. I choose not to risk 
depriving mYselfj my partner, and 
children. I hope more women 
and men have the courage to make 
this choice, and place the firmest 
pressure on policy makers: that 
of unfillable job vacancies. 
Perh2ps 
then the system will change so that 
our children will not 
have to 
make such difficult choices 
in their 
lives. 
Hester J Loonen 
Emma Children's Hospital. AMC, 1105 AZ 
Amsterdam, Netherlands 
(e-mail: h. j. ioonen@amc: -uva. nl) 
i Anon. Keeping women in hospital and 
academic medicine. Lancer 200 1; IISS, 83. 
Sir-You correctly chastise us' for our 
preconceptions about the sex of 
surgeons. However, you make the 
error of perpetuating another 
outdated idea-the notion Eh2t leaving 
clinical medicine means leaving the 
profession of medicine. As one who 
has been responsible for the 
recruitment and training of medical 
students, I would be most unhappy 
if 
my sole role was to supply only one 
employer. I hoped to have a wider 
vision. 
Although most medical graduates 
practise within the UK National 
Health System, some use their 
qualifications in other, but not less 
important, ways. A medical graduate 
working in a preclinical department 
may well have trained your writer 
before she became a medical 
journalist. The pharmaceutical 
industry needs medical graduates to 
devise and oversee the introduction of 
new drugs. The medical profession 
needs medical journalists to help the 
rest of us to keep a sense of 
perspective. If these and other 
activities are to be recorded as a loss to 
medicine, then the world would be a 
poorer place. 
DJT Webster 
University Mvision of Surgery. University Of 
Wales College of Medicine. Heath Park. CardIff 
CF14 4XN, UK 
(@-mail: DearcespilliCardiff, ac. uk) 
Anon. Keeping women in hospital 
and academic medicine LAmm 2001. 
359t 83. 
Health Insurance In India 
Sir-Dinesh Sharma's Aug 4 news' 
leaves the reader feeling unnecessarily 
pessimistic about the prospects of 
health insurance that will include 
India's poor. He quotes from an 
expert "Private health insurance is 
most likely not going to include 
lower economic classes. mainly 
because of their inability to pay 
premiums. " 
Private for-profit insurers, only 
recently allowed in India under the 
Insurance Regulatory Development 
Authority Act (1999), might target 
better-off sections of society with 
expensive packages. However, even 
among the poor, there is the need and 
willingness to pay for insurance that 
will cover the costs of uncertain, 
frequently expensive medical treat. 
ments that might otherwise result in 
indebtedness. Out-of-pocket medical 
expenses account for more than four- 
fifths of total health-care spending in 
India. ' Members of lower socio- 
economic groups generally spend a 
higher proportion of their yearly 
income on health than do more 
advantaged groups., One admission to 
hospital can consume a sizeable share 
of a poor household's resources, 
commonly leading to financial cn%ts. 
'Mis fact could explain why non-profit 
health insurance schemes run by non- 
governmental organisations have been 
able to attract the economically 
disadvantaged. Some of these schemes 
date back more thin 50 years' and 
total coverage under the schemes in 
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CHAPTER 11 
Role of Central Governments in Furthering Social Goals through 
Microinsurance Units 
Kent Ranson and Sara Bennett 
The authors acknowledge, with thanks, the useful comments on an earlier draftfrom Anne Mills, Head, Health 
Economics and Financing Programme, London School ofHygiene and Tropical Medicine andfrom Christian 
Baeza, International Labour Organization 
It must be realized that communityfinancing is, at best, 
only a partial solution, that it may be more diffitcult and 
less effective than reallocation of current resources, 
and that governments have to encourage and 
facilitate-not impose-it. 
-WAYNE STINSON (1982, p. 42) 
Irl nlicroinsurance, people prepay some health care costs and, through revenue pooling, the 
healthy cross-subsidize care for the sick. 1 Government is responsible for the overall 
performance of the health system. It has a responsibility to steer microinsurance units 
(N4IUS) So that they contribute to national health policy goals. Nonetheless, government 
involvement in MIUs varies tremendously from one country to another. Take, as examples of 
the two extremes of government involvement, the Health Card scheme in Thailand and the 
Bwamanda hospital insurance scheme in the Democratic Republic of Congo, both widely 
viewed as successful (Appendix 1 1A). Under the Thai Health Card scheme (between 1983 
and 1994), financial management was conducted at the community level, but the design and 
implementation of the scheme (including setting of the premium and benefit package) were IP carefully laid out by the Ministry of Public Health (author's communication with Samrit 
Sritharnrongsawats, 2000). In contrast, "the overall environment in which the (Bwarnanda 
hospital insurance] initiative took place was characterized by the virtually total absence of the 
state, both in terms of resource allocation and in terms of planning., regulation, control, etc. " 
(Criel 1998, p. 25). Based on the diverse experience of existing MIUs, what can be concluded 
about the optimal nature and extent of government involvement? 
This chapter explores the mechanisms central governments can use tofacilitate the 
development, sustainability, and impact of community-financed health insurance schemes 2 (typically through ministries of health and social insurance schemes). Ybe first section 
establishes a theoretical framework for mechanisms between government and community- 
financed health insurance (NffU) schemes. The second section reviews other authors' views 
on facilitating mechanisms and reviews and analyzes existing mechanisms. The last section 
Suminarizes the findings and makes suggestions regarding options available to policymak-ers. 
Throughout the chapter, the focus will be on developing countries. 
Microinsurance is also referred to as community-financed health insurance and mutual health insurance. If a 
cOmmunitY-fmancing scheme includes prepayment but no pooling, it is not an insurance scheme, but personal 
Prepayment For example, schemes that cover only preventive care (annual check-ups, prenatal visits) cannot be 
considered insurance and will not be discussed in this Chapter. 2 Discussion in this paper will be limited to schemes that are community-financed (via premiums collected from 
the beneficiaries) and which are owned and/or managed by a nongovernmental organization, or a governmental 
agencY at the district level or below. We have excluded schemes that are owned and/or managed by cental or 
state governments (including some of the schemes reviewed by Bennett et al. 1998). 
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Conceptual Framework 
Clearly a first step in considering how central government can further social goals through 
microinsurance is to assess whether or not such schemes are effective and sustainable. There 
is a real shortage of solid empirical evidence on this question; those studies and reviews that 
have been undertaken suggest that many schemes are shortlived and fail even to meet the 
goals they set for themselves (Stinson 1982, Bennett et al. 1998). Despite this body of (less 
than positive) experience it would seem that several international agencies still view such 
schemes as a possible means to improve access to cost-effective health care, particularly 
among the poor. The discussion below is based upon the assumption that MrUs can, at a 
minimum, be a sustainable means to extend social protection in health, and therefore it is 
worthwhile for goverm-nents to consider how they can ensure that such schemes also serve 
broader social goals. Further research on the validity of this assumption-and under what 
conditions it holds, is critical to our understanding of the role that such schemes can play and 
consequently what government should (or should not do) to support them. 
gura, .7 is a simple conceptual map of the associations between: the government's health 
E- =i 
systems goals; obstacles to promoting these goals through MIUs; and the categories of 
government mechanisms that can be used to overcome these obstacles. MUs' two primary 
goals are: to respond to the beneficiaries' health/financial needs (e. g., improving access to 
care, preventing medical indebtedness, mobilizing health care resources, empowering 
consumers); and to be financially viable and sustainable (including the ability to absorb 3 financial shocks such as the costs of an infectious outbreak). The government's broader 
health systems goals, to which MIUs may be able to contribute, are: better health in the target 
population, fair financing, and responsiveness, for example, "reducing the damage to one's 
dignity and autonomy, and the fear and shame that sickness often brings with it" (WHO 
2000, Chapter 2). Goals such as affordability, equity, accessibility, sustainability, and quality 
are proximal (instrumental) goals that are not intrinsically valuable but "are relevant rather as 
explanations of good or bad outcomes" (WHO 2000, p. 24). Similarly, democracy and 
participation are likely to be important determinants of the responsiveness of health systems, 
but are generally not considered goals of the health care system. The goals of the N1IU and 
government may not coincide. For example, a government mandate for community-financed 
health insurance schemes to include the poorest individuals or households-in the interest of 
fairness of financing; -might conflict with the schemes' goal of financial viability. Thus, 
when evaluating government mechanisms, it will be important to consider both sets of goals. 
Another issue that requires fin-ther consideration, but lies somewhat outside of the scope of 
this chapter is whether or not investing in MIUs represents the most efficient means for 
government to achieve its social objectives. While MIUs may represent one path to achieve 
improved equity, accessibility, and so on, other paths (such as greater government financing 
of health care) may, overall, be preferable. Ideally, governments should consider the range of 
strategies available to achieve goals before opting to support or work with Nflus. 
The extent of a government's commitment toward its social objectives is also important in 
determining whether, and how, it should become involved in MIUs. The following typology 
of government types is not fully developed, but will allow us to explore potential negative 
'We have not included efficiency and equity as goals in themselves; efficiency underlies the scheme's ability to 
maintain financial viability, and equity may be defined differently and given different importance from one MILT 
to another. 
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impacts of government involvement in MIUs and the best ways to avoid such impacts. 
Governments run the gamut of intentions and executive competence and are invariably a 
combination of these three types: 
Type 1- Well-intentioned and well-executed government. Governments of this type offer 
the best prospects for developing an environment where MIUs can serve social goals. 
However, despite the best intentions, government involvement can still change the nature 
of the scheme. Increased government regulation and control may change a community- 
financed scheme from bottom-up (participatory) to a top-down organization, where 
decisions are made centrally and handed down to scheme managers. Transparency, voice 
(or community participation), community ownership, and innovation may suffer. While 
some may consider community participation and ownership to be goals in and of 
themselves, there is also some evidence to suggest that community involvement can 
enhance the overall functioning of MrUs. In India, for example, successes of the Mallur 
Milk Cooperative scheme (Dave Sen 1997) and the ACCORD scheme (Prasad 1998) were 
attributed in part to community organization, ownership, and participation. Lack of 
community participation, and isolation of the scheme from traditional and political leaders 
in the area, may have contributed to the downfall of the Barpali Village Scheme (Stinson 
1982). In Nkoranza, Ghana, the lack of community involvement in scheme management 
was thought to be one of several problems that contributed to problems within the scheme 
(Atim 1999). Even the best of governments may find it difficult "to remain neutral in its 
approach of the (sometimes tense) relationship between an insurer and a provider (who 
may be a government facility)" (Criel 2000, p. 44). 4 
Type 2- Well-intentioned butpoorly executed government. State action often has 
unintended consequences, which create additional problems. For example, a government 
may enlarge or replicate microinsurance schemes, paying little attention to the traditional 
networks of social support that it is replacing. Likewise, government facilitation may prove 
harmful, if unstable or unreliable (e. g., a scheme that comes to rely on government 
subsidies may be hard hit if they are withdrawn after a change in mandate or 
administration). This raises the critical question of government capacity to support such 
schemes. 
TvDe 3-Poorly intentioned government. Government intervention may prove hamiful in ,. r 
settings where government is corrupt or self-interested. Bureaucrats may prefer 
government-Provided health insurance (social insurance) where they have direct control 
over resources. Alternatively, the government may see MrUs as an easy source of income 
through extortion. 
If government is corrupt, NflUs should avoid government mechanisms. Under Type 2 
government, capacity building may be needed, its nature and extent depending on the 
situation. Under a Type 1 gove=ent, experience in other settings may provide 
government with lessons on ways it 'should, or should not, intervene. 
A variety of other factors may act as obstacles to MIUs' operating successfully and 
contributing toward social objectives (Figure 11 - 1). Contextual (environmental) problems 
relate to the economic, political, social, or cultural context in which the scheme operates. 
People in a poor or unstable economic setting, for example, may be unable or unwilling to 
4 The parentheses within the quote are those of the original author. 
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participate in an NffU. The classic problems facing all insurers include: adverse selection, 
moral hazard, covariant risks (risks affecting groups of households, communities, regions or 
nations), and unknown probability of illness (Barr 1998). Schemes may also fail to meet 
social objectives due to problems of design and management, for example, failing to increase 
premiums to keep pace with inflation and rising health care costs. Finally, MIUs may fail to 
contribute to social goals if they are not well integrated with the rest of the health care 
system. For example, a hospital-based insurance scheme may adequately cover the risks of a 
high-cost hospital admission, but i'n the absence of a network of preventive, primary, and 
referral services, it may function inefficiently or fail to attract the people who need it most. 
Certain government mechanisms may lessen or overcome obstacles to the success of NflUs 
and their promotion of social objectives. The mechanisms used by government to facilitate 
MIUs can be categorized as: stewardship, creation of an enabling environment, and transfer 
of resources, both financial and nonfinancial. Stewardship covers: developing a policy 
frarnework; implementing relevant legislation; mandating or obliging someone to perform 
certain activities; monitoring and regulating the quantity, quality and/or price of insurance CP W 
and health care; and generating and disseminating information on disease prevalence and 
treatment costs. The creation of an enabling environment is a broader concept that includes: 
ensuring economic and political stability; and preventing corruption in the legal, health care, 
and banking systems (these mechanisms are somewhat "soft" and generally fall outside the 
realm of the Ministry of Health). The transfer of resources to MIUs may occur directly, from 
government to insurer, or indirectly, from government to health care provider (usually 
government-owned) or the insured. Resources (financial or otherwise) may be transferred 
regularly or routinely or only when the scheme faces bankruptcy. Nonfinancial transfers 
include targeted technical or managerial support or provision of a re-insurance function, 
wherein groups of MIUs create a "solidarity" fund for protection against covariant risks. 
As indicated by the arrows in Figure 11-1, government stewardship mechanisms are usually 
directed toward controlling the price, quantity, and quality of insurance available on the 
market by regulating certain aspects of scheme design and management and ensuring that 
health insurers (and health care financing methods) are well integrated with the health care 
system. Government mechanisms that help provide an enabling environment for MIUs may 
Counter the contextual problems (e. g., lack of interest or social capital in the target group) that 
hinder these schemes. Transfer of resources is most likely to tackle the "classic problems" of 
insurers (e. g., the provision of re-insurance to counter covariant risk), or problems of scheme 
design and management (e. g., targeted technical assistance, or financial bailout, when a 
scheme faces bankruptcy due to low premiums or overly generous benefits). 
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Figurell-I Government Goals for NIIUs, Obstacles to Achievin- Them, and tl P-1 Corrective Mechanisms 
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Potential and Actual Mechanisms for Influencing AIIU Schemes 
Here we describe more specifically each type of mechanism used by government to facilitate 
MIUs (stewardship, creation of an enabling environment, and transfer of resources, both 
financial and nonfinancial). Then we discuss the goals (both NfrU and health system) to 
which they might contribute and describe, where possible, scenarios in which the mechanism 
has been used. LaE =e, and Appendix 1 IA give some examples of ways these 
mechanisms have been used in different places. 
Stewardship 
In its stewardship role, government develops a policy framework and regulations, monitors 
MIU activities, and shares information. 
Developing a policyframework A policy framework should define the role MlUs will play in 
the bigger picture of health care financing as well as the roles of other stakeholders in MIUs 
(government, external donors, health care providers, and beneficiary groups). A framework 
should make clear which populations are best covered by MIUs and which populations the 
government will cover. For example, the Government of Thailand has clearly identified who 
should be covered by the Thai Health Card scheme (nonpoor, largely farmers) and who falls 
under other schemes (the poor, elderly, children, and formal sector workers (Appendix II A). 
Government's policy must be well coordinated, and the state should avoid targeting safety net 
programs to specific types of individuals or households (e. g., children, the elderly) if doing 
so is likely to damage existing group schemes (World Bank 2001, p. 149) 
The policy framework may flifther indicate the types of health care intervcnrions best 
., 
debated. MIUs might best complement the government covered by a NffU, a topic still being 
system by covering high-cost, hospital-based care in countries where the government health 
system focuses on providing an "essential package" of primary health care interventions 
(World Bank 1993). In countries where government hospital services are of acceptable 
quality and accessibility, MIUs might best fill in the gaps by covering primary-level curative 
care (at health centers, community hospitals). 
In Guinea-Bissau, the Ministry of Public Health has outlined specific responsibilities for 
village leaders related to community-level prepayment schemes (Box II-1; Eklund and 
Stavern 1995, pp. 210-11). The primary goal of the prepayment schemes in Guinea-Bissau is 
to improve the availability of drugs and first aid in "widely scattered" rural villages. The 
policy framework allows a high degree of autonomy in scheme management (the village 
decides who will manage the scheme, who will do the work, and what the premýium will be) 
and holds the village accountable for such work as constructing a health post and replenishing 
initial drug stocks. 
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The responsibilities defined by the Ministry of Public Health for participants in community health insur2nce 
prepayment schemes include: 
" The village decides on the prepayment scheme fees (whether per capita, per adult or per household) 
and on the timing of payments. 
" Ile village must collect funds under the prepayment system to ensure that initial drug supplies are 
continually replenished. Drugs are sold to USBs (village health'posts) with substantial subsidies, set at 
the central level and equal across regions. 
" Some villages create special health subcommittees to oversee USB operations, but in the smaller 
villages, the political committee executes those responsibilities. 
" The village provides labor and most construction materials for building the health post. The Ministry 
of Public Health provides materials for windows, doors, and hinges. 
" The government supplies simple equipment, including -a metal cupboard for storing drugs, a bed, a 
stretcher, four chairs, one obstetrical stethoscope, one lantern, a kit of posters and other teaching aids, 
and an initial stock of drugs estimated to last for six months (for the population of each village). 
" The village selects one or more residents to be trained as village health workers and midwives. 
Source: Edlund and Stavem 1995, pp. 2 10-11. 
Regulating, MIUs. Government may regulate almost any function of MIUs, including: 
revenue collection (insurance price or premium), pooling, and purchasing of health care 
(contents of the benefit package, "quantity" of coverage for specific interventions, speed of 
reimbursement, nature of provider paymený quality of covered health care services). The 
World Health Organization, for example, argues that the pooling function of health 
insurers-which determines the extent of redistribution from healthy to ill, and wealthy to 
poor- can be maximized by regulations that enforce community rating (adjusting for the 
average risk of a group), portable employment-based pooling (insurance that a worker keeps 
when changing jobs), and equal minimum benefit packages (access to the same services in al I 
pools) (WHO 2000, p. 103). Standard economic theory also sheds fight on regulations that 
can be used to optimize the efficiency of MIUs. For example, Barr (1998, pp. 287-88) writes 
about goverriment interventions for dealing with adverse selection and moral hazard. 
A mandated activity is one that must be performed, and mandates are usually specified in law 
(Musgrove 1996, p. 6). 5 The Government of Bangladesh, for example, mandates that two 
large insurance schemes operating in the country (Gonosasthya, Kendra health care system 
and Grameen health program) provide "preventive services, family planning and health 
education, free for all, irrespective of family subscription to the health insurance scheme" 
(Desmet et al. 1999, p. 928). The impact of this mandate-an attempt to improve equity of 
the health care system and provide priority preventive care-is not clear. The Gonosasthya 
Kendra (GK) system insures roughly one-quarter of its target population, yet the uninsured 
account for a disproportionately small 1.5 percent of GK clinic attendees (Desmet et al. 
1999). 
All altemative approach to mandating, which may be used to deal with adverse selection and 
moral hazard, is to require membership in a microinsurance scheme. Making insurance 
compulsory prevents low risks from opting out and the externalities caused by noninsurance. 
This could be done by starting coverage from before birth to cope with the congenitally and C) 
chronically ill; preventing insurance companies from withholding coverage ftom high-risk 0 
5 Regulation is different insofar as it determines how an activity may be undertakm but a private producer can 
react to regulation by choosing not to undertake the activity at all (Musgrove 1996, pp. 6-7). 
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individuals; and regulating the conditions under which microinsurers could increase 
premiums. Key questions here are: how feasible is community-level mandating in developing 
countries, where many unknowns (e. g., income, population base) make social health 
insurance unfeasible; does mandating membership in a scheme automatically change the 
scheme's nature, so that it is viewed as a goverriment imposition instead of a community 
initiative? In the district of Boboye, Niger, the Ministry of Public Health implemented a 
scheme in which people were required to pay an "annual tax" that was pooled at the district 
level, managed by a health committee (nongovernment), and used primarily to finance 
pharmaceutical products (Diop et al. 1995). Though not discussed by the study's authors, 
community participation in this pilot scheme seems to have been minimal. 
Government regulation has occurred around many NffUs, but the literature provides only 
limited information on the reasons for such regulation and its impact. Until recently in India 
(January 2000), only state ag In th ., encies were permitted 
to sell insurance. e Former Soviet 
Republic of Georgia, only private health insurance companies may manage an insurance 
scheme. At least in the case of Georgia, this intervention would appear to be a case of poorly 
intentioned government (protecting the business of a few private insurers) instead of a 
government attempting to achieve social goals. Depending on the extent to which such 
restrictions are coupled with monitorifig and enforcement, they can seriously hinder MIUs. 
The monitoring and enforcement implicit in many regulations is resource- and skill-intensive 
and might not be feasible for many or most developing-country governments. This applies 
particularly to risk adjustment, ensuring a basic minimum benefit package, and community 
rating (WHR 2000). Evidence on the effectiveness of health sector regulation in developing 
countries is limited, but all that does exist points to major problems confronting government 
in implementing regulation (Mills et al. 2000, Chapter 7). Although regulating health 
insurance may be somewhat more straightforward than regulating health services, the 
difference is marginal, and -lack of government capacity to regulate is a major const-aint. 
S everal MIUs are reportedly subj ect to government accounting (Table II- 1), but it is not 
clear what actions would be taken toward the MIUs, based on financial information alone. 
This is presumably intended to catch any fiscal irregularities, and so protect the scheme's 
financial viability and its members. The UMASIDA scheme in Tanzania, like other health 
ganizations 
in the country, is registered with the Ministry of Home Affairs (van insurance org 
Girineken 1997). Reporting and accounting of UMASIDA funds is controlled by the 
Cooperatives Act, but how these funds are "controlled" is not clear (Bennett et al. 1998). it 
would probably be quite straightforward to figure out what kind of control is exerted--but 
again this 'control' is probably of a very generic nature and does not help to achieve social 
goals in any broad way-but just to prevent misuse of funds. In some cases, governments 
have prepared essential drag lists limiting insurance-covered drugs (e. g., the PHACOM 
scheme in Madagascar, the Tarlac Health Maintenance Program in the Phihppines, and the 41P Lalitpur Medical Insurance Scheme in Nepal; Bennett et al. 1998). This can encourage 
efficiency (and also safety), and as a consequence, financial viability. 
Afonitoring, and regulating health care. Governments can assist MIUs by indicating which 
providers (typically based on some quality-of-care measure) are eligible to enter into a 
contract with an insurer. This can help a MIU optimize the quality and efficiency of health 
care purchased. In selecting its providers, the Tarlac Health Maintenance Program in the 
Philippines uses the hospital accreditation requirements issued by the Philippine Medical 
Care Commission/Philippine Health Lasurance Corporation (Bennett et al. 1998). Failure of 
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the Government of India to regulate or accredit hospitals means that some health care, 
financed under the Self-Employed Women's Association's Medical Insurance Fund, has been 
of poor, if not dangerous quality (Ranson and John 2001). 
Information sharingý Government can provide information useful to insurers in setting 
premiums and benefit packages. This might include information on disease prevalence, 
relative quality of facilities, and relative or recommended cost of different interventions. 
Governments can also ensure that the parties responsible for the schemes have the 
opportunity to share experiences and discuss strategies. An "umbrella" body may serve as a 
useful partnership forum (Bennett et al. 1998). An example of such an umbrella body is the 
Uganda Community-Based Health Financirig. ýssociation (Musau 1999). 
Creating an Enabling, Environment 
The creation of an enabling environment, though clearly important, encompasses a broad 
range of activities. In fact virtually every government activity, from economic promotion to 
education, could be seen as contributing to an enabling environment. This vast range of 41ý 
activities cannot be covered here. We focus only upon activities directly linked to NffUs, 
social animation, legal recognition, and control of corruption. 
Social animation. Government may act as a catalyst for helping disparate parts of the 
community work together. In Madagascar, the government agency I'Unit6 d'Appui 
Communautaire sensitized the community to set up the community-financed insurer, 
Associations des Amis de la Sant6 (AAS) (Bennett et al. 1998). 
Legal recognition of businessev4ventures. To have legal status in many countries, schemes 
have to register as a club, cooperative, nongovernmental organization, or some other type of 
organization. Once registered, the scheme is formally bound by whatever regulations cover 
that type of organization. Normally, these regulations include some provision for presenting 
full accounts to members (and possibly to government). A legal framework should allow 
NEUs to establish contracts with health care providers and to seek assistance or compensation 
if a provider fails to fulfill the contract. The organization's status may also affect whether or 
not it pays taxes; if so, how much; and what happens to any profit (e. g., reinvested or 
distributed to members). These laws are part of government efforts to create an enabling 
environment for ail types of businesses. 
Control of corruption. Under-the-counter payments, if widespread, can present a significant 
barrier to the development of NffUs. For an MIU to operate successfully, providers must 
d6pend upon formal payments alone for their pay (otherwise beneficiaries pay double), 
However, providers are often reluctant to refuse informal payments, a large and tax-free 
addition to their income. Although it is generally thought that governments can play an 
important role in aiding the removal of informal payments, there are few concrete suggestions 
on ways to do so. 
Transfer ofResources 
Government can transfer resources to NffUs directly, indirectly, or through re-insurance. 
Direct transfer. ThegOvernment can make financial contributions directly to a MIU, either 
regularly or during financial crisis. In two cases, the ME scheme in Korea and the Thai 
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Health Card scheme, government makes a matching contribution equal to the amount 
collected in premiums (Appendix IJA). Governments can also provide technical and 
managerial assistance to individual schemes. Technical skills may be required to: assess 
ability and willingness to pay; analyze cost and expected income; calculate fees, premiums, 
and other charges; measure utilization; develop systems (financial, management, or health 
information) for recording routinely all income and expenditures and conducting monitoring 
and evaluation. In the Philippines, the Tarlac Health Maintenance Program was provided 
technical assistance to prepare its benefit package and calculate premiums. Uganda's 
Ministr3ý of Health provided the Kisiizi Hospital Scheme with technical assistance as well as 
computer equipment and peripherals. With financial support from the British Department for 
International Development (DFED), Uganda's Ministry of Health acted as financial guarantor 
to the Kisiizi Hospital Health Scheme up to a loss equivalent to Ush 18 million (US$13,300) 
during its first two years of operation. In 1997/98, the government contributed Ush. 10 
million to the scheme in "compensation" for excess claims arising from a malaria epidemic 
(Musau 1999, p. 21). All these transfers would be likely to facilitate scheme financial 
viability. Some might also facilitate efficiency. 
Indirect transfers, Indirect transfers through providers seem common, particularly where the 
providers are government-owned. Schemes where the government covers staff salaries at the 
health care provider include: the Cooperative Medical System in China, the Bokoro and 
Kongolo schemes in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the ASSABA, the Associations des 
Amis de la Sant6 (AAS) in Madagascar, and the Tororo Hospital Treatment Cards scheme in 
Uganda. Government can make financial contributions to households (or communities) and 
retoramend or require (for example, by providingg, vouchers) that they be put toward 
community-financed health insurance. Such transfers may be risk equalizing, if they 
compensate for socioeconomic differences (and hence differences in risks) between 
households and regions. 
"Tied transfers. " Tied transfers (direct and indirect) are subsidies that encourage use of 
preventive care, primary care, and essential drugs (e. g., bicycles provided specifically for use 
in immunizations). The Government of Guinea-Bissau subsidizes the cost of the 12 essential 
drugs used by the Abota schemes. Similarly, the Government of Nepal supplies the Lalitpur 
Medical Insurance Scheme with its annual stock of essential drugs. 
One important question concerns the best way for government to provide financial support- 
as direct subsidies to scheme, as indirect subsidies through providers, or as tied subsidies. 
Economists usually prefer untied to tied subsidies. Assuming a rational and fully informed 
insurer and insured population, and a competitive insurance market, insurers are theoretically 
more likely than government to use these funds efficiently, due to competitive market forces. 
However, it may be argued that subsidies would be more efficiently used if channeled 
through government providers or tied to certain goods or activities, considering the many 
imperfections of the health care market (e. g., information asymmetries, externalities, 
monopoly providers). This is related to the govemment's intentions (poorly versus well- 
intentioned) and effectiveness (poorly versus well-executed). Tied subsidies from a poorly 
intentioned or poorly executed government could hinder an Nffu's ability to achieve social 
goals. For example, government subsidies for immunizations and other preventive care may 
deter an MIU from fulfillina the goals set by scheme planners and members such as 
protection from the high costs of hospital care. Similarly, subsidies channeled indirectly 
through government providers may not promote efficiency, if the government facilities are 
undersupplied and understaffed, as they often are. At present, there are not sufficient data to 
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suggest that one type of subsidy is superior to others. Research may help to deternýine the 
impact of different types of subsidy on health insurance and health care consumption, and 
ultimately, on the distal health systems gO als, C, 
. 
Re-fnsurance. Government may set up a re-insurance scheme (or solidarity fund). 
Participating NffUs contribute to this pool, and the resources are used to finance unexpected 
expenditure (e. g., epidemics and other covariant risks). Government may establish ttýs fund 
but not contribute to the pooled resources or establish the fund and make some contribution 
to the pooled resources (a combination of re-insurance and subsidy). Among developing 
countries, a re-insurance fund has been established only in Thailand. The Thai govemment 
has established a pool at the central level to facilitate risk sharing among provincial and 
community funds. The individual schemes send 2.5 percent of premium revenues to this 
central fund, This fund appears to be used either when people need health care outside their 
province of residence or costly services (e. g., referral to a University hospital), Due to 
managerial problems rather than a lack of suitable cases, this fund has been underutilized 
(only 10 percent of the fund was used in 1995 and 1996), according to Pannarunothaj et a]. 
(2DOO). Given the very limited experience, it is not clear what financial resources, managerial 
capacities, or broader institutional features a government would have to possess to 
successfully re-insure. It seems that while re-insurance may not place quite the same 
extensive demands upon government capýLcity as social health insurance, it still requires 
actuarial, financial, and regulatory skills, which are frequently lacking in developing 
countries. As an alternative to re-insurance--one for which the infrastructure is already in 
place in most developing countries-governnient could heavily subsidize the cost of what is 
perceived as necessary but high-cost care. Government ownership of public facilities where 
such services are provided obviates the need for re-insurance. 
Table I1 -1 Government Mechanisms in Use 
hanz*, Y-m- Flace used and nature ofmechanism 
e -aid-, 7w sbir 
Developing policy 0 GGLUNEA BISSAU-Abota Health Insurance Schemes. Clear government 
framework &idelines exist gu gu 
0 RýDQNESIA-Dena Sehat Government provides guidelines and training II IN) 
T 
packages. P 
0 OOREA-National Health Insurance (NHT) Class II scheme for self. 
& 
KK 
employed and NW Class IV scheme for rural populations. Govemment Lu 
played an important role in setting and implementing policy. 
Mandating certain BAN ESH--Gonoshathya Kendra and Grarteen Health Program (Pilot 
activities Scheine)/Grameen Health Centres. Government directive to provide 
preventive services, faraily planning, and health education, free for &IL 
iTresDective of farailv subscrintion to health insurance. 
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Monitoring and regulating GUINEA BISSAU-Abota Health Insurance Schemes. Scheme is subject to 
insurance government accounting. 
MADAGASCAR-Les Pharmacies Communautaires (PHACOM). 
Government establishes drug list (formulary) from which "PHACOMs" can 
order for their health centers. 
" NEPAL-Lalitpur Medical Insurance Scheme. Scheme is organized within 
regulations set by government. Government prepares essential drug list. 
" PAPUA NEW GUINEA-Pomio Government Health Centre. Scheme is 
subject to government accounting-officer in charge reports to Provincial 
Health Authority every six months. Government decides on categories of 
patients exempted from copayment (not premium). 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA-Gaubin Health Centre. Financial reports, including 
both revenue and expenditure, are submitted at end of each quarter to 
provincial health office. 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA-Tinsley Medical Insurance Scheme. Financial 
reports on both revenue and expenditure are submitted at end of each quarter 
to provincial health office. 
" PHILIPPINBS-Federated Primary Health Care Mother's Club-Surigao 
City. It is registered with Securities and Exchange Commission and must 
maintain financial integrity. 
" TANZANIA-UMASIDA. Subject to government accounting procedures- 
Cooperatives Act controls fund reporting and accounting. Constitution of 
scheme has been approved by Ministry of Home Affairs. 
0 UGANDA-Kisfizi Hospital Health Scheme. Ministry of Health evaluates 
scheme regularly and makes recommendations. 
g h! 0 0 PHILIPPINES-Tarlac Health Maintenance Prograrn. Scheme follows 
e alth care hospital accredita: don requirements issued by Philippine Medical Care 
Commission/Philippine Health Insurance Corporation. Department of Health 
provides essential drug list in National Drug Formulary, a list of reimbursable 
drugs and medicines. 
TANZANIA-UMASIDA. Government plays implicit regulatory role by 
I registering private providers and assuring they deliver quality care. 
7-- 7 7, ftablinig'ýnjyiiqný 7ent 4- 
Ensuring economic and CHINA-Cooperative Medical System. Central government had key role in 
political stability establishing economic and social system conducive to formation of CMS. 
animation MADAGASCAR-Associations des Amis de la Santh (AAS). Government 
agency, l'Unit6 d'Appui Communautaire, sensitized and mobilized 
I 
communitv to set up AAS. 
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KOREA-National Health Insurance (NHI) Class II scheme for self- 
ey mplo ed and NHI Class IV scheme for rural populations. Government pays 
50 percent of premium 
P IPPINES-Tarlac Health Maintenance Program. Channeled foreign 
ast ce in preparation of management information system. 
UGANDA-Kisiizi Hospital Health Scheme. Ministry of Health signed 
memorandum of understanding with hospital, undertaking to underwrite any 
scheme losses in first two years, up to a maximum of Ush 18,000,000 
(US$ 13,300). Scheme would not be sustainable on membership fees alone 
(cost recovery 55 percent). Government has covered deficit 
" CBU4A-Cooperative Medical System. Central government paid staff salaries 
at higher level facilities. 
" CONGO, DEM. REP. OF-Bokoro. Government is responsible for "payment 
of some salaries. " 
" CONGO, DEM. REP. OF-Kongolo Health Centre. Government pays salary 
of one nurse. 
" GUATEMALA- ASSABA, Community Health Financing Scheme. Primary 
care facilities are organized and financed by government 
" INDIA-Voluntary Health Services, Medical AID Plan. Government finances 
75 percent of community health project and 25 percent of hospital and 
ancillary services. 
" INDONESIA-Dena Sehat. Government continues to fund health care at 
health centers. 
" MADAGASCAR-Associations des Amis de la Sant6 (AAS). Government 
cofinances health posts. 
" MALI-Molodo (owned by government health center). Two of three nurses' 
salaries are paid by governmen . 
" PAPUA NEW GUINEA-Pormo Government Health Centre. Salaries are 
paid by government. 
" PAPUA NEW GUINEA-Palmalmal Health Centre. Salaries are paid by 
government 
" PAPUA NEW GUINEA-Tinsley Medical lasurance Scheme. Government 
pays 80 percent of salaries and operating costs. 
" UGANDA-Tororo Hospital Treatment Cards. Government pays for all 
hospital operating costs, partially offset by user fees and premiums. 
" UGANDA-Pallisa Community Development Trust Government pays for 
essential drug supplies, training and supportive supervision, and bicycles for 
. ation. 
I 
*GA BISSAU-Abota Health Insurance Schemes. Government 
suTbL: es cost of 12 essential chugs and also provides some "simple 
equipment" Village health workers (primary caregivers under scheme) are 
nonpaid volunteers. They do receive training and supervision from 
government workers. 
DýDIA-Self-Employed Women's Association. For scheme's first two years, 
government (through semiautonomous Government Insurance Corpomtion) 
was responsible for both pooling and reimbursement, but not for revenue 
collection. Otherwise, no transfer of resources. 
0 KENYA---Chogoria Hospital Insurance Scheme. Ministry of Health has 
provided technical assistance through Kenya Health Care Financing Projectý 
funded by U. S. Agency foz International Development. 
NEpAL-Lalitpur Medical Insurance Scheme. Government supplies every 
health post with annual stock of essential drugs. 
PHILIPPIýMS-Tarlac Health Maintenance Program. Government provided 
technical assistance in preparation of prograrn's benefit package and premium 
calculation. 
UGANDA-Kisiizi Hospital Health Scheme. Ministry of Health provided 
technical assistance as well as computer equipment and peripherals. 
compiled to write Bennett, Creese, and Monasch. (1998). 
DRAFT-PLEASV90 NOT CITE 
'I , Fw-j&er"g Slcla! G, 4,1-hroughAfterotnsurance Units 
Surnmam Discussion. and Conclusions 
SadIY, despite the intense m' zerest in the role of NUU-s, empirical evidence is still lacking 
about the ext=t to which the. )- can help ser-ve broader social goals, and the circumstance 
under which thcý----rathcr than other tools at goverrirrient's disposal-are likely to be the 
most ef'Tect, ve rn =. s to pr--sue such social goals. Prior to implementing mechanisms to work 
M I'Us. eove=ents shoWd seriously consider whether this is the best strategy to further 
their ob. jectives. 
Having made this decisiori, govermnents can facilitate the development viability, and impact 
of %V-'s through a vanety of mechanisms that have been used in developing countries. The 
Oklective ,n irnplemenr-ng the mechanism and the actual impact of the mechanism are rarely 
r"ned in the hterature. 
Themosicommonrý e of medlarjsm is the indirect transfer of resources from government 
to the % .7 -C rVices at government ., JTU, usually in the form of free or reduced osthealthcarese facihties. Them are also m2ny reports of scheme regulat: ion by government, but the precise 
Matwre of the regul3tion is often not nident. Seldom used mechanisms include re-insurance, 
legislallon thai confers official status on the schemes, mandates that would require schemes 
10 perform ccr=n acti%ities or enroll certain populations, and mechanisms to share health- 
related aformation w-, th schemes (e. g., on disea. se prevalence, cost of care). 
With some coafidence we can conclud-- that: 
Broad pohcy sta==ts by governrnent are helpful, particularly in creating an 
eriv-=nment conducive to building confidence in NffUs (otherwise people may worry that 
schemes will be shut down) 
Regulabon of MR"s should be embarked upon only with caution in developing countries. 
G-, %-cn capac; ty constraints and the fact that regulation is so often perverted to serve 
pn*., a: z int=sts. it should be used with a very light touch. Tighter government control 
0% er schemes may stifle innovation and limit their variety, another reason for not 
cricouraging too much regulation. Any regulation used should be simple and easy to 
understand- 
eniment, Mandat;, ng sche:. ne membership, for exanxple at the level of local or village gov 
is an interesting idea, but we have limited evidence on how it works and how feasible it is 
to imp] em, =t in the contexts where %ffUs can make the biggest contribution. 
Environment :s important-but we have little understanding of the impact of government 
rle=rcs on env: ronment (how frequently does government succeed at uniting disparate 
groups') Nor do fully uziderstand the effects of the environment upon the scheme (e. g., 
how urnportant is n-um among members, or between members and the insurer or provider, 
tO the success of a scheme? ). 
Techmcal assistmict of adequate quality is desirable and not very controversial. 
Financi a] sur ", orl is critical but it is not clear how this should be delivered. Is it best to 
Provide fmanciaj supporl on a regular and sustained basis, or only when schemes are 
fu=cially straizied (for example, due to poor investment strategy, a disproportionately 
old or sick- eny-olled population. prernium set to low), or only when scheme are 
r-nancialh, strained due to covariant nsks) If governments provide support in the first two 
Scenanos. they are at risk of fortering inefBiciently managed schemes. However, this type 
Of support may he mquLred if goverriments do wish to encourage coverage of populations 
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T-lizi are poo-er znd ai ý-* -: sk- of illness. '-NffUs may require re-insurance against 
-sks. bul , he ý, -, -. ---on is : 
he whether. to what extent, and how re-msurance 
Sýo. U*d be cour'ýCý_' of 5. -=c, al technical suppon. 
InIeTnatior-il donors czri do much to fkihtate beneficial mechanisms between government 
and microinsurers. 
" They can recio=nend that poorly intentioned. governments (Type 3) stay away from 
MIL's. 
" pje., can ýelp bu;: d capacity =ong well-intentioned but poorly executed 
gover=nents (Type 2). 
Ainon g well -int=6oned. wen -executed governments (Type 1), they can recommend 
mechanisms d. scussed above. encourage research on the relative impact of 
mec, I,, a. n:.; Tns. and' help dsser-.; Inate the lessons learned. 
Furtze resc=11i should examine the association between specific mechanisms and their 
'0 Impact on \M' goals (e. g.. financial %-abiliry consumer satisfaction) and health-system g als 
(equitv, effic,, encv, =versal covemee). 
The optimal pIckaCe of mechanisj_-S vd1i vary from one country to another, and within one 
countrv zs it mo, *es throu eb e-ifferent stages of development, particularly as health insurance 
coverage Increases For example, in a developing country výith a small formal sector (5 to 10 
perc=j of the populanon). government might best Emit its acti-, ities to establishin 1ý a 
recckndve econOTr,, c and policy emiro=ent, perhaps including broad policy statements 
relevant to d: fferent actors in the health care systern. As the formal sector grows, and the 
be3J'-h care and health financing system grow more complex (encompassing some form of 
social msurance aswell as for-prOfit and NffUs), government might implement targeted 
financial and nonýinancial schemes to facilitateMIU development and foster efficiency and 
equj: ý'. Once. MTUs arewell established, gover=ent might implement specific regulations to 
Stardzrdlzr the pnce, volume. and quably of insurance available in the country, with 
Un: versal soc2al securi-, y coverqe the goal. (See Appendix I IA for a description of evolving 
90vernment rntchanisms around the Thai Health Card scheme). 
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APPENDIX11A 
Five Case Studies 
LN'DIA-SELF-ENPLOVED NVONEEVS ASSOCUTION 
References- Rýgnsoil (2001). Cha=c:? ec and'Vy3S (1997). 
Location: Adhmtdabad. G%ýIarat. Lndia 
Members- The Mee4cal L-surance F=d c4overs some 32,000 members in 10 districts. To join the 
Fi-nd. one must 1v fie, =Je. bcmr= the ages of 28 and 58, and a member of the Self-Employed 
Womer's Assoc; atiori (SEWA). an organ-nnon of poor, self-employed women. 
Scheme description: SENVA 's Integrated Social Security Scheme was initiated in 1992. It provides 
h fe, me-di Cal, Irld assel instrwCe (against the loss of house or working capital in case of flood, fire, or 
commLmi, 'noto The Medic. 21 IrLv=nc-e Fund is o%Nmed and managed by SEWA, a nongovernmental 
Organization (NGO I Women ioming the fimd either pay a yearly premium or a fixed deposit. For 
(ou-pinent caze is not Coxýred), the insured seeks care from the public or private 
Pre-, drT of., -xr choice and pays out-of-pocket for the hospitalization at the time of discharge. She 
Tnust th= sVnmii doctors' certificites and rece: pts to SEWA- If the claim is approved, the insured 
rex-e, ves re-Trburserner. l to it maxirn= of 1,200 rupees. Certain chronic ("Preexisting") diseases are 
exc'uied from coveragr. Women u-bojom by p3ying the fixed deposit (instead of the annual 
PrM-U-J) J. -t Cnt: t1td to Certt=l S, "Cc: 31beneffits(e. g., reimbursement for cataract surgery, hearing 
aid;, and dennýO 
Gavtrnment mechanisms: ! n: riaMv techrj=1 s-apporl, now nothingcý During the first two years of 
Vle scherie ý 1002-9-4), SEWA collected pre=iums and passed them on to the United India Insurance 
corri- revi win pam. (IMC i. a s=, 3utonornous govc= en agency. The U11C was responsible 
for ea 
cla, rris, deci-1-rg the a: -nouni ofrcnnburscrnentý and making the reimbursement. A number of 
; rOb: M.. C Were TCS-, $OnSJ', 1Je A'Or the e-scon-unuation of this partnersInp., women often could not produce 
'he document3tion rr-qu., re, 4 Collecting the documentation involved high travel and photocopying 
c, os*-, -. c ! &=s v6-m often 7. ocessed 113te; and the LMC did not cover certain types of 
hospitalization 
1e9. occupan on&: il Inesses and &NmeCologicaJ dseases). Today, government plays a minimal role: no 
! 'egu'ation ofhea1uh cam cvr (norprofit) health inmxrance providers and no financial or technical 
Zransfc-s 
t-cA--, DA-kisnzi nosrrr. ALnr. A. LTu sociETY 
Reference: NIUSIU (1999). 
Location: P dsnco. of s*uuhu-esu--n Ugand3ý 
Members: 6,5,0 vidividwIs (in 1.400 households in 32 Engozi (btzial and ambulance) societies). 
The twgri rxpulation Is the 100,000 people In-mg m the catchment arm of this I 80-bed, Church of 
, 
-, g*, -nd, rns. ýýIon hosritil 
Scheine description: 7he Fls-, In Hospital Health Society (IUMS) was launched by the minister of 
be4M 'n Augu. q 1 096 ne scheme is rnannagej by the hospital (two MI-time staff in the Community- 
13&sr-d lfca! Vý C= Dcpx=cnl) wi: h inN-- trorn'chairmen of Engozi societies. Premiums are 
cr'lletcIrd evm- thme morths by local E--goz: swnes. Premiums vary according to family size. 
RMCýi*s ncý ude d,.. -, coLm-, s on outp3nen, and inpatient care at Kisii2: i Hospital and outreach clinics 
a ien goe yhd check J: srases and delwery -f the ptts for regular] sc edule -ups). 
ýOM'Irrs pavor'N' %he COPSýncni fee or a hospital adrussion; the scheme pays the hospital directly 
. Or lhe res, o! 'the. r 12- .n ". ent. 
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Government mechanisms: Stewardship, financial and nonfinancial transfers. The scheme is 
recognized and supported by the Ministry of Health and actively supervised through its Planning 
Department. How the Commissioner of Insurance views the schemes in Uganda is not yet clear. The 
Uganda Community-Based Health Financing Association is clarifying this and other legal issues on behalf of all the member schemes. 
At the inception of the scheme, the Ministry of Health, through funding from the British Department 
for International Development (DFID), agreed to underwrite losses during the first two years up to a 
maximum of Ush 18,000,00 (US$ 13,300). The MOH also implicitly accepted responsibility for losses 
arising from epidemics and reimbursed the scheme for a loss of Ush 8.5 million from a malaria 
epidemic in 1998. The MOH also provided computer equipment and peripherals, and under the DFID 
project, technical assistance. 
RWANDA-PILOT SCHEMES IN TEEPEE DISTRICTS, 
Reference: Schneider et al. (2000). 
Location: Three of Rwanda's 40 health districts (Kabutare, Byumba, and Kabgayi). 
Members: 88,000 members in first year of operation. The target population is the 1.1 million people 
living in the three districts. 
Scheme description: Initiated in 1999, the schemes are managed within communities, usually in 
collaboration with health care providers. By paying an annual premium of FRw 2,500 per family, 
members are entitled, after a one-month waiting period, to a basic (government or church-ovmed) 
health center package, covering all services and drags provided at their preferred health center; 
ambulance ref=al to the (government or church-owned) district hospital; and a limited package at the 
district hospital (C-section, overnight stay, physician consultation). Members pay a copayment of 
FRw 100 per episode of care at the health center. Prepayment schemes reimburse health centers by 
capitation payment and the hospital by a per episode payment. 
Government mechanisms: Stewardship, financial, and nonfinancial transfers. Rwanda's National 
Health Policy of 1995 laid the groundwork for developing and implementing community-based health 
financing schemes. The MOH launched the prepayment schemes and conducted an awareness 
campaign (newspaper, radio, TV) in the three districts. A steering committee of government, donor, 
church, and community representatives from the central and regional levels plays the role of the 
strategic decision maker, overseeing the development and implementation process. At the district 
level, community representatives, meeting in workshops, discussed the health care services that they 
thought should be covered, and sent their firidings to the steering committee. Based on these findings, 
the steering committee wrote the by-laws, the schemes' legal basis, and the contract between 
prepayment schemes and providers. 
Funded by the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the schemes receive extensive 
technical support and monitoring through the MOH, but no government money. Health facilities 
receive about 10 percent of their total revenue from the government in the form of salaries paid to 
government employees at the health center. 
THAILAND-TILAJ 11EALTH CARD SCHEME 
References: Pannarunothai et al. (2000); author's communication with Samrit Srithamrongsa%its. 
Location: Thailand, countrywide. 
Note: The scheme was "community-based" between 1983 and 1994. Now it is "owned and managed" 
by the Government of Thailand 
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11-18 Role of Central Governments in Furthering Social Goals Through Microinsurance Units 
Members: 1.24 million members (25 percent of the target population). The target population is 
farmers and workers in the informal sector. 
Scheme description: Established 1983 as a pilot study, the scheme, designed by the Govemment of 
Thailand, was expanded to the whole country in 1987. From 1983 to 1994, the fund was managed at 
the community level; now it is managed at the provincial level. The scheme covers comprehensive 
basic health service packages, excluding some dental and cosmetic health services as well as services 
in the private wards. Cardholders have to go to designated public facilities for care. 
Government mechanisms: A pre-health card entitles the bearer to health care. Thailand had 
previously had a good deal of experience with village drug funds, nutrition funds, sanitation funds, 
and mother-child health funds. 
Phase 1 (1983-87). Initially, the premiums, collected by health volunteers, were retained at the 
community level. The unit of membership (individual versus family), cost of the card, and benefits 
covered varied considerably from province to province and within provinces. The governinent did not 
provide direct subsidies to the scheme. However, because all health care purchased under the scheme 
was public, indirect transfers were likely through the , government providers. 
The Ministry of Public 
Health (MOPH) was involved in monitoring and evaluation, with support from German Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ), perhaps more so in project districts. 
Phase 2 (1987-94). The health card scheme was incorporated into the structure of the Sixth National 
Health Development Plan in 1987. In 199 1, a Health Insurance Office was established at the MOP11 
to execute the National Health Card Programme. A formal information system was introduced in 
project provinces. Schemes were managed at the provincial level, but provinces also "agreed" on card 
price, beneficiaries, benefit packages, referral requirements, and fund management and allocation. 
Phase 3 (1994 topresent). Now managed at the provincial level, the scheme receives a 50 percent 
("matching") government subsidy. The original scheme was strictly regulated, with minimal 
community participation, but no direct transfer of financial re , 
sources. Now, the government closely 
coordinates and monitors the scheme. Nonpoor, largely rural people are covered by the health card 
scheme. The poor, the elderly, children, and formal sector workers are covered separately. 
Premiums and benefit packages are standardized. To facilitate portability of card holders and risk- 4: 1 
sharing among provincial funds, risks are pooled at the central level, and 2.5 percent of total 
premiums goes to the central fund (started in 1995). 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO-BWAIVLANDA HOSPITAL INSURANCE 
SCHEME 
Reference: Criel (1998). 
Location: Northwest of the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Members: Roughly 60 percent of the population is covered. The target population is the 159,000 
(1994) people living in the district. 
Scheme description: The scheme was launched in 1986 by "district health authorities. " Members 
pay a community-rated premium once a year. The household is the subscription unit. Risk coverage is 
limited to hospital care, with a 20 percent copayment rate. 
Government mechanisms: Minimal (Criel 1998, p. 24). Under the Zairian decentralization policy, 
health districts were to be largely self-financed. The overall environment in which the initiative took 
place was characterized by the virtually total absence of the state, both in terms of resource allocation 
and in terms of planning, regulation, and control. This de facto vacuum left district teams with almost 
complete autonomy to manage (or not manage) the health systems for which they were responsible. 
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